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BRIEF SUMMARY 
Societies in transition to modernity hav their own 
unique though similar, political problems . This is a 
case study of the Ba ' th party though, to some extent, 
it ponders the problems of other political parties and 
governmental systems in the developing areas of the world. 
The reasons for the Ba ' th political disintegration on 
23 February 1966 in Syria, form the focal point of this 
study and are treated under four headings, Ideology, 
Politics, Sociology and Organisation. 
One of the most important things to be isolated in 
this study is the fac~ of a ' mentality gap ' existing 
betwee n the ide a l and reality. The Ba ' th, for example , 
wa s the victim of societal change. On the one hand it 
a dvocated Arab u nity on the basis of Freedom and 
So cialism - a nation secular in orientation. Yet the 
environment in which the Ba ' th flourished was torn between 
the ideal of a secular nation state (i . e . nationalism) 
which had p roven its worth in Euro p e and Americ a and the 
reality of f amil i al ,communal and regional ties. Within 
the Ba rth this dichotomy developed in various forms which 
are conside r e d und er the four headings. The climax on 
23 February 1966 - the party rs · day of do om, is related 
to this mental dichotomy . I have come down firmly on 
the side that the Ba r th was sacrificed on the rock of 
the ideal of a secular Arab nation because of the presence 
of histo ric communal, regional and socio-economic dichotomies in 
Arab society and among the membership recruited to the 
party . 
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PREFACE 
From the moment when th Arabs lost th ir empir 
in the eighth century until the tw nti th c ntury m mori s 
of Arab ' unity ' have stirred the imagination of princ s, 
$~(. u~ """.-1., 
theologians, and in the twentieth century Arab 
national reformers . The Arab Socialist Ba ' th Party 
(hereafter Ba ' th party) was a product of the secula r Arab 
nationalist tradition of the late 1930s . The objective 
of Ba ' th ideology was to recre ate (lit . Ba ' th) the 
' glorious ' Arab nation of popular imagination in order 
to give the people a sense of dignity and purpose in the 
community of nation states. 
This study treats the Ba ' th as it evolved from a small 
student study circle in the Tajhiz secondary school, 
Damascus in 1940 - 42, until the moment when as the government 
of Syria it disint egrated in a welter of blood and anger 
on 23 February 1966. For convenience, although it has 
its limitations, this study is divided into four Parts -
Ideology, Politics, Sociology and Organisation. Part 1 
discusses the origin and development of Ba ' th ideology, 
showing the forces conditioning its evolution from a vague 
ideal in the late 1930s to the point where the party 
emerged as one of the strongest political forces in the 
Arab world in the mid - 1950s . Attention is also given in 
some detail to the practical implementation of ideology 
when the Ba ' th constituted the governments of Iraq, 
8 February-18 ovember 1963 and Syria, 8 March 1963-
23 February 1966 . The question is posed whether it is 
possible to isolate ideological dichotomies which might 
ac count for the party ' s disintegration on 23 February 1966? 
Part 2 deals primarily with political behaviour and to 
a large extent subsumes the arguments evinced in Part 1 . 
The objective of this Part is to isolate the forces 
conditioning party politic al behaviour. A major part of 
this section is given over to a discussion of Ba ' th- asir 
relations and their aftermath following the breakdown of 
the United Arab Republic on 28 September 1961. This Part 
also focusses attention on the 2J February 1966, and asks 
whether it is possibl to understand the event in terms 
of conflicting political, as well as ideological, 
f act ionalism? 
x 
Part 3 attempts to isolate sociological charact r-
istics about the Ba 'th ' s leading politi al cadr s, th n 
proceeds to ask wheth e r it is possibl to mak 
' sp e culative ' corr lations between so iological variabl s 
and aspects of political behaviour? Once more th 
objective is to focus attention on the 23 February 1966, 
in order to s ee if it can be explained in terms of 
sociological dichotomies impinging upon and motivating 
political a nd ideological behaviour. 
Part 4 subsumes the arguments adduced in the previous 
Part s and Ev a luations, and d ea l s primarily with 
organisat ional matters. Like previous sections, att ntion 
is focussed on 2 3 February 1966 as the climax of party 
disintegration . F ollowing a d etaile d and semi-legalistic 
treatment of p arty organisation, the question is posed 
whether i n view of the devisive agents previous ly isolated 
in prev i ous Parts, the party could have effectively 
obviated the problem of power sharing, between its senior 
p o litical and military commands. 
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PART I 
I d e olo g y : Orig in and Development 
i : Michel Aflaq : Basic Ideologi al Postulat s 
ationalism in Literary Perspectiv : 
Th writings of Mi h 1 Aflaq rang ov r quart r of 
a c ntury and mor and form th main corpus of Ba'thist 
literatur on the subj ct of ideology. Ind d, to g t 
to the heart of why the Ba ' th party 's a political 
mov m nt and what it b l' ves, it is nec ssary to turn 
one ' s att ntion to th literary outpourings of Michel 
Aflaq the co-founder and main ideological xponent of 
th Ba ' tho 
In 1940 Aflaq wrote: 
Arab nationalism is no-t a theory, it is a 
reservoir of theories. It is not the outcom 
of thought, but the sourc of it. It is not 
the slave of art, but its spirit and spring. 
It is liberty if it is allowed to flow in its 
natural cours 
achieved . l 
and if its pot ntialities are 
In taking this attitude towards Arab nationalism, Aflaq 
was identifying himself with a literary tradition which 
had appeared in the Arab world in the late 1930s. This 
school of thought largely repudiated previous attempts 
to rationalise and theorise the content of nationalism. 
Constantine Zurayq was perhaps the for most exponent of 
this tradition in the later 1930s. In al-Wa ' i al-Qawmi 
( ational Consciousness) published in B irut in 1938, h 
was the first to expound systematically, and at length, 
what might be called ' national ideological romanticism ' , 
in Arab nationalist writing. Basically, Zurayq attempted 
to equat ' nationalism ' with evolutionary ' consciousn ss '. 
Consciousness was a synthesis of accumulated values 
inh rited consciously from experience or transmuted 
uncons iously through time and space by a p ople sharing 
common ultural, racial, linguistic and geographical bonds. 
For him, ' nationalism ' was the id al form of association 
for man and, in parti ular, for th Arab p opl . 
1 
Aflaq, M., Fi abil al-Ba' th (Towards th R 
(Dar at-Tali'ah, Beirut Third Edition, 1963), 
(H reaft r quoted as Fi Sabil) . 
1 
surrection) 
p.4l 
ationalism, as he saw "t, was an volu onary mo m nt 
taking differing forms in differing pIa s und - r 
differing his tori al circumstan s in r lation to 
differing ra ial, linguistic entiti s s eking to 
establish harmonious forms of asso iat"on. ugg stions 
of Tonnies ' G meinschaft (i .. th spontaneously 
2 
developing nation as opposed to th m chanically cr at d 
nation) can be detected in Zurayq's writing . H rd r nd 
Hegel also can be glimpsed in the following quotation 
which is central to Zurayq ' s concept of ' nationalism' 
It will be seen that these man"festations 
of Arab national consciousness are slight 
in comparison with the national consciousn ss 
which permeates modern nations. But if we 
take into consideration the int llectual 
environment of the Middle Ages, when religious 
sentiments predominated over very phase of 
life, we find in these inchoate manifestations 
fitting seeds for Arab national life. These 
seeds had been slowly and gradually growing 
until in the present day the bond of 1 
nationalism is supreme over every other. 
It is important to follow Zurayq briefly to his 
conclusion because through Zurayq, or at least the 
tradition to which he gave an unmistakeable impress, 
Michel Aflaq emerged. Zurayq ' s writing though in som e 
ways eclectic was, nevertheless, a reaction by a Syrian 
Arab against the sectarian and non-sectarian schools of 
Arab writers who had, since the turn of the century, been 
attempting to rationalise and theorise Arab nationalism 
on the basis of doctrinal and dogmatic convictions. 
Zurayq d id not suggest that nationalism, as he conceived 
it, was anti-religious and by implication non-sectarian 
or particularly racialistic or linguistic . Indeed, it 
was a synthesis of them all . Stress, however, on anyone 
of them to the detriment of the whole was what Zurayq's 
school of thought was seeking to obviate. Thus Zurayq 
wrote: 
1 
True nationalism can in no case be incompatibl 
with true r ligion, because its ssence is 
naught but a spiritual movement which aims at 
the regen ration of the inner forces of a 
nation and th r alisation of its m ntal 
useibeh, H.Z., Th 
Univ rsity Press, ew York, 
ationalism (Corn 11 
econd Edition 1959), 
p . 8J. 
and spiritual pot ntial·ti s. t'onalism 
bing a spiritual mov ment must go hand n 
hand with r ligion and d iv from ·t 
str ngth and it n ith r oppos s nor 
contradi ts any r ligion, but a p s th m 
all. If nationalism is oppos d to anything, 
it is not to r l'gious spirituality, but 0 
the disruptive partisanship whi h pIa s 
communal solidarit abov th bonds of 
nationality and whi h refused to be 
assimilated into the framework of the 
nation . . . Th upholders of this partisanship 
are the en mi s of Arab nationalism and th 
destroy rs of its unity . As for true 
religion it manates, with nationalism, from 
the same spring. l 
But how was 'national consciousn ss', as defin d 
by Zurayq, to b translated into reality? From what 
hitherto had been a purely 'theoretical ' treatm nt 
of the ideology of nationalism , Zurayq was finally 
force d to turn to the human ag nt to unfold or r cr ate 
the ' essence' of Arab nationalism: 
It is unthinkable that a nation like this 
[ Arab nation ] should not poss ss a unique 
character and a special mission. But if we 
are to de f ine this mission and to comprehend 
its true essence, we must ngage in profound 
studies and contemplation entailing the 
physical environm nt, heredity, social 
evolution and the ultural legacy. ay, we 
must go beyond these manifestations in an 
endeavour to discover the ' spirit ' of the 
nation, and its personality. It is shameful 
... that our lead rs and thinkers have not yet 
performed this crucial task in our national life, 
and not even depicted our special mi~sion in a 
forthright and unambiguous manner ... 
J 
Zurayq ' s conclusion was presented very much as a 
challenge to his intellectual contemporaries ~o perform] 
this crucial task in our national life ' . Certainly he 
had many fierce criti s of his works, but one man who 
s ms to have been influenced very mu h by Zurayq, or 
at least the tradition whi h he r presented was Mich I 
Aflaq. Aflaq as w will see adopted Zurayq ' s basic 
id ological postulat s, though with significant 
modification. 
1 
bid ., p . 92 . 
2 
bid., p.95. 
A ational Mythology 
' How can w 1 arn from th past ', Aflaq wrot , 
' in a way that will enthuse the pres nt to struggl 
for nationalism? , 1 For Aflaq history ontain d th 
se c rets surrounding the forces conditioning or 
militating against the evolution of national 
conscious ness of a people . Thus in ff ct , tap th se 
vital secrets and the ' true ess nc ' ' spirit ' and 
' destiny ' of the part icular people , in this cas e th 
Arabs, will unfold. How was it, Aflaq pondered , that 
in the seventh century the Arabs wer a mighty ' nation ' 
while in the twentieth c entury they were disunited and 
one of the most backward peoples of the world? What 
were the variables of causality which condition d th 
rise and fall of the Arab nation in history? The 
explanation given by Aflaq was contained in the form of 
national mythology which purport ed to give a vista of 
the Arab nation in history . 
4 
Aflaq ' s national mythology contains five historical 
epo chs (see, Fig. 1) . In these historical epochs, as we 
have reconstructed t hem, situational and environmental 
change s substantiv ly altered the physical charact ristics 
of the Arab nation and people . The period of ignorance 
(Jahiliyya), a particularly barbarous and culturally 
decadent epoch, evolv ed into the epoch of the Arab-
Is l amic umma of the Prophet Muhammad . For the first time 
in their history the Arab tribes were made conscious of 
themselves as a unique ' national ' entity2(Gemeinschaft) . 
With the Islamic ' revolution ' moral and spiritual values 
of the tribesmen c hanged . e w values appeared resp cting 
individual freedom and human dignity . Cultural decadenc 
of the Jahiliyya gave way to a cultural efflorescenc . 
It was during this epoch that the Arabs created a mighty 
empir from th Taurus Mountains to the Jazirat aI -Arab , 
to the Maghrib and the Iberian Peninsula . Among their 
n ighbours the Arabs of this epoch earn d deep respect . 
The epo ch of the Umma was one in which the Arabs conceived 
of their ' eternal mission ' to be a nation embodying ideal 
1 
Fi Sabil, op. cit ., p.17 . 
2 
Ibid ., p . 47 . 
human qualiti s r fl cting th valu of univ rsal 
Truth its If . By ant ast n th J hiliyya Lh 
individual was subj ct to th ontlnual tyranny or th 
trib and deni d th by pression os basi human 
fr edoms . R strictlon of personal £r edom was 
r flected in cultur 1 d cadenc and limit d m ntal 
hor "zons. Th Jahili, according to Aflaq, had no 
conception of the ' past ' or ' futur ' bc"ng 'chain d Lo 
1 the present ' . 
But if in the Arab-Islamic Umma ther had be n a 
surf it of national consciousness, poch three 
instituted a slow erosion of the id al valu s of h 
Umma. With the expansion of Islam outside the confin s 
of the Umma, Arab national solidarity began to wither. 
The people lost th ir sense of corporat national 
identity which had characteris d the previous epoch . 
5 
They engaged once more in tribal battles and narrow 
self-interests which had been a feature of the Jahiliyya. 2 
Physical weakness followed in the wake of declining 
national consciousness to be refl cted in a cultural 
d cline (in Aflaq ' s imagination only) and a subsequ nt 
loss of individual freedom. In tim th Arab nation was 
enslaved by foreigners and remained as such until epo h 
four. 
In Aflaq's first three historical epochs , the I ris 
and fall' of the Arab nation was explained on the basis 
of prevailing moral and spiritual values. For exampl , 
wh n national cons iousness was flourishing (epoch two) 
resp ct for individual human freedom was high. J By 
contrast in epochs one and three, national consciousn ss 
was practically non-existence as was respect for 
individual human freedom. Cultural progr ss was 
similarly equated with the rise and fall of national 
consciousness. 
In the fourth poch, the one in which Aflaq has th 
most int r st, stirrings of a new national renaissanc 
1 
Ibid . , p.46 . 
2 
Ibid. , p.80 . 
J 
bid. , p.47. 
Figure 1. 
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I.nactive Operative 
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(u) 
Individual ~eedom 
Nev moral and spiritual 
values 
Cu~tural creativity 
Vital social order 
National consciou~ness 
and solidarity 
International respect 
Knowledge of' tbe Eternal 
M1s~ion. 
Reconstructed on , e baaia ot his writings. 
The reader will notice strong traces ot 
Hegel in tbe above Figure. 
Michel AIlag : The Arab Nation in Hi~tory 
A National Mythology + 
God 
Humanism 
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Decline 
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Individual freedom 1n 
decline 
Return of' material 
values 
Cultural decline 
Decline in social 
cohesiveness 
Decline national 
solidarity and 
consciouaness 
Foreign domination 
OLMming of' the know1edge 
of' tbe Eterna1 Mission 
Truth 
Nationalism 
'" c o 
E 
~ 
~ 
.c 
~ 
... 
Q 
Stirrings 
ane" 
Colonial/ Partition : 20th Cent. 
(iv) 
Individual f'reedom non-existent 
Excessive preoccupation with 
foreign and material va~ues 
C~tural decadence 
ECf'ete social order 
Absence of' national consciousness 
Foreign domination 
Gl~er1nge ot the Eternal 
Misaion intelligib1e to the 
inf'ormed Cew (i.e. Da'tbiats) 
Operative 
Arab National : Undef'ined future 
(v) 
Individual lreedom 
Return of elevated 
moral and spiritual 
values 
Cultural creftivity 
Vital social ' order 
Vital national 
consciou~ness 
International respect 
Contribution to humanity and peace. 
Knowl edge of' Eternal 
Misaion 
Fulfilment of the 
Eternal Hission 
Arab Na tional: 
(Vi) 
Unity 
Freedom 
Socialism 
Future as~ured 
through recognition 
of the forces militating 
Cor and against national 
cO{laciousness. 
0\ 
w r to b found in growing popul r d mands for 
d mocratic fr dom and liberation of th A ab hom land 
from colonialism, imp r'al'sm, and Zlonlsm. l Y t 
accompanying th 
Jahili t ndenc' s 
pochs 0 ' national rise ' wer als 
qually anxious to crush nation 1 
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awak ning and individual human fr dom. These t nd nc s, 
Aflaq ass rt d, could only b ffectively countered by 
popular struggle dir ct d by th ' inform d few ' whos 
superior knowledge of history and d stiny gav th m 
th right to 1 ad th Arab people towards national 
t . 2 reg nera lon . 
Epoch five in the indeterminat future would marl 
the culmination of succ ssful national struggle 1 ading 
to th overthrow (Inqilab) of th corrupt and d cad nt 
pr s nt . The charact ristics of this epoch would b 
th complete antithesis of the Jahiliyya . 3 With the 
rebirth of the Arab nation there would b individual 
human freedom, elevated moral and spiritual valu s 
conditioning the new social order, cultural creativity, 
social , political and economic progress, international 
respect , contribution towards world peace and humanity 
and, withthe attainment of national r ality, fulfilme nt 
of the ' eternal miss ion' of the Arab people. All these 
attributes were contained in the penultimate of epoch 
five - Unity (Wahda), Freedom (Huriyya) and Socialism 
(Ishtirakiyya) - in fact the Fundamental Principles 
of the Ba'th Constitution of 1947. 
Let us now consider in more d tail how Aflaq took 
th h u man agent, and the explanatory variables conditioning 
the ' rjse and fall ' of the Arab nation in history, and 
wov them systematically into the ideological schema 
which became the modus operandi of the Ba'th party. 
1 
Ibid . , p.50 . 
2 
Ibid . , p . 80. 
3 
bid . , pp . 35, 159-66 12assim . 
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Th IIuman Agent and the Formula .for ation 
Th Ba ' th 
Th whole purpos of Aflaq ' s national mythology was 
to underlin th n d .for national r gen ration ·n th 
twentieth century bas d on the a cumulated exp ri n 
and knowledg of th variables conditioning the ris and 
fall of th nation in history. It is not important to 
ask wheth r Aflaq or h·s contemporari s really beli ~v d 
in his reinterpretation of Arab-Islamic history in terms 
of national awak ning . For him th most important thing 
was that useful parallels had been e stablished b twe n 
the d cadent state of the Arab ' nation' in the pr s nt 
and th period of th Arab-Islamic Umma (see, Fig . 1, 
se c ond poch). S condly, by isolating the variables 
of causality from p riods of 'national rise ' to ' national 
d e c line ' as the presence or absence of ' unity ' and 
ind ividual ' freedom ' or ' human dignity', and giving them 
histori c al foundation, Aflaq was in fact constructing 
an e d ific e upon which to laun.ch a nationalis t reform 
movement in the twentieth century. 
Ideologically, Aflaq believed that an Arab national 
awakening could not be attained unl ss preceded by a 
complete transformation of Arab soci ty . By thems Ives 
th Arabs were unable to realise national consciousness 
because they did not fully comprehend the essence of the 
spirit of Arabism. For centuries they had been subject 
to foreign domination, cultural and ethical values 
coupled to their own sectarian divisions and dissolute 
leadership . ational awareness or consciousness in any 
meaningful form had thus ceased to xist and was only 
int lligible to a f w prescient national r formers. Thus 
for Aflaq, before th Arabs could ver hope to attain 
national fulfilment, they had to b r -educated mentally 
to acc pt the basi principles of national awakening, 
unity and freedom. 
The national mythology was, th refor , to serv as 
th ducativ instrum nt 
societal metamorphosis. 
in th process of complete 
The teachers or rather the 
r cr ators of the n w order were the 'informed few ' who 
had reached th sam v w of history and th evolution 
of th Arab nation and th forces conditioning its rise 
and d clin as Aflaq . H nce their nam , Ba ' thists or 
r cr ators of th Ar b nation from within their own midst. 
Th function and purpos of th Ba ' th in Aflaq ' s 
id ological sch rna was to 1 ad and d· r ct h Arab 
peopl from th m ntality of th Jah·liyya (s ,Fig . 1, 
poch one) of th tw ntieth c ntury to th culmination 
of th ir national mission, th r cr at·on of th Arab 
nation . Yet, for Aflaq, thes w r to b no ordinary 
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men : they were to be, in effect, ' sup rme n ' r e pr s nting, 
as they did, the fulcrum of th w Arab Gen ration', 
for they were r sponsible for r creating an Arab nation 
out of the backwardness, ignoranc and disunity of th 
present . Yet while a good deal of human effort was 
requir d for such a v nture, Aflaq was confident that 
they would be conforming to the logica l historical process 
that one day the Arab nation would be r e created in 
fulfilment of destiny . Hence Aflaq wrote in 1943 : 
The ew Arab Generation bears a mission 
non-political . Faith and belief not theories 
and sayings [ condition our thinking J 
for God , nature and history are with us 1 
In Aflaq ' s earliest romantic conception of the Ba'th 
its members resembled the Christian apostles going out 
into a world of darkness in order to bring the light of 
salvation to the h athen. The fate of the Christian 
apostles was in many instances a martyr's death, but 
what they contributed to the Faith by their life and 
death lived on as an example to other devoted Christians 
to emulate . For Aflaq this concept was not too far 
removed from the mission and fate he imagined for the 
Ba ' thists . They were called to struggle against the 
forces standing in the way of Arab national awakening 
and to dedicate their lives so that others might follow 
in the cause of Arab national awakening for with national 
fulfilment, the salvation of the individual would be 
secured from the wil s of group tyranny and political 
dictatorship . 
Thus, ideologically, by the very nature of its 
historic mission, th Ba ' th was confirmed in the role 
of an elit possessing the truth . Its function was 
spiritual r generation, following the dissipation of 
ignoranc and apathy of the Arabs towards national 
1 
Ibid ., pp. 60-61. 
awakening . Thro ugh revolutionary struggl (Inqilab) , 
the Ba ' th was to unfold the true d s"r s nd wish s 
of the Arabs , though they th ms Iv s may hav b n 
completely unconscious as to what th y r ally want d in 
lif . In 1949 , two y ar after the First ational 
Congress of the Ba ' th decided to adopt his ideology of 
nationalism as the basis for th Party ' s Constitution, 
Aflaq wrote: 
The Arab Ba ' th is the only sol"d rock in th 
midst of this raging troubled s a ... th country 
(specific ref renc to Syria) will hav a r al 
hope of salvation if the Party canlmaintain its 
solidarity ... and influence events . 
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Id ologically, th Ba ' th repres nt d the true dedicated 
Arab elite selflessly p ursuing its s If-appointed mission 
to bring into bing the Arab nation . In this respect 
it was more than just the ordinary political party which 
sought solutions in political terms . In a sense th Ba ' th 
was interested in every facet of the life of the Arab 
individual. In 1950 Aflaq wrote: ... ' the Ba ' th is 
liberal and progr ssive ' (a thing which might hav be n 
said of most political parties) ' but ', he continued, it 
has ' a view ' [o f ] ' the cosmos .. of man .. life .. and 2 ethics ' 
In another article in the same year he wrote: 
We express the will of the nation. This will 
is distinct only to the few ... We represent the 
part of the nation which is still ignorant of its 
reality and forgetful of its indentity. We ar 
ahead of it because we represent it ... 3 
But whil e the Ba ' th was the revolutionary vanguard 
of th ' ignorant' mass es Aflaq tended to take the view 
that it should continue to remain as an elite relatively 
isolated from the masses it was seeking to mentally 
refurbish and politically direct. Aflaq, it seems, was 
deeply fearful of the consequences of world contamination 
of th ideals of th Ba ' th, henc he favoured restricting 
membership to all but the most dedicat d of converts. 
1 
L cture by Mich 1 Aflag to th stud nts of th Syrian 
Univ rsity, Damascus in Decemb r 1949, (The Arab Ba ' th, 
L ban s Branch, Propaganda and Publications Offic , 
n . d. ), pp . 2 - 3. 
2 
Ibid . , p . 290 . 
3 
Ibid . , P . 171 . 
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And v n then, party Rul s stipulat d a 1 ngthy novitl t 
for the new memb r, following r comm ndations by at 
1 least t wo activ m mb rs . In 1957 h wrot 
The popular command should b in th hands of 
the minority (Ba ' th) for most of th p opl ar 
unaware of th ir drawbacks and circumstances, 
nor are they able to organis and disciplin 2 
themselv es seriously for changing the situation ... 
Th refore , while national awakening was th ultimat 
objective of the Ba ' th, until such tim as this was 
realised the party was bound to assume the role of th 
sole revolutionary vanguard . The significance of this 
ideological stanc e will become more apparent in the 
l ater sections of this chapter. 
Associated with the elite role of the Ba ' th it is 
possible to see the first signs of the authoritarianism 
which appeared after 196J . For exampl , it was highly 
conceivable that if the Ba ' th believed that it possess d 
the truth , t he ignorant masses and fals e revolutionary 
nationalist parties might not want to recognise the 
fact . J Indeed they might even forcibly reject the m ssage 
of truth and persecute its apostles. Thus for Aflaq it 
was conceivable that the Ba ' th in the interests of truth 
' and o u t of love for the ignorant masses ' might hav to 
' enforce ' observance of its principles . He wrote: 
Unity 
of it 
human 
has to be enforced by 
[ for ] it4is the means dignity . 
those who conceive 
of liberty and 
We will r eturn to the problem of ' enforcing ' observance 
of Ba ' th principles later in this chapter . 
Ba ' th Socialism : 
To complete our investigations into the basic 
postulates of Aflaq ' s ideological schema, it is necessary 
1 
Se 
Rul sand dat 
Part 4 , Organisation and Structur 
2 
Fi Sabil , op . cit., p.186 . 
J 
Ibid . , p . 165 . 
4 
Ib id . , p . 218 . 
J-9 · 
to xamine h's onc pt o.f so ialism (I=-=-=-::....:::c=...::==.t.~::::...J. and 
th way in which h sought to id nti.fy with th 
Ba ' th whose miss'on was, as w ha s n, primarily 
national·stic. Id ologically, Aflaq found no 
d'fficulti s in giving a national'st party a socialist 
programme becaus h r garded both as being ss ntially 
similar in ultimate obj ctive . For xampl , socialism 
was but another facet of the ternal truth of whi h 
nationalism was also an integral part . ocialism lik 
nationalism was an id al relativ in substantive form 
from epoch to epoch in conformity with th n eds and 
aspirations of peoples seeking national id ntity. This 
was true of Arab socialism as of any oth r variant. l 
But while the outward form changed as a result of 
evolutionary progress, as did that of nationalism, the 
' essenc e ' remained constant- and immutabl Thus, for 
12 
Aflaq, the link betwe n socialism and nationalism was 
doctrinal only insofar as they sought to attain th same 
ultimat objective : human progress. In 1946 he wrote: 
The Arab nation is socialist and one cannot 
conceive of a healthy society within this 
nation without socialism. Ba ' th socialism 
is in perfect accord with the present Arab 
society, a society whose past, present and 
future are linked to the soil ... it regards 
cultural and spiritual values as of great 
influence in th~ evolution of history and 
human progress. 
Binder made a worthwhile observation on Ba'th 
socialism when he wrote: 
If it (socialism) evolved no specific programme 
but rather changed through history then the 
whol e notion can be reduced to the welfare 
state idea. J 
If Bind r imagined that he was uncovering the doctrinal 
hollowness of Ba ' th socialism he was mistaken because 
this was precisely what Aflaq hoped to achieve . For 
Aflaq, socialism was 
unrestrict d by fals 
1 
Ibid ., p.2l0. 
2 
Ibid ., pp . 209-l0. 
J 
'a liberal and elastic system, 
conomic and historical principles ' 
ological R in the Middl 
ork, 1964), p.185. 
Fi Sabil, op. c·t., p.2ll. 
4 
lJ 
Basically, he conc iv d of it as p rforming two fun tions 
simultaneously in the liv s of th Arab p ople . F "rstly, 
it was d sign d to lib rat them from a syst m or syst ms 
of gov rnment d nying them th opportunity for social 
justice, 1 conomic and political r forms. Secondly, 
it aimed to regen rate spiritually th p ople to a 
gr at r corporate awareness of th ir Arab identity through 
th processes of r -education and mental and ethic 1 
transformation of values, the u ltimat objectiv b ng 
once more, national awakening . Aflaq wrote: 
As they (Arabs) have responded to th call of 
religion in the past and were capabl of 
economic reformation (see, Fig. 1 ., comparison 
b tw en epochs one and two) th yare [in th 
present] capable of achieving social justic 
and equality among all citizens ... as a result 
of national faith alone . .. We r quir from our 
socialism that it s erves the national cause ... 
[ calling ] f~rth individual freedom and richn ss of 
the soul . . 
If the romantic mind is everywhere in evidence in the 
above passage, it is clear, nevertheless, that the 
ultimate objective of Ba'th socialism is Arab unity and 
fre dom. When the Arab nation reawalen d as a result 
of Ba ' th socialist indoctrination unity and freedom 
would be realised simultaneously. In a sense therefore, 
socialism would have served its purpose and would no 
longer be intelligible as socialism per se, but Arab 
nationalism. 
Comparison with other Socialist Ideologies 
As a result of its national character, Ba ' th 
socialism in Aflaq's ideological sch ma was essentially 
differ nt from other socialist variants. While on th 
one hand, he was prepared to accept th fact that 
socialism in its ideal form embodied univ rsal human 
truths, its applicability was conditioned or determined 
in accordance with uniqu historical and situational 
factors which had onditioned the lives of the people of 
a particular nation. Ideologically , th refore, Aflaq 
1 
Ibid., p.207, Rassim. 
2 
Ibid . , pp . 204- and 207 . 
was able to ass rt why it was that Communism and 
Fascism wer irr 1 vant to the xp ri n of th Arab 
nation . L t us look at his argum nt in mor d tail, 
noticing how he waves Arab nationalism into h"s 
rejection of Communism . 
Aflaq ' s ideological rejection of Communism st mm d 
from the fact that "t sought to demean nationalism and, 
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by implication, Arab nationalism . But this, he beli ved, 
was under the guise of Russian expansionism . Communist 
parti s throu ghout the world were h nce the ag nts of a 
foreign nation se king to break down indigenous forms of 
nationalism in order to graft on top of them, in th 
name of world wide proletarian revolution, Russian 
domination . He wrote : 
[Russia] has restrict~d herself to aiding 
expansion of r volution and the propagation of 
a Communism conforming to the interests and 
aims of Russia .. . We consider that the Communist 
Party is a destructive force, for two reasons . 
The first resides in its defective socialism 
which promises the Arab people all they need, 
at the same time trying to drag them into the 
clutches of another state, Russia. The second 
reason is internationalism . . . l 
For Aflaq, the Marxists had wrongly interpreted the forces 
conditioning the evolutionary transformation of societies 
within the historical process. While on the one hand, 
the Marxists saw history as unfolding along a continuum 
from feudal society to proletarian society and being 
activated by class struggle from a lower to a high r form 
of societal consciousness, Aflaq ' s saw historical 
transformation of societies in terms of striving for 
national awakening (see, Fig . 1). All that existed 
b for world wide proletarian government was, in Marxist 
theory, essentially imperfect and corrupt and only stood 
as an example to be bettered by the Communist movement . 
But for Aflaq , history was not all corrupt and decadent, 
I 
to b forgotten or used only in ord r to call for greater 
effort in the present . Islam had been the original forc 
which had transformed the minds and morals of the Arabs, 
bringing in its wake a national awakening . Throughout 
the historical process its stamp had remained with the 
1 
Ibid ., p . 211 . 
Arab p opl although, by its id nt"fi tion with oth r 
' nations ' and p opl s, th solidar"ty whi h it had 
or "ginally brought to th Arabs had b n d"ssipat d 
consid rably . Y t it instilled valu s into th Ar bs 
which condition d them to striv onstantly and yarn 
for greater national solidarity aft r th first Arab-
Islamic Umma had declined and anish d into oblivion . 
Thus social class struggl was not th sole motivator 
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of soci ties , rath r it was th yearning for national 
a wakening whi c h c ondition d the ris and d cline of th 
Arab nation (and all other nations of the world) . ocial 
class distinctions , however, were remov d as a result of 
national a wakening , but they were the consequence and not 
the cause of the awakening which Aflaq attributed to th 
growing realisation of the people that they possess d 
a c ommon birthright and a common destiny . 
Aflaq's interpretation of history had a direct 
bearing on his attitude towards social class struggle 
in the Arab world of the mid-twentieth century . Unlike 
the Marxists he did not believe that the Arabs could 
solve their problems simply by resolving the conflict 
betw en the rich and the poor : 'th owners of production 
and those who do not own' . He wrote explaining th 
nature of the problem as he and the Ba'th saw it: 
Our problem is much more extensive than this 
(Marxist class struggle). It is a problem of a 
nation that is fragmented and partly colonised. 
Fragmentation is the major obstacle in its path 
of progress. It is also a problem of the 
backward nation - in mentality, in its economy, 
in politics and in everything. We must build 
everything an w . Thus we have placed the Arab 
nation to one sid and all who attempt to retard 
its progress to another . The capitalists and 
feudalists are not the only enemies of the Arab, 
th re are also politicians who cling to this 
state of fragmentation because it serves their 
own interests; ther are those in addition who 
submit to the imperialists, in one form or 
another , and finally , those who fight ideas, 
duc ation , evolution enlightenment, toleration and 
the independ nce of our homeland. All these we 
have placed on on side and the Arab nation on 
the other . Therefore we do not claim to have 
divid d our nation into two or more classes on th 
Marxist pattern . We maintain that a man of 
r ligion, for example, who sows the seeds of 
r ligious fanaticism and is poor, is as 
d trim ntal to soci ty as th apit list 
and f udalis t who x ploi t work rs and 
peasants . l 
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Th r fore class struggle in a strictly Marxian s ns was 
impractical in vi w of th vastly diff ring probl ms 
confronting th Arab peopl in their r volutionary 
struggles for national fulfilment . 
for th Ba'th, unity was the most 
For Aflaq, as ind d 
ss ntial objectiv 
through which to attain national awakening . Th 
function of Ba ' th socialism was, firstly, to pr pare 
the people for unity, whil simultaneously regenerating 
their minds and bodies to accept the new social order, 
itself a direct reflection of the national awakening . 
Ba 'th socialism was, ther fore designed with the express 
purpose of changing th old decadent and corrupt order 
which had permitted t h e existence of social class 
distinctions, politi c al disunity, capitalist exploitation 
and c olonial d omination of the Arab homeland. In terms 
of s pe cific social class di s tinctions Ba ' th socialism 
aimed towards levelling down soci ty into a one -c lass 
(nationalist) mass of people but not, a s Afl aq was careful 
to po int out, b y proletarian revolution . He wrote: 
Those rulers and others wi th vested material 
or moral interests who obstruct the nations 
unity must be fought decisively by the people . 
But they must be c ombated in a spirit of love, 
since the struggle of the people against them 
does not issue from greed or envy or spite but 
from the love of life itself, which2 these men 
are trying to suffocate and retard . 
The romantic moral overtones of this passage almos t 
res mble the spirit of Gandhian ' Truth Froce ' (Satyagraha) 
or the ' Gospel of Love ' in the ew Testament . But as 
with much of Aflaq ' s writings it is n c ssary to read 
between the lines, or from a much wider sample of his 
works to fully comprehend the inn r meaning . In th 
above passage it would seem that he was saying that it 
was only the social classes which consciously tried to 
1 
Ibid ., p . 22J . 
2 
Ib i d . , p. 2 24 . 
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w ak n or d lay national unity that had to b ombat d 
in a spirit of lov ' or perhaps by p rsuasion or r -
education of what nationalism entail d for th mselv sand 
th peopl as a whol Ind d , only wh n all av nu s of 
p rsuasioll had brok n down was Aflaq prepared to us 
mor viol nt means to ' nforce uni ty' . 1 
Aflaq's int rpretation of nationalism condition d 
his whole belief in socialism and all that it r pr s nt d. 
For him , socialism could only be m aningfully and, ind ed, 
purposefully expressed in the whole (Arab unity) . On th 
-' 
other hand, socialisation of any particular region to th 
detriment of the whol e was, in his thinking, a 
contradiction of its basic function. lIe wrote: 
So cialism cannot be achiev d in Syria alone , 
for Syria is a small state with limited 
resources ... That is why our socialism (Ba'th) 
will only be able to gain definite recognition 
within the framework of a singl Arab unifi ed 
state - that is to say when the Arab people ar 
freed, and when the impediments that oppose 
the success of socialism, such as impe r ialism, 
are removed . This does not prevent certain 
Arab countries from putting this doctrine into 
practice2 before others, although perhaps only in part . 
The last sentence is the key sentence, and the key word 
is ' part '. Socialism, like nationalism in Aflaq's 
ideological schema, was essentially an evolutionary 
proc ss which would be fully realised when the nation was 
resurrected and national consciousness fully operable in 
the minds of the people. On the other hand, socialisation 
of a part (i . e . region) though in itself a worthwhil e 
venture, could never be complete in itself and, at best , 
only a partial fulfilment of its ultimate long term 
objective . For Aflaq, there were both ideal and practical 
reasons b hind this b lief . In terms of practicality , th 
pooling of combined resources of many Arab regions would 
make socialism uniformly even and acceptable to the p ople, 
wh reas particular socialist variants would be lik ly to 
xacerbate regionalism insofar as they sought to dev lop 
and xploit their limit d resources. 
1 
Ibid., p.219. 
2 
Ibid., p . 212. 
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Substantiv dif r nc s b tw n Ba ' th so ialism and 
Communism r sult d Erom th ir parti ular national 
ori ntations. Unity and fr edom h d condition d th 
awakening of Arabism during the Jahiliyya, translorming 
it into the Arab-Islamic Umma (s ,Fig. 1) . Th 
function of mod rn Ba ' th socialism was ss ntially similar 
to that of ancient Islam : to k p upp rmost in th minds 
of the n ew Arab gen ration th principl s refl ctiv of 
Arab national aspirations - unity and fr dom . On th 
oth r hand , the d personalised masses of Fascists and 
Communist totalitarian r gimes r pr sented the complete 
antithesis of Aflaq ' s concept of ' ational ocialism '. 
H wrot 
Our socialism, on th contrary , is based on th 
individual and his personal freedom; it does not 
al low his individual liberties to b scorn d and 
considers all individuals as equal and a 
tyrannical dic tatorship unnecessary.l 
For Aflaq , the main strength of th nation lay not in the 
state (i . e . governing elite or party such as Communist or 
Fascist parties) but 'i n the pres rvation of individual 
initiative which ncourag s action '. This was a clear 
inversion of then (early 1940s) current Fascist and 
Communist doctrines of the individual and the state. It 
was the lifeless st reotype individual such as he 
witn ssed in European totalitarian regimes that Aflaq 
sought to avoid in his system of ' ational Socialism '. 
For this reason he embodied in his ideological schema 
principles permitting the e x istence of private property 
and inheritance (Waqf) in the belief that these would 
develop individual pride , responsibility and initiative 
in the individual and, ul timately , in the Arab nation 
2 
of the future. How ver, Aflaq was cautious to point out 
that private property would be of value to the individual 
and the nation only insofar as it was not used to exploit 
the work and the lives of others: 
1 
2 
Communist so cialism has gone too far in the 
direction of nationalisation; it has abolished 
property rights a nd consequently has killed 
individual initiative. Ba'th socialism ... 
Ibid . , p .211 . 
Ibid., p . 211 . 
is car ful not to abolish privat 
therefore limiting itself to th 
strong impedim nts to abus 
prop rty, 
cr ation of 
Communism does not recognis th right of 
inh ritance. Our socialism, on th contrary, 
recognises it and believes that a citiz n 
cannot b d prived of it . v rthel ss, to 
pr v nt the wrongful use of th national 
walth and the exploitation of labour, we 
have imposed c rtain changes that male the 
right in c rtain cases almost theoretical 
(i. e . big business tc . ) and r duce it in 
oth r cas es to a simple moral right. l 
Aflaq ' s particular emphasis on th right of 
individual freedom within the nation state leaves much 
to b explained . It is clear (as it can be) from his 
writings and in particular the Ba ' th Constitution, that 
he or the party were not proposing unlicensed freedom. 
The Constitution, for xampl~, continually circumscrib s 
' freedom ' (Huriyya) with ' inthe national interest' 
(see , Se c ond Fundamental Principle). Of course it is 
clear from history that Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin 
in their own way were seeking to lead the people ' to 
glory ' in the inter sts of the ' state '. However for 
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Aflaq, the purpose of the state was not to lead and dir ct 
the people from above making them in its own image . On 
the contrary, the state only existed insofar as it was 
expressing the ' national will ' on the individuals within 
it . It was therefore the existence of individual freedom 
within the state, duly reflected in the process of 
government, which gave the state the right to exist as 
a ' true nation ' and not an artificial creation of a 
totalitarian party or dictator . Within this nation state 
there would be no place for class or racial bias as the 
true nation state would be motivated by a code of 
humanitarian moral and thical values . 
However it might b argued, that in seeking to 
recreate the ideal nation state the Ba ' th was leading 
and directing the p ople from above in much the same way 
as the Communist or Fascist parties which it condemn d . 
Yet for Aflaq there was a very important distinction . 
The Ba ' th, for xample , was not seeking to make the 
1 
Ibid ., p . 2ll . Ba ' th Constitution, ' Economic 
Policy of the Party ' , Arts. 26-J7, in App ndix I . 
iLU[j.vil1ua. I s nbs> TV i nt to a tyranni al and d pe rona Li d 
~3 taLu or poJit-Lcal part Rath r th lnL r st 01 the 
l3a'th, ill Lheory, I' st d on th n d to mancipat th 
' psych ,1 01 thE' individual making him conscious 01 hls 
natural rLght Lo human dignity and.fr dom with'n th o 
nation stat l in L i k Lh totalitarian pol'ti al 
systems of' Europ<' LlH Ha 't h had no xpansionist amh'tion 
h yond th Arab world end l' . i ' Led only to eras soclal 
in quality and restor to th ind1 vi dual his hasi hLlJ.!a n 
c ordingly : rlghts . Aflaq wrot 
Ba'th socialism do s not aim at expansionism . . . It 
supports all that Lends towards the liberation 01 
p oples still under colonial rule . It desires that 
other peoples may practice socialism and :follow an 
conomic policy that gives justic to all and a 
higher standard of living for all p oples, at the 
same time cons rving the individuality of' each . 2 
aLional Mo rality : 
I)ne of thp major aims of Aflaq' s national mythology 
(I " ig . 1) was to underline the fact that ' morality ' 
cOll<ii.tioned the rise and fall of national consciou nes 
wLLltin the historical process . For exampl , Jslam 
-Lntroduced new r volutionary valu s among which was 
r pect lor 'individual freedom' . By contrast the 
Jahillyva had subjected the individual to what Aflaq 
caJ Lod 'groufJ tyranny' . Thus , for Aflaq, it was th' 
preS('llCP or <l 'nat.iuwd I.lo rallty' permltting 'indivldual 
freedom' and creatlvity which condition d the ris~ and 
fall of' the Arab 'nation' in history, and which s parated 
J th true .from the fals nation in tho twentieth c entury , 
It i very apparent from Aflaq's con ept of national 
IIlOI'niity that he did not have to constru t an elaborate 
s st m to prove the fact that th istencc of ' indi idual 
freedom' contribut d to the rise and fall of national 
consciousness and human progress . Ind ed, Af'laq's 
Qoralistic concepts are certainly post-French R olution 
1 
Ibid . , p . l70, 2assim . 
2 
Ihid . , p . 2lJ . 
J 
, Af'laq's r action to CommunlsL and Pascist stat s 
pp . l - 2 0 . 
and r s mbl , sp cifically , thos of th s hool of 
Fr nch and Italian moral philosoph rs mong whom, Andr' 
Gi d ( 1 87L~ -1951) and Romain Rolland (1866-1944) , stand 
out most notic ably . or Gid and Rolland national 
morality was the k y towards so c ial progress . Gid 
wrot i n 1897: ocial qu stions? Y sind d . But th 
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thi cal question is nt c dent . Man is more int r sting 
1 than men '. Rolland in his play nth of 
J u ly in 1901, despis d crowd morality and prais d 
individuals for standing in the fac , of violenc for 
'cherish d principles ' . 2 Rolland ' s Jean-Christophe 
which appeared in ten volumes betwe n 1904-12, was a 
social satire with a poignant social messag relevant 
to the first decade of the twentieth century . Jean-
Christophe a young intellectu al revolutionary says to his 
friend in a restau rant ... ' as long as you are only out 
for material interests .. you don ' t interest me . The day 
wh n yo u mar c h out for belief then I shall b with you ' . J 
Figu res from classical mythology abound in the vast 
literary outpou rings of Andre Gide stretching over more 
than half a c entury . But in the pages of Gide th y w r 
not pre s ented as mere lifeless recreations of their 
c las s i c al counterparts, but in many respects as Gide ' s 
o wn id al s ocial reformers . For example, the Goddess 
Persephone was still the Queen of the Underworld in 
response to her obligations to the God Pluto, but her 
visits to and from the nderworld were portrayed in the 
form of a genuine concern for suffering humanity . 4 
Promethe u s , the God who brou ght fire to man thereby 
inc urring the anger of the Gods was, for Gide, a 
1 
o ' Bri n, J ., 
195J ), p . JJ2 . 
Ethics . 
2 
Portrait of Andre Gide (Secker and Warburg, 
The quotation is taken from Literature and 
Rolland, R . , The Fourteenth of July [Translat e d by 
B . II . Clark ] (Georg All n and Unwin Ltd . , London, 
Reprint d 1928) . La Contat who d fied the mob becaus 
of her f elings of sympathy for the doom d Queen Mari 
Antoin tte , is on example of a virtuous moral individual . 
Principles rather than mob violence interesting the 
author . 
J 
Rolland , R ., Jan-Christophe [Translat d by G. Cannan] 
(The Mod rn Library, Random Hous Inc ., 191J), p . 199, 
passim . 
4 
Gid, A ., P rs phone , (Gallimard, Paris , 19J4) passim . 
An op ratic s c enario in vers writt n in 19JJ at th 
requ s t o f Ida Rubinst in . 
reoc curring figur r pr senting id a1 s If-sacrific"ng 
man, ind e d almost th Christ-man, as h wrot 
.. . the aggr gat of all human fforts towards 
th b autiful, th gradual mast ring of those 
brut forces and th ir utilisation to achiev 
th good and th b autiful on earth. This is 
the Prometh anasp ct ; and it is th Christ 
asp ct too; it is th blossoming on man, and 
all virtues contribute to it . l 
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In 19JO Gide ' s three act play , 2-dipus Tyrannus twist d 
th Sophoclean emphasis from divine responsibility for 
mankind to man ' s r sponsibility for himself , or human 
2 
resourcefulness . 
According to Gide ' s biographer, Justin O ' Bri e n, it 
was 1925 after a visit to the Congo that marked th 
t u rning point of Gide ' s life . J Hitherto he had been 
c ontent to portray the inadequacies in human society but, 
thereafter , according to O' Brien, he became very conscious 
o f the need to find a vehicle upon which to realise his 
human i dea l s . Men in fa c t had to be led to see the truth 
and f a l sity o f human existence . Six years later he 
embrac e d Commun ism . In 19JJ he wrote about how he had 
been d rawn towards Communism : ' What leads me .. is not Marx, 
4 i t is the Gospel . It is the Gospel that formed me '. 
Communism for Andre Gide and Romain Rolland, seemed to 
o f fer the solution to the enigma confronting mankind . 
Yet it was not dogmatic theories of dialectical 
materialism which immediately appealed to them . Rath r, 
it was the belief that Communism might be the twentieth 
c ntury equ ivalent of Christianity, stripped of its 
theological emphasis, but containing the essence of 
humanism . (Aflaq, it will be recalled , drew much the 
sam parallel between Islam and modern Arab nationalism . 
S e , Fig . 1) . 
Gide and many of his intellectual contemporaries 
wer attracted to the new twentieth century ' religion ' 
1 
O ' Brien , op. cit . , p . 2J8 . 
2 
Gide, A., Oedipe (Editions de la Pleiade, Paris, 19J1) 
passim . 
J 
O' Bri n, op . cit . , p . J21 . 
4 
Ibid ., p . J21 . 
in the xp ctation that through 't suff ring mankind 
would be upl'ft d morally as w 11 s conomically and 
politically . Aflaq and his clos fri nd Salah ud-D'n 
Bitar wer stud nts at th Sorbonne (1928-33) at th 
mom nt when Gid cr ated world-wid int r st by his 
espousal of Communism. They, lik many other colonial 
scholars in Paris at this time embrac d Communism 
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b cause it se med to off r the mans for regenerating 
maruind towards a n w universal morality. Aflaq lat r 
recalled : ' They (Communists) were vigorous in attacking 
foreign colonialism and s emed to us to give life and 
t t Id t t A b 't 1 A d movemen 0 our 0 s agnan ra SOCle y . ccor ing 
to Brecher , Jawaharlal ehru was attracted to the 
c oncept of a communist classless society in 1927, but 
wa s emotionally repelle d by the communist militant . 2 
In 1936, however, the intellectual world was just as 
shocked to hear of Gi d e ' s severanc with the Communist 
movement a s it had been five years earlier with his 
espousal o f it. 3 Returning from the Soviet Union at the 
head of a literary delegation in 1936 Gide , in a little 
boo k, Retour d e L ' URSS , condemned the Soviet Union for 
betraying the Communist revolutionary ideal and for having 
established a one-man dictatorship . 4 He was app~lled by what 
he called the depersonalisation of the individual under the 
Communist system of government . 5 He vividly recalled the 
sufferings of the inmates of the Siberian concentration 
camps and the regimented art and literary forms which he 
had observed in his travels throughout the Soviet Union. 6 
The Russian communists, he wrote, had replaced the upper 
classes with a new and more henious class of party 
bureaucrats who cultivated in the people an ignorance of 
1 
Seal , P ., The Stru~e for Syria : A StudZ-£f 
Arab Politics, 1945-4§ (Oxford University Press, 
1965 ), p . l49.'" 
2 
Post War 
London , 
Br cher, M. , ehru : A Political Biography (Oxford 
University Press, London, 1961, Abridged Edition), p . 55 . 
3 
4 
O ' Brien, op . cit . , p . 330 . 
Gi d , A . , Retour D.e L ' URS suivi Retouches AMon 
Retour De L ' URSS (Gallimard, Paris, Dix-neuvieme Edition, 
1950), p . 69, p a ssim. 
5 
Ibid . , p . 42 . 
6 
Ibid ., p.74, passim. 
th outsid 1 world . In a graphic p ssag r capturing 
his d ep d spair with th collaps of his Communist 
id aI , he wrot e : 
Et j e doute qu ' en aucun autr pays 
aujourd ' hui fut-c dans l ' All magn 
d Hitler, l ' sprit soit moins libr , 
plu ' s courbe, plus craintif (t rrorise) 
plus vassalise. 2 
Like the majority of intellectuals in the 1930~ 
int er sted in the question of social and national 
24 
ref Or! 1 , A:flaq tvas acquainted with Marxist and Fascist 
traditions of writing along with the Fr nch and Italian 
schools of moral philosophy such as R nan, Mazzini, Gid 
and Rolland and others . 
national morality of the 
But on the que stion of the 
ew Arab G n ration ', the 
influ nc of Andre Gide comes through very cle ar, as can 
be seen below in one of Aflaq's earli st publishe d 
articles in 1936 in the left-wing journal, Left-wing 
Vanguard (at-Tali'ah al-Yasariyya) . This was written 
at the moment when Gide had seceded from the Communist 
movement : 
If I were se king to define socialism I will 
n ver look in the books of Marx and Lenin. 
I will answer: ' it is the religion of life over 
death ' .3 
What almost might be called ' religio-humanism', is 
apparent in this extract . Let us compare it with a 
similar extract from Gide in 1933 : 
What leads me to Communism is not Marx, it 
is the Gos~el . It is the Gospel that 
formed me . ) 
Apart from the more romantic overtones of Aflaq's extract, 
it might be thought that both extracts were writt n by 
th same man. Aflaq continued. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
It is by opening the opportunities for work 
before all (i . . orthodox socialism including 
Marxism) and by permitting all the talents of 
Ibid . , pp . 58-59 . 
Ibid . , p.61. 
Sidawi n an- ahar, op . it . 
O ' Brien, op . cit. , p.32 1. 
the p opl and their virtu s to d v lop and 
b useful (se , GOd) which k ps th own r-
ship of life to lif and does not 1 av to 1 
d ath except th dry flesh and rott n bon s . 
Aflaq was ther fore 1 d to much th sam conclusions as 
Gide in 19J6 on the dang rs of 'sci ntifi socialism ' 
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r gimenting the individual thereby making him a 
colourless stereotyp of the totalitarian state . 
Following Gide very closely, Aflaq went on to argu that 
the ideal solution for social progr ss was to b found 
in a new morality in which th individual would b fr e 
to develop his talents and potentialities to th full, 
thereby enriching life and contributing to the material 
welfare of the state. He continued : 
If I were asked for the reasons for my attitude 
towards solialism, I would ans wer: '14hat I am 
after is not an increase in the richness of the 
factories, but the richness of life . It is not 
my c oncern that the people should be equal in 
the distribution of food (i.e . opposition to 
Marxian regimentation) as much as it is my 
concern that every individual should have a 
chance to develop his talents and potentialities 
to the full (see, Gide's Retour De L ' URSS , p . 4J, 
f.n.i) . The work r only sees in socialism a 
promise that he may get what he is denied; but 
I don ' t look at it except as a ge~erous and 
continuous giving, that we 2 should give life 
more than it has given us . 
Although there is certainly a strong romantic flavour 
about this passage, in many ways it contains the essence 
of many of Aflaq's later concepts of socialism (i . e . 
acceptance of private property and welfarism) and national 
morality around which he construct ed his ideological 
schema. The Ba ' th party, for example, as the focal point 
o f the ' ew Arab Generation ', assumed a role not unlike 
the ' Promethean aspe c t ' of Gide . 
ow that w have examine d a skeletal outline of th 
basic ideological postulates which Aflaq gave to the Ba ' th 
(vi z. Unity , Freedom and Socialism) , let us proceed to 
discuss the way in which they wer a d apte d and in some 
instances amended by later party congresses and theorists . 
1 
S idawi, in an- ahar , op . cit. 
2 
Ibid . 
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ii: Id ological Orientation: Th 
Dichotomy 
Th Con stitution of April 1947 
Th epoch of the national mythology into whi h 
Aflaq placed the Ba ' th was numb r four (Fig. 1). The 
primary function of the Ba ' th was to r spond to th 
' national stirrings ' of the peopl and to give substanc 
and form to them by recreating and reinterpreting through 
a process of moral and spiritual r generation a gr at r 
c orporate a wareness of th ir ' national ' identity. Th 
revolutionary (Inqilab) mission of the Ba ' th would thus 
be realised with the attainment of poch five. Thereaft r 
the nation would generate its own political consciousn ss 
in the ' national interest ' . But what would be th 
sUbstantive form of th recreated Arab nation in epoch 
five? Aflaq was unprepared to say, if inde d h e really 
envisioned the ideal Arab nation of the future. To him 
the primary function of the Ba ' th was to unfold and 
reinterpret the signs of national awakening, and to react 
as the situation at any given moment might warrant against 
the forces standing in the way of th Arab national 
risorgim nto . 
Aflaq ' s concept of the unfolding 'nation' in popular 
consciousness was, in many respects, a direct reaction to 
the totalitarian state in which the individual was 
regimented for the ' glory ' of the state . For Aflaq, the 
inverse was the ideal: the individual was to condition 
the state and to lead it by articulately expressing his 
nee d s and aspirations in the informed councils representing 
him and his fellow individuals . This was for Aflaq, true 
democracy . But it was a long-term ideal to be realised 
only by continuous revolutionary struggle against the 
'corrupt present I. Until such time as the people were 
ready for democracy they had to be led and condition d 
to r c ive it informedly . But, if the Ba ' th were uncertain 
about the futur form of the Arab nation, as of Unity, 
Fre dom and Socialism wh n fully realised, the Constitution 
of 1947 gave, at least, some practical content to th 
programm to be adopted by the party in the fulfilment 
of its ideological obj ctiv s . 
The Constitution formulated by the First ational 
Congr ss of the Ba ' th in April 1947, juxtaposed nationalism 
to socialism larg ly in accordance with Aflaq ' s 
ideological sch rna . For exampl 
But : 
The Party of the Arab Ba ' th is a national 
party ... It b liev s that the feeling of 
national awakening which unit s the 
individual to the nation is a sacred fe ling . 
(Art . J) 
The Party of the Arab Ba ' th is (also) a 
Socialist Party . It beli~ves that socialism 
is a necessity which emanates from the 
depths of nationalism itself . Socialism 
constitutes , in fact, the ideal social order 
which will allow the Arab people to realise 
its possibilities and to enable its genius 
to flourish and which will ensur the nation 
constant progress in its material and moral 
output . (Art.4) 
The Constitution, as with Aflaq 's ideological schema, 
gives a ' revolutionary ' bias to ' socialism': 
... so c ialism cannot be achieved except by 
means of revolution and struggle . To rely on 
slow evolution and to be satisfied with 
partial (i . e . regional) and superficial reform 
(i . e . morality) is to threaten these aims . 
(Art . 6) 
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But against whom and with what purpose was ' revolutionary 
socialism ' to be implemented: 
1 . The struggle against foreign colonialism in 
order to liberate the fatherland completely 
and finally . 
2 . The struggle to gather all the Arabs in a 
single independent state . 
J . The overthrow of the present faulty structure -
an overthrow which will include all the sectors 
of intellectual, e conomic, social and political 
life . (Art . 6) 
In a Communist manifesto one might expect to find the 
stages through which the party was to proceed to its final 
revolutionary objectiv s . The Ba ' th Constitution, however, 
offers no ' scientific formula ' to be employed by the party 
in its revolutionary mission . 'Our aim', wrot e Aflaq, 
' is, therefore, a long term one: a revolution to be 
brought about in people's way of thinking' . Violent 
revolutionary class struggle has, therefore, no place in 
the Constitution as inde d in Aflaq ' s ideological schema. 
The Constitution states in this regard : 
the party carri s on its struggl (Inqilab) 
among the labouring classes of soci ty so that 
such separation and diff r ntiation will com 
to an end and th citizens will r cov r th 
whole of th ir human dignity and will b 
enabled to live in the shad ow of a just social 
order in which nothing will distinguish one 
c iti z en from another exc ept intell ctual 
c apa c i ty and manual skill . (Art . 42) 
In this Arti c le, t wo ssential conc pts ar juxtapos d 
t o g ther : 
' Human dignity ' and 'c lass differentiation ' 
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In this c on text the f un c tion of the r volutionary 
v anguard is to struggle (Inqi lab) to le~sen the division 
thereby establishing a ' just ' social order . Aflaq can 
c learly be d etected in th thought form of this Article. 
The presumption is that man is not, as a ccording to 
Hobbes, essentially evil and corrupt thereby having to 
be administered by an iron hand for his, as for the 
nation ' s , general well-being . Through moral regeneration 
' the citizens will recover the whole of their human 
dignity ', and be made to see their previous fals e hood 
and the corrupt and degenerate order created by them . 
Thus , ipso facto, by knowledge of themselves and the 
realisation that by harming others socially, economically 
and politically, they are in fact harming themselves, 
human beings would willingly respond to the new order of 
national morality . In this society (see, ew Arab 
Generation) ' nothing will distinguish one citizen from 
another except ', but this ex c eption is crucial to the 
understanding o f the Article, ' intellectual capacity and 
manual skill '. Abu Jaber is c orrect in interpreting 
Article 6 as an attempt to create ' a one-class mass of 
1 people ', but c ertainly not a ' one class-mass ' in the 
Marx ian sense, because of the recognition that ' skills ' , 
intellectual and manual , ' distinguish one citizen from 
another ' . Thus this Arti c le should be read in context with 
the articles providing for the existence of ' private 
property ' , ' individual freedom and morality ' (Articles 
3, 30 and 33 , passim) . Creative ability (i . e . skills) 
are to be protected within the limits of the ' national 
interest ' (Article 34) . It 'vas the situation in which 
1 
Abu Jaber, K . S . , The Arab Ba ' th Socialist Party : History 
Ideolo and Organisation-TSy racuse Univ rsity Press , ew 
York , First Edition 1966 , p . 113 . 
individuals w r qual ben ficiar o s of th stat th t 
Aflaq and the formulators of th Constitution tri d to 
0d 1 
aVOl . What in fact they sought to construct was a 
system of gov rnment in which individual creativity 
(i.e . skills) would be permitted to exist side by sOd 
wi th the so cialist policies of the nation stat 
ownership of privat prop rty , itself the fruit of 
legitimately employ d individual skills, would 
Thus 
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th oreti c ally be acc ptable ' so long as they (individuals) 
do not exploit it to the harm of others ' (Article JJ). 
Similarly , nationalisation of land and industry would 
be undertaken only up to the point that state initiativ 
began to usurp the power of individual freedom , 
intellectual and ipso facto , economic initiativ 
Binder ' s interpretation of Ba ' th socialism lea es 
much to be desired when he wrote : 
Ba ' th socialism means the dictatorship of the 
lower middle class and the levelling down of 
all those who stand above them in the social 
and e conomic scale . .. 2 
While Binder is correct in stating that Ba ' th socialism 
was being put forward as an agent for ' levelling down' 
socio-economic class distinctions, he is missing the 
point when he identifies it and the Ba ' th with 
' dictatorship of the lower middle classes' . In theory, 
at least, the Constitution is proposing a new national 
morality in whi c h social class distinctions would cease 
to hav e any meaning and , if some wer~ foolish enough to 
maintain them, the benign state would intervene in the 
interests of social justice . Thus for the Constitution 
makers and in particular Michel Aflaq, a socialist 
society reflecting petit bourgeois interests was the most 
suitable and conveni nt system in th late 1940s for 
g u aranteeing individual freedom and state incentive for 
national well -being . However, as with many of the 
Articles of th Constitution there is an air of impermanence . 
It was as if the party had said, ' this is what we know now 
1 
cit ., p . 218, 'socialism . . resuming status 
g ts his right a ccording to his aptitud ... ' 
Bind r , op . cit . , p . 184 . 
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and beli ve now of th forces or conditi on or militating 
against national awak ning . But in th futur 
circumstanc s may hav changed, h nc n w syst m 
unintelligible to th pres nt might unfold a 
complet I differ nt societal ord r for which w will 
hav to readapt our thinking as well as our pragmatic 
policies ' . 
The key to th Constitution and what it purports to 
a c hieve in terms of pragmatic solutions, is th r for to 
be found in the repeated juxtaposition of national 
morality to socialism a nd revolution . For example : 
in the accomplishment of its (Ba'th ' s) 
mission the party relies on the people with 
whom it seeks to establish intricate contact, 
the spiritual moral material and physical 
level of whom it is trying to raise, in ord r 
that the people may (i . e . in the future) 
b come conscious of its personality and that 
it may become able to exercise its right 
in private and public life . (Art . 5) 
Unity : Evolving Ideological Attitudes 
Arab unity is the ultimate objective of the Ba ' th 
Constitution . But the substantive form of the united 
Arab state or nation was only vaguely conceived in party 
ideology . It was defined by Aflaq very much as the ideal 
promised land wher the needs o f all would be met and 
judged according to their national worthiness . A great 
deal of flexibility was therefore in evidence in Ba ' th 
ideology from the very beginning. In a sens e Arab unity 
as conceived in party ideology could entail a socialist 
paradise; to the liberal Islamic reformer a return to 
Arab-Islamic unity; to the nationalist pragmatist 'unit y 
in strength to counter Israel and th imperialists'; to 
the peasants in the field the removal of the 'wicked ' 
landlords and a more equitable distribution of land; to 
the m rcantile classes in the cities greater markets and 
I ss troublesome r gional imposts, while to the students 
and int llectuals denied adequate opportunities for 
car rs requisite to their ability , the opening of new 
horizons for opportunities . Inde d Ba ' th ideology could 
in a sens be bent to accommodat a very wide sp ctrum 
of inter sts all aspiring to unity, but with very different 
Jl 
ultimate ambitions . Th s , how ver, th Ba ' th propos d 
to ' tame ' or rath r mou ld through th proc ss of national 
reg n rat i on and re c reation of a new national morality . 
Thu s if it is possible to d tect Ba ' th unity th ory, 
it existed only through the leadership and direction of 
the informed revolutionary vanguard . o long term 
objective path could be set down in systematic form to 
be distributed to the Arab people under the heading : 
' Obje c t i ve Paths Towards Arab Unity ', because unity , as 
the ideological fathers of the Ba ' th conceived of it , 
was a relativ e c oncept developing from continuous 
rev olutionary s t ruggle against the forces standing in 
the path o f Arab unity . All , indeed, that the Ba ' th could 
propo s e wa s to fo llow its ' inspired ' evaluative judgements 
a nd to reac t to eac h situation in ac c ordance with previous 
experi enc e (Fig . 1) and knowledge . Eventually the time 
wo u ld c ome when the people through the lead ership of the 
Ba ' th would automat ical l y re s pond to any given situation 
h inde ring t he p roc ess o f uni ty . 
In an i nte rvi e w on 21 August 1954, Bitar said : 
' The Arab people believe in unity and are working for its 
r ea l isat i on . 
struggle all 
Our party no wa d ays leads the popular 
1 
over the Arab homeland '. But by what means 
was the Ba ' th to lead the struggle over the Arab homeland ? 
' Our party acqu ires its programme ', said Bitar, ' from the 
principles o f its Constitution whose objects are political 
2 
and so c ial demo c racy '. But essentially it was to be 
throu gh the organisational framework of the Ba ' th, and 
by its evalu ation of the need for situational changes in 
a cc ordance with the principles of the Constitution , that 
the revol u tionary struggle was to be maintained . But 
ho w was the party to evaluate policy in the light of 
sit uational c hange, bearing in mind the need to accommodate 
growing national c onsciousness and societal adaptability to 
the new national order? For the Ba ' th this was to be 
undertaken through the policy evaluation of the party cadres 
l 
i dal al - Ba ' th [The Ba ' th truggle ] (Dar at - Tali ' ah, 
Firs t Ed ition, 1964) vol . J , p . 18 . ' Interview with the 
e d itor of the news pap r al-Jar i dah ' . 
2 
Ibi d . , p . 18 . 
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and its id ological spokesm n of th obj ctiv r alit· s 
confronting th Arab nation as a whol R gion 1 or 
stat polic y was to b d t rmin d in h li ght o.f n t'ona1 
policy and to be c o-ordinated accordingly by th supr m 
party lean rship or ational Command (h raft r B C) 
formed at the First ational Congress in April 1947 . 1 
Complet d pend enc e was thus, of n c ssity, plac d upon 
th supr me party 1 adership for 1 ading, guiding and 
dire c ting the lower party cadres and through th m th 
2 
masses . 
Application to Arab unity was therefore the 
ideological test to be applied by Ba'th theorists before 
the adoption of a particular line of p Olicy. For example, 
at the First ational Congress in 1947 a firm line was 
adopt d against colonialism, imperialism, and Zionism 
because they were standing in the way of Arab national 
liberation . J Inde d , what each of these represented, 
not only in terms of domestic Arab politics but 
internationally , c onditioned the party's ideological 
attitu des towards neutrality or non-alignment . Thus 
by diplomati c ally allying with nations harbouring 
sympathy for the State of Israel or imperialist, 
colonial~st or capitalist ambitions in the Arab homeland 
or elsewhere, the Arabs would be ringing their own d eath 
knell. ' Aligning with either' [Anglo-American or Sovi t 
blocs] Aflaq wrote in April 1947, 'will do nothing but 
4 harm to the Arabs' . on - alignment was therefore an 
i deologi c al part of Arab unity as conceived by the Ba'th . 
But was the Ba'th being original in its demands for 
national liberation? Outwardly it was not, as interest 
groups ranging from leader-patron (Zu'ama) parties to 
regional socialist parties to the Arab ationalist 
Movement , had much the same emotional attachments to 
national liberation . But for Ba ' th theorists unity 
1 
Part 4 Organisation and Structure discusses this 
problem in more d tail. 
2 
J 
4 
Ibid . 
idal al-Ba'th, vol . J, op . cit . , p.1S7, passim . 
al-Ba'th, 6 April 1947, in Abu Jaber, op . cit . , p . 27 . 
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entail d mu ch mor than motional s nt·m nt, it was an 
arti c l of faith to b fashioned and shap d in a ordanc 
with t h e prevailing r alities of th tim . And although 
the long te r m manif station of unity would r main 
ob s cur e until th final national awakening, its ss ntial 
attribu te , ' freedom' , singled it out from oth r unity 
mo v ement s seek ing only political solutions in r spons 
t o ob j e c t i ve s itu ational requirements . Thus, 
ide o lo g i c a lly , the Ba ' th r e j ect d unity proje c ts such 
a s the ' Fe r t il e Cr s c ent ' of uri as - Said or the 'Gr ater 
Syri a ' o f King Ab dullah of Jordan in the 1940s and in 1951 
the Qudsi Plan (Syrian Prime Minister) proposed in th 
Arab League for a f deration of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan 
1 
and Iraq . For the Ba'th these projects were simply 
papering over mu ch deeper cracks in society which call d 
f or so c ial tran sformation to precede Arab unity . The 
Arab Leagu e, at any rate for Ba'th theorists was not the 
ideal instrument for leading the Arabs to a greater 
c orporate a wareness of themselves as a united nation, 
as within its Charter it perpetuated Arab state 
sov reignty . Bitar, the editor of al-Ba'th wrote 
accordingly on 24 February 1951 : 
It is an illusion to waste time discussing unity 
in the corners of the Arab League which acts 
secretly and openly for the maintenance of 
partition . The road to unity lies in the 
establishment of popular g~vernment in every 
part of the Arab homeland . 
In later s peeches and writings Bitar developed a more 
pragmati c and systemati c approach towards unity than 
h i therto evid ent in Aflaq's argument that the basis of a 
s u cc ess fu l nationalist movement entailed 'moral and 
spiritual regeneration of society' . But looking for more 
obvious and concrete obstacles standing in the way of 
Arab unity , he wrote : 
1 
Th real problem is the problem of national 
lead ership : The leadership of national action 
idal al-Ba'th, vol. 1, op. cit . , p.220j ibid, vol . 2, 
p . 9J ff. Abu Jaber, op . cit . , p . 24 . 
2 
idal al-Ba'th. vol . 2, p . 9J ff . 
Chang would r mov th fals 
and substi tut them with r al 
1 
on 
d rs 
s.l 
Placing a differ nt mphasis on Afl aq ' s thesis of th 
morally d egen rat Arab society, Bitar argu d that it 
was the 1 ad rs of th people who had 1 d th P opl 
into a situation of moral degenera y . Th Y were a 
class apart, h wrote , who had no conc ption of th 
n eeds of the peopl b cause ' they wer not of th 
p ople' . For Bitar th lead rs of the various Arab 
state s repres nted self-c ntre d elites moving from 
on regal master (i . e . colonialism, imp rialism) to 
anoth r whil e stoop ing to placat their subjects with 
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superficia l reforms , in particular regarding Arab unity . 
In Bitar ' s thesis the ruling groups typified a ' rightist 
deviationist' mentality. The people on the other hand 
seeking national unity, social economic and political 
change were the ' left', or 'progressives ' . He wrote: 
The nature of the struggl e in Arab society is 
the fierc e fight between the progressives and 
revisionists of th ruling group. Therefore 
it is impossible to achieve national 
reconciliation whil e the division between the 
left and right remains. 2 
Th division between the 'right ' and ' left' was an 
unnatural social d e v elopment, resulting from capitalist 
and feudalist exploitation of the people . In the 
twentieth century this was exacerbated by imperialism 
' which had made reconciliation [between the two ] 
impossibl e , . J Therefore, drawing the logical concIusion, 
Bitar argued that the peopl e must fight to overthrow 
the xploiters of society thereby restoring the social 
. 4 
e quilibrium a nd ipso f a c to national conSClousness. 
According to Bitar it is wealth and social status 
which contributed to the ruler-rul d dichotomy in Arab 
soci ty . Indeed if his writings were not heavily 
1 
Bitar, . , a s- iya s ah al -Arabiyya Bayn al-Mabda Wa 
Tatabig [ Arab Politics Betwe en Principle and Practice ] 
Dar at -Tali ' ah, B irut, 1960), pp . 12-lJ . 
2 
Ibid . , pp . J8-9 . 
J 
Ibid . , p . 40. 
4 
Ibid . , p · 50, 12assim . 
overlad n with d m nds or Arab un'ty, on might Imost 
b Ii v that h was advocating social lass struggl 
similar to the Marxian conc pt. How v r .it is plain 
that Bitar ' s ultimat objectiv is substantially 
d iff r nt from the Marxist's. or Bitar, ther is an 
obvious corr lation betw n walth, 1 vat d social 
class status, privil g and opposition to Arab unity, 
while inv rsely, low so ial status, in om and g n r 1 
deprivat'on produc s yearnings for national unity. 
The sam th m choes 'through Aflaq ' s writings 
but th distinction is not primarily wealth and so ial 
status which commits a man to, oragainst Arab unity. 
Rath r as w have seen, it is more a question of ideals 
based on moral and spiritual valu s. 
xampl 
He wrote for 
We cannot therefor say that we have divided our 
nation into two class s in the Marxian sense. 
The man of r ligion, for exampl , srreads the 
s eds of fanaticism and he is poor while ] at 
the same time he is harming the people as much 
as the capitalist who exploits the labourers 
and the feudal lord the peasants. The problem 
is not an easy one and we hay to be careful 
that the national ideal should not b lost and 
confused with class interests when those who 
benefit from those interests sing cheatingly 
and dishonestly in the national interest to say 
th ir skins . 
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It is very important to notice the different emphasis 
which Afl aq and Bitar place on socialism in regard to 
Arab unity. Th ir ultimate obj ctives may have b en 
identical, but the way in which they sought to achi v 
th m can be se n to be substantially different . Bitar 
may b 3aid to repr sent the pragmatic national socialist 
trend which looked mor towards political solutions for 
attaining unity, provided they were far reaching nough 
to permit popular d mocratic gOY rnm nt free from 
imperialist and colonialist domination . Aflaq on th 
oth r hand, r pr s nt d the id alist national socialist 
tr nd which advocat d moral and spiritual transformation 
of soci ty as a nec ssary constitu nt of any political 
solution . H wrot in 1956 that 'uni ty is not a political 
proc dure b tw n stat s ... but a revolutionary struggle 
1 
Fi abil, op . cit . , pp.223-24 . 
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stag d by the p opl , .1 But th natur of this struggl 
(Inqilab) was not by any str tch 0 th imaginat"on 
social class struggl employing viol nc in ord r to 
compl t ly eradicat the intransigent opponents of 
unity but rather, as h wrot in th sam year : 
Th struggle that w have mad within our 
country is not charact ris d by spite 
but by goodn ss and righteousness The 
people should struggle against Lcapitalists, 
rulers and others] who stand in th way of 
unity of the Arab nation . .. in a positive 
loving spirit for this struggl is not 
because of gr edin ss for their wealth, of 
envy or spi t ,j)ut is due to lov of life 
its lf which th y ... h~nder Lin ] its 
development and growth . 
By implication the trend represented by Aflaq was 
less obviously motivated by social class struggl e p 
~---
than the one represented by Bitar . In a sense th 
idealists believed that the successful criterion for 
revolutionary struggle lay in loyalty and sincerity 
to the cause of Arab unity . Thus, conceivably, a rich 
oil sheikh might be sincerely dedicated to the cause of 
u nity while a poor peasant in the field might not. 
Aflaq, of course , c rtainly thought that such examples 
wou ld be few and far between but, nevertheless, his 
ideologic al beliefs took cognisance of the fact . Bitar, 
on the other hand , it seems, had less confidence in the 
inherent goodness of man . For him, it was essential for 
the Ba ' th to adopt a more rigid code of social conduct 
i n order to lead the people against the ruling elit s 
and the f o reign economi c and political interests which 
they represented . Aflaq, on the other hand, wanted the 
Ba ' th to remain detac hed from any particular social 
c lass or grouping while seeking to indoctrinate the 
'whole' towards a greater appreciation of Unity, Freedom 
and So c iali s m. 
Let us now observe how th se two trends influenc d 
party ideology in its attitude to and relations with, 
Pr sid nt 
unity . 
asir of Egypt regarding the question of Arab 
1 
Ibid . , p.2l8. 
2 
bid . , p.224 . 
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iii: Formation 
of 
Unity 
Egyptian Id ologica1 Attitudes Towards Arab Unity 
Th Free Offic rs who s iz d pow r on 23 July 1952 , 
w re not idealists in the Ba ' thist s ns , but soldi rs 
motivated by imm diate pragmatic conc rns. A radio 
communique broadcast in the nam of G n ral Muhammad 
Teguib shortly after the ' revolution ' stated : 
Egypt has b en passing through a trying 
period of corruption and insecurity which 
has had a profound ffect upon the Army. 
Selfish and corrupt elements caus d the 
Army ' s defeat in the Palestinian War. After 
the war was over the traitors conspired against 
the Army and left Egypt without any protection 
whatever . This is why the Army has decided 
to purge itself and put the affairs of our 1 
country in the hands of men whom we can trust . 
Rationalis ation about the importance of the revolution in 
terms of history and th Arab world came later . P rhaps 
the offi c er to give the most thought to this was Colonel 
Gamal [si c , Jamal] Abd an- asir who after 1954 was to 
emerge as the undisputed leader of the Revolutionary 
Command Counc il (RCC) . In his Philosophy of the 
Revolution (Falsafat ath- Thawra) of 1953, it was argued 
that the 23 July revolution was inevitable insofar as the 
people of all nations had the right to live in freedom 
and security . Denied this freedom th y were justified in 
overthrowing the despotic government. H nce with reference 
to tpe Free Officers who had led the military putsch 
which overthrew King Farouk ' s government, he wrote: 
1 
Our revolution demanded that we should stand 
in a row and forget the past , while another 
revolution forc d us to restor the lost dignity 
or moral values and not forget the past. This 
was not my will; nor the will of those who took 
part in the revolution of 23 July . It was the 
will of fat , of the history of our nation 
(Egypt~an) and the stage it is passing through 
today . 
e~uib, M. , Egypt's D stiny (Victor Gollancz, London, 
1955), p.40. 
2 
asser, Gamel Abd 1, Th Philosophy of the Revolution 
(E c onomica Books : Buffalo, 1959), p.40 . 
guib, for xampl , interpr t d th 23 July 
revolution as a desp rate mov by young army offi c rs 
to 'wip th slat cl an and to b gin all ov r aga'n ' 
For him th revolution was condition d by events 
immediately preceding it, such a s th Pal stinian war , 
th mounting moral d pravity of the Farouk gOY rnm nt 
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and so on . asir on the other hand rationalis d, some what 
like Aflaq, that the Free Offi c ers wer m n motivat d by 
higher ideals which compelled them to act on behalf of 
their people who were yearning for fr edom a nd social 
and politic al progress . He wrote: 
Fate has so will e d that w should b on the 
cross roads of the wo rld . Often we have b en 
th road which invaders took . In certain 
circumstances we found it impossible to explain 
the factors latent in the soul of o ur nation 
without due c onsideration of these circumstances. 
In my o p inion we cannot overlook th history of 
Egypt und er the Pharaohs or the reaction betwe n 
the Greek spirit and ours , the Roman invasion and 
the Muslim conquests and the waves of Arab 
migrations that followed . 2 
asir 's interpretation of the Egyptian nation in 
history and the influences which moulded its evolutionary 
transmutation, has much in common with Aflaq ' s national 
mythology (Fig . 1). Yet it is of vital importance to 
notice one important distinction. asir, for example, 
was writing romantically about the Egyptian 'nation ' 
which, in his opinion, ' a cted' its historical role quit 
separately from the Arab nation as conceived in Aflaq ' s 
national mythology. Indeed if their romantic interpr tat ions 
of history were to be pursued to their logical conclusions, 
it might be a rgued that the invaders who despoiled the 
historic Egyptian nation were the victorious generals o f 
the Arab-Isla mic Umma (Fig . 1, epoch two) of which Aflaq 
was so proud. Contrariwise, the foreign rs who led to 
the breakdown of the Arab-Islami c Umrna were the Egyptians, 
among others . 
D spite the romantic languag of the Philosophy of 
the Revolution, it is important to notice that asir was 
articulating a well- stablished tradition that Egypt was 
1 
guib , op. ci t ., p . 146 . 
2 
ass r, op. cit., p .49 . 
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a uniqu national ntity in the Arab world . In th 1940s, 
ahas Pasha had sought to nsur Egyptian h g mony in 
th Middle East at th e xp nse of' s h m s for gr at r 
Arab unity such as wer propos d by th Hash mit st t s 
of Iraq and Jordan . 1 Ind ed for c nturi s ther had b 
trad itional rivalry in this part of th Middl East 
b t we n the 
control of th 
ile and the states of th Two Riv rs for 
2 land lying betwe n th m . Th mbodim nt 
n 
o f respect for Arab state sover ignty in th Arab L agu 
Charter o f 1945 was in many resp c ts th product of 
Egyptian Midd le Eastern poli c y to ensure that states such 
a s yria a nd Lebanon were not incorporated into the 
Has h mite domains . J 
Th Philosophy of the Revolution was, therefor, 
simply rationalising a tradition which had been a major 
plank in the government overthrown by the Free Officers 
on 2J July 1952. Indeed the furthest that asir was 
prepared to go to accommodate Egyptian foreign poli cy 
interests with those of other Arab states was solidarity 
of purpose to withstand foreign domination of the Arab 
4 
world . Only the slightest hint that Egypt might be 
prepared to work for a policy of Arab unity was to be 
f ound in the concept of the Three Circles in which he 
envisioned Egypt ' s future destiny as being linked firstly 
to th Arab world, secondly to Africa and thirdly to the 
Islamic world . 5 
On So c ial and Political Revolution : 
With the overthrow of Farouk ' s regime asir came to 
believ e that political revolution was inadequate to enthuse 
the people to fall in behind the new regime . The Egyptian 
1 
A very good discussion on this is .given in Seale , op . cit . , 
Chap . J , passim . 
2 
Faris , . A. , What Chance a Unified Arab State, 1958 . I 
am indebted to th late Jabih Amin Faris for kindly letting 
me use this unpublish d manuscript while "\vorking as his 
Research Associate at the American University of Beirut in 
1967 . 
J 
eale, op . cit. , p . 2J, Eassim . 
4 
asir, op . ci t . , pp.7 0-41. 
5 
Ibid . , pp . 7 0 -78 . 
P opl , h argu d in th PhilosoEhy 
h d for centuri s b n h Id n subs rvi nc to d spoti 
1 a d rs nd h nc had los t th ir ability to r spond to 
th order . 1 M ntally new they w r apath tic and 
ac cepted the chang of government as s mply anoth r 
passing phase over which th y had no control. Thus 
a sir cam to th sam conclus ion r ach d by Aflaq 
mor than a decad b for, that political r volution to 
be meaningful h a d to be ac compani d by a process of 
con t inuing social r volution which morally and 
spiritually regenerat d society to look to th future 
as to the present with a s ns e of purpos or national 
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mlSSlon . But having lost this s nse of mission through 
centuries of foreign domination and despotic governm nt, 
the people had to b r -taught by the informed 
r volutionary vanguardJ - the Free Officers of the RCC. 
asir ' s conception of social r volution in the 
Philos oEhy of the Revolution was expressed in romantic 
non-legalistic terminology. Like the Ba'th ' s conception 
of revolutionary struggl (Ingilab), asir ' s social 
revolution was portraye d as a continuing evolutionary 
force transforming the face of society at all levels in 
a ccordanc e with the humanitarian ideals of the inform d 
revolutionary v anguard of the people . 
It is important to notice at this point that the 
role envisi oned for the RCC had much in common with that 
devised by Aflaq for the Ba ' th several years before . For 
example , a certain Promethean character was attr ibuted 
to the Free Officers o f the RCC who were seen to be 
motivated by f ate or d estiny t o uplift the fallen 
Egyptian nation. Ind eed within asir ' s concept of ' ideal 
leadership ' ther can be detected the s eds of future 
authoritarianism . What would happen, one wonders, if the 
Ba ' th and asir propos d to work together for a political 
obj ctiv such as Arab unity? Would they agree to for go 
or compromise th ir monopoly of enlightenment and of 
truth? We shall s e further de lopments in this field 
lat r in this chapter . 
1 
bid . , p · 5l . 
2 
Ibid . , pp . J8-40 . 
J 
Ibid . , p .J2 . 
Ba'th- asir Ideological Agreem nt to Establish th 
Unit d Arab Republo 
B twe n 1955-57 th most outspoken advocat of 
Arab unity was th yrian Ba'th, lat r in 1956-57 to b 
assist d by its Jordanian and raqi bran hes . Aft r 
initial hostility towards the Egyptian regime, (1952 -54) 
Ba ' th leaders such as Aflaq, Bitar and IIurani cam to 
see in asir a man fated to 1 ad th Arab people to 
independence and unity. At th signing of th military 
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and economic assistance pact between Syria, Saudi Arabia 
and Egypt, Ba ' th leaders met with ' as ir for the first 
time and pressed him to nter into formal unity 
discussions between Syria and Egypt. Wh n Bitar was 
appointed Syrian Foreign Minister in June 1956, th Ba ' th 
was abl to press mor ffectively for Syro-Egyptian 
unity as the first st p towards overall Arab unity . Yet 
asir resisted Ba'thist pressures for the reasons we have 
enumerated . But rath r than completely reject unity 
overtures which might have disillusioned the Ba'th and 
aided the opponents of Cairo, asir kept Syria and the 
Ba ' th close to his political orbit (with vague promises 
of unity) by a series of military, economic and cultural 
agreements between 1955-57 . But when pressed to enter 
into more formal arrangements for unity, he told th 
Ba ' th that the time was inopportune in view of Western 
pressures on the Arab world and the likelihood that the 
West would intervene to sabotage any unity agreement. 
Ba ' thist leaders on the other hand who were ideologically 
obsessed with the need to formalise Arab unity, argued 
that by entering into unity Arab states would be 
strengthening their base against imperialist encroachments . 
asir, however, beli ved otherwise. lIe wanted at least 
a minimum of five years (from 1957) to prepare for unity 
and to ensure its succ ss when fully implemented. Why 
then did he change his mind and enter into unity with 
Syria on 1 February 1958? Was he suddenly converted to 
Ba ' thism? 
asir's references to Arab unity must be seen as 
part of his strategy to facilitate Egyptian foreign and 
domestic policy int rests. Ind ed in a sense this strategy 
was int r-active. For xample,his firm stand on Arab 
lib ration at the b ginning of 1955 was designed, among 
things, to strength n the domestic bas against such parties 
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as th Muslim Broth rhood and to r mov th stain of 
hav ng p rmitt d th Br" tish to op rat th ir bas in 
S u ez d u ring th two years aft th 23 July r volut" n " 
In championing Arab lib ration asir was plac d in a 
strong r position to ensur Egypt "an h g mony in th 
Arab world . In mid-1956 continual r £ r nc s to th n d 
for Arab national solidarity help d him to withstand the 
Anglo-Fr nch-Isra Ii attack on 29-30 October 1956, by 
nsuring that stat s such as Iraq did not take him from 
th r ar in Syria in his moment of crisis with th 
Western powers. Indeed had uri as-Said attempted such 
an action through op n i lprasion, his r gime would have 
r ceived universal cond mnation from millions of 
enthusiastic asir supporters . In 1957 asir ' s strat gy 
of working for solidarity through veiled referenc s to 
Arab unity suc ceed d in keeping Syria closely orient d 
to wards Cairo while at the same time warding off Iraqi 
encroachments . Mahmu~ Riyad referred to asir's attitude 
towards unity in 1957 as follows : 
All Syrian party leaders claimed to be in favour 
of union, but the Ba ' th were alone in actively 
planning, in se king and demanding practical 
steps to bring it about. Our policy was in fact 
to avoid union . We knew that it would arouse 
all the Powers against us (i . . Baghdad Pact plus 
the United States committed to the Eisenhower 
Doctrine in the Middle East) andlthat we would 
b accused of annexing Syria ... . 
R ferences to Arab unity do not exist in asir ' s 
speech s befor 1955. Ind ed it was only after relation-
ships between Nasir and the Baghdad Pact powers began to 
det riorate in late 1955 that vague references clouded 
with emotive language can be detected. For example, 
following the signing of the Syro-Egyptian defence pact 
in October 1955 asir said : 
1 
2 
This agreement is th pre Iud to a new futur 
History shows that if Syria and Egypt unite 
they will prot ct th East rn world from all 
dang rs that may threaten it . That is what took 
place at the tim of the Crusades. Wh n Syria 
allied h rs If to Egypt (under aladdin lat 
tw lfth century) together th y prot cted the 
Islamic world from the dangers that it feared . 
Today, Syria and Egypt2will protect the Arab 
world against Zionism. 
S al , op . cit . , p . 3l4 . 
al , op . cit . , p.253, quot d from al-Ahram (Cairo), 
9 ov mb r 1955 . 
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asir f s referenc , how v r, was d Or t d to f a n w futur f 
omm nc ? asir, f or yria and Egypt, but wh n would it 
appar ntly, was in no hurry to formalis onstitutOonal 
proc dings , if at all he rally nt rtain d such an 
id al . asir f s Arab policy during 1955-56 was rath r 
dir c t d towards attaining Arab solidarity under th 
1 adership of Egypt in ord r to pr vent th Baghdad Pact 
po w rs from consolidatOng their hold over th Middl East 
and , most important of all for asir , incorporating Syria _ 
th land betw en the ile and th Two Rivers - within 
their territorial orbit. 
It is i n deed possible to corr lat asir ' s ref r nces 
to Arab unity with the d terj_ora tion of political 
relations with Iraq , Britain, France, the United Stat s 
between 1955-57 . For example following the nationalisation 
of the Sue z Canal, h said in the Al xandria speech on 
26 July, which included a special appeal to Syria: 
We shall pro c ee d together , brethren, united as 
one man wi th one heart in ord r to achieve the 
pr i n ciples of tru dignity and true grandeur, 
and in ord er to establish throughout the Arab 
homeland and Arab nation a true political 1 
ind ependenc e and a true economic independence . 
Yet in this extract actual reference to substantive Arab 
unity proceedings is non-existent . Instead Arab unity 
is veiled in highly emotive language and projected into 
the indeterminate future, ' We shall proceed ' - but when, 
the Ba ' th asked? evertheless by adopting this attitude , 
asir was in fact achieving Syro-Egyptian solidarity to 
offset the expect d Western reprisals against Egypt for 
the nationalisation of the Canal . A similar theme with 
perhaps more obvious reference to Arab as opposed to 
purely Egyptian nationalsim (see, Philosophy of the 
Revolution) can b se n in his speech on 12 August 1956 : 
1 
2 
Th voices in the Arab world b gan to say that 
it is not the Suez Canal, but the Arab Canal . 
Arab nationalism b gan to appear in the best 
form and clear st meaning .. . I read an article 
on Arab nationalism in a for ign n wspaper and 
it said, ' Arab nationalism became a danger after 
1 952 '. Th n I thought, we as Arabs must be a 2 
singl nation. We must fight as a single nation . 
Ibid . , p . 261 . 
Binder, op . cit . , pp . 21+-12. 
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Cl arly to 'fight as a singl nation' j s som thing quit 
diff r nt :from b ing a singl nation. R .f r n to unity 
is oblique in this xt act . What, how v r, do s stand 
out is the pr ssing n d for Arab solOdarity to maint 
the indep ndence o.f th Canal - th Arab Canal - to 
whose direct advantat ? - Egypt's. 
Id ological Attitudes towards Arab Unity 
If ideologically, policy were devised on its 
applicability to Arab unity, th n th re was littl for 
the Ba ' th to commend in the Egyptian r volution of 
2J July 1952 . Betw en 1952 -55 al-Ba ' th d scribed th 
in 
r volution as littl more than a military putsch executed 
by a junta lacking progressive ideals and popular backing . 
For example al-Ba' th s ta ted on 2 J May 1954 : 
The Egyptian government attain d power through 
coup d ' etat and not by popular struggle based 
on the principles of Unity, Freedom and 
Socialism of the Arab nation ... The absence 
of its popular base forces its leaders (RCC) 
towards revisionary states which subscribe 
towards imperialism and colonialism. l 
Military government in any form was an abhorrent 
c oncept to Ba'th ideals. In Syria, for example, the party 
took a similarly hostile attitude towards military 
dictators such as Husni az-Za'im and Adib Shishakli, 
1949-54 .
2 
Indeed it was not until 1955 that the Ba'th 
in Syria b gan to change its attitude towards the Egyptian 
r gime . What brought about the change? 
Following asir's severe condemnation of the Baghdad 
Pact and his successful negotiation of arms with th 
East rn bloc in 1955, the Ba'th like millions of Arabs 
v rywh re came to believe that th y had found a new 
Saladdin to liberate the Arab world from imperialism. 
Faris wrote : 
1 
2 
J 
Until then (Arab masses) they moved in a vicious 
circle of frustration and despair . With the 
signature of th arms deal, the jinx was broken, 
and the person whose name was associated with it 
became overnight th focal point of Arab hopes. J 
idal al-Ba'th, vol. 2, op . cit . , p . 257 . 
, Part 2, Chap . 2. 
Faris, op. it., p. 6 . 
It is doubtful, how v r, wh th r sir actually 
int nd d to come upon th Arab stag as a h ro whos 
objectiv was to liberat the Arab hom land from 
imp rialism and colonialism . Rath r h was pr cipitat d 
into the role of an Arab champion p rhaps as an indir ct 
result of Egyptian foreign policy in th Middl East. 
Ind ed it is possibl to argue that th ev nts which 
h r Ided asir as th n w Arab champion were littl mor 
than aspects of traditional Egyptian for ign policy . 
Opposition to Iraq for subscribing to the Baghdad Pact, 
(February 1955) was as much an Egyptian protest against 
suspected Hashemite expansionist t ndencies through the 
Pact as it was an attack against West e rn imperilaism . The 
Czechoslovakian arms deal was, of course, the first Arab 
arms deal with a Communist country. While on the on 
hand , it underlined the independence of an Arab leader 
to choos e his friends thereby breaking traditional 
orientation to the West, it might also be argued that the 
actual reason for the arms deal was asir's humiliating 
1 d feat at Gaza in March 1955 by Israel. Indeed in 1956-57, 
many of Nasir ' s actions which confirmed him in the role 
of the undisputed Arab champion and for the Ba'th the 
focal point of Arab unity, could in fact have been 
interpreted, if emotional sentiments had not been running 
so high, as manifestations of Egyptian foreign or domestic 
interests. For example, the nationalisation of the uez 
Canal in July 1956 was certainly an anti-colonial move, 
but it also resulted from the need of the Egyptian 
government to patch up a flagging economy and to give 
substance to the fact that it would not permit foreign 
bases or influence to undermine the independence of th 
government . 
Clearly the reason for asir ' s sudden ideological 
volte-face was not a sudden conversion to Ba ' thism . 
Rath r in the formation of the United Arab Republic he 
was employing an extension of pr vious strategy which 
call ~ among other things, for Arab solidarity in the fac 
of imperialist encroa hm nts. But later in 1957 the 
1 
Th W st rn arms partity agre ment of 1950 betw en the 
'Arab stat s and Israel was obviously found inad quat by 
sir v n for def n e purposes, henc his ne d to turn 
to th Soviet Union . 
political realiti s chang d consid rably r garding 
Syria . Betwe n 1955-57, h had suc ssfully k pt 
Syria on a string which he t w dl d to k P out of th 
Baghdad Pact . In ov mb r-D c ember 1957, yria was 
bing slowly pull d out of his grasp by his old n my 
uri as-Said, his W st rn allies, and by th local 
Communist party and leftist allies. 
asir was fac d with the choice of 1 tting Syria 
slip out of his grasp, thereby d"minishing Egyptian 
influenc e in the r gion or incurring the wrath of the 
Western powers by entering into constitutional union 
with Syria . He chos the latter proposition, perhaps 
encourag d by the thought that th Soviet Union would 
stand by the Arabs in the face of Western aggression . 
Se c ondly, he may have seen hims lf for the first time 
in the role o f a new Saladdin . But if he thought in 
terms of Arab unity, his conditions for entering into 
unity with Syria were all to Egypt ' s advantage . As w 
shall s ee in Part 2, these entailed complete c essation 
o f all political party activity, coupl ed to assurances 
that the military would refrain from interfering in 
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politi cs. Finally he ensured that in the union, supreme 
po wer would remain in his own hands . 
aive Attitudes of the Ba ' th Towards the United Arab 
Republic 1958-61 
If the Ba'th's ideological spokesmen such as Aflaq 
and Bitar were aware of asir's political motives in 
entering into union, they were prepared to dismiss them 
as irrelevant , in the belief that the inherent power of 
Arab nationalism would obviate all outstanding political, 
economic and social differences . 
Shortly after th formation of the UAR, the type of 
naiv thinking which drew the Ba'th uncritically into 
asir's orbit can b seen in an extract from an articl 
by Aflaq . He argued that the UAR 'is a revolution in 
Arab thinking and a guarantee of freedom for which it was 
specially design d' . He continued, 'it would contribut 
to the liberation of all Arab t rritori s from imp rial·sm 
and th achievem nt of ov raIl Arab unity ' 1 A short 
whil lat r he publish d an art·cl whi h attempt d to 
rationalis th formation of th UAR in terms of popular 
d mands for unity str tching back many y ars . H continu d : 
We (Ba ' th party) always us d to say that we 
are an xpr ssion of the maturity of Our 
nation (i .. Arab) ; w don't creat our 
nation it cr at s us and w take our str ngth 
f rom it ; w interpr t its wish sand announc 
it s wil l . Our str ngth woul d not have been 
worth ment i oning if it were not dependent 
upon the stren gth o f the nation and this 
hidden c ontinuous consciousness in every 
segment of its parts. If the Arab nation 
were not prepared for the Ba'th (lit . 
renaissanc e) and for the great m ssage which 
a waits it , these movements (i . e . Algeria, 
Tunisia et c ., ) would not have appeared at 
the same time Lwith ] the same principles 
objectives Land methods of ] struggle . This 
is the best proof that this nation (UAR) is able 
to go on with conviction to lift itself to the 
stage of unified struggle after these events 
and experiences have given us tangible evidence 
that our nation (Arab) is maturing and is 
2 prepared . . . 
Bitar wrote in similar fashion: 
The unity struggle between Egypt and Syria 
is the fulfilment of a dream that has dominated 
the Arab conscience for hundreds of years . .. It is 
a step towards Arab unity to which Arab people 
aspire as there only hope . J 
An air of unrestrained optimism pervaded a good deal 
of Ba ' thist and g neral Syrian attitudes towards unity on 
the ve of the formation of the UAR . The astute editor of 
the Beirut daily an- ahar summed up the situation with th 
c omment: ' The Syrians are expecting unity while the Egyptians 
ar waiting for th words of asir'. In short, behind all 
the emotional sympathi s for unity in Syria,the man on whom 
the suc cess or failure of the union would rest would be 
asir, the ' unquestioned' ruler of Egypt . 
1 
Arab World, 12 February 1958, quoting from ar-Ra ' i al - Amm . 
(Arab World is a Daily Digest of Arab Press Opinion and 
Busin ss N ws, Published in Beirut and Edited by A.M. Tam r). 
2 
Fi abil, op. it., pp . 264-65 . 
J 
Bitar , op. cit . , pp.129-J2 . 
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n nt ring into union with asir, Ba'th 1 a d rs 
s e m to hav giv n v ry littl att nt'on to th r cord of 
his dom stic administr tion aft r 1955. His social'st 
policies they accept d as g n rally progr ssiv , though 
p rhaps lacking an ffective ' national orientation ' . 
Th's , however, they b eli v d could b rectifi d within 
th proposed ational Union in which th y hop d to play 
a promin nt part, if under a diff r nt nam as th 
ideological spokesm n . l Bu t in hoping to harness asir 
to their own id ological disposition, Ba ' th lead rs were 
shutting their ey s to the fac t that he had crush d all 
politi c al parties in Egypt which had tried to harness , 
dire c t or even influence his domestic administration . 
Underneath the v eneer of the popular champion of the 
Arab masses, a sir was 
'enlightened policies' 
at heart a dict ator, albeit with 
(See·, Philosophy of the Revolution) . 
It took only s e veral months a ft er the formation of 
the UAR in February 1958 for relations to deteriorate 
between the Ba'th and a sir . By December 1959 all Ba ' th 
members in the government of the UAR had either been 
s a cked or resigned in protests against asir's high-handed 
dictatorial methods. 
ideologically? 
Ho w can this be explained 
FirstlY,we must take account of the obsessive 
idealism and political naivety of Ba'th leaders such Aflaq 
and Bitar who sold the party to asir in the belief that 
it would be accorded a prominent role within the UAR 
administration . asir , however, could not accept the 
existenc e of a part~ albeit within the ational Union , 
which claime d ideologically to have fashioned the sentiment 
which brought the UAR into being. As the President of 
the n w republic h also saw himself as the archite c t of 
its i d eo logical and politi c al orientations. Furthermore , 
he resented the e xis tenc e o f a party which believed that 
it h a d destiny on its side - that it had a monopoly o f 
truth from which to draw in the interests of the Arab 
people a s a whole . Such a party was _potentially a threat 
to asir 's co nc8pt of personal enlighten d leadership . 
1 
Int rview with Salah u d-Din Bitar, 16 ov mber 1967 . 
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H th refore proc d d to waken and discr dit th Ba ' th 
f inally forcing its m mb rs to withdraw in protest at 
th e nd of 1959 . 1 
Th basic mistak of th Ba ' th in nt ring into th 
UAR was the fact that it left v rything to chanc 
believing unrealistically that constitutional details 
c o u ld be finalised later. But what the Ba'th interpr t d 
as the dawn of a new mill nium in Arab history , turn d 
o u t to b little more than momentary popular euphoria 
fo r a man who had the ability to lift the minds and 
t ho u ghts of the Arab p ople above th ir degrading 
backwardness ~nd to give them a sense of dignity in the 
c ommunity of nations by his ' bold' fore ign policy and the 
r spe c t whi c h he arn d from the Afro-Asian nations at 
Ban d u ng . A year or so after the Syrian and Egyptian 
people had s ung the praises o f Arab unity, regional 
d i v ersities began to draw them apart . Being the larger 
part n er Egypt grad ually came to dominate every facet of 
life in the union . a s ir ' s own senior political and 
military personnel seemed to the Syrians to be drawn 
2 pri mari ly fr om Egypt . Ind eed if the Syrian and Egyptian 
peopl thought th y were members of the one Arab family 
s haring c ommon national ideals, when they attempted to 
trans late these into economic and political reality they 
f ound that c e n turies of separation and acquired regional 
p culiarities of culture and temperament had given them 
vastly different attitudes. 
Again the unity fervour which swept Syria into the 
arms of asir in February 1958 did not lead to other Arab 
states suddenly tearing down their regional frontiers . 
With the possible exception of Yemen, no other Arab state 
showed the slightest inclination to join the unity club . 
Iraq and Jordan, for example, seeing asir firmly entrenc hed 
in Syria (the land between the ile and the Two Rivers) , 
immediately entered into federal union as a natural 
reaction to offset asir's suspect d expansionist aims. 
Even f ollowing Qasim's overthrow of the Hashemite government 
1 
For the political details see Part 2 , Chap . J . 
2 
Interv i w with alah ud-Din Bitar, 17 ovember 1967 , 
Be irut . 
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of Iraq on 14 July 1958, with the subs qu nt br akdown 
of the f deral union, raq did not inclin towards th 
Cairo-Damascus axis. Rath r it maintain d an isolationist 
ori ntation, inclining after 1959 towards th oviet 
orbit . L banon sim"larly refrained from joining th 
UAR though she exp rienc d a civil war in so doing. 
As a final blow to the calculations of Ba'th id al "sts 
such as Aflaq,a military putsch on 28 S ptemb r 1961 1 d 
by disgruntled ' Syrian' army officers put the union, which 
had been labouring for som time,out of its misery . The 
mass of Syrian p ople who had only thr e and a half 
y ars earlier sung th praises of Arab unity stood 
apathetically on the side-lines, perhaps believing that 
if they were to undergo hardships and be subject to a 
dictatorial regime, it might as well have been by a 
Syrian rather than an Egyptian faction. Indeed, ev n 
in Egypt there was very little enthusiasm left for trying 
to salvage the union by military action. asir himself 
seemed to have tired through attempts to make the union 
work as he saw fit. Such was the waning sentiment for 
Arab national unity - the sentiment which had hoped for 
so much was crushed and disillusioned. What had gone 
wrong? Were the Arabs incapable of entering into union? 
Who was responsible for the breakdown of the UAR? Was 
secessionism a natural or unnatural movement? Why had 
the Ba'th agreed to dissolve itself in the UAR? Why had 
the Ba'th not done more to save the union from internal 
destruction? Why had Ba'th members withdrawn from the 
government of the UAR ? Why had the Ba'th not completely 
merged its identity with asir's to form a solid base 
for unity which could withstand internal and external 
chall nges? These and many other such questions wer to 
pre-occupy Ba'th party congress es from 1959 onwards. Let 
us follow some of these questions and accusations to s e 
how later Ba'th congr sses and ideological spokesmen tried 
to r solve or rationalise them. Let us also observe how the 
Ba'th emerged from the UAR. Our focus, as of previous 
chapt rs, will be primarily ideological. 
An Ideological Wat rshed: 
Th Ba'th ' s loss 01 pow r, influ n and pr stig 
and its subs quent withdrawal from th politi al lif 
of the UAR and its apparent unwillingn ss to d f nd th 
union at the mom nt of its demis reat d many s rious 
id ological divisions which w r to liv with the party 
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until the coup of 2J February 1966. The ational R ports 
of March 1960 and October 1961 contain th ss nce of 
th s di v isions. Both Reports could be said to be de ply 
critical of asir for his 'mishandling ' of the affairs of 
the union . The Report of March 1960 said, for exampl : 
The union should be revolutionary . .. 
permitting equal opportunities to both 
regions ... It should not be left to the 
Egyptian region alone to run the affairs 
of the state while neglecting the poten-
tialities and rich experiences of the 
Syrian region , especially on the level of 
organisation and national politics. This 
policy harmed th6 revolutionary struggle 
in other Arab countries and it played a 
significant part in the relapse of Jordan 
and the failure of the Iraqi revolution 
(14 July 1958) and it weakened the forces 
of the ideal of union in general. l 
The Report went on to criticise asir for his despotic 
individualistic rule, his police state methods, defective 
socialism, perpetuation of Egyptian self-interests, 
unpopular ation Union, weakening of unionist movements 
in the Maghrib, attacking the Ba'th for not possessing 
a clearly articulated ideology, and so on . The 
r signation of Ba ' th ministers in December 1959 was 
j ustified as an attempt to draw asir ' s attention to the 
need for more democratic systems of government to ensure 
. 2 the life of unlon . 
But alongside criti c ism of asir both Reports were 
deeply critical over the way in which the idealists 
(i . e . Af laq and Bitar) had led the party into union 
without any clearly defined political strategy . For the 
first time, and c rtainly not the last time in Ba'thist 
thinking , the term 'sci ntific' as applied to socialism 
1 
idal aI-Bath, vol . 4, op.cit . , p . lJJ . 
2 
Ibid ., pp . 149-52 . 
was adopted by th R ports, indi at "ng 
Aflaq ' s basic id olog"cal postulates. 
r action to 
For xampl 
It (Ba ' th) believ s that the national 
r volution is rated for the p opl and 
it w0rks to develop this r volution and 
to widen the scop for its util"sation on 
a scientific so ialist basis. Th socialist 
revolution works for the establishm nt of a 
society free from rank differ nc sand 
follows a plann d scientific policy in 
industrial "sation and d velopm nt of 
agricultur and r organisation of production 
and distribution of national walth . It 
determines the stag s of this plan ... in 
ac c ordanc with the economic and political 
conditions of the country . l 
' Scientific so c ialism ' as used above would seem to hav 
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been employed as a verbal reaction to th 'uni ty idealism ' 
which had ended the party in an inglorious r tr at from 
the politic al affairs of the UAR . What it entailed 
sub s tantively , ho wever, was not clarified in th Report . 
Ind e d, in its juxtaposition to nationalism,it might 
simply have been calling for a more determined and 
carefully planned popular movement for national unity . 
The ational Report of October 1961 also employed th 
term 'scientific ' to differentiate betw en the ' sound ' 
and the ' haphazard ' policies of the unionist idealists . 
For example : 
Th attitud e taken by the party was based 
to a great extent on its faith in the 
leader of the revolution of Egypt ( asir) 
and to his popularity .. . The party ' s 
attitude was not decided by objective 
conc rns as much as it was based on 
personal elements , which shows that they 
w re departing from the sound scientific 
methods expected to be followed by the 2 
Command of a socialist revolutionary party . 
The Report went on to a ccuse the party idealists of 
ncouraging an emotional rather than a scientific attitude 
towards unity among the members of the party and the Arab 
p ople . In this r spect, it submitted, the party leader-
ship had erred badly: 
1 
Ibid . , p . lJ7 . 
2 
Ibid ., p . 20J. 
P rty writOngs (i o . Aflaq l s) w r 
concentrating almost compl t lyon 
union and as for d mocracy or 
s o c ialism th y both k pt playing a 
minor role in th thinking of th 
parti s ans . Th distinctive charact r 
o f the Ba ' th was its national charact r. 
For exampl, v n th application from 
the party membership emphasis d Arab 
nationalism without mentioning socoalism ... 
this created in th partisans an motional 
rath r than a scientific outlook towards th 
° 1 . 
unlon ... 
Ideologically, th ma j or point of variance betwe n 
Aflaq (i . the id alists) and the pragmatic socialist 
reformers of th Fourth ational Congress lay in th 
value they gave to socialism in its relation to 
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nationalism. For example, Aflaq believed that socialism 
shou ld entail a revolution in men ' s thinking as well as 
progressive liberalisation of the political and economic 
system of the Arab Ination ' (see, Constitution) . What 
Aflaq was deeply afraid of was a situation in which a 
regional party organisation would develop a particular 
socialist variant which had no relationship to the whole 
(Arab nation) . Socialism, as he conceived of it, could 
only be fully realised and implemented with freedom, 
when the c ombined resources of the Arab world were pooled 
together through Arab unity . The advocates of ' scientifi 
so c ialism' on the other hand, did not at this stage deny 
the premise that so c ialisation of the whole was preferable 
to socialisation of a r gion or part. What they seem d 
to be asserting was the fact that the party had to involv 
the p ople in a more clearly articulated socialist programme 
with d e f inable political ob j ectives in order to demonstrate 
that its ideals could be experienced in part as a prelude 
to gr ater expectations in the whole . But this said, 
the problem of what valu to give to socialism became a 
c ont ntious point at issue which was to trouble th party 
thereafter. Would i , for example ntail greater emphasis 
on social class struggle? Would th re not be dangers in 
losing the national orientation of the Ba ' th in favour of 
a socialist orientation? If the party de e loped r gional 
socialist variants substantively, how w re they all to b 
1 
Ibid . , p . 203. 
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co-ordinated towards th ultimat obj ctive Arab national 
unity, baring in mind th diff ring stag s of 
d v lopm nt in th Arab world? 
onom'c 
A d e finitive r lationship between socialism and 
nationalism Was not, how v e r, th only probl m to b 
highlight d by the Ba ' th ' s involv ment in th UAR . As a 
condition for imm diate unity th idealist wing of th 
Ba ' th had agreed to t rminate the lif of th party in 
the UAR be lieving t h at it shared a common national 
ideology with President asir. How v r , substantive 
diff renc s of approach had develop d shortly aft r the 
formation o f the UAR and the Ba ' th felt obliged to withdraw 
fro m the polit ic a l life to the union in the belief that 
s rious ideo logica l differences had developed wi th 
Pr sident Nasir. T h e re were , however, factions h ad d 
by Abdul lah ar - Rimawi and Fuad Rikabi who argued that the 
UAR was more than President a si r , that it epitomised a 
new phase in the Arab struggle . Rimawi wrote: 
The birth of the UAR has come to declare, for 
the first tim in modern Arab history, and for 
hundreds of years , the establishment of a united 
Arab state in which (a) there is no hostile and 
basic contradiction, in terms of will or inter st, 
between the people and the government, and (b) 
there is no nostile or fundamental contradiction, 
in terms of will or interest, between the 
government and the Arab nation . l 
Rimawi held that the consciousness and aspirations of the 
whole Arab people were concretely manifested in the 
2 policies of the UAR . It marked a n w phase in Arab 
struggle and constitut d the focal point of a revolutionary 
movement to liberate the Arab homeland from imperialism 
and c olonialism . ] It was a landmark in Arab socialism 
and Arab u nity ' raising them from the level of slogans 
to obj ctiv reality, . 4 So far Rimawi had said nothing 
to distinguish him from the idealist wing of the Ba ' th . 
But his conclusion, however, went on to argue that in 
opposing asir 's poli cies Ba ' thists and others were 
1 
Rimawi, A . , al-Manti g ath-Thawr i Li al-Harakah al - Qawmiyya 
al -Arabiyya [Revolutionary Logic of the Modern Arab 
ationalist Movement ] (Dar al-Ma ' arifah, Cairo, First Ed . , 
19(1), p .95 . 
2 
Ibid . , p . 40. 
] 
Ibid. , pp .84-86 . 
L,. 
Ibid . , p . ]]. 
indir ctly und rmining th Arab nationalist mov m nt 
epitomised in th UAR . l Thus the Ba'th should suff r 
the pangs of pain and distr ss of asir's polici s 
in ord r to fulfil and expand th unionist s ntim nt 
among all Arab people. By withdrawing from th union 
in opposition to asir ' s dictatorial polici s, Rimawi 
implied, the Ba ' th was assisting the imperialists who 
wer sch ming to und rmine the lif of th union . 2 
Th Fourth ational Congress, however, did not 
accept Rimawi ' s argum nts and inst ad h was expell d 
from the party . This Congress was highly critical of 
the idealists for dissolving the party in the UAR on 
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th grounds of id ological affinity with Presid nt asir . 
Quit clearly, it was argued, the party's painful 
experiences in th UAR indic ated that it had a separate 
mission to perf orm and thii could not be accomplished 
in a situation in which a dictator ruled the UAR with 
an i ron hand denying even the most lementary popular 
f reedoms . The Report of Oc tober 1960 following the 
Congress stated in this respect : 
The party sees that its mission at the 
present time has become more n cessary 
and important . The spreading of military 
rule and military mentality (i . e . oblique 
reference to Nasir in the UAR) in many 
Arab regions has put on the party's shoulders 
th responsibility for organising the masses 
in the face of this new danger. The spreading 
of national consciousness between the Arab 
people will enable the party to concentrate 
on democracy and socialism and create in its 
members an objective scientific spiritlin 
harmony with the hopes of the masses . 
But even among members who were unwilling to support 
Rimawi)there ' were som who believed that the Ba'th could 
b st fulfil its national mission by advocating an 
immediate and unconditional return to unity with asir 
follo wing secession in September 1961 . Later this wing 
1 d by Sami Sufan seceded from th Ba'th party to form 
the So c ialist Unionist Movement ( UM) . Then there were 
others such as Aflaq who, after their initial enthusiasm 
1 
Ibid ., p . 40, passim . 
2 
b i d ., p . lJ4 , passim . 
J 
idal at-Ba'th, vol . 4, p . 206 . 
for unity, adopt d a mor cautious approach towards 
futur unity sch m s . Whil e on the on hand, th Y . f lt 
committ d to advocat a r turn to union with asir it 
was not to be at th price of sacrifi ing party id a1 
A communique issued by the Ba'th on th 29 S pt mb r 1961, 
expr ssed the attitude of this wing as follows: 
Th Ba ' th party f els that th r n wal of 
union b tween Syria and Egypt requir s 
going to th p opl and organising th ir 
forces and strength ning th ir working 1 
ranks in a popular democratic system ... 
tudied union, or union with conditions for ensuring 
popular democratic government or coll ctive leadership 
was the ideological commitment of this wing of the Ba'th . 
At the other nd of the ideological spectrum th r 
was a wing which gathered around Akram IIurani following 
secession . It was, like its leader, d eply hostil to 
Nasir for the failure of the union . Unlike the more 
orthodox wings of the Ba'th it was opposed to any futur 
unity venture with asir. Indeed it pr ferred to build 
up a local power bas in Syria with perhaps unity being 
a very long term pro j ect . To party purists, however, 
this platform was down right heresy which was labelled 
regionalism . Ther were , however, senior leaders of the 
. 2 party such as Bltar who were so disillusioned by the 
failure of all their id als that for a while they subscribed 
to the regionalist point of view. 
Th proverb, 'enter in haste repent at leisure ', 
could very well sum u p the ideological confusion existing 
in th Ba ' th following secession in S ptember 1961. 
Aflaq's ideological postUlates which had been inscribed 
in the Constitution of 1947 had been found to be inadequate . 
Vague unity ideals had not rased regional, political , 
social and economic diversities. Arab states had not 
rush d to join the unity club following the formation of 
the UAR . The Ba'th had lost influenc in the UAR and in 
Secessionist regime . Many young men who had join d th 
Ba'th in the mid-1950s severed ties with it,seeing it as 
1 
Ibid . , vol . 6, p.1J . S ,The Relapse of Se c ssion : 
Party Communigue, 29 September 1961. 
2 
Int rvi w, Bitar, 17 ovemb r 1967, Beirut. 
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nothing mor than a onfus d lit addi t d to high 
i d als without substantiv foundations. o hers s d d 
to form i d ologi al br akaway movem nts in th hop that 
th Y c o u l d achieve more lasting pragmati obj ctiv s. 
asir , f u rthermor , was d ply embit r d towards th 
party for sabotaging, as h believ d, the union by 
withdrawing from its political lif Aflaq, th 
id ological found r of th party had b n s v r ly 
c rit ·cis d for p rs onally leading th party into an 
impasse i n the u nion, and there was a movem nt in th 
Th ird ational Congr ss to replace his personal lead rship 
with ' col l ectiv 1 ad rship , .l In brief, the Ba ' th was 
in an infinitely worse dilemma following th UAR than 
it had e v er been in the past. ow many ideologi cal 
s poke s me n and f actions w re p u lling and pushing to apply 
t h ei r own interpr etations to the basic party slogan 
Uni ty , Freedom and So c ial i s m. It is to examine th se 
i d eological and other qu e s t i ons in the ideological platform 
a d opt ed by the Ba ' th that we t u rn in the next section . 
iv : Post - Secession I d eological Orientations 
T h e Afl a gi an Synthesis : Re-evaluation 
B t ween the Fourth and the Sixth Iational Congr sses 
of the Ba ' th , one of the most serious charges to be 
levelled insid and outside the party was that it lacked 
. 2 
a clearly definable and ob j ectively realisable ldeology . 
Following the party ' s seizure of power in Iraq, 8 Febru ary 
and Syria 8 March 196J, the need for a more practical 
and ob j ective statement of beliefs became vitally 
nec ssary if the party were to r tain the confidence of 
the p ople and pu rsue its revolutionary mission . The 
person , o f c ourse, to suffer the most serious criticism 
f or wo o l l y t h inking was Michel Aflaq,the Secretary-General 
since 1947 . One particularly itriolic critic of Af laq ' s 
1 
ee , Part 4 . 
2 
a f a d i , M. , Hizb al B ' th : Ma ' sa al-Maulid , Ma ' sa 
al - iha ' y~ [ The Ba 'th Party : Tragedy of The Bi~th and 
Trag d y o f Th e End] (Dar al-Adab, First Ed . , Bel rut 1964), 
p . 212 . T his writ r is v ery pro- asir and in s ympathy 
and ou tlook is clos to Abdullah ar-Rimawi . 
ideology was Ali Salih a!di. Th ov rthrow of th 
BaVth in Iraq on 18 ov mb r 196J,h attribut d to h 
la k of clearly d flned ldeologi al obj ti v s. 
D f nding his own 1 ad rship of th Iraqi R gional 
Command (IRC) b tw en F bruary- ov mb r 196J, h said : 
At the beginning of th R volution (8 F bruary) 
we looked ev rywh re for so ialist thinkers 
who might help us but could find none .. I beli v 
that the causes of the set-bacl in Iraq go de p r 
than the mistak s of this or that individual. 
5 
They are a result of the social constru tion of 
the Party and th obscurity of socialist planning. 
We were a Party tossed by th urrents of sentiment 
and emotion. W were unable to control our Party 
and that is why we landed in Abdul asservs lap 
and why now some members are even advocating th 
1 dissolution of th Party. 
Sa'di's criticism of the ideological poverty of th 
Ba'th represented a pinnacle of a much deeper reaction 
among the younger members of the party in Syria and Iraq. 
Indeed since the party's dissolution in the UAR, its 
withdrawal from the union and se ession, vocal criticism 
of the party's ideologi al poverty grew until it burst 
into th open at th Sixth ational Congress in Damascus 
in October 196J. But before considering the solutions 
proposed by this Congress~let us firstly turn to consider 
how Aflaq and a group of ideological reformers close 
to him attempted to defend the 7 0r thodox line ! (i . e . 
Aflaq Vs ideological schema) following the crisis of 
confid ence in the basic ideologi al postulates of the Ba'th. 
In an article in th Lebanese Ba t thist organ, 
as-Sahafa, 11 May 1960, Aflaq had ritics such as ar-Rimawi 
and ar-Rikabi in mind when he wrote in defence of th 
idealism which had guided the thinking of the Ba'th prior 
to the formation of the UAR: 
1 
It (Ba'th) is th first serious att mpt to stir 
the Arab revolutionary for es in the Arab 
nation towards Arab obje tives and an independent 
orientation (i.e. world). The Ba'th movement has 
given Arabism its modern content and its obj tiv 
revolutionary spirit as before ihis Arabism was 
a vague empty word - a frame without a spirit and 
ontent. 
Arab Politi al Documents (APD) 1964, (Published by th 
Poli ti al S'tudi sand Publi Adminis tration D partment 
of the American Univ rsity of Beirut , L banon , n.d . ). 
e, 'Minutes of th Extraordinary Syrian Regional Congr ss 
of th Arab Ba t th Soci list Party, Damas us, 2 February 
1964 v ,pp 35 and 37. 
If argu d that although th Ba'th had noL cr at d A ab 
nationalism (see, Fig. 1), it had noneth less giv n L 
it a 'unified logical :form' and a truly 'Ar h spirit ' 
It had saved the p opl therehy from xc ssive 
pr occupation with 'r gional :fanati ism', making th m 
conscious of the n d to 'struggle' (Inqilab) to attain 
'fre dom' or 'liherty' (Iluriyya). II wrot ' For th 
first time a revolutionary upsurg towards national 
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unity (~ahda) appeared putting r actionaries, regiona ists 
and c ommuni s ts in a critical position' . The Ba' th , he 
cont i nued, through its r gional party organisations 
(s e, Part 4) had dev loped a co-ordinated pattern of 
struggl throughout the Arab homeland stirring the 
national consciousness of those in Arab East (Mashrik) 
to support their struggling brethren in Arab W st 
(Maghrib) . But, he asserted, with obvious referenc to 
the younger party activists, the stag through which 
th Ba'th was passing was a necessary and vital part o:f 
its revolutionary mission . Indeed b fore the peopl 
could conceive of 'organised socialist discussion ' th y 
had to be mentally elevated to the point where th y 
recognised that they were lacking basic national fr edom . 
In bringing Syria and Egypt into th UAR the Ba'th had 
fulfilled a vital part of its national mission. It 
had made the people conscious of the need to repel 
imperialism, colonialism, communism and Zionism . IIe 
wrote: 'From the beginning our ideology called for a 
new revolutionary solution to the prohlems of the world 
hased on the principle that man is free from the negative 
forces of materialism and fanaticism'. This, he argu d, 
had h en one of the party's basic hopes in the formation 
of the UAR and the wider Arab national renaissanc : 
We want the Arah renaissance to be deep and with 
sound foundations, rich in spirit, considering 
freedom sacred .. . respecting individual freedom 
and independence (all of whi h had heen denied 
in the UAR hy Jasir) . We want to make the Arab 
renaissan e avoid every negative trace or form 
which comes to it as a contagious disease. W want 
th path of the renaissance to h clear and 
shining as an example o:f a worthy revolution . 
Concluding with a veiled snipe at asir's dictatorial 
policies and the memb rs of the party who argu d that 
ideologically th Ba'th was bound to d fend th principl s 
and th government of the UAR,he wrote: 
60 
W cannot corr ct n gativ attitud s by 
negative attitudes (is upholding the 
governm nt of th UAR with its dictatorial 
policies), but by a more faithfulness to 
the Ba'th by giving new xampl s of our 
beliefs in fr edom and by th right of man 
in general and the Arab man in particular 
to practic e this freedom . l 
Afl aq 's d e fenc of the Ba 'th 's ideology in t rms of 
'freedom' was highly romant ic. How, it might have b n 
asked by the pragmatists of the party, was fr e d om in 
the ideal to be objectively r eal is , d in practice ? 
Aflaq was highly elusive of defining things in th 
concrete . Freedom, in practical form was, for him , th 
antithesis of the situation obtaining in the government 
of the UAR. It was a state of mind to be nurture d and 
cultivated by the benign state government in the int r st s 
of the people . Nasir , however, in Aflaq's thinking had 
put the cart before the horse in the implementation of 
socialist decree s wi thout the ac companiment of, or the 
preparation for, individual freedoms. The ational 
Report of August 1961, shows strong traces of Aflaqian 
idealism in its denunciation of the socialist decrees 
of July 1961 , for this v ery reason : 
Our aims for the union, freedom and socialism 
are the aims of all Arab peoples , and as the 
UAR was fo r med to be the starting point of 
overall [Arab ] unit y these progressive de cision 
therefore should not have been instituted as a 
surprise to the Arabs by the will of one individual 
(asir) . [It would have been better ] to put these 
(socialist decrees) as slogans for which the Arab 
people wtll struggl e (mentally prepare themselv s) 
outside and inside the UAR and when it is realised 
within the UAR the people will exert pressure up~n 
their governme nts to a ccomplis h similar steps . . . 
Thus for Alfaq and t he idealist wing of the Ba ' th the r 
was ideological justification in withd rawing from the 
governm nt of the UAR because of its basic denial of 
' human freedom'. Therefore the secession resulted not 
be c ause the Ba'th did nothing to save the union , but 
because the c onfidence of the people in unity had be n 
undermined as the r suIt of the denial of free d om . 
1 
as-Sahafa , 11 May 1960 
2 
Nidal al-Ba ' th, vol . 4, op. ci t ., p . 251 . 
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To th Arab mind accustom d to r'ch flow ry or tory 
cloth d in semi-mystical romantic id alism, th r may 
have sounded a good d al of plausibil'ty in Aflaq ' s 
ideological def nc C rtainly as w will s this 
vague mystical and romantic evaluation of obj ctiv 
political crit ria was to continue with the Ba ' th into 
the phas when it constituted the governm nts of Iraq 
and Syria . But looking at Aflaq ' s id ological d f nc 
with a more critical gaz , it is c rtainly rel vant to 
argu that it was a rationalisation of ev nts e x post 
f acto . Indeed as w will discuss in Part 2, Ba ' thist 
politi cal leaders such as Akram Hurani, Riyad Malki, 
Khalil Khallas
l 
and others were as anxious as asir 
to implement far-reaching socialist legislation on land 
and industry in order to prove their revolutionary 
worth to the people . But altruism apart, thes men 
were power lovers for its own sake . lfurani ' s lifelong 
ambition had been to rule Syria and xt rminate the 
landlords of the Hama region . He possessed this ambition 
long before be coming a leader of the Ba ' th in 1954 . 2 
Indeed , if anything led to the resignation of Ba ' thist 
ministers in December 1959 , it was not because of the 
absence of 'freedom ' per se, but the direct result of 
asir ' s unwil lingness to permit these ministers the right 
to exercise ' unanswerable ' power through their respective 
ministries . 3 Thus if ' freedom ' signified anything at 
all , it meant that which was duly the right of the Ba'th 
to implement in th interests of the UAR and wider Arab 
national unity . W might term it co- qual partnership . 
If Aflaq was aware of the power motive behind the 
facade of party altruism , he was reticent to admit it . 
Indeed, just the reverse , he tended to regard political 
pow r a s an evil corrupting force by itself . 4 He did 
1 
See, Biographical ot s for details. 
2 
e , Part 2, Chap . 2 . 
3 
Abu Jaber , K . , The Arab Ba ' th Socialist Party, History, 
I d ology and Organization (Syracuse Univ rsity Press, 
e w York , 1966), pp .48-5l . 
4 
Int rviews, Jubran Majdalani, 23 Octob r 1967 and 
Bitar , 17 ovember 1967, B irut . 
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not deny that it was the ambition of th party to attain 
po w r to 1 ad and dir ct the p opl to th ir ' prom's d 
land ', but it was a typ of pow r such as might hav 
been ex rcised by a r ligious saint (i . 
or philosoph r king in the Platonic s ns 
a Prom an) 
H nc as 
virtu and necessity r sided within th Prometh us 
aspect of the Ba ' th it was, for Aflaq, unn cessary to 
defin how the Ba ' th should exercis political pow r 
and what values it should apply to the basic ideological 
postulat s . When it cam to office it would be motivat d 
by high ideals to evaluate the situation and the n ds 
and aspirations of the people in accordance with its 
knowledge of truth and destiny (se . Fig . 1), and to 
lead them accordingly as men inspired and dedicated to 
a lif ' s ambition . 
But if Aflaq ' s romantic oratory had the effect of 
anaethetising some minds to the practical realities 
c onfronting the party organisationally and politically, 
there were other younger intellectuals who came to 
desp i se what they c alled the 'Aflaqiyya mentality ,. l 
In the Fourth and Fifth National Congresses there were 
pressures from many quarters for a more objective 
ideological statement of Ba ' thist goals . In a memorandum, 
' The Party ' s Plan after Secession ' , December 1961, 
obvious criticism of the ' Aflaqiyya mentality ' can be 
detected in the following extract: 
[A] lack of understanding of the mission of the 
party and the method of its realisation and the 
primitive methods for analysing social and 
political phenomena in Arab society such as 
military coups which led to th adoption of 
sentimental for objective attitudes led the 
party into many policy contradictions ] in its 
life and method of work .. . The absence of an 
obj ctive statem nt of intentions (lit . clear 
previously drawn picture) for the union (UAR) 
n cessitated starting the union from zero, 
and as ther were no precedents for union the 
government had to imitate a system of government 
in Egypt with all its faults and def cts and to 
impl ment it in Syria (i . e . in th Syrian 
Regions of the UAR) . 2 
1 
Azma Hi z b al-Ba'th aI-Arabi al-Ishtiraki Min Khil ' al 
Tajibatahi Fi aI-Iraqi (The Crisis of the Arab Ba'th 
So c ialist Party Through its Experiment in Iraq) . Prepared 
by th Pr paratory Committee for the eventh rational 
Congr ss (Sa ' diyya), Dar ash- ha'b, n . d. (1964) , p . 17, 
passim . Hereaft r, Azma Hizb al-Ba'th . 
2 
idal al-Ba ' th, vol . 6, p . 2J . 
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But d spit growing pressures within th party organisatio~ 
for an ideological statem nt of int ntions, th Aflaqiyya 
resisted all such attempts . For Aflaq it would hav 
be n s If - restricting for the Ba ' th to b ti d to 
partially realisabl obj ctive goals in vi w of th fa t 
that society was in constant evolutionary progr ssion 
along a national consciousness continuum . (S ,Fig . 1) . 
He believed in the po wer of mental el vation of th 
people through th skilful use and employment of slogans, 
to bring them to the point where th y would be ready to 
r s pond to ' organis d socialist discussion ,. l 
Out of office the Ba ' th may be said to hav gain d 
much from its greater flexibility in no t defining partial 
objectives thereby limiting its goals to elevating mental 
slogans . Slogan peddling could b interpreted in a 
multitude of different ways by different people but only 
in the ' right ' way by the leaders of the Ba ' th . But 
what it gained in this respect it lost in organisational 
cohesiv eness (see, Part 4) . Regional party organisations 
cut off from the National Command by hostile state 
governments could w 11 ask how they were to standardis 
their political behaviour in relation to the centre . 
What ob j ective goals were they to aim to attain and how 
could these be measured in partial fulfilment? Or in 
other words, what policy line were they to sell to the 
people to ensure their loyalty to the party and to the 
ultimate objective goals of the party, Unity, Freedo m 
and So cialism ? Out of office, promises however honourable , 
c ould be proffered without any responsibility for their 
implementation . But when by two successful coups d'etats 
in F bruary and March 1963,the Ba ' th came to power in 
Iraq and Syria , it was forced for the first time by 
necessity to translate ideals hitherto xpressed in 
slogans, into the practical administration of two stat 
governm nts . Let us now examine how ideological reformers 
from 1963 attempted to synthesise objective ly Ba ' th'ist 
ideals under the n w realities . 
1 
as-Sahafa , 11 May 1960, see, Aflaq ' s ideological def nc 
Orthodox Ideological Synthes,_i~s~: ___ 1~9~6J-66 
xt to Aflaq and B'tar Munif Razzaz and Abdullah 
Abd ' Da'im
l 
ar the b st known writ rs and th orists of 
the orthoQox (i . e . Aflaq) wing of th Ba ' th . In 
examining their wri tings between 196J-66,2it is v ry 
important to notice that despite strong moral and 
thical overton s th y wer not writt n or d liver d 
from ivory tow rs . Both writers w r active party 
m mbers until sudd nly overthrown by young r left-wing 
socialists on 2J February 1966 and forced into exil 
The writings which w have selected are by no means 
their only contributions to Arab nationalist literatur 
though in the case of Razzaz they might be regarded as 
his better known works . In this section our intention 
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is to ask how the orthodox theorists of the Ba 'th, taking 
Aflaq ' s basic ideological postulates re-evaluated and 
re - a d apted them to fit the changing objective realiti s 
of a revolutionary party in power as the governments of 
Iraq (February- ovemb r 196J) and Syria March 196J- . 
In most, if not all, of their writings on Arab 
nationalism,Abd ' Da ' im and Razzaz start from the Aflaqian 
principle that in national unity there is to be found 
complete reality while in the region (Arab state) only 
partial (incomplete) reality.J It is to the task of 
obviating the tautological implications of this principl 
that both writ ers address themselves. In basic literary 
style Razzaz and Abd' Da ' im are less romantic than Aflaq 
and have more of the pragmatic bent common to the writings 
1 
Se ,Biographical otes. 
2 
Razzaz, M. , al-Huri~ (Liberty) (Dar al-Ilm Lil-Malayin, 
Beirut, 1965) : Ma ' alim al-Ha at al-Arabi a al-Jadida 
(Essentials of the ew Arab Life Dar al-Ilm Lil-Malayin, 
Fifth Edition, 1966) : at -Tajribat al -Mura (Bitter 
Experience) (Dar Ghandur , B irut, 1967): Da 'im A . Abd ' , 
al - Watan al - Arabi Wa ath-Thawra (The Arab ation and the 
Revolution) (Dar al -Adab , First Edi tion , 196J): al-Takhtit 
al-Ishtiraki (Socialist Planning) (Ministry of Cultur and 
J 
ational Gui dance Publication, Damascus n.d . probably 1964) . 
Abd ' Da ' im, al~atan, p.26, passim, at-Tatkhtit , p . 7S, 
passim; Razzaz, al-Huriyya, p .1S, passim, Ma ' alim, p . J12, 
passim . 
of Bitar . Ho w ver, th y acc pt uncritIcally Aflaq ' s 
national mythology though with th mphasis firmly 
placed on the pres nt . (Se , Fig . 1 , poch four) . 
Lik Af laq they believ that ' fr dom ' (Uurizza) is th 
major guarantee of national consciousn ss and social 
economic and political progress . l Abd ' Da 'im ass rts 
that political disunity , conomic, soci 1 and cultural 
backwardness were not natural inher nt charact ristics 
of the Arab nation throughout history . 2 Lik Aflaq h 
b lieved that th Arabs contributed immeasurably to th 
growth and development of Western civilisation through 
their contributions to the arts and sci nc s . J But it 
was through continual foreign oppression that the Arab 
nation gradually lost its national solidarity and 
succumbed to foreign domination . In th ninete nth and 
t wentieth c enturies , the imperialist and cOlonialist 
nations of the West exacerbated the divisions alr ady 
extant by the partitioning of the Arab home land . For 
Abd ' Da ' im this marked the final seal of mental and 
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physical enslavement of the Arab peopl e to 'foreign 
oppression ,. 4 It is therefore to r store the Arab 
nation ' s fallen dignity that the revolutionary vangua rd 
o f the people must struggle to attain national liberation 
and Arab re-unification . 5 
During the 1940s and 1950s,as we have seen, Aflaq 
had argued along simi lar lines although he had studiously 
refrained from drawing d efinitive practical objectives 
from party ideals embodied in the slogan, Unity, Freedom 
and So cial ism. Abd' Da ' im and Razzaz were, however, 
faced with the problem of trans lating party ideals into 
workable party policy as the governments of Iraq and yria . 
As S cretary-General of the Ba ' th, 1965-66 , Razzaz , in 
particular, was deeply aware of the need to make party 
ideology intelligible to the people as to party members 
through its greater adaption to practical reality . 
1 
Abd' Da ' im, al-Watan, p.270, passim; Razzaz, al-Hurizza, 
p .l, passim . 
2 
Abd ' Da ' im, al-Watan, p.254. 
J 
Ibid . , p.2 54 . 
4 
Ibid . , p . 254 . 
5 
Ibid . , p . 270 . 
For both writ rs 'fre dom ' r pr s nt d h ultimat 
goal to b attain d through national r volut'onary 
struggle . But what did th Y und rst nd by ' fr dom ' 
and how could it be translat d into practical working 
poli cy at the 1 v 1 of incompl t r ality, th Arab 
state (i . e . Syria or Iraq)? Lik Aflaq both writ rs 
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t nd to avoid giving ' fr dom ' an obj ctiv d finition . 
It is , for them , an ideal relative to th national ntity 
in which it is nurtur d . It can, according to Razzaz , 
be ' felt ' in its ' dynamic historical cont xt , l and , 
according to Abd' Da ' im, it can b glimps d even if 
through a glass darkly from a thorough comparativ 
knowledge of the historic past with the corrupt and 
2 decadent present (Se, Fig . 1) . 
If both writers s em to over stress the need for 
n ational liberatio~ it is done for th purpose of 
underlining the unique situation obtaining in the Arab 
world in comparison to Western soci ty . For example, in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries European society 
a chieved social, political and economic reform as a 
r esult of social c lass struggle - the haves against th 
hav e nots . But for Abd ' Da ' im and Razzaz the objectiv 
r ealities c onditioning socio-economic class struggle in 
the West resulted fr om vastly differing historical 
circumstances influencing and confronting the Arab world 
or the world of the Eas t . J Class polarity based on socio -
economi c division had not crystallis d into the same 
4 antitheti c al class groupings as in the West . Ind d, 
for both writ ers, c lass divisions in the East were largely 
exac erbated by foreign domination (i . e . divide and rul ) . 
Bu t whi le c ertain privileged classes undoubtedly 
benefit d from imperial and colonial domination and 
partition of the Arab homeland , the majority of class s 
suffered from deprivation of basic ' freedom ' and ' tyranny ' 
1 
Razzaz, al-Huriyya, p . 22 . 
2 
Abd ' Da ' im, al -Watan, p . 254-70. Also Int rview, 
15 May 1967 , Beirut. 
J 
4 
Razzaz, al-Hur~ , p . J7, passim . 
Abd ' Da ' im , at - Takhtit, p . lJ, passim . 
of enforc d m ntal and physical salv ry.l Th r for for 
both writers, th r al n mi s of th P opl ar not h 
u pp r clas but the p rsons nd forc s, 
regardless of socio-economic class status standing in 
the way of national reg n ration or national awal 
Ideologi c ally Razzaz and Abd' Da " m s m to b 
. 2 
nlng . 
n gotiating a very narrow chann 1 in theory b tw n 
commitment to doctrinaire socialist class struggl and 
national liberation. But while in their writings th y 
acc pt in principl the need to 'overthrow ' the d cadent 
anti-national ' bourgeois m ntality ' xisting within Arab 
society, their emphasis is on Aflaqian Ingilab with 
minimal reference to r volutionary viol e nc . J Thus in 
the following extract in which Abd ' Da ' im is calling for 
' struggle against the upholders of partition ', he has 
in mind the breaking down of a particular anti-national 
mentality and the recreation of an atmosphere favourable 
to national unity, more so than the physical annihilation 
of the ' class es ' opposing national liberation: 
Struggle against partition is to b 
directed against the defenders of 
partition or against those whose 4 
interests are connected with partition . 
Despite their apparent emphasis on removing the bourgeois 
mentality from Arab society, Razzaz ' s and Abd ' Da ' im ' s 
basi c motive is national struggle . Inherent in Abd ' Da ' im ' s 
extract above and in its context, it is possible to d tect 
the Aflaqian principle established in the 1940s, that 
social struggle would be inapplicable to the Arab people 
because a ' poor religious' man might be deluded into 
thinking that national unity would b against his interests 
as much as the capitalists and feudalists. Thus while the 
latter had to be ' overthrown ' (Ingilab), the former had to 
b ' educa ted ' to th new emerging realities of Arab 
nationalism. 
1 
Razzaz, al - Huriyya, p . 4J. 
2 
Razzaz, al-Huriyya, p . J7; Abd' Da ' im, al-Watan, pp . 270-74 . 
J 
Abd ' D , . 1 W tan p 276 at-Talhtit, p.92,· Razzaz , a 1m, a - a ,. , 
Ma ' alim , p . 94. 
4 
Abd ' Da ' im, al-Watan , p . 27J . 
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For national struggle to attain national liberation, 
both writers subscribe to th for 
politi cal and social revolutions to xist and int ract 
1 
simultaneously to ach other . Political r volution on 
the one hand is to overthrow reactionary political 
regimes in preparation for a new popular political ord r, 
social revolution on the other is to create th right 
'atmos phere I by expanding mental horizons to receive th 
new realities of political revolution in the form of 
basic human freedoms though , albeit, incompletely until 
the Arab nation appeared anew in the future . (See, Fig .l, 
epoch five) . Ba ' th socialism therefore is accepted in 
the Aflaqian sense as the leavener of national conscious-
ness within society while directing it towards political 
as we ll as social and economic freedom through national 
struggl e . In an interview on 6 January 1965 Aflaq said: 
The implementation of socialism must lead 
to the creation of an atmosphere favourable 
to Arab unity, must lead to raising the 
economic, social and intellectual level of 
the Arab masses, must bring into existence 
an Arab industry backed by Arab capital _ 
which in some countries is being dissipated 
on the luxurious living of individuals _ 
must create a wider market stretching from 
the Atlantic Ocean to the Arabian Gulf and, 
finally , must make use of our technical and 
professional potentialities ... The strength 
of Arab unity does not lie in simply bringing 
together the states presently divided . It 
is a force greater and more significant than 
this . Hence we must create an atmosphere 
suitable for Arab unity.2 
According to Razzaz the 'healthy society' is the one 
in which the democratic will of the people is fully 
embodied in the political process es of the state. Its 
external manifestations are a well ordered democratic 
electoral system, parliamentary representation, separation 
of judicial and executive functions, existence of popular 
sindical organisations, political parties , and so on . ] 
1 
Abd' Da'im, al - Watan , p . 62 ; Razzaz , al -Huri~ , p . 88-126 , 
passim. 
2 
APD, 1965, op. cit ., p . 5. 
] 
Razzaz , al-Huriyya, pp . 60 - 68 ; Ma'alim, pp . 64 -90 and 
pp . 16o-186. 
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The essence of these is to permit th wid st expr ssion 
of individual politi cal freedom otherwis , he ass rts , 
' libe rty b e comes the monopoly of th state ' and th tool 
of a dictator to manipulate at will . l 
But if theoretically the parliamentary system is 
acceptable to Razzaz as to the formulators of the Ba ' th 
Constitution of 1947 (Art. 14), in practice h conclud s , 
it is a system which has shown itself to b op n to 
manipulation by unscrup ulous ' bo u rgeois interest - groups ' 
2 to the detriment of the democratic will of the mass s . 
Hence a parliamentary system may be the ideal for the 
future, but in the present it would be unworkable in 
view of partition and the existence of 'high-finance' 
i n the Arab world . In arguing on this point , Razzaz 
is led to the seemingly lo gical conclusion that if 
influential minorities have hitherto stultified progressive 
liberalisation of the Arab homeland,then political parties 
representing their intere sts c an have no share in the 
politic al freedoms of the new society to be created 
through Ba'th socialism. J Political liberty, he asserts , 
means 'freeing man from restrictions and oppression , . 4 
There would, however, be some justification in denying 
political freedom to all potentially reactionary political 
parties, forces and individuals within the framework of 
the new society. 
Razzaz and Ab d ' Da ' im describe economic freedom as 
' freeing man fro m the fetters of exploitation ' S or 
' substituting the will of man in place of the will of 
6 
the market '. But while both writers stress the need to 
ensure individual freedom wi thin the economic system, it 
is clear that they are not proposing economic 'laisser -
faire' . Both writ ers are firm believers in a 
1 
Razzaz, a l-Huri:l:la, pp . 4S-S4. 
2 
Razzaz, al-Huri:l:la, p . 60 . 
J 
Ibi d . , p .84 . 
4 
Ibid . , p . 88. 
S 
Razza , 
6 
al-Huri:l:la, p . 88 . 
Abd ' Da ' im, at-Takhtit , p · 7 9 . 
' sci ntifi c ally ' plann d conomi syst m which, among 
th mor important things, rais s th standard of 
production, expands th agri cultur 1 and conomi 
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s e ctors without d eleterious ff cts upon ith r , and 
a ctively fos ters popular self-manag ment of nationalis d 
. d t· 1 I ln us rles. ndeed most , if not all of thes po'nts c an 
be found in th Syrian Provincial Constituion of 24 April 
1964 (Arts . 24-JO) and in the Ba ' th Constitution of 1947 . 
(Arts . 26 - J7 ). 
On nationalisation of industry n ither Razzaz or 
Abd ' Da ' im can be s 
the Marxian sense . 2 
n to be doctrinaire socialists in 
Both believe in the existen of 
small privately owned businesses and limited land holding 
within a ' scientifically' planned state economy as an 
as su rance to individuals to pursue their creativ skills 
and abilities in the ' national inter st '. Like Aflaq, 
the most important asp ct of socialism is the ' enri chment 
of human life ' and not an efficiently administered 
economic s y stem which denies individual freedom and 
initiative within the system . J 
It wa s on the interpretation of the inter-relationship 
between soci a lism and democracy that the orthodox wing 
of the Ba ' th differed substantially from the left-wing 
socialists who overthrew the Eighth B C on 2J February 
1966. Razz a z wrote in at-Tajribat al-Mura : 
1 
ationalisation alone cannot make socialism . 
Socialism is the transfer of ownership from 
individuals to the state . The state is not 
the people unless it represents the progressiv 
will of the people . Leftism must surely be 
measured in terms of power and authority of the 
masses and in terms of its freedom ... [ it must 
not only be measured in ] terms of what it can 
achieve for th working class, otherwise Hitler 
would be a socialist . For what is important 
is the need to develop the individuals free will 
to participate in4developing his country politi c ally 
and e conomically. 
Razzaz , Ma ' alim , pp . 114-50; al-lluriyya , pp . 88-9J; 
Abd' Da ' im, at-Takhtit, pp .7 9 - 82 . 
2 
Abd' Da ' im, at-Takhtit, p . 92; 
pp .2 10-15 in which h discusses 
betw en Ba ' thism and Marxism. 
J 
Razzaz, at -Tajribat, 
ideological differ nces 
Abd' Da ' im, at-Takhtit, p . 92 ; Razzaz , Ma ' alim, pp . 266-69 . 
4 
Raz z a z, at - Tajribat , pp . 228-29. 
71 
Th ne d to d v lop an eff ctiv infr -s ru tur 
of b si human fr doms within soci ty s an a comp nim nt 
to socialist economic and political tr nsformation , is 
c entral to th id ological b Ii fs of Abd ' Da ' im and 
1 
Raz zaz . Yet this "nfra- structure can only b cr at d 
in time through the edu tive proc ss s of th 
' inform d ' 
revolutionary vanguard of th p opl , th orthodox wing 
of th Ba ' th . Like compl t socialism, fr dom is to 
be attained in the futur only after continuous struggl 
against th forces of r action. (See, Fig . 1, po h 
five) . But in partial fulfilment, as w hay s n, 
so ialisation of the conomic syst m has also to be 
accompanied with m ntal r ceptivity or the people to 
und rstand ' freedom ' and to utilis it, albeit in part, 
in th r gional (Syrian) transformation of the Arab 
peopl In brief , ther fore, "the mission of the Ba ' th 
as Razzaz and Abd ' Da ' im see it is to move cautiously 
with economic socialisatlon adapting it to meet the 
expanding realities of the Arab people as they grow in 
mental awareness and alertness to conceiv the ultimate 
realitie s embo d ied in Arab national unity. On the 
other hand, to rush into complete nationalisation of 
industry in Syria, would be substituting the imperfect 
2 part for the realities of the nationalisation of the whole. 
From their exposition on ' freedom ' it is now possibl 
to asc rtain the ideological basis of the Ba'th ' s view 
of international relations, at least until the 2J February 
1966 . For these orthodox theorists , ' fr dom' is th 
ultimate goal to be attained through national lib ration 
of the Arab homeland . ations opposing Arab reunification 
are on the other hand,d nying the Arabs the rights 
inscribed in the Unit d ations Charter on Human Rights. 
The State of Isra 1 is, of course , th most blatant 
exampl of this, h nce in the interest of human rights 
the Arab p opl must be organised to annihilate it, 
1 
Razzaz, Ma ' alim, p . 269; Abd ' Da ' im, at-Takhtit; 
al-Watan, p . lJ8 . 
2 
Razzaz, at-Tajribat, p.222 ; 
pp · 75-76. al-Ba ' th, 1 ovemb 
on ' Arab Unity and Soci lism '. 
1967, B irut . Th importanc 
confirm d nd und rlin d . 
Abd' Da ' im, at-Takhtit, 
r 1965, see, Bitar ' s article 
Interview, Bitar, 17 ovemb r 
of th abov argument Was 
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th by guarant ing th ir nt· 1 fr doms. 1 r own ess 
condly, for ign pow rs supporting h t t of 
Isra 1 ither diplomatically, by trad or v n v rball 
are by implication stabbing the Arab p opl in th bacl 
whil p rpetuating th lif of a tat which has no 
lawful xist nc in th Arab homeland. II nc th r 
could b no friendly overtur s betw n th Ha ' th and 
thos foreign powers . ations cultivating support among 
capitalist and feudalist el m nts with·n th Arab hom land 
ar similarly, for obvious r asons, r gard d with 
hostility by orthodox th orists . 2 
In the case of Communist states, Razzaz argu s that 
becaus they shar a common socialist h ritage with 
Arab socialists it does not mean that the Arabs (i.e. 
Ha ' th) must naturally gra itate into their orbit. As 
with the Western nations they (Communist states) will 
have to earn the friendship of the Arab p ople through 
their ability to assist in liberation of the Arab homeland 
and its social, economic and political progress. Razzaz 
is prepared to admit that Communist states such as th 
USSR, Yugoslavia, and China have in the past demonstrat d 
their willingness to assist in the Arabs' national 
liberation; but from tim to time they have compromised 
their acceptability to the Arab people because of support 
of local Communist movements (i . e. in Iraq) against 
indigenous Arab nationalist movements . J In this respe t 
they have been guilty of the same crime as the imperialists, 
colonialists and other local exploiters of the basic 
national freedoms of the Arab people. Hence international 
dealing with Communist states is not to be solely 
determin d on the basis of socialist common-origins, but 
on what th y have to offer to the Arab p ople in its 
historic quest for unity and freedom - evinc d in national 
liberation . 4 
1 
APD, 1965, op. it., pp.J5J-54. S e, ' tat ment by Dr 
Munif Razzaz, Secretary-G neral of the Ha I th Party 
Concerning th Role of the Arab Masses in th Palestin 
Problem, J 0 tober 1965, Damascus I 
2 
Razzaz, al~furiyya, pp.144-65. 
J 
4 
Razzaz, t-Tajribat, pp.21J-19. 
bid . , p.215. 
From the writings of orthodox th or·sts su h as 
Razzaz and Abd ' Da'im it is possibl to d t ct th 
conviction that th Ba ' th is mor than just an ord·nary 
7J 
politi al party . It is a party with m ssiani miss·on 
which it is compelled by fate to fulfil. Both writ rs 
seem to have inherit d this self-right ousn ss from 
Aflaq . For these writ rs the Ba ' th is compell d by 
fat to sacrifice itself in order to 1 ad and dir t th 
Arabs to national lib rationwhilesimultan ously 
ducating their minds to accept th new obj ctiv 
r aliti s of expanding national consciousness (S e, 
Fig . 1, epoch fiv) . But what, it might be asked was 
to pr v nt the Ba ' th from becoming di tatorial like 
Pr sid nt asir ' s regime? For both writers the ideals 
of the party would pr vent it from succumbing to th 
t mptations of seeking power for pow r ' s sake at the 
expense of democratic freedoms. Tru these theorists 
expected a long period in which the Ba ' th, in the 
interests of the people and the Arab nation, would have 
to curtail the granting of complete social, political 
and economic freedoms in order to nsure that the 
enemies of the peopl did not use th m with the 
intention of subverting the national r volutionary mission 
of th Ba ' th. But in time Ba ' th ideals embodying truth 
and justice would triumph at the expense of falsehood 
and injustice . Muta ' afadi a non-Ba ' thist writer with 
unionist convictions may have come nearer to the 'truth' 
than he intended wh n he commented sarcastically that 
to fully comprehend Ba ' th ideology it was necessary to 
join th party and imbibe it in isolation from the 
realities of the str et . l 
L t us now proceed to examine the ideological beliefs 
of th major heterodox wings of the Ba ' th, between 196J-66. 
1 
Safad·, op. cit., pp.79-87. 
7'-1 
al 1963-66 
L ft-Wing Socialist R 
o 
tional Congr ss , 
Th 1 ft-wing so ialist ration within th ixth 
ational Congress can b dir ctly attribut d to th 
growing loss of faith by many young party int 11 tuaLs 
in the basic ideological assumptions of th Ba ' th . Whi1 
in the 1940s and 1950s they believed that the Ba ' th had 
served a useful purpose in calling upon th Arab p opl 
to struggle for fr edom and national lib ration,l in th 
period from February-March 1963, th object've realiti s 
confronting the party wer seen to have b n substantially 
diff rent, hence the immediate need for a reappraisal 
of party ideology. Being less emotionally attach d to 
th indigenous qualities and attributes of Arab socialism 
than th older Aflaqiyya generation, th y wanted to 
employ variants of socialist theories whi h had prov n 
th ir worth in other socialist countries. 
trend (Iraq) held, for example : 
The Sa ' diyya 
We as socialists and revolutionari s do 
not hold in advanc any stupid hatred for 
world socialis t xp rience as a whole or to 
Marxism in particular, but we onsider it as 
a mine and a spring from which to drink 
without any limitation2 0r any pr vious 
sacr d considerations. 
Th ational Report of the ixth ational Congress 
which contained the party ' s first syst matic ideological 
s tat ment was d ply influ nced by th Sa ' diyya 
orientation when it held, for exampl , th two epithets 
essentially applicabl to the Party's ideology are 
' scientific' and ' revolutionary' within a national 
framework ... 3 Embodied also in this trend was the belief 
in socio- conomic class struggle which had been reject d 
by th Aflaqiyya from the inception of the party. But 
1 
2 
Azma IIizb al-Ba ' th, op. it., p.9, passim. 
Ibid., p.73. 
3 
APD., 1963, op. it., p.'-I'-IO . See, 'Resolutions on 
C rtain Th or ti al Probl ms Connect d with Party 
Id ology and Arab truggl 
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for th 1 ft-wing so iallst th Afl qiyy Lradi ion 
wa outdat d. Th Sa ' dly a wrote: 
[Th ] Aflaqiyy lIs] a mere tr of' th past wh" ch des erv s to be put in a orn r or a mus um of histor of th par y whi h poin s to the stage of hlldhood and adol s n through whi h th party has d. 1 pass 
The socialist r formers bel" v d that if th Ha ' th w r 
to fulfil its revolutionary mission wIthin Arab so iety, 
th n it had to adopt a code of social r lations in whi h 
it would be m ntally and physically identifi d with th 
' toiling mass s ' with whom it was se king to lead to 
national consciousn ss. Thus: 
On the basis of a scientific analysis of 
th political and conomic situations in 
th two states (Iraq and Syria), the Congress 
mad important d ductions . with regard to the 
bourgeois middl class. This class is no 
long r capable of playing any positive role 
in the economic fi Id and its opportunism 
has made it a new ally of imperialism. The 
Congress has consid r d that work rs, peasants, 
e d ucated revolutionaries (military and 
civilian) and th petty bourgeoisie ar the 
forces which will make - if united - the
2 socialist revolution in its first phas 
The Report also emphasised the need to create an equilibrium 
within the party, on the one hand betw en centralisation 
of authority and, on the other, by invol ing the ' toiling 
masses ' in the lif and work of the party ' s revolutionary 
mission through xercising practical re ponsibilities, 
hence ' it will safeguard the unity of th Party land ] 
will prov how genuinely democratic and fl xible it is . J 
The influence, though veiled, was direct d in this respe t 
against the Aflaqiyya who w re accused of having fostered 
an elitist vi w of party relations with th masses. Azma 
Hizb al-Ha ' th comm nt d bitterly: 
I 
2 
Aflaq us d to imagin th party as n lite 
above all class s whi h was able to fr e 
itself from the rottenn ss of soci ty in order 
Azma Hizb al-Ha ' th, op. cit., p.17. 
APD . , 1963, op. cit., p.4~o. 
in th R volution' . 
ee, ' Th So ialist Forces 
3 
Ibid., p.439. Se 
Lead rship'. For mor 
' Th Prin ipl s of ColI ctive 
dis ussion on this point se Part 4. 
to stablish a lortr ss for char ct r 
(i. . or morality) ... A.flaq does not 
sp ak of th struggl s of a certain 
class ... h speals about a ew G n rat'on 
whi h is ut o.ff from th rotten r ality 
to which itlreturns to put an nd to 'ts 
rottenness. 
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With the swing towards a socialist orientation, 
ther w re also accompanying proposals .for xtensiv 
nat'onalisation of land at industry . 2 Th obj ctlv 
behind th se was th ne d to involve work rs and peasants 
in a mor overt control over the means of production, 
as th R port stressed ' a sound point of d parture from 
the socialist point of view for the transformation of 
social relations ... , J Th extent to which private 
enterpris e was to b permitted to remain within this 
system was not spelled out in so many words, but from 
the general context it would seem that the trend Was 
marke d ly against its continuation on do trinaire, i.f for 
no o the r reasons. 
Perhaps out of deference to the Aflaqiyya,the Report 
emphasis e d the need for socialist planning to be mad on 
both ' r gional and Arab 1 vels ' , a cardinal plank in 
orthodox party ideology.4 But if on this point there 
were some agreement, little was to be found in the 
proposal that socialist planning should b made in the 
' light of socialist and revolutionary xperience 
throughout the world ., 5 
The left-wing socialist r action of the Sixth ational 
Congress tended to reverse the emphasis of the Ba ' th 
from a ' nationalist ' to a ' socialist ' ori ntation. It 
was in efFect asserting that the national objectives of 
the party could only b attained through ' scientific 
revolutionary socialism ' . The Aflaqiyya on the other 
hand,held that s ocialist objectives could only be 
1 
2 
Azma Hizb al-Ba ' th , op . cit ., P .1JO. 
APD . , 196J, Ope cit . , pp . 440-4l. 
J 
Ibid . , p . 44l . Se 'Policy on Land R lorm' L~ 
bid . , p . 4L~1. Se ' Socialls t Planning ' . 
5 
bid. , p . 440. 
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d termin d in th light of national xp ri n On th 
on hand, th socialist r formers b Ii v d in mploying 
for ign so c ialist variants whi h had prov n th ir 'vorth 
in other countries whil , on the oth r, the Aflaqiyya 
held rigidly to th b Ii f that Arab so ialism should 
functIon in accordanc with national aspirations of 
th peopl as they matured towards compl t national 
a wakening . 
To non- Ba ' thists th national-socialist dichotomy 
might s e m to hav b n splitting hairs n dlessly . 
But in fa c t substantive policy chang s can be shown to 
hav e be n theoreti c ally relat d to th s diff ring 
ideological orientations . For example , in international 
r e l at i ons, the Af laqiyya took as their yardstick th 
i ntern ational response to th Arabs ' struggle for national 
l i berat i on . They wer not predisposed to seek friends 
and all i es within a socialist orbit solely because of 
c ommon so c ial i st heritage . On the other hand , the Report 
of th Six th ational Congress shows that almost out of 
ideological reflex the left - wing socialist trend sought 
to precipitate the party into a ' socialist world ' orbit : 
. .. the Congress declared that the policy of 
non- alignment must not prevent th strengthening 
of ti s between the people of the socialist world. 
It stated that the strengthening of ties between 
th Arab people and the peoples of the socialist 
camp will create new and genuin possibilities 
for demolishing the imperialists ' strategic 
positions and their monopolisation of economic 
interests in th Arab homeland . It will also 
lead to an intensification of the universal 
struggle of mankind against impe rialism.l 
ow c ompar this with a foreign policy statement in the 
Report of the Eighth ational Congress, April-May 1965, 
whic h marked a brief return to the Aflaqiyya tradition : 
1 
Our Party ' s attitude to the Socialist 
c amp must be bas d on t wo f undamental 
consid rations . Firstly w ar a socialist 
movem nt and secondly ware a liberation 
(national) movement . . . Our overall attitude 
to the Socialist camp must not pr clud us 
f rom a d opting a separate policy towards each 
ind ividual country . The Party ought not to 
confine its relations to one country , but 
Ibid . , p.444 . 
.3 c, I TI s wi th the ocialis t World I • 
must take this trend towards ind p nd nc 
into account , str ngth nits r 1 tions 
with all So ialist countries andlstudy its 
programme 'n th various fields . 
The important distinction in both th s 
xtracts Ii s 
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in the fact of their prevailing id ological orientation. 
The first tended to 'd nti£y itself with th socialist 
world b cause it too shared a common socialist heritag 
on-socialist countri s w re th refor ipso facto 
o u tside the rang of natural friends. Th second xtra t 
on the other hand , t nd d to try to balan the over-
whelming socialist orientation of the Sixth ational 
Congr ss with the return to a more orthodox id ological 
orientation at the Eighth ational Congress. While 
f riends hip within the socialist world seem d to off r 
more possibilities than in the ' Western ' world, the 
latter was not altogether ruled out . The criterion in 
the se c ond extract for suitable friendship was the 
ind ividual response of countries ' towards l Arab ] 
i n d epend enc e ' . 
Betw en 1963 - 65. the national-socialist dichotomy I 
tended to exacerbate factional unrest with the party 
organisation. To the Sa ' diyya it seem d that the 
Aflaqiyya were unwilling to adopt scientific revolutionary 
socialist theory becaus of their inherent bourgeois 
ideological disposition . Azma Hizb al-Ba ' th commented 
bitt rly, ' the overthrow of the Aflaqiyya is the first 
objective in order to op n before the party wide horizons 
so that th bases (i . e . peasants and workers) will 
u tilise scientific socialist logic (i . . socio-economic 
class stru ggle) . 2 Other doctrinaire socialists such as 
Yasin aI - Hafiz and Abu Maizar demanded th total abolition 
of private property if real economic fr dom were to be 
a c hieved. Partial nationalisation they argued, would 
simply turn th state into a kind of philanthropic 
organisation but not a true socialist stat 3 
1 
APD ., 1965, op . cit . , p . 180. 
th---Socialist CampI . Se , ' Our Attitude Towards 
2 
3 
Azma Hizb al-Ba ' th, op. cit., p.17. 
Abu J b r, op . cit . , p.123. 
Moving along a path to th right of th 
was a group of Syrian int llectuals such as 
a ' d'yya 
ur ud-Din 
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Atasi, Yusif Zu ' ayy n and Ibrahim Makhus who, 'n th ory, 
accept d th inter-r ~ationship b tw n nationalism and 
socialism with th ultimat obj ctiv bing Arab untiy. 
Y t th Y diff red from th Aflaqiyya on th mans to 
th end . They argued, for exampl , that for nationalism 
(Arab) to b r alis d radical social'st transformation 
had firstly to b undertak n at the r gional (stat ) 
1 v 1. Lik the Sa ' diyya they believ d in the Marxian 
analysis of conflicting socio-economic class interests. 
Basically their starting point was the ideological 
statement of the Sixth ational Congress. 
During 1964-65, the regionalists ga'u d in power 
within the Syrian Regional Command (SRC) in the face of 
strong opposition from th nationalists of th B C. 
The Eighth National Congress, for example, warned against 
what it termed 'leftist one-upmanship', but the regionalists 
with the assistance of military allies, in particular 
the unofficial Alawite officer committee, were strong 
enough to defy the supreme executive command of the 
party . On 21 December, however, the B C momentarily 
caught the regionalists unprepared and dismissed the 
SRC for acting unconstitutionally . But quick retaliation 
by the regionalists on 23 February 1966 brutally remo ed 
the B C from power within the party. After 23 Februar~ 
the Ba'th split into two major ideological orientations, 
the regionalists representing the SRC and, as we will 
see, the , inth ational Congress 01 September 1966, and 
the Nationalists the ov rthrown Eighth ational Congress. 
Let us examine in mor detail the ideological beliefs 
of th regionalists as th y developed after 23 February 
1966 . 
Th ational Congress: Regional Socialism: 
Th inth ational Congress of September 1966 
adopt d as its starting point the id ological statement 
of th Sixth Jational Congr ss of 0 tob r 196J . l How 
with th overthrow of the nationalists th r gionalists 
o 
r, 
w r fr to mov furth r along the road to r volutionary 
social·sm . This was ariously expr ss d in th creation 
of a pl thora of popu lar work rand p asant associat·ons 
which, in theory, were designed to ncourag th activ 
participation of th 
' d stitute mass s ' in the progr ssiv 
r volutionary socialist struggles of their vanguard, th 
2 
Ba ' th party . Th standard jargon of th party also 
changed noticeably in th ational R port of this Congr s. 
Th term ' comrade ' to define the new ' progressive Ba ' thist ' 
replaced th innocuous ' member ' of the pr -2J February 
phas The term ' destitute masses ' replaced earlier 
references to ' ignorant masses ' commonly mployed by 
Aflaqiyya theorists . Str ss on 's cientific revolutionary 
socialism ' was, of course, the most natural substitut 
of t h regionalists for ' national awak ning ' , ' national 
consciousnes s ' , ' mental regeneration' and so on of the 
discredited Aflaqiyya . J 
Und er the regionalists Ba ' th socialism became an 
ins trument of war to be levelled at all exploiting classes 
insid and outside the Arab homeland. Without 'economic 
fr ee d om ' it was argu dr, there could be no corresponding 
' so cial and political freedom'. The new ecretary-General 
of th Ninth B C , urruddin al-Atasi held, for example : 
1 
Frer s citoyens, 
Si la Revolution du 8 Mars 196J est une reclamation 
d toutes les categories proletair s du people, il 
est natural que , dans sa planification et dans ses 
realisations, elle adopte Ie socialisme en tant 
qu ' instrument economiqu de liberation pour son 
action politique future, car le socialisme signifie 
d ' abord la liberation du peuple de l ' imperialisme 
et nsuite sa liberation de toute xploitation . 
ans le socialism, il serait impossibl a la 
Th ational Congress, September 1966 (Offices 
of Propaganda and Information, ational Command Headquart rs, 
Damascus), Political Report, p . 227 . 
2 
Ib id . , p . 2JO. 
J 
Ib id . , p . 2JO, passim . Razzaz, Tajribat al-Mura , p . 225 . 
Revolution d supprim r d'finitiv m nt 1 s 
ag nts d l ' imp'rialism t s s so ·'t's 
petroli ' res commercial s et industri 11 s a 
l ' int'ri ur . l 
Lik the Afl aqiyya in th two previous d cades th 
r gionalists of th inth ational Congress saw th 
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battl lying b fore th Ba ' th and th ' d stitute mass s ' 
which it was leading as a long and fi rc on . By 
implication at least , it was believed that th p opl 
2 had to be forced to be fr in order to onfound the 
exploiting classes and their foreign capitalist and 
imperialist allies . By contrast the Aflaqiyya in theory 
had stressed that the Ba ' th should educate 3 the p ople 
to be ' fr ee ' . 
In theory at least, ' to force ' or ' to ducate ' 
people to be 'free ' constituted for th two major wings 
of the Ba ' th very differ nt systems of approach to the 
extent of bing incompatible . For the Aflaqiyya 't o 
force ' a man to be ' fre e ' denied him the individual 
incentiv e or initiative to be ' fre e ' . In so doing it 
destroyed his soul and his powers of creativity . He 
became a mere stereotyp e such as Andre Gide had revealed 
in Retour d e L ' URSS in 1936. For the Aflaqiyya, 'freedom ' 
was ideally a state of mind which grew out of expanding 
national consciousness as people were ' educated ' to 
receive the n w realities of national struggle. On the 
other hand, for the regionalists ' freedom ' was something 
to be snatched from th evil clutches of the capitalist 
and imperialist exploiters of the people . If the people 
were m ntally dull to the need to overthrow the wicked 
social exploiters then they had to be forc d by the informed 
revolutionary vanguard to conform in their own interest . 5 
1 
Discours Prononce Par Le Doctuer oureddin Atassi, Ch f 
De L ' Etat, Dans La uit De Mardi 7 Mars 1967, A~ccasion 
De La Cel bration Du 4 me Anniversaire De La Revolution 
De 8 Mars (Agence Arab Syrienne d ' Information) p.52 . 
2 
inth . ational Congress: 
p . 125, passim . 
3 
Political R port, op. cit . , 
APD . , 1965 , op . cit . , p .181 , ational R port of th 
Eighth ational Congr ss, 4 May 1965 . ee , ' The Change 
to Socialism ' . 
4 
Ibid . , p . 181 . 
5 
Atasi , op . cit . , p . 36, passim . 
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In int r-Arab aff irs,th r gionalists w r 
moti at d by the sam so 1 list logic as for th r gion 
(Syr' a ). Popular war was, in th ory, d lared gainst 
all r actionary r gim s (' monar hi sand r publi s 
such as L banon, Turri ia, Iraq tc .) to b sponsor d 
ov rtly and covertly within th r action ry states 
conc rn d. l In theory th y want d to stablish a popular 
progressive, r volutionary front dir cted by th party 
and oth r such progressiv 1 ments with th obj ctive 
of attaining ' unity of struggl ' against xplo'ters 
of the ' destitute mass s ' and their for ign alIi s.2 
This necessitated the removal of all for ign bases, 
military pacts, reactionary allianc s, conomic monopolies 
and, above all, the State of Israel . J States with which 
the Ba ' th was at least willing to co-operate w re few, 
though asir ' s regime in the DAR, whil still regard d 
as a dictatorship, was thought to be moving towards the 
same objective go als as the Ba'th, hence ' we should com 
to terms with it ,. 4 The Algerian ational Liberation 
Front ( LF) ' notwithstanding basic contradicitions' was 
seen as ' the only guarantee for establishing a socialist-
unionist stance in Alg ria,.5 And in Y men 'our party 
will support the Republican regime maintaining the 
security of the r volution ' ,6 while in Aden and the South 
' th party believes that only force, indi idual and 
collective effort can compel imperialism to step down ' 7 
In the Sudan ' we should support the progressive front ' 8 
And as an example of the way in which popular revolutionary 
struggl was to be undertaken in the r actionary states, 
it was said of Kuwait: 
1 
Political R port, pp.125-49. 
2 
Ibid ., p . 125. 
J 
Ibid., pp.192-20J. S , 'Recommendations and Resolutions in 
the Fi Id of International Policy ' . 
4 
Ibid. , p . lJ8. Se , 'Political Report ' 
5 
Ibid . , lJ9· 
6 
Ibid . , p . 144 . 
7 
Ibid . , p . 144 . 
8 
Ibid . , p . 145. 
W should xtend our org nisation th r , 
multiplying our activit'es with th aim of 
xposing the r visionist tribal gov rnm nt 
(whil proffering) th slogan 'Arab 
P troleum is Arab prop rty , l 
Furth r co-op ration with Arab summit conf renc s 
which p rmitted the att ndanc of ' r actionary' stat s 
was also rej cted on the doctrinair socialist 
c onviction that th peopl could gain nothing by allying 
with forc s of reaction ven for the purpos of national 
l 'b ' 2 S G 1 ratlon . ecretary- en ral ur ud-Din Atasi, might 
have been paraphrasing Marx or Lenin when h said on th 
question of the Arab summits: 
i la mentalite de droite, qui nagu're commandait 
la Revolution, a accepte la participation aux 
conferences aux sommets, nous declarons que le 
sommet des Arabes c sont les masses Arabes 
seules et non les dirigeants traites, et les rois, 
ag nts de l'imperialisme et du colonialisme . ous 
nous adressons a la veritable nation Arabe, au 
veritable sommet, des Arabs, aux mass s populaires 
t proletaires Arab s qui edifieront l'uniteJavec 
leurs bras labori ux et leur sang fidele ... 
By contrast the Aflaqiyya were less ideologically 
opposed to the Arab summit conferences. Munif Razzaz 
gave the reason in the following extract: 
The Summit Conference brings togeth r the Arab 
gov rnm nts and so contains all the various 
contradictory attitud s held by these governments. 
But w must realise that the results of any such 
conf rence do reflect the force of popular 
(national) pressur s in the Arab world ... The 
great r the 4pr ssure, the more significant the 
r sults ... 
Through the summit conf rences1the Aflaqiyya were hopeful 
that latent national consciousness would be encouraged 
to grow into a more expansive nationalist oriented 
movement . 
1 
Ibid . , p . 146 . 
2 
Ibid ., p .21J. See, 'Obj ctiv s' . 
J 
Atasi, op. cit., pp . 48-49 . 
4 
APD., 1965, op. cit., p . J5J . S e,' tatem nt Concerning 
the Role of the Arab Masses in the Palestine Problem 
Damascus, J Octob r 1965'. 
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Finally, in int rnational r lations, doctrinair 
socialist ori ntation motivat d for ign policy options 
of th r gionalists. So ialist countri s w r h ld to 
b th natural alIi s of the Ba ' th and oth r Arab 
progr ssiv fronts n their struggl against 10 al r -
action and its for ign alIi 1 Russia, and s . a n w com 
to Ba ' th Political R ports, Communist China, wer s n 
to offer th great st fri ndship pot ntial to th Arab 
2 peopl Referenc s, how v r , to China's undaunting 
opposition to imp rial ism and capitalismJjuxtapos d to 
4 Russia ' s ' abandoning of the ideal of world war ' (i . e . 
coming to t rms with the capitalist world) would se m 
to hav indi c ated that the regionalists w r at least 
willing to bargain friendship between Moscow and PIing 
r 
in return, no doubt, for substantiv value. On th otler 
hand , the doctrinaire socialist convictions of the 
regionalists drove them to see in Western nations 
implacable enemies of th Arab people in view of th 
form r ' s manifest support for the State of IsraelI gaIly 
within the UN and, cov rtly, by trad and arms deals 
and by general support for imperialist xploitation of 
th Arab hom land and Afro-Asian countries in general. 5 
v : Evaluation 
In this Part we have been focussing our attention 
on th origin, development and practical outcome of Ba'th 
party id ology betw en 1940-66. In those years we have 
s e n it volve from thr e basic postulates, Unity (Wahda), 
Freedom (Huriyya) and ocialism (Ishtirakiyya) to rec iv 
pragmatic formulation in the Ba'th Constitution of 1947 
and later between 196J-66 in the governm nt policies of 
Iraq (February - ovember 196J) and Syria 196J-66 . But in 
its e v olutionary development Ba'th ideology encountered 
1 
ational Congress, see, Political Report, p . lJ4 . 
2 
Ibid ., pp . 190-92, se , 
China. 
oviet Policy in the Ar a (and) 
J 
Ibid . , p . 192. 
4 
Ibid., p . 190. 
5 
Ibid . , p . lJ4, s , Political Report. 
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serious int rnal probl ms which on 23 F bruary 1966 1 d 
to a brutal purg of aLL thos 1 m nts supporting th 
orig'nal orthodox lin of th Ba'th . In Lh on lud'ng 
paragraphs of this Evaluation w will try to isolat nd 
evaluate th r asons for th se int rnal d'fficulti s. 
Ba ' th id ology as it was formulat d by Aflaq, dr w 
heavily from th Fr n h, Ge rman and Italian histor'cal 
and philosophical schools of the nin t nth and tw nti th 
c nt u ries . In its basic assumptions it was truly c1e tic . 
The II g lian conc pt of ' fr edom ' undergoing various 
historical transmutations until embodied in the 
constitutional procedures of the German state, d eply 
influ nced the thinking of Aflaq as it did many of his 
Arab c ontemporaries and other Asian and African leaders 
o f the future . Ba ' th id ology in its earli st 
manifestations in the early 194os~showed promin nt 
trac s of German and Italian fascism although tempered, 
as we have s een , by an appeal to Arab-Islamic history, 
( s ee, F i g . 1) and by the humanitarian legacy which Aflaq 
inherited through An d re Gid e and Romain Rolland . 
The concept of the ' nation ' being reborn (Ba ' th) 
out of the historical process was for Aflaq the a nswer 
to those who were asserting that nationalism had to be 
rationally defined on the basis of language, religion, 
cultur , history and so on . As we have seen, Arab 
nationalism for Aflaq , was a synthesis of the ideal 
qualities shared by a people inheriting common historical 
experiences r suIting from consanguinity, linguistic and 
cuI tura'l affinity to g ographical propinquity. ationalism 
was both spirit and matter embodied in a particular p opl 
It was in microcosm the epitome of ' spirit', ' feeling ' 
and ' love ' embodied in th familial unit . It could not 
be rationally defined but, by the same token, its absenc 
was imm diately notic d. But wh n was the evidenc of 
' spirit ', ' feeling ' and ' love ' in Arab society of th 
t w ntieth c ntury? For Aflaq, th y were verywhere to be 
seen in th daily liv s of the Arab p ople, but the latter 
had no mind or consciousness to conceiv of them in r aLity. 
Th id ological principle that th Ba ' th was endowed 
by d stiny to recr at th Arab nation (Qawm) out of 
'spirit ' tended to give th party an litist, almost 
s mi - m ssianic , orient tion from its inc ption . Through 
socialism its m mb rs w r to edu at and trans£orm 
th mOnds, morals nd Lt" tud s or h Ar h p ople to 
struggl (Inqilab) for th r alit" s of n L"onal 
fUlfilm nt (i . e . th promis d land) against th ror s 
mainta"ning the partition or th Arab hom land. 
Soci lism, as w ha s n , refl t d humanitarian 
ideals to be nurtur d hy th Ba ' th within th nation 1 
ntity as it gr w to national fulfilm nt through the 
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1 ad rship and instigation of the Ba ' th party . ltimaL 
r ality would b attain d wh n the nat"onal ntity was 
r cr at d and human fr edom and progress assur dafter 
successful national lib ration had r -unit d Lhe memb rs 
of th Arab nation) artificially separuL d £rom ea h oth r . 
Aflaq ' s ideological postulates}mor than anything 
emphasis d that succ ssful national lib ration could 
only be ff ctively realised through th leadership of 
the informed vanguard or the people, the Ba ' th. Within 
the Ba ' th resided all knowledge and capability to recr ate 
th Arab nation . But objective definition of Ba ' th 
ideology was rejected by Aflaq and his tradition for th 
very fact that Arab soci ty was constantly in ' flux ' 
or in evolution from on phase to another as national 
consciousn ss or awareness developed through constant 
confrontation with th objective realities militating 
for and against national recreation . At best, Ba'th 
ideology prior to the Sixth ational Congress in Octob r 
1963 was only prepar d to proffer m ntally elevating 
slogans encouraging the p ople to struggle under th 
lead rship of the Ba ' th to liberate th Arab homeland, 
thereby attaining unity and freedom. But how? 
For the Aflaqiyya th important qu stion was not 
' how ' but ' why ' th Ba ' th and the Arab p ople should 
struggl to attain national liberation and, ipso facto, 
national unity and fr edom . As we can s th degr 
of emphasis is substantially diff r nt . Faith condition d 
th latt r belief and t nd d th reby to dim consciousn ss 
of th practical ' how '. But in th cours of the 1950s ~ 
with th growth of party membership, the ' how ' becam as 
important to rank and fil activists as th ' why '. Th Y 
w nt d to know ' how ' party ideology w s to be meaningfully 
transl t d into popular mass action in th r volutionary 
national lib ration struggle. Inde d, th ' how ' began 
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to t k pr c d nc ov r th ' why ' follow'ng th 
disastrous s t-ba ks n ount r d by Lh Da ' th in th 
UAR, 1958-61 and th S ssion, 1961-63. And th 'how ' 
d v lop d to a cr sc ndo following th party ' s s izur 
of power in ~yria and Iraq in 1963. 
n lew of th pr sing ircumst n s confronting 
the party after 1963)th A£laqiyya wer lorc d to 
att mpt to translate Aflaq ' s basic id ological postulat s 
into r ality within th r gion while knowing, in stri t 
theory, that this was comp1et ly imposs'bJ Thus by 
implication their id ological 1 ad rship of th Syrian 
Ba ' th amounted to telling th peopl som thing lik this: 
' This is the b st we can off r you und r the circumstanc s 
in the way of social, economic and political reform, but 
wh n national unity is attained as a r suIt of successful 
liberation struggle, then the objective r aliti s existing 
in th recreated national entity will determine the 
substantiv reforms for which you have been yarning and 
waiting for such a long time. Continue to live in faith 
1 in the 1 adership of the Ba ' th '. Caution, therefore, 
befor anything Ise conditioned the ideological beliefs 
of the Aflaqiyya. Socialism within the r gion, they 
believ d, had to be developed strictly in accordance 
with its applicability to th national entity. Thus, 
for xampl , to extensively nationalise yrian industry 
and land would, in theory be utilising the very limit d 
2 
resour s of an imp rfect non-viabl part. 
Finally, it is n c ssary to briefly return to the 
qu stion posed earlier and to some extent ubsumed 
within the general discussion of the Evaluation: is it 
possib1 to explain the disintegration of the Ba ' th on 
23 February 1966 on the basis of some inherent ideological 
defici ncy? I am strongly of th opinion, fortified by 
th vld n e and arguments of the previous four chapt rs 
that such a con lusion would be affirmative though subject 
to some qualification. Ideological vagu ness in th 1940s 
and 1950s (prior to 1958), c rtainly p rmitted th Ba ' th 
1 
My own reconstruction bas d on ext nsive int rviews 
w'th leading Ba'thists of the Aflaqiyya radition . 
2 
Intervi w, Bitar, 17 ov mber 1967, Deirut. 
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to draw from a wide cross-s ction of Ar b society . But 
by th sam token th unwillingn ss of its 1 ad rs to 
objectiv ly defin fundam ntal prin ipl s such as Unity, 
Fre dom and Socialism , nabled factions to mano uvre 
within the party and to seek to drag 't towards th ir 
own id ological disposItion . During th 1960s this 
w ak ned the party considerably and 1 d to many factional 
s cessions . The cas of the Sa ' diyya is one in point. 
But perhaps the fatal flaw in Ba'th id ology can b 
trac d to its failur to r solv the national-socialist 
dichotomy - nationalism before socialism or socialism 
befor nationalism. Th origins of this flaw can b 
traced to the formulat'on of Ba'th ide ol ogy in th writings 
of Michel Aflaq . During th 1940s and 1950 it did noL 
prov unduly troublesom to the Ba'th when out of offic 
but after 1963, wh n the party ' constitut d the governments 
of Iraq (February- ovember 1963) and Syria (March 1963- ) 
it cr ated an endless sourc of friction which was only 
resolved by the coup d ' etat of 23 February 1966 . But 
was the national-socialist dichotomy an issue which 
c oul d have bee n resolved without recourse to intra-party 
warfare? As we shall discuss in Politics (Part 2), 
So c iology (Part 3) and Organisation (Part 4), the argume n t 
of this thesis favours the contention that ideological 
divisiveness and, in the latter case incompatibility , 
was symptomatic of deeper underlying issu s destroying 
the Ba'th party from within and without. 
PART 2 
POLITICS : MOTIVATION AND STRATEGY 
i : Th Formativ 
Th Ba ' th party had its arli st beg'nnings as a 
student study circl (IIalaqa) n th Tajhiz s condary 
school , Damascus, in 1940 and in 1942-43, it made its 
first app aranc on the streets of th 
a student prot st or action movement . 
yrian capital as 
Th founders o.f 
th Ba ' th wer two t achers, Mich 1 Aflaq and Salah 
ud-Din Bitar . In 1942 both resigned from the Education 
departm nt to giv their full-time to organising their 
student action mov m nt into a fully fl dged political 
1 party . 
Th Ba ' th party can be classifie d with the group of 
lat independence political parties which sprung up in 
the late 1930s and 1940s . (See Tabl 1) . Unl ike the 
earlier nationalist parties and movem nts which had com e 
through the Arab Revolt of 1916, to be embodied in the 
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ational Blo c or Kutla of 1929, these parties were motivat d 
by i deologies whi c h sought to give greater purpose and 
meaning to the national liberation struggle against the 
French and the colonial powers occupying the Arab homeland . 
As we have seen in Part 1, German and Italian national 
socialist variants deeply influenced the ideological 
schemata of Arab national reformers at this time. 
In 1928 Hassan al-Banna founded the Muslim Broth rhood 
in Egypt with the objective of regenerating the Arab-
2 Islamic nation on the basis of ' Qurani socialism ' . In 
1932 Antun Sa l ada found d the Parti Populaire Syrien (pPS) 
with the objective of regenerating the ' hidden ' Syrian 
nation on the basis of ' state socialism ,. 3 In 1933 the 
Leagu of ational Action (L A) was founded in Lebanon 
and Syria by a group of intellectuals who took as their 
objective the indivisibility of the Arab nation. An early 
manif e s to held that 'Arabism is a movement of renaissance 
1 
Allush, . , ath-Thawra Wa al-Jamahir (The Revolution and 
the Masses) (Dar at-Tali ' ah, Beirut, Second Edition,1963 ) p .4E 
Abu Jaber , op . cit . , p . 12 . 
2 
Laq u u r , W. Z . , .'=C~o~m::m~u~n.:.l=' .::::s~m~~a~n~d::::......:.:.!:a~t~i~o~n.:.a:=.=l:...::i=.:s~m~i=.:n::.......::..::~--:~.::::.:::::.:::..:=­
East (Routledge and K gan Paul, London, Third Edition, 
1961), pp . 237-46 . 
3 
u leiman, M., Politi 
University Pr ss, Itha 
in L banon (Cornell 
w York, 1967), pp . 9l-l l 9 . 
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n a llon. In 1960. e ube o rib ed 
to tbe UAR "'ationa l Chart e r 
t o a ttaln Arab unity, 
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Sunn.i Muellm 
Greek Orthodo .. 
SW\nl Hu e tim 
Prote. eional 
~:~!~ (no lll lna lly) 
Lo v or-MidcUe lll6«al 
MHitary/ 
Proteaeional 
Lo w.r_Middle Illega l 
Prot.a.l onal 
Syri a 
Arab 
Milltantly Arab nationa1ht . 
Advocated progl"Gaeive eooia1ie t 
r.to.... Slall a r 10. ~y wa y . 
to tb. PPS in org anteation a.o.d 
outlook. 
Ind1v1aibUHy ot tbe Anb 
nation . Unity , ai n a d t broucb 
. ooi.lht revolut i on. 
Suba oribed to the lIAR 
Na tional Chart e r ot 1962 . 
~ The Middl . £ ... t (Europ • .P ubli c ati on. , Lo ndon). v o le . 1948-67 . S e e ' Vh o' . Vho in t h e Middle Eaet' . 
Arch l ve a 8to ra hi u. Pe rmanentea Du Mende Arab (Edite pa r I e Burea u de. Docu . e n tatton) 
Syr ienn • • e t Arabo a Dama s , vol a . I and 2 . 
KhaUI, M. Th . Arab Sta t.. a and The Arab Lea t[Ue l v o l . 1. Con.ti tu t lona l Develop .. nt. , (Kha y ata , Belrut , 1962) 
S o . 'Political Par tie a ', Chap . .. il. 
Sul e hlan, H . V ., Political Partie. i n Le b a non. Tbe Cba llenge o f a Frarma n t.d CV ure (Co r n e ll Univer.ity • 
.... v York , 1967). 
Ziad.b, H. , Syri a and Leba non (Erne . t Benn, London, 19'7) . 
Ke rr, H . , Th. Arab Cold Va rt A Study o f Ideolo frY i n polittoe (RI ll , Olt.l'ord Un l v eraily Pre .. , London, 196,) . 
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and lib ration which aims at th cr at'on of on unifi d 
Arab SOC1' ty ,. l Ah d LI ' M' 1 F ( 
.m rusayn S lsr a - atah Young 
Egypt) of 1938 had as its obj ctiv th r storation of 
Egyptian pristine glory with the establishm nt of a 
great empir based on two main principl s - ' faith and 
. 2 
actlon ' . Like the Syrian-L ban se PPS, Misr al-Fatah 
had an organisation of storm troopers to assist in th 
implem ntation of party policy.3 
These ideologically orient d part· s and movements 
r pres nted strong und r-currents of dissatisfaction 
among the younger nationalist intellectuals. In the 
Levantin states, for example , the older nationalists who 
had s rved under Amir Faisal and in the short-lived 
Syrian Congress of 1919-20, were still v ry active in the 
mid-1930s . In 1929 the Kutla swept into power upon the 
4 formation of the Syrian Constituent Assembly. For 
several years it continued to apply pressures upon th 
French mandato ry authorities to relinquish, intact, the 
Syrian mandate accorded to France at the Peace Settlements 
following the First World War . In 1936 the Blum socialist 
coalition government actually responded to the demands 
for the relinquishment of the Levantine mandate, but its 
sudden removal from power and the det riorating political 
situation in Europe delayed final ratification of the 
project . 5 Later the cession of the Sanjag of Alexandretta 
to Turk y in 1939-40 and the Kutla's apparent acquiescence , 
shook the confidence of the younger nationalists in the 
older leaders who seemed to be selling their birth-right 
6 to the French . 
It was , therefore, in the midst of the deteriorating 
international situation and growing loss of confidence 
in the French and th Kutla, that the Ba ' th had its 
1 
Ziadeh , .A., Syria and Lebanon (Ernest B nn, London, 
1957), p . 198 . Safadi, Hizb al-Ba'th, pp . 63-64 . 
2 
Laqueur, op . cit ., p . 247 . 
3 
Sul iman, op. cit . , p . 112 . The national anthem of theFP 
was Syria uber alles to th familiar tune of Deutschland , 
uber alles. 
4 
Ziadeh, op . cit., p.192 . 
5 
Ibid . Sale , op. cit . , p .25. 
6 
Abu Jaber, op. cit., p . 25 · 
~afadi, op . cit., pp . 55-69. 
Allush, op . cit., p . 45. 
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arliest, if hazy, b ginnings . According to afadi, 
following the c e ssion of Alexandretta to Turkey in 1939, 
an Al xandrettan int 11 ctual, Zak' al-Arsusi, fl d to 
Damascus with a handful of discipl s wher h comm nc d 
to pr ach the id a s of th L A ' which Aflaq and Bitar 
lat r advocated ... in particular regarding th ideal of an 
Arab nation with an ternal mission ,. l afadi ' s 
implication would se m to be that the Ba ' th was not an 
original political mov m nt . Allush, on the oth r hand, 
appears to have much the same story as Safadi, but draws 
a substantially differ nt conclusion. For exampl , h 
agrees that following the cession of Alexandretta 'Arab 
youngsters ' (intellectuals-students etc.,) fled to 
Damascus where they form d a ' national cell'. In 1941 
other national c lls joined forces with the original 
national cell following the Rashid Ali al-Kaylani 
coup d ' tat in Iraq (April-May) against the pro-British 
Hashemit government . In 1942, asserts Allush, these 
national cells made contact wi th Aflaq and Bitar ' and 
constituted the movement which they called the Ba ' th 
2 party ' . 
Both these accounts, it seems, should be taken 
cau tious ly. Safadi, for example, is a writ er with 
pro- asir sympathi s whose sole purpose in Hizb al-Ba ' th 
was to denigrate the originality of the Ba'th as an 
ideologically oriented political movement . Allush, on 
the other hand, was for many years a promin nt member of 
the Lebanese Ba'th and hence ath-Thawra Wa al-Jamahir 
might be said to b over partisan in sympathy . Yet by 
putting these two accounts together, it is at least possible 
to reconstruct an approximation of the main events which 
led to the formation of the Ba ' th in 1942 . For exampl , 
Safadi would seem to be wrong in sugg sting that the 
Ba ' th plagiarised its ideology from Arsusi. Indeed 
betw n 1936-40, Aflaq ' s writings show that he was toying 
with ideas of a regenerate Arab nation. But for that 
matter, so were many oth r intellectuals such as Constantine 
Zuraqy who were influenced by current European national 
1 
Saf a di, op . cit., p.56 . 
2 
Allush, op . cit . , pp.45-46 . 
socialism . Taking afadi's point that Arsusi was 
pol-tical activist, it might be argu d that in Damas us 
he would have sought political support from parties and 
intell ctuals wi th similar id ological b Ii fs . II nc 
93 
he might have propos d a merg r of his d pleted organisation 
(L A) wi th the various ' national cells ' alluded to by 
Allush . And in 1942 these ' national cells ' made contact 
with Aflaq and Bitar, at th moment wh n they resign d 
from the Tajhiz, with th intention of d voting their 
full-tim to political organisation . 
Foundation Memberslof the Ba'th, 1942-48 
So ciological Perspective 
Current research on the Ba ' th party has failed to 
open up a venue s of inv stigation into th type of m mbers 
r ecruited to the party in its earliest and latest phases 
2 
of develo pment . Abu Jaber is, throughout, vague on the 
question . For example, he refers to the foundation members 
a s ' a small circle of intellectuals . .. largely inspir d 
by the ir desire to see the conditions of the Arab world 
ameliorated,.3 Allush simply states that the majority of 
foundation members were students and young intellectuals, 
though he does admit to a certain broadening of the social 
base after 1945. 4 Safadi, on the other hand, appears to 
have quite a few details about the social characteristics 
of the foundation members of the Ba ' th . For example, he 
asserts that in its arliest phase, the Ba ' th recruited 
1 
The concept of ' member' of a party coincides with that 
of an adherent. This is distinguished from 'supporter' 
who declares his agreement with the doctrines of the party 
and sometimes lends his support but who r mains outsid 
its organisation and th community which it forms. Se, 
Duverger, M. , Political Parties, Their organisation and 
Activity in the Mod rn State (Trans. French, B. and R . 
orth, Methe u en, London, 1954), p.62 . 
2 
S e, Part 3, for a more detailed discussion of the 
' latest phas es of dev lopm nt ' 
3 
Abu Jab r, op . cit . , p .2 3 . 
4 
Allush, op . c it . , p . 46 . 
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th bulk of its memb rs from rural minority communiti s 
such as Alawi tes, Druz s, Isma'ilis a nd Christians . 
Originally, h argues, the Ba'th was a sectarian movem nt 
whi c h had designs on supplanting th traditional ord r n 
which th Sunni Muslim community was dominant . H 
continu s : 
The minoriti s wer more ambitious to overthrow 
th traditional ord r in which the Sunni Muslims 
were the dominant community. Th Sunnis 
formed the bourg oisie ... being politically 
and economically dominant ... only a f w Sunnis 
ent red the party (Ba ' th) until 1956-57 . 1 
Let us test the accuracy of these statements by reference 
to Tabl s 2 and 3. 2 
On the question of membership distribution 55 per cent 
of the sample came from urban centr s and of thes e , 36 p r 
cent were Damascenes. By our socio-economic classification, 
the lower to middle class was predominant in both the urban 
and rural centres. 3 The community with the highest 
representation was clearly the Sunni Muslim with 68 per c nt, 
a figure almost identical to the Syrian percentage over 
all other communities . (See, Table 4) . Thus on thes 
points alone, Safadi would seem to be wrong. 
Table 3 confirms Abu Jaber's and Allush's 
unsubstantiated statements as to the ' intellectual' 
character of the foundation members of the Ba'th . 
1 
Safadi, op . cit . , p.69 . 
2 
A word about the preparation of the above Tables . I am 
not sur ho w many foundation members th re were between 
1942-48 . At the First ational Congress in April 1947, 
Aflaq stated that 'during the first three years of its 
exist nc (circa 1942-45) our membership did not exceed 
ten '. (S e, Abu Jaber, op . cit . , p.26). I have listed 
twenty-two members who were actively involved in the party 
during those years . I do not assert that they represent 
all th members actually involved, though I believe from 
ext nsive intervi wing of lading Ba ' thists, that the 
m mbers in the above Tables were a fair cross-section of 
th earliest members r cruited to the party. As to the 
statistical information in these Tabl s, I would like th 
read r to treat it with some caution. Whil every ffort 
has b n made to ascertain r liable information, no real 
documentary evidenc existed. All the facts noted in 
Tabl s 2 and 3 were th r fore compiled from piecing 
togeth r information gain d largely on th basis of the 
human m mory of thos a tually involved in the party 
from its ·nception. 
3 
For more d tails on socio-economic classification, s e 
Tabl L~ 6 . 
~, 
AFUQ. Hicbel 
ABO' IlA'IH, Abdullah 
ABDIN. Chaleb 
"1.SAM'!, Shibl! 
ASHURI. Huh.a.mmad Fahmi 
ATISI. JaJII&l a 1-
JURASII, Manaur 
8.A.DRUDOIH. A.haed 
BITAR. Hadhat 
BITAR. SaLah ud-Din 
Il4IRl. Ma z sa 1 
DARX..A.HI . As' ad 
ORUBl, Sa-.1 
CHA.1<EH , Vahib 
JABER, All 
JUNDI., Sam! 
MUR.lIVED. Haasan 
MAW AS. A..bdullab 
ADUVl:. Abdullah 
SAnAD. Jala.l &.8-
SlfUX.AIR. Am!.n 
SVURY. Nabi! 
KEOl.JJ( AGE : 
'rOT AL MEMBERS : 
TOTAL PERCENT : 
TJ.llLE 2 , 
Age 
1948 
)8 
24 
28 
19 
21 
J8 
2) 
24 
41 
J6 
28 
21 
)0 
)1 
27 
2) 
21 
J2 
30 
)5 
)1 
18 
271 
-
-
RlJR.A.L FAMILY 
Landless Peasant Landlord Labour1.ng 
Peasant Lower-Middle Middle-Upper Artisan 
· 
· 
· 
. 
· 
· 
· 
. 
· 
· 
- 8 2 
-
0 )6" n- O 
URBAN FAl<ILY 
Loy er-Middle 
Mercantile 
SOCIAL STATUS OF THE FAMILIES OF 
FOUNDATION MEMBERS OF THE llA'TH 
PARTY, 1942 -48 
CENTRE 
Middle - Uppe r 
Mercantile URBAN 
Semi-ProFess 10nal ProCessional 
· 
Damascus 
. Damascus 
· 
Damasc U5 
· 
Damaa cwt 
· 
Damascus 
· 
Damaacua 
. Ho ... 
· 
Da.ma.a cue 
· 
Jen.t.aalem 
· 
Ramallab 
· 
Amman 
· 
Drun8.Scua 
10 2 12 
45" 9" 55" 
RURAL 
Jabal 
Druze 
Idlib 
Ho= 
Jaba.l 
Druze 
lIauran 
Aleppo 
Lat t..akJ._ 
!labaUeb 
Sou t h LcbaooD 
Hama 
Delr as-Zor 
10 
45" 
Sunni Hus lim S hi ' i Mus Lim 
· 
· 
· 
· 
· 
· 
· 
· 
· 
· 
. 
· 
· 
· 
· 
· 
15 1 
68" 5" 
RELIGIOUS roKKIJN ITT 
Isma'ili Uawlte 
. 
. 
1 1 
5" 51> 
Dn.aze 
. 
. 
2 
n-
Chris tian 
. 
. 
2 
91> 
I 
\0 
~ 
TABLE ), FOUNDATION HEfmEIIS: EDUCATION AND OCCUPATION , 1242 - 1•8 
S URNAHJ!) SECONDARY TERTIARY: UNIVERSITY UNIVERSITY SUBJECT ONLY NON - UNIVERS ITY ARAB NON-ARAlI SPECIALITY OCCUPATION 
FLAQ Sorbonno H1e tory Full-time Party Organ1.aor 
BD' OA I IH Syrian Sorbonne Pi)ilooophy University Fund, Cairo Leoturer 
\ADDIN Syrian Law LO'WYor 
\AISAM I Syrian Eduoation Student 
\ASHURI Syrian Law Student 
\AT ASI Syrian So .... bonne Psyohology 
Journali8tl 
Wrl tor 
jATRASH Amerioan Sor boruta F1.ne Art. Student Universi ty Law 
Do lrut 
InAORUDDIN Syrian Medicino Intern 
BITAR MADllAT Syrian Medioine Physioian 
BITA!! SALAH Sorbo nne Physio. 
Full-time 
Party Organiaor 
DAIRI Syrian Engineering Engineor 
DARKANI So rbonne Philo8ophy 
University 
Lecturer 
DRUBI 
Syrian Philo8 o phy Diplomat 
Fuad, Cairo Psycho l o gy 
GIlANEM Syrian Medioine Physioian 
J ADER Syrian Medioine Physioian 
JUNDI Syrian Dent!. try Dentist 
Amerioan Political Student flURAlWED University Scienoe 
Beirut 
Syrian Law 
Journalis t / 
NAWAS Wri ter 
I Polltiokor' 
Soienoe Sohool Teaoher 
nHIAWI Syrian General I Polittoker ' 
SAITAD Syrian Law Lawyer , 
SIlUKAIR Syrian Pharmaoy Phannaols t 
Homs Military Military Officer S WAIRY Colloge Studies Co.do t 
Muhafaza t : 
(Province) 
Deir ez-Z,or 
Dera ' a 
Damascus 
Aleppo 
Jazira 
Horns 
Hama 
Lattakia 
Jabal Druze 
Total 
Arabic 
Kurdish 
Armenian 
Turkish 
Syriac 
TABLE 4 : 
Sunnis 
98 . 0 
92 . 5 
82 . 7 
82 . 4 
67 . 9 
66 . J 
64 . 6 
18 . 9 
1 . 8 
68 . 7 
57 . 4 
8 . 3 
J . O 
SYRIAN RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES ACCORDING TO ~mHAFAZATS AND LANGUAGES . + 
Isma ' i lis 
and Shi ' is 
0.1 
1 . 0 
0.2 
1.3 
1J . 2 
1 . 8 
1 · 5 
1·5 
A1awites 
0.4 
0 · 7 
0·3 
0.1 
10 . 4 
9 · 5 
62 . 1 
11.5 
11.5 
Druzes 
2.5 
0.2 
87 . 6 
J . O 
J . O 
Greek 
Orthodox 
0 . 1 
2 . 6 
3 · 9 
1 . 1 
0 . 2 
9 . 4 
11 . 0 
12 . 8 
5 · 7 
4 . 7 
4 . 7 
Armenian 
Orthodox 
and Catholic 
1 . 1 
0 . 1 
3 . 2 
8 . 9 
6 . 8 
1 . 4 
0 . 4 
1 · 3 
0 . 7 
4 . 2 
0 . 2 
4 . 0 
Other 
Christians 
0 . 8 
4 . 4 
4 . 7 
4 . J 
22 . 4 
11 . 2 
1 . J 
3 · 1 
4 . 2 
5 .2 
3 · 1 
0 . 1 
2 . 0 
+ Adopted from Baer, G., Population and Society in the Arab East (Trans . from Hebrew, 
H . Szoke, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1964), p . 109 . 
Other : 
(Jews , 
Yazidis) 
2 . 2 
1 . 8 
2 . 4 
1 . 2 
1 . 1 
0.1 
Total 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
82.5 
8 . 5 
4.0 
J . O 
2.0 
\0 
---l 
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Fo r x ampl 100 p r c nt had ith r had or w r pursu ng 
te r tiary du c at ion wh n r cruit d to th Ba ' th b tw n 
1942 -48 . When on cons i d ers that in th 1940s yria h d 
an ill it racy rating of 70 per cent, it can b s n tha 
the foundation memb rs r pres nted th int 11 ctual cr m 
o f Syrian s o c iety . 1 Furth 27 rmor , p r cent of th s 
rec i v e d t rtiary and post-graduat ducation in Europ 
and 18 p r cent in Arab uni ersiti s other than the yrian 
Univ rsity . It might be argued , therefore, that for th 
famili s of the fo undation m mbers to b able to afford 
s u ch an ducation for th ir sons, th y must have had 
incomes well in e x cess of the Syrian per capita, equi al nt 
to US $ 12J in 1949 . 2 
F oundation L a d ers 
In Ba ' th political communiques between 1942-48, six 
leaders were frequently mentioned : Michel Aflaq, Salah 
ud-Din Bitar, Madhat Bitar , Jalal as-Sayyad, Jamal al-Atasi 
and Wahib aI - Gh anem . (See, Tables 2 and J) . In terms of 
urban- r ural dis tri b u tion, the foundation leaders can be 
divide d ev e n ly . Commu nal representation , however, shows 
a clear preponderance of Sunni Muslims, though in the 
Firs t B C o f Apr il 1947, thi s was balanced by minority 
representation (see, Table 28) . Communal parity was 
upset in the Second B C, 1954-58 by a ratio of 2:1, in 
f avo u r of the Sunni Muslim ma j ority community . This was 
the ' Ba ' th - asir ' phase in which Arab unity was the sole 
d emand . Indeed there may be a positive correlation 
between the relatively high incidence of Sunni Muslims on 
the B C , and the unconditional demand for Arab unity . 
Cultu rally , at least, Sunni Muslim leaders would have 
been less opposed to Arab unity (approximat ly 80-85 per 
cent of all Arabs being Sunni Muslim) than Ba ' thist 
leaders drawn from minority communities such as the 
Alawit , Isma ' ili , Christian and Druze . On the other hand, 
wh n the Ba ' th ' s political relationships began to 
d teriorate with Presid nt asir after 1959, it can be shown 
1 
Lerner , D . , Th Passing of Traditional Society (The Fre 
Pr ss of Glenc oe , Colli r-Macmillan, London, Paperback 
E d ition , 1964), p . 276 . 
2 
Ibid ., p . 266 . 
on Tabl 28 that th r was a progr ss v n r as 
rural and secta ian r pres ntation on th 1 ad'ng 
political commands of th party. 
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in 
Prof ssional r pr s ntation of th foundation 1 ad rs 
was fairly typi al of th professional sample as a whol . 
For exampl , prof ssions with a r lativ ly high 
repr s ntation, were school teach rs or full-time party 
organisers (two), physicians (two) - prof ssions lik ly 
to come in contact with a broad cross-s ction of society. 
The remainder compris d a lawyer and a writ r-journalist. 
Taking the membership sample on Tabl 2, with one 
exception, it can be shown that ther wer no prominent 
landed or urban family names such as had dominated the 
1 Syrian nationalist movement for several decades. The 
one exception, however, was the young ' r bel ' Mansur 
Atrash, son of Sultan Pasha Atrash, leader of the Druz 
rebellion of 1925, feudal lord and spiritual leaders of 
th Druze community of the Jabal Druze. Jamal al-Atasi, 
for example, was a member of the large Atasi family of 
Homs which had produc d several notable nationalist 
leaders, though he came from a poorer, 1 ss influential, 
side of the family . Overall, it might be argued that 
the foundation members were sons of families which had 
not hitherto played any leading role in the nationalist 
movement . 
From its inception, the Ba ' th seems to have represented 
a r action among the less socio-economically privileged, 
though professionslly capable ' young effendis', against 
political power based on good name and family fortune. 
These , the Ba ' th believed, were insufficient grounds for 
permitting the traditional leaders of the Kutla the right 
1 
Mi d dl East Journal (MEJ) (Middle East Institute, 
1ifashington, DC, Autumn, 1962). Se, C . Ernest Dawn ' s 
' Th Rise of Arabism in Syria ' , pp.164-65, for an attempt 
to list the names of th leaders of the Syrian nationalist 
movem nt in the period before, and imm diately following, 
th First World War. one of those mentioned were directly 
r lat d to any of eh foundation m mbers of the Ba ' th . 
Of cours , by this we do not imply that th families of 
the foundation m mbers w re inactiv in the Syrian 
nationalist movement. Aflaq, for ampl, recalled that 
his fath r had b n in olv d in nationalist politics, ' it 
was he who taught me patriotism ' , APD., 1964, op. it., 
p.J2 and Abu Jaber, op. cit., pp.10-ll, r lates that 
Aflaq ' s fath r ' was arr st d by both th Ottomans and 
French ... thus Aflaq gr w up in a hom where politi s was 
a favourite top'c. 
to rul Syria . Aflaq may hav summ d up th basic 
attitud of th foundation memb rs for joining th 
Ba ' th wh n he wrot 
To understand the bankrupt y of th Blo (i . 
Kutla) on must ppr ciate that th m n of whom 
it was compos d had no overall vi w (i . lik 
the Ba ' th r garding Arab national unity); th ir 
ambition was restrict d to s curing their own 
political survival and a limit d d gre of 
independence for the country . Th y lagged a 
long way behind public opinion, partic~larly 
the young, who had for several years be n 
subject to Ba ' th and Communist ideas. The Ba ' th 
gave the public wider ambitions, on both the 
social and national (i .. Arab) plain ... It also 
sought independence at home as a springboard 
from which to launch a movement to free and unite 
other Arab states . But these ambitions were 
remote from the views of the governing classes. 
The Ba ' th spoke th language which the people 
understood . The m n in power accused the Ba'th 
of idealism and utopianis~ - th Y could find 
no worse charge. l 
Let us now consider some practical aspects of th 
political motivation of the Ba ' th between 1942-48. 
Political Motivation in The 
First Phase of Struggle 
Opposition to the French 
On 8 June 1941 , Syrian and Lebanes nationalists 
were jubilant wh n General Catroux on behalf of the 
Gaullist French promis d independence to both States . 
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But when the Vichy French were overthrown by the forc s 
of General Wavell in July, and the Gaullists formly 
established, there was less willingness to implement the 
letter of the independence declaration. Between 1941-46, 
the Gaullists insist d that in return for complete 
recognition of ind p ndence, both Syria and Lebanon 
had to sign a treaty ensuring the Fr nch a privileged 
position in view of ' their civilising mission' during 
th Mandatory period . 2 This led to a great deal of 
1 
Seal, op. cit . , pp . JO-Jl, from an int rview with 
Aflaq on 7 January 1961, in Beirut . 
2 
Ziad h, op. cit., pp . 68-69. 
nationalist unrest which culminat d in strik sand 
s t r t rioting . 
In the midst of d teriorat ing national confidenc 
in the French and Ku tla , the Ba ' t h blend d on th 
streets of Damascus alongside the oth r professional , 
stud ent, para -military and neo - fascist politic al 
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movements . In April 1941, for example , Jamal al -Atasi , 
a foundation member of the Ba ' th, rushed off to support 
the Rashid Ali coup in Iraq a longside Akram Hurani who 
had part icipated in no-fascist youth mov ements in the 
1 Hama district during the late 1930s . 
In this phase of negative struggle, the Ba ' th 
supported Shukri Quwatly ' s c a ndidature for President 
of Syria. Between 1941-43 , Quwatly ' s f ame had r is en in 
the estimation of the nationalist forc e s b c ause of his 
strong opposition to the French . Al though he was a 
longstanding member o f the Kutla, he s eeme d to be more 
progressive and hence ac c eptable to a wide s ector of 
nationalist opin i on . It wa s for this reason that the 
Ba 'th gave its support but, as the following communique 
shows, it wa s not deeply impressed by Quwatly ' s lasting 
powers of l ead e rship: 
The Ba ' th diff rentiates between the nationalist 
movement which emanate s from the new Arab 
generation and the present Arab situation ... We 
fully realise what we are doing in co-operating 
with Quwatly . Our support augments the support 
and influence which he en joys . Yet our support . 
doub t s his capacity to a chi eve his objectives . 
Our idealism ... is most realistic, seeing and 
comprehending the situation. 2 
But if the s elf-right eous young Ba ' thists disdained 
the older nationalist generation in theory , it did not 
pr v e nt them f rom attacking the French for their 
indiscretion in d eposing President Bis hara al - Khury of 
Lebanon a nd severa l members of his c abinet following the 
latter ' s unilateral declaration of ind epend enc e in early 
ovember 1943 . Hence a communique held: 
1 
Seal , op . cit . , p . 10 . e , Biographi c al ot es . 
2 
idal al -Ba ' th, vol . 1 , op . cit . , pp . 7-8 . 
Ba ' th ' s Support for Quwatly, 15 June 1943 '· 
See ' The 
Syrians should consid r th following : 
th us of Lebanon is an Arab caus and 
the caus of Syria x lusiv ly. Th Y should 
contact the nation ' s (Syria) d puti s . . . in 
addit'on to th Council of Arab Stat s . They 
should direct through Parliam nt, a poli y 
of complet e solidarity with L banon, putting 
a limit on the policy of m diation and 
negotiation ... r garding evacuation of Fr nch 
forces from Syria and L banon . l 
In th early months of 1945, Lebanese and Syrian 
nat ' onalists mounted an int nsiv campaign to comp 1 
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th Fr nch to liv up to th ir ind p nd nce declaration 
of 8 June 1941. Secondly, they wanted to attract th 
att ntion of world opinion, in particular the San 
Francisco Conferenc (United ations), to their plight . 
At the forefront of this agitation in Syria was the 
Ba ' th party . 
Ba ' th communiques from 1945 to 17 April 1946, the 
date of yrian independence, repeatedly called upon th 
people to ' assert their right of national independence ' 
Thus, fo r example , on 4 February 1945, ' Syria should 
e x ercis e its independenc boldly and without loss of 
time ' , 2 On 8 March, ' any treaty with France would be 
injurious to the independence of Syria ,. 3 Following 
the intensification of French pressure upon Syria in May, 
to sign a treaty recognising the former ' s privileged 
position in Syria, a Ba ' th communique on 20 May called 
for a complete rej ction of future contacts with Franc, 
·t · t . , 4 T . t 
' wh ther .. . pOll lcal, cul ural or economlC. 0 aSS1S 
in the lib ration struggle, it proposed the formation of 
popular resistance militia ' of twenty five members under 
the direction of a sergeant ,. 5 T en days after the 
1 
Ibid ., pp.37-40. Se 
Ind ependence of L banon, 
2 
' Regarding the Attack on the 
14 ovember 1943 ' . 
idal al-Ba ' th, vol. 1, op . cit., p . 44. See 
and the Army ' . 
3 
' Ind p nd nc 
Ibid ., p . 48 . e ' R garding the p ch of the Pr sid nt 
o f Syria, Shukri Quwatly ' 
4 
Ibid., pp . 94-95. ee ' ational 
of yrian Independence '. 
5 
truggle in th D fenc 
bid., p . 95 . This communique was sign d by Aflaq, 
Madhat Bitar and Jamal al-Atasi . 
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bomb rdm nt of D mas us by th Fr n h n ral, Oliva-
Rog t , had d r'ven n t'onalist diss tisf ct'on to bo'ling 
point , a B ' th communiqu' on 9 Jun d mand d, " ts high 
tim for th Syrians to give 
and xpos Fr nch d c pion ' 
what th Syrian and L ban s 
until ind p nd nc n 1946 . 2 
up th pol' y of n got' tion 
1 
nd d, this was pr is ly 
gOY rnm nts did from mid-1945 
n De mb r, pressur .from 
the British and Am rican gOY mm nts, finally brought 
the Fren h 0 th conferen tabl with th British 
to plan the sch dul for withdrawing all oc upying lor s 
from th Levantin states . 3 Bu by this tim th Ba ' th 
was d eply sceptical about the sincerity of the Franco-
British obj ctive . 
for example : 
A communique on 26 December held, 
Th m r occurr nce of such an agr ment is a 
continuation of Franco - British heg mony. Such 
an agr ement is against UN principl s for it 
has not consult d the people concerned . The 
a g reem nt called for the withd rawal of Franco-
British troops while deploying Fr nch troops 
in L banon for the d efence of the Mediterranean, 
whi c h is little more than maintaining imperialism 
within the ar a . 
Th Syrian and L ban s governments forced along 
by nationalist opinion, rejected outright the Franco-
British agreement to r tain forces in Lebanon . The 
matt r was raised several times in the b tween 
January-March 1946, receiving favourabl support from the 
great powers for the complete withdrawal of all occupying 
forc s from the Levantine states. Th Fr n h relu tantly 
complj d and this was completed in Syria on 17 April and 
. 4 ln Lebanon on 23 December 1946 . 
Opposition to the Kutla 
B tw n 1942-46, th Ba ' th tend d to maintain solidarity 
with oth r nationalist organisations s eking Leban se and 
1 
Ibid . , pp. 98-99 . S ' The French will n v r r turn ' . 
2 
Ziad h, op . cit., pp . 87-88 . 
3 
Ibid., p . 88 . 
Frenc h M n date, 
1958 ), p . 354 . 
4 
Longr'gg, op . 
Longrigg . , .H . , Syria and Lebanon Und r 
(RIIA, Oxford niversity Pr ss, London , 
it., pp . 354 -55 . 
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Syrian ind p nd nc But ft r mid-1944, a hang f 
emphasis can be d t rmin d in Ba ' th political communiqu's . 
For example , on 24 August 1944 , a party stat m nt 
d eliv r d in commemoration of th Battl of Maisalon , 
argu d that aft r having ov rthrown th nationalist 
f orc s , the Fr n h proc d d to contaminat th 1 ad rsh'p 
of th yrian people: ' hame on th s lead rs for 
de f acing the liv s of the y oung r gen ration , l (i .. Ba ' th 
etc . ) . In 1945 - 46, loss of confid nc in the ability 
of the Ku tla to 1 ad th country to ind pendence, becam 
more notic able in party political communiqu's . On 
4 February 1945 a communiqu' und r the signature of 
Salah Bitar, asserted that Lt he Kutla J 'comes to power 
2 
not for realising national but individualistic objectives ' 
The communique went on to demand th formation of ' a non-
partisan , constitutional government Lto] (1) oppos the 
policy of negotiation (Kutla) with the French Lfor th 
transfer of the Trou~s Speciales etc . ] , and (2) to 
guarantee popular d emo cratic freedoms to the people] . J 
R action of the authoriti s was swift and for his action 
Bitar was summarily imprisoned for a week . 4 
On 8 March a communique signed by Salah Bitar 
launched a forthright attack against President Shukri 
Quwatly who at that time seemed to have been supporting 
th Greater Syria Plan - unity of yria, Lebanon, 
Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq - on the basis of a 
f d eral ' democratic republican system of government ' 
' It ' s strange ' , ass rted Bi tar, ' that the President holds 
1 
In Commemoration of the Battle of Maisalon, by Dr 
Madhat Bitar , 24 August 1944 . On 24 August 192 0, King 
Faisal and the forces of the Syrian ational Congress 
whic h had opposed the French Levantine mandate, were 
defeated at the Battl of Maisalon outside Damascus . This 
broke all further resistance to French occupation for 
sev ral years . Bitar was calling for national solidarity 
(i . . Lebanes e -Syrian ) to avenge the def at by driving 
out th French. 
2 
idal al-Ba ' th, vol . 1, op. cit . , p . 4J . See, 'Regarding 
the Army (i . e . Troup s Special ~) and Independence '. 
J 
Ibid . , p . 44 . 
4 
Ibid ., p . 4 J S ' Editor ' s ot 
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strongly to the ' r publican syst m whil und rmining 
its °nt rests , l (i . . through th d nial o.f b si 
constitu tional lib rties n Syria) . u h an outspok n 
remarl provoked Bitar ' s imm diat arr st and summary 
imprisonm nt for 2 14 sev r 1 months. On Mar h a 
ommunique u nder the signature of Aflaq, h ld that th 
Kutla was living on its past laurels, whil in the 
pr s nt , it was ruthl ssly silen ing th opposition 0 
all popu lar nationalist forces . J n a 1 t r from 
prison on 2J March , Bitar argued that th Ba ' th was 
fanning a ' crisis of cons i nce ' among all segm nts of 
th peopl , in ord r to effect a ' d ep and basic chang 
1 
nterpretation of this communique has resulted in a 
dif ferenc of opinion between Abu Jaber, op. cit . , p . 24 
and Khalil, A.Y., Th Socialist Parties in Syria and 
Lebanon (Unpublishe d Ph . D. Thesis, The American University, 
Was hington, DC, 1962), pp . 117-l8. The point at issue is 
that Ab u Jaber insi s t s that in March 1945 the Ba'th 
supported the Greater Syria Plan, though it later chang d 
it s po licy on that matter . Suleiman, op . cit., p.150, 
agree s with Ab u Jaber 's contention arguing that the 
Ba ' th bel i eved that ' a merger of Iraq and Syria (i.e. in 
the Greater Syria Plan) had to precede true Arab unity ' . 
Khalil, himself a Ba ' thist, argues against this cont ntion 
on t wo grounds (1) that it would enhance a Syrian rather 
than an Arab nation and (2) that it was suspected of 
British back ing. The strange thing about these inter-
pretations is the fact that each writer was using the 
same document to det rmine his point of view. Unless 
the commu nique of 8 March 1945 'Concerning the Address 
of His Excellency th President of th Republic ' has been 
falsified by Dar at-Talia'h in editing, Abu Jaber and 
Suleiman are almost c rtainly wrong. It states, among 
o th r things , that the Greater Syrian Plan... ' is the 
alienation of Arab unity ' . Clearly there is no support 
for the Plan if th authenticity of this document can be 
v rified, see, idal al-Ba'th, vol. 1, op. cit., p.48 . 
From the general cont xt of the Ba'th ' s political and 
ideological beliefs at this time (March 1945), it would 
seem unlikely that it would want to support a Plan in 
which 1 aders such as Quwatly, uri as-Said, King Abdullah 
of Jordan, Bishara al-Khury and th like, would be brought 
together constitutionally . Under the Iutla, constitutional 
freedom was restrict d in yria while in a larger Syrian 
ntity, th probl m in the Ba ' th's stimation would hav 
b n gr atly compound d . Also Khalil is justified in 
pointing to the fact that British int r sts would hav 
ben fite d from the cr ation of a GreaLer yria in view 
o f the form r ' s political and economic interests in Iraq, 
Pal stin and Trans-Jordan . 
2 
J 
i dal al-Ba'th, vol. 1, op . cit . , p.48. 
o te 1. 0 • 
See 'Editor ' s 
Ibid . , p . 59 . 
its Policy '. 
S e 'Warning to the Ruling Group Regarding 
in th country ' s und rs tand· ng of n t· onalism and 
constitutional gov rnm nt , .l On 25 M r h, Aflaq 
follow d with an ac us tion that ' th utla consid rs 
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that anyon who do sn I t agr with it is a traitor and 
a lack y of the Fr n h , . 2 On 15 April, a 1 tt r from 
Bitar once mor dr watt ntion to th way in which th 
Kutla was failing to r sp ct the Syrian constitution, 
w·th th result that it was mo ing th p opl to 
distrust their political 1 ad rs, the eby dimin·shing 
the hop of national solidarity against the French . J 
Following the Fr nch offensive against th Syrian 
gov rnment in May-June to compel it to sign a treaty 
ensuring the privileg d position of Franc in th area, 
numero us Ba ' th communiques called for popular action 4 
and the r epudiation of all furth r negotiations with th 
French . 5 On 24 August, a party communique asserted 
' th Arab League resolution calls for the evacuation of 
French troops from Syria and Lebanon, [ while ] we find 
the Syrian government (Kutla) resorting to negotiations 
wi th the French, thereb;-ShOWing its deficiency, . 6 
Finally on 16 Septemb r, a communique seemed to suggest 
that the Ba ' th had given up all hope of co-operating with 
th Kutla: ' We are not prepared to co-operate with non-
t · 1 . . t· , 7 na lona or reVlslonary par les . 
1 
A Letter from Salah Bitar 2J March 1 4 
th Arab Ba ' th . 
2 
Nidal al-Ba ' th, vol. 1, op. cit., p.80 . 
from Homs ' . 
J 
Ibid., p . 86. 
4 
(Office of 
See ' Aflaq 
Ibid., p.91 . S e Communique, 16 May 1945, 'The Arab 
Ba ' th called for overall strike ... for struggle until 
peopl have won otal lib rty ... ' . 
5 
Ib i d., p . 98 . 
9 Jun 1945 ' . 
6 
bid., p.llO. 
7 
S e ' The French Will ver Return . .. 
S e ' Trad·tional Policy '. 
Ibid . , p . 112 . See Communique to an- idhal (newspaper 
daily) ' Regarding th Party ' s Principl sand tandpoint : 
Questions Put to Aflaq - ihat has mov d you to establish 
al-B ' th? ' The reader should not that Aflaq's answ rs 
repr sent one of the earliest d efinitiv statements on 
Ba ' th policy . 
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Aft r yrian ind p nd nc on 17 April 1946, th 
Ba ' th assum d th rol or opposition Lo the gov rnm nt.l 
On 6 July after s v r 1 y ars of tying, th party 
finally p rsuad d th gov rnm nt to p rmit it to publish 
2 
a n wspaper, al-Ba ' th. But in ov mb r, politi al 
d'visions with'n th ruling KutlaJ nd panic aus d by 
mounting nationalist dissatisfa tion, ror ed th 
gov rnm nt to introdu legislation (De r o. 50), 
giv'ng th Minister of th Interior w'de pow rs to 
Ii ense political parti s, n wspap rs, societies and 
associations, banning thos which he round una c ptahl 
to gov rnment pOliCy . 4 Such a denial of Constitutional 
fr edom deeply embitt red the Ba ' th and other nationalist 
organisations. Viol nt street lash s nsued with th 
authorities, followed by bloodsh d and loss of life. 
A party communiqu' on 15 ovember describ d the poli y 
of the government as ' exploitation and despotism,.5 I 
concluded that its ' continuation in office is against 
any legis lation, law or parliamentary convention' . . . 
it is a challenge to the people's will' .6 So enrag d 
was public opinion, fanned in part by Ba'th propaganda, 
that the government was forced to rescind the D cree. 7 
Tasting success as the vanguard of progressive 
nationalist opinion, the Ba ' th in April 1947, attacked 
Prim Minister Jamil Mardam ' s scheme for instituting 
8 indirect elections to the Syrian Parliament. To th 
Ba ' th, this was but another insidious move by an unpopular 
government to whittle away Constitutional freedom in order 
1 
Abu Jab r, op . cit., p.25 . 
2 
Allush, op. cit . , p.46. 
p.lJ8 . 
idal al-Ba ' th, vol. 1, op. 
J 
Seale, op. it., p . 27 . 
4 
Abu Jaber, op. it., p.25. 
5 
idal al-Ba ' th, 01. 1, pp.150-51 . 
th Existence of th Constitution ' . 
6 
Ib·d., p.151 . 
7 
Abu Jaber, op. cit., p . 25. 
8 
bid. , p . 26 . 
S ' Regarding 
it. , 
10 
to ma'nta'n its lf in offic . Th Ba ' th on the oth r 
hand, demanded un'v rs male and f m 1 suffrag, in 
th 1att r instanc a v ry progr ssiv st p in an 
nvironm nt wh re traditional slamic social mor s 
d e mand d mal domination and se lusion of wom n within 
1 the home. 
Thus it was in the midst of a v ry troubled situation 
in yria and throughout th Arab world, that the Ba ' th ' s 
lead rs convened the First ation 1 Congress on 4 April 
1947 , attende d by two hundred interested persons. 2 
Among other things, the Congress adopt d a poli y o~ 
revolutionary struggle, ' To overthrow th present faulty 
structu re - an ov rthrow which will in lude all the 
s ctors of intellectual, 
life ' . J 
conomic so ial and political 
The First ational Congress : Political Orientation 
Between 1942-47, the Ba ' th evolved from a very small 
intellectual study circle preoccupied with a metaphysical 
ideal (see, Fig . 1) to a street action movement and 
finally in April 1947, to an Arab nationalist politi al 
organisation. n these years, political attitudes 
were formed and d veloped . After 1945 the Ba ' th app ared 
as one of the sharpest opponents of imperialsim, which 
it interpreted in its widest possible sense to repr sent 
all forces hindering constitutional freedom and awak ning 
national (Arab) consciousness. Hence, as we have seen, 
the Kutla was identified as an ally of French imperialism . 
The Arab League Pact of March 1945, was h ld to be in th 
interests of the imperialists as 'it is a series of 
resolutions which confirm the partition of Arab stat s ' 4 
1 
Ibid., p . 26 . Berger, M., The Arab World Today (Weidenfeld 
and icolson, London, 1962), pp.145-5J. See ' Changing 
Status of Women ' Se, Ba ' th Constitution, Art. 12, 
Appendix 1. 
2 
Allush, op. cit., p . 46. al-Munadhil (Combatant or 
Struggler), July 1966, nQ. 6. A monthly periodical 
publish d by th Ba ' th in Syria. For the political 
scientist int rested in Ba ' th affairs, this publication 
is a must, although it is strictly confidential to members. 
J 
Ba ' th Constitution, Art. 6, App ndix 1. 
4 
idal al-Ba ' th, vol. 1, op. cit., p.80. 
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n 1946 Ba ' th polOtO al ommuniqu's, r p aL dly call d 
for Ar b solOdarit against the British pr s nce in 
th il Vall y and Su z Canal. l On 6 Aprol, a 
communOque attack d th Anglo -Jordanian tr aty and 
branded King Abdullah as an ally or imp rialosm. 2 It 
continu d: ' The Tr aty ... acts against th ind p nd n 
of th r gion ... imp dOng the progr ss of th se r gOons 
towards unity (Wahda)'. This communiqu' also identifi d 
imp rOalism and Zionism as t wO n broth rs . Thus, ' Ot 
(Tr aty) s cures for th 
ob j ectives in Pal stine ' 
. Zionists realisation of h ir 
A communique assert d that 
the first steps to wards Arab unity ar (1) opposing 
[and removing] all foreign influence imposed upon Arab 
states and (2) wo rking for the removal of all barri rs 
(state partition) artificially s parating the Arab 
people . J 
On 20 March, al-Ba ' th included for ign aid in 
imperialist schem s to reimpose th ir will on the Arab 
p op l e : 
Any foreign aid to a weak nation will 
shortly be transferred into political 
influence in that ountry. Let the 
Arabs look to ach other for assistance 
and they will discover that their freedom is at 
home and not in London, Washington or Moscow. 4 
The First ational Congress embodi d the Ba ' th ' s 
anti-imperialist s ntim nts in a series 01 harsh 
resolutions . The West rn powers, in particular, wer 
cond mn d for maintaining bases, political and economic 
influ nce within the Arab homeland, which the Ba ' th 
treat d as a whole. Th refore, the Arabs should not 
be friendly with Britain 'which occupies the ile 
Valley, Suez Canal, Palestine , Jordan, Iraq, Libya and 
the Protectorates '. Th same applied to France ' which 
1 
Ibid., p . 1J2. S e ' Arab upport for Arab Egypt '. 
By ncouraging Egypt to join the Arab fold the Ba ' th 
was offsetting the plans of the Hashemit s to dominate 
the MOddle East through the Fertile Cr sc nt or Greater 
Syria schem s. 
2 
J 
4 
Ibid . , p . 1J5. 
Ibid . , p.159. 
Abu Jab r, Ope 
S ' Th Anglo-Jordanian Treaty ' . 
S e ' Our Standpoint on th Present R gim 
it., p.26. 
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occupi s Alg ria, Morocco and Ar-Ril ' . An nti-Turkish 
attitud was h ld over th former ' s 0 upation of 
Al xandr tta and I il'kia . Iran was bla 111st d for its 
annexation of Ahwaz. Finally, th A ' s 'nt rfer nc 
in th Middle East (i . . 0 er its support for th 
partition of Pal stin ) was thought to b detrim nLal 
to Arab inter sts . l 
On the Arab Leagu the Congr ss was d eply cr'tical . 
It should hast n, it was asserted, the progressiv 
int gration of all Arab states, politically , economically 
and militarily with the objective of bringing pr ssure 
to b ar upon the imp rialists for th e vacuation of 
2 
th Arab homeland . Secondly , it should work to unite 
the family of Arab states in one national entity.J On 
th firs t point , the Congress believ d in using U 
4 
representation to attain satisfactory results. 
The Ba ' th 's view of the world in 1947 revolved 
a round the premise of wha t the world thought about Arab 
liberation . From its i d eological opposition to 
' imperialism ' the Congress adopted a platform of non-
alignm nt in international relations. Aflaq, the newly 
appointed Secretary-General, explain d th reason for 
the poli c y of non-alignment between the Anglo-American 
and Soviet world blocs : ' Aligning with either will do 
nothing but harm to th Arabs ,. 5 
The policy of non-alignment was inscribed in the 
Constitution and largely influen ed th party ' s foreign 
policy until 1966. 6 Thus, ' The foreign policy of the 
Arab state will be guided by the interests of Arab 
nationalism ... (Art. 22) . ' The Arabs will struggle with 
1 
Ibid ., pp . 26-2 idal al-Ba ' th, vol. 1, op. cit ., 
pp . 187-90 . See Resolutions, lJ April 1947. 
2 
Ibid., p . 186 . 
J 
Ibid., 186. 
4 
Ibid ., p . 187 . In May 1947, how ver, the party was 
c alling for the Arab states to withdraw from the U 
which was se n as a tool of Zionism and he 1 estern pow rs. 
5 
Abu Jab r, op . cit., p . 27 . 
6 
Ba ' th Constitution, App ndix 1. 
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all their power to destroy the foundations of 
co lonial ism and of for ign occupation Land ] all for ign 
political or conomic influenc in th ir country. 
(Art . 23) ... all treati s, pacts and docum nts, conclud d 
by gov rnments which d tract from total sov reignty 
of the Arab, will b abrogated ' . (Art. 24) And finally, 
' Arab for ign policy se ks to give a tru pictur of 
the will of the Arabs to live in fr edom Land ] to s 
all oth r nations enjoy the same lib rty '. (Art . 25). 
As a practical measure for attaining thes obj ctives, 
a resolution called for co-operation with other 
' progr ssive Arab forces in the organisation of an 
Arab liberation front ,. l 
On the domestic political front, the Congress adopt d 
a system of governm nt, which was described in the 
Constitution as being republican, constitutional, 
parliamentary, non-sectarian and democratic. The 
Constitution intimated : ' Executive power is responsible 
before the legislature which is directly elected by th 
people ' (Art . 14 ) . Yet in many respects, this was a long-
term party ideal to be attained after successful national 
liberation . A resolution held that in view of the 
situation existing in the states of the Arab world in 
2 1947, constitutional parliamentary government was impossible . 
Hence for the Congress, a major objective was to take 
rapid steps to permit the people to exercise political 
freedom in order, as it was believed, to secure social 
jus tic . 
In the context of the whole thesis, this chapter 
has be n described as the ' Formative Phas e ' of the Ba ' th 
party . It must be emphasised, however, that when th 
First ational Congress assembled in Damascus in April 
1947, the Ba ' th was, relatively sp aking, a very small 
political organisation drawing mainly (s e, Tables 2 and 
3) from lower-middle class professionals. In fact, th 
Ba ' th might hav remain d as a small id alistic political 
party had it not been for the partition of Palestine by 
1 
idal al -Ba ' th, vol. 1, op. cit., p.189 . e , ' Resolutions ' . 
2 
Ibid. 
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the J in ov mber 1947 and on 14 May 194 , th r t ·on 
of the tat of srael . 
To many · nt 11 ctuals , familiar with th v ws of 
th Ba ' t h on national lib ration, it must hay s m d 
that th y had b n borne out by the v nts in Palestin 
a s t h e ruling elites of th Arab wo rld had shown th ir 
incapability of leading th people to victory aga·nst 
the Zionists and imp r·alists. l In s v ral instances, 
ruling elites were even suspected of bing in collusion 
2 
wi th the Zionists and lat r the Stat of Israel . 
It was on the way of a sudden popular revulsion 
that the Ba ' th grew aft r the Pal stinian debacle of 
1947-49 . By 1956 branches and cells had been establish d 
in the majority of Arab states . Unity, Fr edom and 
So cialism Was a slogan adopted by Arab governments which , 
only a few years before, would have summarily imprison d 
a ll who dared to mention it . Munif Razzaz wrote of th 
loss of P a l e stine that it was the bell toll for th 
bankrupt governments, ushe ring in a new era - an era of 
revolution . J 
L t us now discuss in more detail the phase of 
Ba ' th expansion, culminating in the party ' s merger with 
the Arab Socialist party of Akram Hurani in March 1954. 
ii : Merger with Akram Hurani ' s Arab So cialist Party 
5 March 1954 
First Phase : Broad ning of Contacts 
Ba ' th party contacts with Akram Hurani can be dated 
. 4 from the Rashid Ali mov ment in Iraq in Apr~l 1941. It 
is v ry likely that both worked tog ther in the struggles 
against the French. In 1945 Hurani founded the Arab 
1 
eguib , op . cit., p . 12J, passim . Abd an- asir , Philosophy 
of th Revolution, passim. 
2 
D ard n, Ann, Jordan (Robert Hale, London, 1958), pp . 79 
and 91 . Seale, op. cit., pp .JJ and 62 . 
J 
Razzaz, Ma ' alim al-llayat, pp .10-ll. 
4 
S ,Biographical ot s. 
Socialist party in Barna with a larg ly p asant bas 
(s ,Tabl 1). At hart, Hurani was ss nt·ally a 
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pragmatist for whom so lalism m ant th radi ation of 
f u dal privil ge. n 1946 discussions w r h ld with 
th Ba ' th f or a merger of th two parti s, though h s 
lat r b r ok do wn for r asons which ar not ntir ly 
1 1 c ar . It may have b n that Hurani found the Ba ' th 
to o i d ealis t ic whil Aflaq , on the other hand, may hav 
h a d d oubt s abo u t t h wis d om of allying with a peasant 
bas e d p arty . 
Yet i f on i d eolog ·cal grounds there was little 
agreem nt between Hu rani and th Ba ' th, other issues 
wer slowly d rawing them together . On 2 December 1947 
a Ba ' th c ommunique called for volunte rs to liberat 
2 Pal stin from the Jews. Early in January 1948 Hurani 
was one of the first to lead bands of irregulars into 
Israel . Accompanying him were the leaders of the Ba'th, 
Aflaq , Bitar, Ghanem , and others . 3 
The Palestine war of 1948-49 had the effect of 
u niting natio n alist forces which were lat r to influenc 
the course of events in the 1950s. For example, through 
its association with Hurani,the Ba ' th made its first 
contacts with Syrian army offic rs among whom were Adib 
Shishakli and Bahij Kallas, brother of Khalil Kallas, 
who later became the Ba ' th ' s first Minister of ational 
E c onomy in 1956 . 4 
Syria was th first country in the Arab world to 
e x perience nationalist reaction following the Palestinian 
d ebac l e . On 30 March 1949 the army seized power under 
Colone l Husni a z -Za ' im in the name of the people . 5 
tand ing c lo s e to Za ' im in the take-ov r were Adib hishakli 
1 
Allus h , op . cit . , p . 46 . an- ahar (Special Issu ) 
Christmas 1965 - w Y ar 1966, pp . 57-93. See, Raja 
Sid a wi ' s ' Ba ' th ocialist Party '. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
idal al-Ba ' th, vol . 1, op . cit., p . 228 . 
Abu Jaber, op. it., p.28 . 
S al , op . cit., p . 39. 
Ibid., p . 44. 
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and in the background Ak am Hurani. l Th Ba ' th was 
jubilant at th ov rthrow of Presid nt Quwat1y and for 
a short time eag rly gav its support to Za ' im . A 
communiqu ' on 4 April hoped that Za ' im would 'form 
provisional cabinet and governm nt which had the support 
of the people and would guarantee constitutional fr dom 
and free elections within a spe ifi d tim , 2 ensing 
that it had friends in high places the Ba ' th delug d 
Za ' im with requests for th termination of foreign 
conc ssions (Tapline) , J the repudiation of French off 
of conomic and t chnical a ssistanc improvement in 
labour conditions and wages and for the summoning of a 
popularly elected constituent assembly to formulat 
Syria ' s n w constitution. 4 
rs 
Yet upon becoming Head of State and Chief of Staff 
of th armed forces, Za ' im, in true Machiavellian form, 
began to remove those who had brought him to power. 
Personal friends were selected for key posts in the 
army, government and civil service. Muhsin al-Barazi 
of the powerful feudal lan of Hama (Hurani 's bete noir ) 
was appointed Prime Minister. 5 All political party 
activity in Syria was banned, newspapers were heavily 
censored, and civil servants were forbidden from 
participating in politics. 6 Contrary to the demands of 
the Ba ' th and other nationalist parties, Za'im appointed 
a constitutional committee on 25 June, of civil servants, 
to formul ate the new Syrian constitution. 7 
By J August 1949, there were very few leaders and 
parties who d id not bear a grudge against Za ' im. Even 
the leaders of the ational and People ' s parties, who 
1 
Ibid. 
2 
idal al-Ba ' th, vol. 1, op. cit., p.287. 
J 
Ib i d., p. 288 . 
4 
M morandum to the Head of State, Husni az-Za ' im by th 
Ba ' th Party, 24 May 1949. 
5 
eale, op. cit., p . 60. 
6 
Abu Jab r, op. c't., p . JO. 
7 
S al , op. cit., p.60. 
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w r not s nt packing Onto exile, w r scandalis d by 
his personal misus of power . Thus it was with gr at 
reli f to all concerned that th army onc mor int rv n d 
on 14 August under Colon 1 Sami Hinnawi . Za ' im was 
depos d and summarily x cuted with his Prom Minist 
Muhsin al-Barazi, a fitting end to Hurani 's b 
..::::...:::....:..-=-..:.:.=~:::. 
Hinnawo gave mor fr edom to politi al parti s than 
Za ' Om. Those who had be n remov d from pow r und r 
Za ' im w re in many instances given back their old 
positions . Shishakli, for example , was mad commander 
of the First Tank Brigad at Qatana, a few kilometres to 
2 
the southwest of Damascus. In the provisional gov rnment 
of IIashim al-Atasi, Hurani and Aflaq were appointed to 
cabinet rank with portfolios of Agriculture and Education, 
resp ctively.J The People ' s party gain d considerably 
under the new regime. Rushdi al-Kikhia was given the 
Interior and azim al -Qudsi the Foreign Ministry . 4 
With the People ' s party holding k y portfolios , 
Syria ' s foreign policy veered towards Syro -Iraqi unity . 
This was hastened in September , when Sabri al-Asali , 
leader of the ational party, suddenly switched his 
party ' s traditional Cairo-Riyad orientation to support 
that of the People ' s party . 5 In ovember, the proponents 
of Syro-Iraqi unity gained further successes at the 
elections to the Syrian Chamber of Deputies. iVi th 51 
supporters out of a Chamber of 114, the People ' s party 
was in a very strong position to press home the advantage. 
(Se , Table 5). Thus on 17 Decemb r 1949, a resolution 
was ° f S I ° 0 ' 7 adopted call1ng or yro- raql unlon . 
1 
Ibid . , 
2 
Ibid . , 
J 
Ibid . 
4 
Ibid. 
5 
Ibid . , 
6 
Aflaq 
elected 
7 
Ibid . , 
p.75. 
p . 77 . 
p.78 . 
lost his seat in the elections; Hurani was re-
from Hama. bid., pp.78 -79. 
pp.84-85 . 
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TABLE 5 : Syrian Chamber 
R sults 1949 
Peopl ' s Party 
Ind p n d nts 
(inc luding 9 tribal 
repres ntatives) 
Indep n d ents friendly 
to wards the P opl ' s 
P::t.rty 
ational Party 
Islamic Socialist Bloc 
Ba ' th 
Co-operative Socialist 
Party 
Parti Populaire 
Syri n 
Total : 
* 
4J People ' s Party 
Ind p nd nts 
Jl 
20 
lJ 
4 
1 
1 
1 
114 
ational Party 
Ba ' th 
Co-operative Socialist 
Party 
Parti Populaire 
Syrien 
Arab Liberation 
Movement 
Communist Party 
JO 
64 
19 
22 
2 
2 
2 
1 
142 
Based on figures and explanations given in Seale, op. cit., 
p . 182. 
The general effect of the People ' s party ' s policies 
i n the Chamber was to unite many smaller groups and parties 
i n oppo s ition . The Ba ' th, whose strength in the Chamber 
was insignificant, gave its support to Hurani, Abd al-Wahab 
Homad and Sheikh Mustaf'a as-Siba ' i of th Islamic 
Socialist Front, who formed a Republican Front to oppose 
Syro-Iraqi union . l This faile d to turn the course of 
ev nts in the Chamber and in desperation, Hurani, who 
had no liking for the Iraqi Hashemit s, made a secret 
visit to the Qatana garrison, where he called upon his 
officer friends ' to save the country and put an end to 
its decline . ' Syro -Iraqi unity', he continued, [will ] 
' permit an imperialist army to ent r Syria behind the 
2 
screen of an Iraqi army '. Thus on 19 Decemb r the tanks 
rumbled into Damas us 1 d by Colonel Adib Shishakli . 
1 
Ibid . , p . 85. 
2 
Ibid . 
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On the sam day h issu d a ommuniqu ·nforming th 
n ation that th army had b n compell d to t to put 
an nd to the conspirac·es of th Chi f of taff 
(Hinnawi) as w 11 as a numb r of ' prof ssional 
politicians ' who, in conn· vance with for ign el m nts, 
thr at ned the s curity of the army, th structur of 
th stat and the republican regim ' (i . e . through 
proposals to unite wi th monarchical raq) . l 
Encount rs with hishakli 
During the 19JOs and 1940s Shishakli and lu ranl 
had been determined oppon nts of feudal privilege, a 
policy which was continued, following th coup d ' tat 
on 19 D c emb r 1949 . To assist in the drive against 
the traditional parti s and their landlord retainers, 
Shishakli t u rned to parties with a more 1 ftist nation-
alist orientation, such as the Ba ' th . IIurani also 
respond d to the ' challenge' of eradicating the Barazis, 
Kaylanis and Azms of the Hama district by reconstituting 
the Arab Socialist party . ( See, Tab 1 1 ) . 
When in the summ r of 1951 Hurani launched an anti-
landlo d campaign, th Ba ' th openly supported him. A 
communique on 1 May, ass rted that the Ba ' th toils on 
behalf of the destitute, productive elements of Arab 
2 
society (i . e . labourers and peasants) . On 19 May, 
al-Ba ' th bitterly attacked the mercantile and industrial 
communities of Aleppo, People's party strongholds, for 
their disregard for their workers : 
1 
2 
J 
The people plead for the overthrow of the 
feudalist regime, for a property limit, 
distribution of land, worker peasant 
1 gislation to improve their lot; to fight 
pov rty, disease, ignorance, and economic 
imperialism. Th people plead for a share 
in liberating th country and defending its 
land . The p ople want to worl within an Arab 
solidarity front to abolish artificial class 
barriers ... to nsure laJ future in socialism 
and freedom. J 
Ibid ., p . 86 . 
idal al-Ba ' th, vol . 2, op . cit., p.119. 
Ibid ., pp . 122 and 129 . 
n mid-S ptemb r 1951, Hurani and th Ba ' h limax d 
th ir summ r off nsiv s against th landlords, by a 
thr day anti-feudal rally in Al ppo . l P asants 
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att nded from all ov r Syria and march s w r condu t d 
through Al eppo , d manding labour and agr rian r forms. 
Th success of the anti-feudal driv s of 1950-51 
may have ncouraged Shishakli to strik with more 
confidence at the entrenched power of th P ople 's 
and ational parties in th Chamber of D puties. Plagu d 
by a series of unstable and unacceptable P ople ' s p rty 
governments during 1951, Shishakli r mov d Mar ' uf 
Dawalibi ' s cabinet at th nd of ovember and dissolved 
the Chamber . Colonel Fawzi Salu was mad Head of State, 
Prime Minister and Minister of Defence in the provisional 
government formed by Shishakli . Thus with the traditional 
parti s temporarily removed from the scene, Shishakli, 
with Hurani's backing, introduced D cree 0 . 96 of 30 
January 1952, providing for the 'Dis tribution of tate 
2 
Lands' - a further blow to the landlords who supported 
the traditional parties. 
The Homs National Pact, 4 July 1953 
If Shishakli and Hurani had used the Ba ' th in their 
drive against the People ' s party and its landed, 
commercial and industrial bases , it had been to their 
mutual advantage . For the first time the Ba ' th had be n 
permitted to operate under semi-official state patronage 
to spread its ideology . Under Shishakli it had expanded 
from a small intellectual based party to b come directly 
involved with worker and peasant problems. 
In the early months of 1952 Shishakli ' s drive against 
the traditional parties, had largely succeeded and he 
was in a much stronger position to a dminister the country 
more op nly . But his allies of the previous two years 
were not willing to susp nd th ir agitation for social, 
political and economic r forms - demands which began to 
hit at Shishakli ' s military dictatorship. Shishakli 
1 
Seal , op. cit., p.120 . 
2 
Ibid. 
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r taliat d in April by abolishing all politi al parti s 
including Hurani ' s Arab Socialist party and th Ba ' th . 
The Machiavellian dictum of r moving thos ' who w r 
r sponsibl for bringing th princ to pow r ' was onc 
more being repeat d. In August Shishakli found dan w 
political movem nt known as the Arab Lib ration Mov m nt 
to be the sole political force in th country . On 
28 December , sensing growing unr st in th army, 
Shishakli arrested and imprisoned s venty-six offic rs 
who had be n ' deceiv d by the words of some extrem 
parti s , . l There was little need to ask th names of 
thes parties . On 29 December, Hurani, Bitar and Aflaq 
were imprisoned only to escape fiv days l a ter across 
2 
the mountains into Lebanon, where th y immediately 
joined forces in attacking the Shishakli regim . J 
Hurani, Bitar and Aflaq lived in L banon until June 
195J, when th y were asked to leave by th government 
which was becoming embarrassed at their attacks against 
Shishakli ' s regime . 4 From July to October, they wandered 
round Europe while awaiting the opportunity to return to 
Syria to join their forces against Shishakli and the 
retainers of feudal power . 
Meanwhile on 4 July, representatives of the People ' s , 
National , Ba ' th and Communist parties and a number of 
influential ' independents ' all sharing a common hatred 
for Shishakli, met secretly in Homs to put their signature 
to a National Pact which was, in effect, a pledge to bring 
down th regime. 5 
On the eve of the Octob r elections to the Chamb r 
of Deputies, the Ba ' th instigated a series of strikes 
and student protests throughout the country. On 21 Octob r, 
Aflaq, Bitar and Hurani returned to Syria following a 
general amnesty proclaimed by Shishakli after his election 
1 
Abu Jaber, op. cit . , p . Jl . 
2 
Ibid ., p .J l . 
J 
idal al - Ba ' tg , vol. 2, op. cit., pp.19J-95 · 
4 
Abu Jab r, op. cit . , p .Jl. 
5 
Sale , op . cit., p .1 J4 . 
(unoppos d ) to th 1 Pr sid n y. 
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Immedi t ly th Y led 
th ir forc s "n opposition to th regim On 25 J-anuary, 
hishakli ' s s c ret polic , b coming alarmed at the way 
o f viol nt nti-gov rnm nt prot sts , onc mor impr"son d 
2 Hurani and the Ba ' th ' s leaders . But by Lhis tim th 
forc es of opposit "on w r b ginning to mov against th 
regime in th Jabal Druz , Damascus , c ntral Syria and 
th orth . J 
n th three years of his regime, Shishakli had 
creat d opposition from the majorit of political part" s 
with, perhaps , the exception of the PPS . Th traditional 
parties disliked th way in which h sapped their est d 
interests and power bas in the Chamb r . The Ba ' th and 
the Arab Socialist party felt that h had fail d to 
implemen t far reaching social, political and e conomic 
reforms and most of all they disliked his proscription 
on political freedom and in this, th y share d much in 
common with the ational and People ' s parties . But it 
may hav e been Shishakli ' s repeated purges of army officers 
in th latter phas e which was the catalyst for the over-
throw of h i s regime on 25 February 1954 . Rather 
c oincidentally, it was a Hurani partisan, Captain Mustafa 
Hamdun of the Aleppo garrison, who announced that the 
army was taking over the country : 
1 
2 
J 
4 
... in the name of the people and in that 
of th officers in Aleppo, Hama, Homs, 
Deir ez-Zor and Lattakia [and ] that ash-
Shishakli is a criminal oppressor who 
should immediat ly acc d e to the will of 
th people , by r linquishing power and 
leaving the country .. . And we call upon the 
p ople to exercis their powers alone , 
eff ctively and honestly, to set up their 
own republican and popular regime, and to 
help the army to return to its id al duty 
of protecting the fatherland and maintaining 
its saf ty. 
Ibid ., p . 1JO . 
Abu Jaber, op . cit . , p . J2 . 
Seale , op . c it . , pp.1J5-J6 . 
Khalil , M., The Arab States and the Arab League , A 
Docum ntary R cord , vol . i . , ' Constitutional Developm nts ' 
(Khayats, Beirut , 1962) . S ,Doc., o. lJL~, 25 February 
195 LI- , tat ment by Captain Mustafa I-Iamdun on Behalf of 
th Aleppo Garrison, Announcing a ew Mov m nt Against 
Brig . A . hishakli ' , pp . 594-95 . 
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Proph tic words to b r - ho d by Lh 1 Lorious 0 r 
h anquish d, in Syrian lutur coups d ' taLs . 
The M rger 
On 5 March 195 LI, th Ba ' th m rg d with the Arab 
Soci a list party of Akram IIurani, to form th Arab Ba ' th 
Soci a list party ( h raft r simply referr d to as th 
Ba ' th ). Hurani ' s only condition for m rg r was that 
the Ba ' th should displ ay its soci a list orl ntation in 
the party nam 
From the early 1940s, Hurani and th Ba ' th had b n 
op rating in roughly the same political orbit . Und r 
Shishakli they had b een drawn closer together in common 
opposition to the traditional parties and their landlord 
retainers . But after th y had succ ed d in werucening 
the power b ase of the traditional parties, Shishakli had 
no furth r use for them . Once more they were drawn 
tog ther to work for th 0 erthrow of his regime . But 
after Shishakli, who would rule Syria? Would the 
traditional parties and the upholders of feudal privilege , 
try to make a come - b ack t o power in the government? Th 
fear that the l atter mi ght b e the cas , se ms to ha e 
b een the impetus to the merger on 5 March 1954 . 1 
In many respects, the Ba ' th- Hurani merger was a 
calculated political expedient . Hurani controlled a 
large peasant following in addition to many officer 
friends . But what he lacked was an effici ntly organised 
p arty structure and an urban intellectual base to give 
his mov m nt a truly mass characters. By contrast, in 
1 954 , th Ba ' th was still primarily an urban professional 
type party, though it was gradually establishing branches 
and cells throughout Syria and in oth r Arab states. But 
it l a cked a mass b ase and powerful milit ary allies . Its 
le a ders were men enthus d with mor a l and thical ideals 
and given mor e to philosophising a bout political probl ms . 
Hurani on the other hand, was essentially a political 
pragamatist who had few, if any, moral scruples in his 
striving aft r power . In 1949, for example, he had 
work d with Za ' im , then IIinnawi and .finally Shishakli, 
1 
Seal , op . cit . , p . 158 . 
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whom h h lp d to ov rthro1 . 'Akram would ha alli d 
with th d vil ' 
1 
it was said, 'to hav b n in th s at 
of pow r '. 
Th success of th Ba'th-Hurani m rg r can b 
d etermined by the el ct~ons in Octob r 1954 to th 
Chamber of D puti s . (S ,Tabl 5) . IIurani's 
candidat s in Hama c aptured:fi e seats, routing a ri al 
list of ndep ndents h ad d by a pow rful young landown r, 
Abd ar-Rahman al-Azm, who had th backing of many of th 
traditiona l landown'ng families in the district . 2 In 
Lattrucia, Wahib al-Ghan m wa s returned and in Dama scus 
Bit a r defeat d the Secretary- General of th PPS, Isam 
al - Maha iyri . J The Ba'th, how ver, lost a few of the 
seats contested in Damascus to members of the traditional 
parti s . On surpris defeat was that of Riyad al -Malki 
whos brothe r Adnan was a promin'ent army officer and Ba' th 
' 4 
partisan . Yet despit these set - b acks , the Ba'th ' s 
electoral victories were as impressiv as the substantially 
reduc d majorities of the traditional parties . 
The Ba ' th electoral successes must be directly 
attributed to the merg r with Hurani . Y t other factors 
must not be overlook d in acc ounting for the rapid growth 
of the Ba ' th at this time . Between 1949-54, the younger 
Syrian generation was b coming increasingly dissatisfi d 
with the slow rate of soci a l, ec onomic and political 
progress . On top of this, there was a smouldering bitterness 
against th ruling elites for their failure to liberat 
Palestine from the J ews . Th se I frustrated young effendis ' 
in the words of Dani 1 L rner, began to look for more 
radical solutions to the problems confronting Syria and 
the Arab world as a whole. The Octob er elections in Syria 
would seem to indicat that many young Syrians belie ed 
that the Ba ' th offered a worthwhile solution to their 
frustration , 
1 
Interview, Bitar , 1 6 ovember 1967, Beirut. Other 
Ba 1thist leaders xpressed similar vi ws. Abu Jaber, 
op . cit . , p . J4 . 
2 
J 
4 
Seal op . cit . , p . 18J. 
Ibid . 
Ibid ., p . 24 - , f . n . 2 . 
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L t us now xamin th outcom 0 th Ba ' th growing 
political base following th m rg r w·th Huran· . 
iii: The Format·on of the United Arab R public 
Internationalisation of the Middle East : Struggl for Syria 
In 1955 Syr ia was r garded by Western d fence plann rs 
as one of the most strategic pawns in th Middl East . 
To th ast sh8 exposed the flanks of the Baghdad Pact 
and to the north, the ' soft under belly ' of ATO . To 
the west and south she posed a threat to L ebanon and Jordan , 
bo th of whom were traditionally oriented towards the West . 
I n b r i ef , whoever controlled Syria would be in a strong 
position to influence Middl Eastern politics and def nce 
syst ms . 
The struggle for Syrian commitment to Western 
defence schemes continued unabated between 1951 - 55 . 
How ever , under Shishakli Syria had managed to remain non-
a l igned . But with the dictator ' s overthrow in February 
1 95 4, the whole question of foreign policy orientation 
was thrown into the melting pot as pro - Western and Arab 
neutral ist forces wrestled unceasingly and with growing 
b itterness to drag Syria into their own political and 
defenc orbits . 
The struggle for Syria was further complicated in 1955 
b y a change in Soviet policy following the death of Stalin . 
At Bandung in April 1955, the Soviet Union emerged as the 
new champion of the rights of bourgeois nationa list 
states threatened by colonialist or imperialist expansion . 
This policy was officially ratified at the Twentieth 
Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1956 . The first 
signs of renewed Soviet interest in Syria came in March 
1 955, wh n promises of support wer given in the event of 
1 
an attack from the Baghdad Pact . Following the visit of 
Shepilo ( Editor in Chief, Pravda ) arm ' s d als were 
2 
conclud d with Egypt in September and Syria, October 1955 · 
1 
S al , op . cit . , p . 234 . 
2 
bid . , p . 236 . 
124 
Ov r th next two years Soviet arms, conomic and 
t chnical assistanc pour d into th s countri s in v r 
incr asing quantities . Thus, th Sovi t Union, by a 
simpl change of policy, had hurdled th ' north rn ti r ' 
perimeter which United States S cretary of State, Dull s, 
had m ticulously construct d betw en 1951-54 . Turkey 
was threatened from the south and Iraq ' s oil outlets 
a cross Syr"a to the M diterranean were now placed in 
jeopardy, as Syria und r pressure from the West, mov d 
closer towards Moscow. Could the W st afford to stand 
idly by, while the Soviet Union entrenched itself in 
Cairo and Damascus? Soviet planners may have asked a 
similar question: could they afford to have their 
a llies undermined in Syria and Egypt, thereby leaving 
the southern perimeter of the Soviet Union open to 
Western penetration . To the great powers, the struggle 
for Syria was a vital part of their international 
defence systems . 
Int rnational pressures upon Syria tended to polarise 
political opinion, making stable government virtually 
" "bl 1 lmpossl e. This was e,vident in the Chamber of Deputies 
which assembled after the elections of September - Ocotber 
1954. (S ee, Table 5 ). On the right there was a group 
of deputies from the People ' s and National parties with 
about ten Independents, led by Munir al -Ajlani2 and on 
the left a more cohesive,though slightly smaller, group 
led by Hurani and Khalid al -A zm . Mid-way between these 
groups were several uncommitted Independents and an Islamic 
"j)loc. 
Faris al -Khuri's right-wing coalition government 
lasted frqm October 1954 to February 1955, falling as a 
result of mounting criticism from the Hurani - Azm neutralist 
left-wing over its pro-Western political orientation and, 
in particular, its sympath tic attitude towards the 
Baghdad Pact . J The neutralist left - wing coalition formed 
under Asali-Am, immediately precipitated Syria into the 
non- aligned Cairo-Riyad orbit, which had existed under 
1 
Vatikiotis, op . cit . , p.157 . 
2 
Ibid . , p . 214 . 
J 
Ibid . 
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Shishakli . In March , this was follow d by th signing 
of an 
to th 
conomic and mili tary assistanc pact as a count r 
1 Baghd a d P act . Syri a th r b y b cam clos r 
a li gn d t o Egypt and its n w ' rising star ' Gamal Abd 
an - Nasir . 
Continuing int rnational pressures upon Syria to 
commit it s curely to eith r of the major world blocs, 
tended to inject a n e w wave of viol nce into dom stic 
politics . Between F e b ruary a nd April 1 955 , for example , 
street viol enc e brok e out b tween Ba ' th p a rtis ans and 
th pro - We st e rn PPS . 2 In one such affray in Rama on 
17 April, Akram Rurani ' s brother Wasil, was killed with 
sev ral o thers . J The penultimate crisis to this wave of 
viol ence occurre d on 22 April, when the Deputy Chief of 
Staff and Ba ' thist p a rtisan , Adnan Ma l ki, was assassinat d 
4 by a memb er of the PPS . Coming at a moment of growing 
political tension following Britain's entry into the 
Baghd a d P a c t in April, Ma lki ' s murder seemed to demonstrate 
the exten t to which the PPS and its Western and Iraqi 
a lli e s were prepared t o g o t o reverse the trend in Syria 
and restore their own position . 
As a r esul t of this incident the Ba'th and the 
Communis t party moved closer together . The influence of 
Rurani ' s l eadership of the Ba ' th can be seen at this 
point . Both parties seemed to believe, that if justice 
were seen to be hesitant or slow, progressive nationalists 
would b e d emora lis ed, whil the PPS and its friends would 
b e enc ouraged to attemp t a coup d f etat . 5 On 5 May, 
a l - Ba ' t h fulminated, that the message from al - Malki ' s 
assassination , confirmed the need to fight against local 
revisionism, concluding 'Imp erialism , not the United 
States a lone, us ed the PPS in the as s assination of al -
Ma lki on 22 April 1955 '. In June, the Bill of Indictment 
list e d on hundred and forty members of th PPS as being 
implic at d in the as s a ssination of al - Malki. Thirty 
1 
Ibid . , p. 224 . 
2 
Abu Jab r, op. cit., p . J8 . 
J 
Kha lil, The Socia list Parties, p . 1 26 . 
4 
S eal e , op . ci t . , p . 2J9 · 
5 
Ibid . , p . 2 42 . 
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were charged with crim s c a rrying t h e d ath p nalty, 
including murder, con tacting a for ign pow r and 
1 inciting mili tary p rsonnel to disob di nc The 
officer primarily r sponsible for th purg of the PPS 
was the r cently appoint ed chi f (March 1 955 ) of the 
Duexieme Bure au, L t . Col . Abd a l-Hamid Sarraj,2 a 
longst anding acquaintance of Hurani and Shishakli and 
a man fired with strong Ara b n a tiona list sentiments . 
On e of the ine sc apabl conclusions a bou t W stern 
pressures upon Syri a in the mid-1950s , was th fact 
that it consolidated the b a s e of the neutralist left-wing 
while drawing the Communist p arty under Khalid Baqdash 
into closer a lignment wi th the Ba i th . The Ba ' th b efor 
the merger with Hurani, had be e n ideologically opposed 
to any sort of dealings with the Communist party . But 
in 1955 following the merger and mounting internal and 
external pressures from West e rn oriented political 
factions, the Ba ' th and Communist parties moved closer 
together for mutual convenience . J Thus at the Horns 
by- election in 1955, both p a rties agre e d to support a 
non- party candidate Ahmed a l - Hajj Yunis against the 
nominee of the P e opl e ' s p arty . Yunis was successful, 
providing both p a rti es with a g ood reason to form a 
4 
national front. This, a s we will see, developed after 
the Sue z crisis of Oc t ober - ovember 1 956 . 
As Syria veere d towards the Soviet Uni on and Cairo 
in the autumn of 1 955 , the neutralist l eft - wing b ecame 
a dominant influenc e in the g ov e rnment . Said a l-Ghazzi ' s 
g overnment in September , confirmed the pol i ci es of the 
Asali - Azm co a lition and in October, a Syro-Egyptian 
defenc e pact was signed at the mom ent that the first 
shipment of Soviet a rms were a rriving in Syria . Was this 
the be ginning of a sir ' s strategy to b a l ance Soviet with 
Egyptian presti ge in Syria? 
point l a t e r in th cha pt er . 
1 
Ibid . , p . 241 . 
2 
We sha ll r turn to this 
Biogra phic a l otes for more det a ils. 
J 
Ibid . , p . 256 . 
4 
Ibid . 
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F ars and alarums of th Baghdad Pact, forc d C iro 
and Damascus in 0 clos r political alignm n than might 
oth rwis have occurr d in less troubl som tim s . Th 
Ba ' th int rpreted this as th first signs of Syro -
Egyptian unity . On 20 April 1956, al - Ba ' th published 
a list of party demands for most of which was the call 
for Syro - Egyptian unity . Arab unity, it was ass rt d, 
was th only reliable guarant e against imp rialist and 
Zionist ncroachm nts within the Arab hom land . l 
On lL~ June 1956, Syro-Egyptian unity b came a live 
political issue upon th formation of the a tional Union 
government of Sabri al - Asali . In this centr - left - wing 
coalition, the Ba ' th was given the important portfolios 
of For ign Affa irs ( Bitar ) and ational Economy (Kallas) . 
The indispensibility of the Ba ' th at this time might be 
guage d from the fact that it only agreed to accept offic 
on the condition that Syro - Egyptian unity became official 
g ov ernment policy . 2 Thus on 27 June, Asali declared : 
We shall embark on a consolidation of our ties 
with Egypt through immediate talks which we 
hop will 1 ad to a common policy to which the 
other liberated Arab countries will be invited 
to adh re, so that we may achieve a comprehensive 
Ara b unity . ] 
On 29 Jun , al - Ba ' th published euphoric comments about the 
way in which President asir had transformed Egypt and 
th Arab world : ' Your succ ss is a pleasure not only to 
4 Egypt but to the Arab people as a whole ' . It conclud d 
with a r minder to asir that the Arab p opl looked to 
him to initiate a ' Syro - Egyptian fed ration as the nucleus 
for all Arab unity '. 
On 5 July, a thr -man minist rial committee was 
formed under Asali, Bitar and Qanbar to nter into unity 
discussions with Presid nt asir and on the same day, 
1 
2 
] 
4 
idal al - Ba ' th, 01 . ], op . cit . , p . 171 . 
nt rvi w, Bit ar, 160mb r 1967, B irut. 
S al , op . cit . , p . 258 . 
l - Ba ' th, vol. ], op . cit., p . 209 . ~--'---~-----
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the Chamber of Deputies resolved that Arab unity was not 
incompatible with the provisions of the Syrian Constitut ion 
'which lays down that the Syrian people are part of th 
Arab nation ' . 1 
The joy of the Ba'th in s ecuring the passage of 
Syro - Egyptian unity in principle, was only tempered by 
the fact that it susp e ct ed that many memb ers of the right -
wing in the Chamber had b een temp:orarily cowed into 
voting for it . 2 This ma d e the party mor than ever 
anxious to initiate unity discussions before the opposition 
parties regr~uped with the as sist ance of their friends 
in Iraq and the Western world, t o precipitate a change in 
political orientation . Following the nationalisation of 
the Suez Canal on 26 J~ly 1956 , the Ba ' th b ecame more 
i mpatient for Ar a b unity, fearing that sooner or l ater 
the Baghdad P a ct powers would retaliate against Nas ir and 
his uni onist allies in Syria . J 
During August-Septemb e r 1 956 , al -Ba ' th continued to 
fulminate against Western imperialism and to call for 
Arab solidarity with Egypt in its mounting confl i ct with 
the West . Juxtaposed to calls for solidarity were a lso 
constant reminders of the n eed for Arab s tates to enter 
into unity, to c ounter continuing imperi a l ist assaults 
on the Arab homel a nd . On 17 August, a l-Ba ' th a ss erted 
' that Syro - Egyptian unity is the only guarantee against 
the separation of the Ara b (Mashrik) East from the Arab 
(Maghrib) West ,. 4 On 24 August, it was asserted , ' we 
are facing two decisions, e ither the Arabs have to fore g o 
a dignified independent e~ist ence or imperialism has to 
forego its interes t s ,. 5 On 28 Sept emb e r, al -B a ' th . 
supported the stand of the Damman conferenc e against the 
6 Baghda d Pact . It commented approvingly, 'S audi Ar abi a , 
Syria and Egypt a r e one entity ' (i . e . politically 
economically and mili tarily) against imp e r ialist intrigu s . 
1 
Seale, op . cit . , p . 258 . 
2 
Abu Jaber, op. 'ci t ., p . 41. 
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Nidal al - Ba ' th, vol . J, op. c it ., pp . 2 l4-l7 · 
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It continut d, ' Franc s countering th Alg rian 
r volut'on ... Bri ta 'n is maintaining its dominanc in h 
ar a for wh'ch Turk y ' s mobil's'ng forc s on th Syro-
Turkish fr ont ' r .. . . Sy 'a , L banon and Jordan and c ntr s 
of W stern 'nt ll'g nc Iraq has b om an arms d pot 
for Br'ta'n as has Cyprus ' . For al -B a ' th, th only bright 
star n th f'rmam nt was Pr sid nt asir who was , 
ass rt d al-Ba ' th on 28 S pt mb r, ' b 'ng mal' ciously 
att ck d by W st rn n ws ag nc s as a d' tat or ... a 
Hitl r ' . 1 
Exp c d W st rn r pr'sals for h nationalisation 
of t h e Suez Cana l occurred on 29 - JO October 1956 with a 
co-ord'nat d Anglo-Fr nch- Israeli thrust into th Canal 
Zon w'th th in ention of bringing down asjr ' s r gime . 
M anwhil on 28 Octob r , Syrian s curity uncover d a pro-
Iraqi conspiracy to 0 r hrow th at'onal Un'on go rnm nt 
of Sabri al -Asal'. I mpl i c at d nth's w re forty - s n 
politicians, milit ary offi rs and sympathisers of the 
right -wing P ople ' s p arty and bann d PPS . 
To unionist-leftist elements such as th Ba ' th and 
the Communists, the conspiracy was immediately linked 
with th Su z 'nv sion and ' nt rpret d as an attempt 
t o stop Syria fr om com' ng t o th assistanc of Egypt , 
Ther f ore , a few days aft r th uncov ring of the 
consp'racy, the Ba ' th b gan to pr ss for the formation of 
a ' national parliam ntary front , to d f at imp rialist 
machinati ons and a n w go rnment b tt r suited to defend 
2 the nat on ' s int grity . Th Commun'sts ag r to 1 t the 
Ba ' th s t th pac , qu'ckly ass nted . Thus on Jl D cemb 
1956, pr ssur from the un'on ' st-l ft - w'ng compelled Sabri 
al-Asali to reshuffle his c ab inet thereby cluding th 
P opl ' s party and Munir al -Ajlani ' s Constitutional Front, 
both of whom had b n 'mpl'cat d in th consp'racy. Th 
B ' th on the oth r hand , r ta 'n d its po fol'os while 
Khal'd l-Azm , a man wi h 1 ft' st t nd nc ' es , was bought 
bacl t o th cabin t s M nist roD f nce. J 
1 
Ibid . , p . 226 . 
2 
S 1 , p . c' t. , p,2 2 . 
J 
Ib'd . , p. 2 2 . 
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The at ional Front 1957 
W·thin th ational Front ther w r thr major 
parties : th Ba ' th (i .. Hurani and Bitar), th 
Democratic Bloc ( i . Khalid al -Azm) and th Commun·sts 
and fellow travell rs (i. e . Khalid Baqdash) . Mediating 
betw n them was th 1 ader of the ational party, Sabri 
a l - As ali . In all the Front numbered about si ty-fiv 
1 d puti s, in addition to milit ary alli sand fri nds 
outsid th Chamb r . 
For the greater part of 1957 the Front achie ed 
not abl e successes . In Ma rch, for exampl , President 
Quwatly and his politically moderate Chi f of Staff,Tawfiq 
izam ud-Din, tried to undermine the pow r base of 
2 
. unionist-l eft - wing officers in the army . The Deuxieme 
Bureau chief, Abd al - Hamid Sarraj, was to be transferred 
to Cairo as Military Attache . The forces of the Front 
retaliated by upsetting Quwatly ' s plans and a few months 
later by securing the resignation of izam ud-Din . In 
May , left - wing candidates secured the majority of seats 
at the by- e lections caused by the conspiracy trials of 
right - wing deputies . In the case of the Damascus by-
election, the Communists co-operated with the Ba 'th to 
defeat the le ader of the Muslim Brotherhood, Sheikh 
Mustaf a as - Siba ' i . 3 
One of the inescapable conclusions about Middle 
East ern politics between 1955-57, was the fact that the 
more the Western powers tried to drag the countries of 
the Middle East into their political and defence orbits, 
the more l eftist extremist groups thrived and the Soviet 
Union gained in added prestige in the area . In the first 
half of 1957, the Eisenhower Administration tried to fill 
the def nce acuum creat d in the Middl East by the 
demis of British and French influence after Suez . In 
March , th Eisenhower Doctrine promised the countries 
of th Middl e East, Unit d States support in the event of 
1 . t . 4 L . h . int ernal or e terna Communls aggresSlon . aVlS economl 
1 
an - ahar , 1 January 1957 · 
2 
Seal, op . cit., p . 290 . 
3 
Ibid . 
Polk, W. R., Th d Stat s and the Arab World 
( Harvard ~:::"'::"-"---:=---s-s--'-, ---=C=-am-bridge, Massachus etts, 1965 ), 
p . 28l . 
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assistance was also dang l ed b efore the noses of the 
governments of the region. In April, King Husayn availed 
himself of the offer (unoffici a lly ) to overthrow the 
left - wing unionis t government of Suleiman abulsi . l 
American economic and military a ss istance to Saudi Arabia 
managed t o extract her from the four-power Arab pact. 
(i.e. Jordan , Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arab ia) . Lebanon 
officially subscri bed to the Eisenhower Doctrine and 
received arms and economic assistance t o ward off the 
Communist menace seen to exist in Syria. Thus by mid-1957, 
the United States had managed to restore Jordan to a pro -
Western 'orbit and to d etach S audi Arabia from the Cairo -
Damascus orbi t to a politically non-aligned posture, 
moving progressively towards a Western orbit. Lebanon, 
Turkey and Iraq were similarly being fortified against 
suspected Communist ambitions in the region. 
The overall effect of United States policy in Syria, 
was to make it more belligerent t owards the West . The 
parties to benefi t the mos t from this , were the Azmite-
Communists . Soviet prestige similarly grew in Syria with 
every American build-up of arms in the surrounding 
countries. On 6 Augus t , Khalid al -Azm signed a wide -
ranging economic and techni cal agreement with the Soviet 
Union in Moscow. Meanwhile, there were reports in some 
Western newspapers, of Sovie t a rm's flooding into Syria . 2 
The growth of popular resistance organi s ations in Syria 
similarly w.orried Western defen ce experts. On lJ August, 
the crisis was heightened with the expUlsion of three 
American diplomat s from Syria, accused of conspiring with 
right-wing political f a ctions to overthrow the ational 
Union government . J On 15 August, the appointment of 
Afif al-Bizri, an officer with pro-Communist leanings, 
as Chief of S taff, frightened the Western world into 
. t . . t 4 believing that a Communls t ake -over was lmmlnen . 
While the Ba ' th was obviously opposed to all forms 
of Western interference in the domestic affairs of the 
1 
Seal e , op . ci t . , p . 289 · 
2 
Ibid . , p . 29l. 
J 
Ibid . 
4 
Ibid . 
Arab homeland, it was qually ~earful of th opposit 
xtr me - a regi on dominat d by th Communists and 
firmly ntr nched in the So i t orbit . As th Azmit -
Communist partners of th Front fann d anti - W stern 
sentimenL to draw Syria towards an extr m 1 ft - wing 
pro - Moscow orientation, Ba ' th political communiques 
became more insistent that Syria ' s foreign policy was 
geared towards positive neutrality with th objective 
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of maintaining Arab ind pendence . Th following xtracts 
from sp ches of Bitar reported in al -B a ' th , mak this 
point clear . For e xampl e , on 2 March, ' positive 
neutrality stems from Arab nationalism and its obj octiv s, . l 
On 29 March, he asked, ' What are the goals of Syria's 
foreign policy ' , and followed up with the r eply that it 
. is ' Arab orient e d ! clnd in internati onal relations' our 
policy is positive neutrality . ~We befriend whoever s ks 
our friendship and are hostile to those who antagonis 
us, . 2 On 21 June, 'Our main problem is partition and 
our main objective is Ara b unity'. The article concluded 
with a warning to the West ern powers and the United States 
not to oppose Syrian aspirations which only sought the 
n atural right of a ll Arabs independence and unity - not 
Communist expansion . 3 
As the Syrian crisis deepened during October- ovember , 
the matt r was introduced into the United at ions where 
Syri a and Turkey accused each other of massive troop 
concentrations on each other's borders . The great powers 
took sides in the dispute , a dding a cold war dimension 
to the issue . 4 With fears and alarums of imminent invasion 
from anyone of Syria ' s hostile neighbours, young men 
flocked to join the Communist party and the popular 
resistance movements dominated by it . o longer were 
the Ba ' th ' s partn rs in the Front willing to temper their 
policies to ac commodate Ba'thist demands . 
d ai ly, th b . t 5 ey ecame aggr SSlve p ar ners . 
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idal al - Ba ' th , vol . 3, op . cit . , p . 249 · 
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Gaining in pow r 
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Seale, op. cit., pp . 300-02 . Polk, op . cit . , pp . 281 - 82 . 
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effort of the Front was th 1 at'on of Akram Huran' to 
1 Speak r of the Chamber of D puties, on lomb r . 
Thereafter, it b gan to disint grate as th Ba r th 
suspected that its partn rs might b plann'ng to mrue 
a sole bid for power within the gov rnm nt . 2 To count r 
this trend, Ba r th lead rs attempted to d tach Syrian 
foreign policy from cold war politics which had prov n 
so beneficial to the xtreme left-wing . This, for 
example , can be seen in a speech by Bitar on 14 ov mber: 
" .the Syrian qu stion emerged into the 
international sphere as a new phenomenon, not 
as a phenomenon of the cold war and the 
~onflicts between East and West, but a s a 
phenomenon of the neutral camp - the 
phenomenon of a small state bravely 
pursuing its course, exercising its 
independence backed by the entire Arab 
nation and the free peoples of jhe world, 
among whom is the Soviet Union . 
On the 15 ovember the Ba r th decided to boycott the 
Municipal elections as it appeared that the Azmite-
Communist factions would score a convincing moral 
victory - a victory which might encourage them to make 
a sole bid for power . 4 
Nasir ' s Poli tica'l Strategy in Syria 1957 
During 1957 asir seems to have been watching 
political developments in Syria with growing apprehension . 
As the extreme left-wing of the ational Front succeeded 
in pushing Syria closer to the Soviet orbit, asir 
countered deliberately with more direct guarantees and 
assurances of Syro-Egyptian solidarity . For example, with 
the promulgation of the Eisenhower Doctrine on 9 March, 
asir countered on 25 March by an Arab cultural agreem nt 
with Syria which, in the preamble, declared that 'unity 
of thought and culture are one of the ba ic factors of 
1 
Ibid., p.J10 . 
2 
Ibid . , pp.J16-l7 . Abu Jaber, op . cit . , p.44 . 
J 
BBC . , Summary of World 
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th hop d - for Arab un,ty ,. l On 6 August, th tensiv 
economic and t chnical ss'stanc agr m nt with th 
Sovi t Union was count r d on 3 S pt mb r by a Syro-
Egyptian conomic agr om nt sign d in Dam scus by th 
Ba ' th ' s Minist r of Economy, Khalil Kallas and his 
Egyptian counterpart , Abd al - Mun ' im al -Qaisuni . 2 This 
agr e m nt, among other things , mad pro lsions for th 
unification of the two economi s . Thus by implication, 
if Azm could hay his agr m nt in Moscow, th Ba ' th 
could hay its own in Damas cus . On 20 S ptemb r, th 
day befor e Bitar arri ed in w York to put his 
country's case against Turkey before the G neral 
Assembly , two Sovi t warships and an scorting destroy r 
steamed into Lattakia harbour to the plaudi ts of the 
Syrian pr ss . 3 On 13 October, Egyptian troops landed 
in Lattaki a in fulfilment of the defence agre ment 
( 1955 and 1956 ) with Syria . 4 Finally, growing anxiety 
with Ba ' thist-unionist elements, culminating in the 
boycotting of the Municipal elections on 15 ovember, 
was countered by the dispatching of an Egyptian 
parliamentary delegation to Damascus on 17 ovember, und r 
Anwar as - Sadat, to discuss unity propos a ls with its 
Syrian counterpart . And it was r solved ' ... that the 
deputies of ,the two Chambers bless th practic a l steps 
taken for achieving union and call [ on both ] to enter 
immediate discussions for the completion of this union ,. 5 
On 1 8 ovember , Syro - Egyptian troop mano uvres confirmed 
Egypt ' s det rmination to defend Syria milit arily against 
6 
al l com rs - perhaps an obvious reminder to th Azm-
Baqdash factions not to att mpt any military overthrow 
of the ational Union gov rnment. 
Was asir really mo ing towards constitutional union 
of the two countries or simply mano uvring to maintain a 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Anabtawi, M.F., Ara b Unity in T rms of Law (Martinus 
ijhoff/ Th Hagu , 1963), p . 174 . 
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BBC. , o . 406, 18/ 11/57 · 
Ibid . 
strategic hold 0 er Syria? Th answ r would s m to b 
th l att r . What th n , chang d his m'nd 1 R han two 
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months l ater to hasten substanti unity proc dings wi h 
Syria in the formation of the Unit d Arab R public? To 
answer this , we must focus our gaze onc e more on th 
Syrian political and mil'ta y s c en s. 
The Breakdown on the ational Front 
By December 1957 th joint effort of th ational 
Front no longer exist d , ow th main struggle for 
power lay b etween the Ba ' th and the Azmite-Communists, 
with the latter having the added advantage of extensive 
control of popular resistanc e , worker-p easant and trade 
union organisations . l To some extent, the presence of 
Egyptian troops in Syria permitted the Ba ' th to press 
more openly and vigorously for unity, while serving as 
a warning to the extreme left-wing to refrain from 
making a so l e bid for powe~ at the e pense of asir ' s 
unionist allies . For example , right - wing political 
parti es which had earlier opposed Syro-Egyptian unity on 
account of Nasir ' s ' progressive policies ', now came to 
se in unity a preferable, if not the only alternative 
to a country dominated by the Communists and firmly 
entrenched in the Soviet orbit. Seeing unit sentiment 
growing, the left-wing tried to out manoeuvr the Ba ' th 
and , by implication, President asj_r , by making extreme 
d emands for unity, such as complete merger of the two 
countries . The Ba ' th had proposed federal unity ' strong 
enough and centralised enough to stand firm against all 
opponents at home and abroad, 
a llowances ~or the different 
two countries , .2 (See, Art. 
[a] federation to make 
political histories of th 
16, Ba ' th Constitution) , 
Later, the Ba ' th envisaged a more integrat d form of unity , 
when regional diff renc s had been satis actorily resolv d. 3 
1 
Laqu ur, W. , (Ed.) Th Middle East in Transition 
(Routledg and Kegan Paul, London-,-195S}: ee Laqueur ' s 
' Syria: ationalism and Commun' m', p.329. 
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Communist Par ty Strat gy 
Communist pa ty strat gy towards Arab unity was, on 
the whol , condition d by political gain . twas s If-
evid nt to Baqdash that unity with asir would sp 11 doom 
for th local Syrian Communist mov ment, which was 
thriving overtly and co ertly in lat 1957. But on th 
oth r hand, to oppose popular unionist s ntim nts would 
lead to the Ba ' th accus"ng th Communists of being 
unpatriotic Ar a bs . Baqdash could not affo d to los ground 
in this respect, so he countered by st aling and pIa ing 
the Ba ' th ' s ' trump card ' - being more unionist mind d than 
th party, whose sole obj ctive was Arab national unity. 
Baqdash ' s calculations seem to ha e been that asir 
would be rep lIed by union if compl te merger were propos d. 
Indeed asir ' s pre iously cautious attitude se med to 
confirm Baqdash ' s pro gnosis (see, Part 1, Chap . J). But, 
towards th end of December 1957, Baqdash was becoming 
concerned that asir and the Ba ' th might take advantag 
of mounting unionist sentiment to precipitate a sudden 
entry into formal unity discussions. This may have be n 
confirmed by a statement in al-Ahram on 2 January 1958, 
which h Id that asir was contemplating unit by the nd 
of 1958 . The immediate response of the Communist party 
was to t mporise on its unity demands whil attempting to 
reconcile differences with the Ba ' th, in the hope that the 
latter would be persuaded to share power with it in th 
ational Front in prefer nce to the unc rtain political 
future of union with President asir. The Damascus daily, 
ar - Ra ' i al-Amm on 2 January, quoted a Communist party 
stat ment on the ' neces ity of an understanding betw en 
the Communists and Ba'thists, who together form the corner-
ston of the ational Front"l On IJ January, another 
statement proposed th implementation of union on the basis 
of two stat s inst ad of a single unifi d stat It h Id 
that du consideration should be giv n to the 'peculiar 
conditions in each of the two countries ' and concluded that 
such an arrangement ' would pro ide opportunities for the 
. 2 furth r promotlon of fr dom and democracy ' , 
1 
Arab World, J Janua y 1958, quoted from ar-Ra 'i al-Amm . 
2 
Arab World, 15 Januar 1958, quot d from ar-Ra ' i al -Amm . 
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Coincid ntally , th·s stat m nt w s m d on th d ay 
following th s urpr ·s visit of fourt n s nior Syrian 
army offic rs to Cairo to pr sent a m morandum from th 
High Command to th ffect , that compl t m rg r was th 
b est guarante for th def nc and s curity of the nation, 
whil any other form of agreement would b a mere 
a lli anc b tw en two nations . l The strat gy of the 
Communist party was to counter such moves by exploiting 
fears that unless Syria was guarante d a high d gr of 
political a utonomy under any unitary agr m nt, 
would curtail b asic political freedoms . 
Entry into Union : Complet Merger or othing 
a sir 
Syro - Egyptian union had b een the officia l policy of 
the at iona l Union g overnment sinc e 27 June 1956 , y t the 
precipitate a ct ion of th senior army officers on 
1 2 J a nuary , caught the g overnment badly off b a l an c e . A 
communique which the De uxi eme Bureau chief, Abd aI - Hamid 
Sarraj, d e livered t o the government in the officers ' 
nam , was couched in the form of an ultimatum: that 
in i w of the fact that the country was politically on 
the point of collaps and that the Communists were gaining 
2 g round d aily ' unity was the only remedy'. 
But if al - Asali's government agre d in principle that 
unity was the desired obj ective , in practice there was 
considerable disag reement as to the form of unity to be 
entered into. Presideni Quwatly and Sabri al-Asali, 
preferred a loose bi-presidentia l system which would unify 
and standardise foreign policy, defenc , currencies and 
educat ional systems, whi l e otherwis permi tting a high 
d gr of autonomy on purely domestic matters . J Akram 
4 Hurani tend d to favour the Quwatly pl an, while Aflaq 
and Bitar sought a more integrated f der al system with a 
strong central gov rnment, which made allowances for 
1 
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1 
region 1 p culiariti s in the initial stag s . D puty 
Prim Minist r,Khal'd al -Azm and th Communist d puty, 
Khalid Baqdash, vacillat d from complet m rg r to a loos 
bi - pr sidential syst m, to complete hostility to unity 
2 in any form, after 21 January . The Minist r of Justic 
Ma ' mun Kuzbari was secr tly opposed to any form of 
union with asir and may ha e been conspiring with 
ri ght - wing memb rs of th Chamber of Deputi s to ff ct 
a coup d ' etat with the assistanc of Iraq . J Sabri 
a l - Asali may a lso have b een involved in the conSPiracy . 4 
If asir had summarily dismissed th offic rs 
d emands on 12 January , his unionist allies in Syria would 
h ave suffered severe set-backs . The Azmit -Communist 
factions may have proposed an immediate alternative 
to Syro - Egyptian unity - clos er ass oci ation with Moscow 
in th interest of Syrian independence . On the other 
hand, the right-wing which had been cow d and frighten d 
into sil enc e , may have precipitated a coup d'etat with 
the ass istanc e of Iraq and the Baghdad Pact Council 
a ss embling in Ankara with known opposition to Syro-
Egyptian unity. asir must have b een aware of the 
difficulties confronting the Ba'th in Syria, vis-a- is 
, 
the ri ght -wing and the extreme left-wing, but could he 
continue to play the role of b alancing Ba'thist with 
Communist gains? On 12 January, asir seems to ha e 
b een in great doubts as to the future of his strategy in 
S yri a . However, being reassured of the Syrian army 
chi e fs ' unconditiona l support and perhaps believing that 
his allies were losing ground, he may have b een tempted 
to put on t h e ' crown of S a l a ddin' at the moment when 
1 
Interview, Bi tar , 1 6 
cit . , p . J18 . an - ahar, 
comments on Federation, 
2 
o ember 1967, Beirut . 
14 J a nuary 1958 . See, 
p . l . 
Seale, op . 
Abu Jawdeh ' s 
Ara b World, 15 January 1 958 , quoting from ar-Ra 'i a l-Amm . 
S eal e , op . cit . , pp . J18-J2J . an- ahar , 19 January. 
J 
Abd al- asir , G. , ~p ee ches a nd Press Interviews, 1 961 
( English Translation, Dire ctor Gen eral of Information, 
Cairo) , p . 40l . asir a ssert e d that Kuzbari and Asali 
were secr tly planning subversive activities while in 
th proc ss of outwardly n gotiating for Syro - Egyptian 
unity . Vatikioti s , op. c it . , pp . 185-86 . 
4 
Ibid . 
lJ9 
Syria was b 'ng politically torn apart and in no position 
to b argain for un · ty as an qual partn r . 
On 15 January, asir agr ed to hold formal unity 
discussions . l On 16 January, Bitar and Syrian 
del gation arri d in Cairo to se how far th offic rs 
2 had comm·tted the go ernm nt . Bitar l a ck d any cl ar 
governm nt mandate upon which to negotiat ; his role was 
on of a suppliant, a welcome role for th co-found r of 
th Ba ' th party . asir ' s first intimation to the Syrians 
was a warning that th y w re rushing into unity . In his 
o pinion they should wait five years until both countries 
w r adequat ly pr pared for union . J However, in view of 
th unusual circumstances in Syri a , he agre d to enter 
into union, though only on certain stipulated conditions , 
t o minimise the chanc s of later disintegration . Firstly, 
he d manded the cessation of all political party activity 
in Syria to be replac d by a ati onal Union, modelled on 
th Egyptian counterpart. Secondly, all milit ary offic rs 
had to choose between a military or political car er, 
but not both . Thirdly, complete merger of the two 
countri s had to b adopt d on the basis of a uni-
4 presid ntial e ecuti e system. 
From the point of view of the leader of the Ba ' th, 
Aflaq, Bitar and Hurani, asir ' s conditions were thought 
to be a little extreme but in no wise incompatible with 
their basic ideological conceptions . 5 It was believed 
that if the Ba'th lost its identity as a political party 
it would regain it in another form within the ationa l 
Union as the most unionist of a irIs Syrian allies . 
Similarly , complete merger and the dissolution of all 
p olitical parties would almost cert a inly be to the 
disadvantag of the Ba'th ' s most serious rival for power, 
the Communist party, whom asir would be certain to 
p rs cut and eradicate . Again, di olution of the 
1 
2 
J 
4 
5 
Inter i w, Bitar, 1 6 o ember 1967, Beirut. 
Ibid. Khalil, The Socialist Parti s, p . 1J4 . 
asir, .;:S~p;:....:...;:...:_.::...;::. 1961, p.258 . 
S al , op . cit . , p . J22 . 
Int r i w, Bitar, 16 o ember 1967, Beirut . 
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right - wing P ople ' s and ational parti would pr nt 
them "n futur from bing us d a conspirator"al bases 
from which to precip"ta 
orbi t . 
Syria Onto a W st rn politic 1 
For th right-wing political parties, dissolution 
meant v ry little real loss in t rms of party organisation . 
On the whol th Y w r loose associations which confin d 
th ir political activities to el ction ring and 
parliamentary debating . Through dissolution, th y 
could maintain roughly th same political association 
within the ational Union though it woVld almost certainly 
wreck the centralised organisational structures of their 
major rivals, the Ba ' th and the Communists. Howe er, on 
the qu stion of complete merger they w re apprehensi e 
beli ving that a looser f deral system would be a 
pref rabl alternati e . 
On 20 January, al-Ahram reported that the unity 
discussions had reached the point where an ' historic 
decision ' had been taken in a four-hour meeting between 
Abd an- asir , Salah ud-Din Bitar and Afif al-Bizri, 
union having entered the ' practical and concrete phase ' 
Bitar, th reafter, returned to Damascus to report on 
proceedings to the cabin t, only to be met by continuing 
indecision over acceptability of asir ' s conditions . On 
25 January, Quwatly and al-Asali sent Bitar once more to 
Cairo, this time with more concrete proposal for a 
federation allowing each member country a large mea ure 
1 
of autonomy . asir, however, reject d this alternate 
plan . On 27 January, al -Ahram report d that after a 
lengthy meeting , a unity plan wa adopted providing for 
one pr sident elected by the people of Syria and Egypt , 
one stat and one unified p~rliament . Clearly it would not 
hav b en to the advantage of Bitar or the Ba'th to pre s 
asir too hard into accepting the federal proposals of 
the Syr" an government . 
On 28 January 1958, les than two weeks after formal 
unity di cussions had begun, the Syrian cabinet agreed to 
2 
enter into union on asir ' s condi tion The cabinet, 
1 
Seal, op . cit . , p . J2J . al-Ahram, 25 January 1958. 
2 
Daily Star (Beirut), 29 January 1958 . 
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how r, was by no m ans completely un"t d on th d cision . 
Deputy Prim e Minist r, Khalid al-Azm, for ampl , had 
b een op nly campaigning against any unity proj ct w"th 
Nasir sinc 21 January and s veral oth r s nior minist rs, 
including President Quwatly, w re f arful of the 
consequ nc s of th complet merg r of the two countri s . 
Yet by late January it is doubtful whether th cabin twas 
th mast r of its own d stiny being und r consid rabl 
pressur from the army chiefs and from growing popular 
unity s ntiments - protray d as the solution to all 
probl ms . Similarly, constant fears and alarums of 
external West rn aggr ssion and internal Communist 
subversion unsettled and, indeed, unner d the members 
of the cabinet forcing them to make a decision which, in 
many r spects, was ' the lesser of the two evils '. Rath r 
coincidentally the decision to enter into union was made 
the day after the opening session of the Baghdad Pact 
Council in Ankara . 
Yet despite agreement-in-principle, several last 
minute deadlocks delay d final ratification of Syro-
Egyptian unity . These were finally resolved on 31 January 
when the Chief of Staff Afif al-Bizri, who had played a 
prominent part in the unity discussions in Cairo, ord red 
a plane to stand by, assembled the cabinet on it and 
embarked for Cairo . According to Seale, he is reported 
to have said to the more recalcitrant members: ' There 
are two roads open to you: one leads to Mazza ( a prison 
outside Damascus ); the other to Cairo ,.l Thus, on 
1 February the Syrian and Egyptian governments held a 
joint s ssion at which union was officially proclaimed 
and th United Arab Republic (UAR) came into existence . 
In th struggle for Syria the Ba'th and asir had won the 
first round . 
L t us now examine the Ba ' this political relations 
with asir in the UAR. 
1 
Seale, op . cit., p·323 · 
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and the Unit d Arab 
1958-61 
Conc pt of Go 
From th inception, as'r ga e ry w pow rs to 
the Syrians in determing go ernment policy for the union . 
In F bruary, a constitut'onal committ compris d of 
( Syri n ) Salah ud-Din Bi ar , Akram Huran' , Ahm d Abd 
al-Karim and (Egyptians ) Zakaria Muhiudd'n, Kamal ud-Din 
Husayn and Kamal Rifa ' t, m t to plan th principles and 
obj cti es of the ational Union . A Syrian and Egypt' an 
plan was submitted to asir , The S rian plan called for 
the speedy implementation of the ational Union which 
it was hoped would provid for a wide r pr sentation of 
syndical and political opinion . 
1 ignor d both plans . 
asir, however, promptly 
On 6 March , the pro isional Constitution strength ned 
the executive base of the union . President asir was 
gi en powers to nominate the ational Assembly, Central 
Cabinet and the two regional executive councils (i . e , 
Syrian and Egyptian) . In addition he assumed emergency 
pow rs to initiate 1 gislation and to dismiss minist rs 
for default of duty . And if these executive powers were 
insuffici nt to maintain a tight grip over the orthern 
region (Syria), asir also became Supreme Command r of 
the Armed Forces of the UAR. 2 
Within the pro isional go ernment of the UAR , asir 
took special care to nominate his most trust d a sociates 
to major executive offic s . For example , of the thirty-
four m mb rs of the first cabinet of March 1958, e cluding 
the Pr sident, twenty were Egyptians and fourteen Syrian 
The major portfolios of War, Foreign Affairs, Interior, 
Industry, Education and ational Guidance w re reser ed 
for Egyptians , (S ee , Table 6). Of the Syrians, four w r 
Ba ' thists with possibl another four to fi e being fellow 
tra ellers . Huranl was nominated Vic-President, Bitar, 
Minister of State for Arab Affairs, while of the memb rs 
of the Syrian Regional Council (SRC j UAR), Kallas retained 
1 
Int r i w, Bitar, 17 0 mber 1967, B irut. 
2 
atikiotis . op cit ., p . 176 , Arab World, 6 March 1958. 
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the Ministry of ational Economy and a n w com r to 
politics, Mustaf a Hamdun , was nominat d Minist r of 
Labour and Social Affairs . l 
In theory the Ba ' th poss ssed consid rabl 
representation on the SRC / UAR, but asir ' s strategy was 
design d to prevent it (Ba ' th) or any other party from 
attaining an absolut control of the orthern region . 
In March h retained the services of the x-Syrian 
Deuxieme Bu r au chief Abd al - Hamid Sarraj, and set him 
to work to root out all existing political party opposition 
to the regime . 2 Parties which had not officially dissolved , 
were to have their assets xpropriated and their memb rs 
imprisoned for illegal political activities. Primarily 
these laws were direct d against the Communist party 
b ut Nas ir was also wary of the Ba ' th. Thus in case 
Hurani should have wanted to use his office to become 
the Premier of the SRC / UAR, Nasir appointed Sabri al-Asali 
a s V j_c e -P r s ident to counter Hurani' s power aspirations 
eithe r p rsonally or in the interes ts of the Ba ' th . J 
a 
On 20 September 1958, al-Jumhuriyya (Cairo) hinted 
at th inadequacy of effective centralised control over 
the exist ing Regional Councils . 4 On 8 and 26 October, 
s eries o f Presidential decrees amended articles in the 
provisional Constitution, thereby providing for an 
enlarged central cabinet (CC / UAR) with powers of co-
ordination and supervision of the policies of the SRC/ UAR 
and ERC / UAR . In effe c t , all government departments with 
the xception of War and Foreign Affairs were to have 
three minist rs, all of whom by decree were made directly 
responsible to the President . 5 
At first Ba ' thist leaders were generally pleased with 
the constitutional am ndments as they seemed to make the 
union an integrated ntity, while at the same time 
1 
2 
J 
4 
5 
Mideast Mirror, (Reuter ' s, weekly digest Beirut), vol . 10, 
o . 10, 9 March 1958 . (Her after MEM). 
Arab World, 12, 19 and 25 March 1958 . 
Arab World, 7 March 1958, quoted from an- ahar . 
Vatikiotis, op . cit., p . 178 . 
Ibid . , pp . 179-80 . 
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incr asing Syrian r pr s ntation on th CC / UAR . l For 
exampl , of th tw nty-on memb rs of th CC / UAR, fift n 
wer Egyptians and six Syrians. Of th Syrians, Bi ar 
was appoint d Minister of Cultur and ational Guidan 
and Hu rani, in addition to the office of Vi e-Pr sid nt, 
became Minister of Justic In the r shuffl of th 
SRC/UAR, the Ba ' th (unofficially) gained two other 
portfol i os with th appointment of Riyad al-Malki to 
Culture and National Guidance and Abd aI-Ghani Qannut 
" to Labo ur and So cial Affairs; Hamdun ~as moved to 
Agrarian R form, a ministry of key importance to th 
orth rn region . 
I f the Ba 'th wer of the opinion that asir had 
recognis e d its indispensability in the orthern region 
by a ccordin g it a substantial share of th seats in the 
SRC/UAR, it wa s soon to be thoroughly disillusioned by 
the strategy behind the constitutional amendments of 
October 1958 . a sir it seems, did not want to antagonise 
unduly Ba ' thist members and sympathisers in the orth rn 
region, whom he recognis d to be influential in many 
quarters. But on th other hand, he could not tolerate 
any political movement setting itself apart from the 
regime. In this respect he may have been embittered 
by the vocal criticism of Ba ' thist leaders against the 
agrarian reform laws of September 1958 which, it was 
held, provided far too liberal compensation to landlords 
. 2 deprived of thelr lands . Thus to counter Ba ' thist 
criticism, asir gav the party (unofficially) two 
additional portfolios in the reconstituted SRC / UAR in 
October, one of which was Agrarian Reform. But on the 
other hand, he appointed Sarraj to the Interior, a watching 
brief within the SRC / UAR, to ensure against further policy 
cri t ic ism or default of duty by Ba ' thist leaders. Meanwhile 
Hurani and Bitar, who may have served as rallying points 
o f opposition to the regime, were brought to Cairo to take 
up a ppointments in th CC / UAR. J Thus with the resignation 
of Sabri aI -As ali as Vice-President in October and 
1 
Intervi w , Bitar, 17 ovember 1967, B irut. 
2 
Kha lil, The Socialist Parties, p.14l . 
op . c it ., p .49 . 
Abu Jaber, 
J 
Intervi w, Bitar, 17 ov mber 1967, Beirut. 
Hurani in Cairo, Sarraj in th nam of Pr sid nt asir 
became the most po werful man in th orth rn r gion . 
S igns of T nsion 
D spite asir ' s unwillingness to tr at th Ba ' th 
as a partner in the gov rnment of th UAR, Ba ' thists 
generally refrained from publicly criticing the regim 
during 1958. Jamal al-Atasi wrote in as-Sahafa , 
2 January 1959 : 
When Abd an- asir speaks about the West e rn 
or orthern regions and about industrial 
and agricultural projects, we f e l that he 
is speaking about Arab society and n ot about 
regional society .... 
Others s u ch a s the s e cretaries of the Jordanian and Iraqi 
Regional Commands, Abdullah ar-Rimawi and Fuad Rikabi, 
argued during the first half of 1959 that the Ba ' th 
should merge its identity completely with asir ' s forc s 
in the UAR and throughout the Arab world in view of their 
common ideological objectives. l 
Aflaq, Bitar and Hurani on the other hand, were 
beginning to question the wisdom of unconditional unity 
with asir . After all, what had they gained ? The ans w r 
was clearly that they had lost badly and were continuing 
to lose influence in the orthern region as a result of 
Sarraj ' s police activit ies. It was very plain to them 
by mid-1 959 that asir would not tolerate co-equals in 
2 the government of the UAR . Thus, to counter the Rimawi 
line within the party , Aflaq convened the Third ational 
Congress at the end of August 1959 , which e xpelled him 
for pOlicy deviation. J Although primarily a party affair , 
Rimawi ' s expuls ion was an indirect slight to asir and 
may be thought to be the first sign of the parting of 
the ways . Let us account for this in more detail . 
1 
See pp . 54-56 
2 
Abu Jaber, op . cit., p . 48 . 
J 
idal al - Ba ' th, vol. 2, op . cit., pp . 175-76 . See 
, ational Report ' , Mar ch 1960. Abu Jaber , op . cit., p . 54 . 
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asir ' s Foreign Policy Dil mmas 
Bing surrounded on three sid s by pro-W st rn 
Arab stat s, asir ' s strategy in th early months of 
the union was to cushion pressur s by xploiting 
political differenc s within these states. By mid-1958 , 
this strat gy was beginning to pay divid nds in L banon 
where Rashid Karami and the Ba ' thist lead r Abd aI-Majid 
Rifa ' i were on the point of pro claiming the c ssion of 
Akka ( orthern Lebanon) to the UAR . l On 14 July , asir ' s 
politi c al obje c tives were raise d even higher by th 
o v erthrow of the pro-Western Hashemit government of 
Iraq by Qasim and Arif, both of whom w re thought to be 
2 Arab nationalists. Earlier in the year, Ye men had 
intimated a willingn ss to join the UAR,3 thereby giving 
asir the opportunity to harass We stern bases in the 
South (Janub). 
Y t the success of asir ' s political strategy in 
the Middle East was short lived . The United States 
invoked the Eisenhower Doctrine on 15 July, to save 
Lebanon from political disintegration . 4 Order was 
restore'd at the price of the Shihab government und e r-
taking to observe a policy of strict neutrality in inter-
Arab affairs . Thus, from the unionist Arab point of view, 
Lebanon, in theory, was ' placed on ice ' . By October 1958, 
Iraq which had earlier stood on the threshhold of union 
with the UAR, was veering towards the Soviet Union 
assisted by the local Communist party . Furthermore, an 
outbreak o f Communist party activity in the orthern 
region towards the end of 1958 seemed to indicate that 
the Syrian and Iraqi Communist parties were on the point 
o f making a bid for power with at least the nominal 
support of the Soviet Union . 5 
1 
Ori nt (Paris, Quart rly), vol . 2, o . 6 . See, Jean-
Pierr Alem ' s ' Troubles Insurrectionels Au Liban ' , p . 46 . 
2 
Kerr, M. , The Arab 
Ideology in Politics 
London, 1965), p . 22 . 
3 
Cold War , 1958-1964: A Study of 
(RllA, Oxford University Press, 
4 
5 
Arab World, 3 March 1958 . 
Polk, op . cit . , pp.282-83 . 
Cremeans , C. D . , Th Arabs and asser ' s Arab 
ationalist Policy~Council on Foreign Relations, Praeger, 
1963), pp . 288-89. 
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In h·s Port Said sp h on 23 D mber, asir mad 
it v ry plain to th Sovi t Union tha h dislik d its 
int rf r nc in Arab affairs through the local Communist 
1 
mo v m nts . In January-F bruary 1959, th Tw nty-First 
Congr ss of th Sovi t Communist Party was highly criti al 
o f s tat s which pers cut d th Communist mov ment . 2 
Khrushh v ' s speech, for exampl , singled out the UAR 
with a reminder to asir that anti-Communism would only 
assist imperialism and Zionism . UAR- ovi t r lations 
d teriorat d still furth r during the first half of 1959 . 
n sp ches on 12 , 13, 14 and 15 March, asir denounc d 
Arab Communists as agents of a foreign power, cond mned 
Communist ' atheism ' , accused Qasim, the Iraqi Premi r, 
on subs rvi nce to the Communist party, and said that 
in Iraq, Communism was ' eliminating patriotism and 
nationalism in th nam of false democracy , .3 
By mid-1959, asir was in the un nviable position 
of bing sandwiched b tw en states repr senting great 
power interests in th Middle East. Th Twenty-First 
Congress had made it clear that as a price for Moscow's 
continuing friendship (measured in arms and technical 
assistance), asir was expected to treat the local 
Commu nist movement as a ' partner ' in the struggle against 
imperialism and Zionism. Such a proposal was completely 
unthinkable to asir. But what policy option remained 
open? He might , for example, pursue a policy of rigid 
non-alignment from either of the major world blocs, 
but with Israel on his d oor - step he required arms and 
spare parts if only for defensiv reasons . He could 
relinquish charge ov r the orthern region while cons rving 
his military capabilities in Egypt alon . But what would 
th Arab masses think about their national hero, if h 
a d opted that course of action? 
1 
Ibid ., p . 289 . Daily Star, 25 December 1958. 
2 
Mizan wsletter (C ntral Asian R search Centre, 
London ) , vol . 1, no. 2, February 1959. ee ' The xxist 
Party Congr ss and the Middle East ' , p.i . 
3 
Mizan wsl tter, vol. i, no. 4, April 1959 . S e 
th ovi t iew ' , p.5 . 
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In t rms of policy options, asir poss ss d only 
on real alternativ 
to hav to swallow : 
though in its lf a ' bitt r pill ' 
improv d diplomatic relations with 
th W st rn suppli rs of arms and technical assistan 
(i . th United States)l as a counter to the Sovi t 
Union and a policy of app asement with Jordan, Saudi 
Arabia and the pro-West rn states of th Maghrib, in 
2 
ord r to isolate Iraq within the Arab L agu . Thus 
in Au gust 1959, Jordanian-UAR diplomatic r lations w r 
restored and t wo w eks later King Ibn Sa ' ud was rec ived 
in the UAR on an official state visit. 
For the Ba'th inside and outside the UAR, asir's 
shift in political alignment was completely unacceptable . 
The ational Report of March 1960 held : 
... false understanding of ,union ... has 
effected the reputation of the UAR in 
all Arab states . The policy of the UAR has 
had a bad effect on the liberation movements 
in the Eastern (Mashrik) and Western (Maghrib) 
Arab s tates . ] 
In Jordan and other Arab states, Ba'th partisans 
continued to c all for Arab unity and national liberation, 
while Nasir on the oth r hand , was trying to restore 
c ordial relations on the basis of mutual respect for 
state sovereignty . The outcome of this was intense 
embarrassment for aSir,4 who was thought to have been 
closely associated with the Ba ' th - several of whose 
leaders were prominent ministers in the SRC / UAR and 
CC/UAR . Therefore to effect his policy objectives and 
after the attempted assassination of Qasim by Ba'th 
partisans in October 1959, to lessen irritation between 
Baghdad and Cairo, asir was compelled to disavow all 
association with the party . This permitted Husayn and 
Qasim in particular to crush the Ba'th and drive it 
further underground . 5 Ironically, the party which had 
1 
Kerr , op . cit . , p . 25. 
2 
Ibid . 
] 
idal al - Ba'th, vol . 4, op . cit . , pp.147-48. 
4 
Khalil, The ocialist Parties, p.14l. 
5 
L ' Orient , 5 January and 29 March 1960. 
s v d yria from bing dr wn into th Communist or 
W st rn orbit was now (July- D c mb r 1959) bing 
crucifi d to app as 
Arab stat s . 
pro-Communist nd pro-l st rn 
ational Union El ctions 
It was at th moment wh n Ba ' th- asir political 
r lations wer d ter"orating , that th long await d 
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lections were h Id for th ational Union in th first 
w k of July 1959 . Out of 9 ,44 5 seats allotted to the 
1 
orth rn region, Ba ' thists won only 250 . A striking 
f atu r of the lection campaign was the fact that th 
Ba ' th withdrew clos to nin ty per cent of its 
candidates2 on the grounds that opposition parti sand 
officia l State propaganda were ' ganging-up' against th 
party ' peasants , labourers and educated p ople [ being 
warne d ] not to support Ba ' th candidates for they are 
against the regime,.3 The resultant outcome was a victory 
fo r right -wing politically independent candidates . In 
Al ep p o , the Ba ' th 's list was routed by a rival list of 
independ nts, some of whom were memb rs of the old 
4 People ' s party . Hurani's list of five was successful 
in Hama, but in Damascus, out of a list of fifteen, the 
party secured the election of only eight candidates. 
Bitar and Riyad al-Malki were elected on this list, 
thought Aflaq was defeated . By comparison, fifty 
religious 1 aders, thirty-five civil servants and an odd 
assortment of politically independent candidates were 
r turned in the capital hitherto a strong centre of 
unionism . 5 
How is it possible to account for th Ba ' th ' s 
humilitating defeat at the ational Union elections? 
1 
Daily Star , 25 August 1959. The paper suggests that 
asir and Sarraj conspir d against the Ba ' th to ensur 
its defeat. 
2 
MEM , 11/ 28, 12 July 1959 · 
3 
idal al-Ba'th, vol. 4 . See 'The ational Report, 
Marc h 1960', p . 1L~4 . 
4 
MEM , 11 / 28, 12 July 1959 . 
5 
tar , 11 July 1959 . 
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Some, like Jargy , hav argu d that th lection r sults 
1 
were a tru measure of the Ba ' th ' s popular app al . 
Others , including th Ba ' th , have argu d that th 1 ctions 
w re rigged. Let us e xamin bri fly both cont ntions . 
Taking the latt r point first, circumstantial 
vidence, which alon xists, would seem to suggest 
that asir was anxious to s ecure th r turn of candidat s 
who w re both politically independent and mod rat in 
outlook . In fa c t, his domestic and for ign policy 
ob j e c tiv es might have b n thrown into doubt had the Ba ' th 
and unionist-socialist c a ndidat es be n return d with 
substantial majorities . 
On the second qu stion there is, of course, som 
tru th in the argument, though i t must be remembered that 
in 1954, the Ba ' th secure d twenty-two seats in the Syrian 
Chamber of Deputies (see Table 5) and in 1957 its 
cand i d ates and fellow travellers won the bulk of the 
by-ele c tions . The growing politi cal power of the Ba ' th 
in 1957 was only second to that of the Communist party , 
a probable reason, as we have s een , in the formation of 
the UAR in February 1958. Even in th first eighteen 
months of the union, a si r seems to have paid deferenc 
to the party ' s power base in the orthern region , by 
according its leaders four portfolios in the SRC / UAR and 
t wo in the CC /UAR in addition to a Vi c e -P residentship 
of the Republic. 
Yet Nasir ' s strategy within the government of the 
UAR was to limi t th power base of all independent 
political movements and in this resp ct, the Ba ' th was 
no exception. Thus on the basis of ci r cumstantial 
evidence, it might be argue d that a si r would be likely 
to discourage the ele ction of c andidate s who owed 
allegiance to party boss e s not direc tly under state control . 
Thi s might be inferred from his annivers ary speech on 
2J July 1959 which held: 
1 
Ori nt, J / ll, 1959 . S e Simon Jargy ' s ' Le D clin 
D ' Un Parti ' , pp.J4-J5 . 
Those who regress into the party system 
and take their orders from party boss s, 
ar nothing but traito rs , for in so 
do ing they def eat the prim purpos of 
t h ational Un'on and this b nef'ts 
no one but our nemies ... Thus I say 1 
clearly ... no more political parti s . 
Between July and Dec mber 1959, asir larg ly 
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succeede d in stripping away th Ba ' th ' s r maining pow r 
base in the government of the UAR. For example, during 
the at'onal Union el ctions, th Directorate of 
Broad casting n Damascus was removed from the Ministry 
of Culture and ational Guidance administered by Riyad 
al-Malki and g i ven to the Minister of State for 
Presidential Affairs, Ali Sabri in the CC /UAR . 2 Damascus 
radio had apparently been reporting articles from 
al-Jamahir (The People) on the unfair conduct of the 
elections . 3 On 11 July, al-Jamahir, edited by Jamal 
al-Atasi, a Ba ' th p artisan, was suspende d and in August 
forced into liquidation following the withholding of a 
g overnment SUbSidity.4 In August, Ba ' thist leaders 
boycotte d official functions arranged for asir 's visit 
t o the or thern region. 5 A week after the Thir d ational 
Congress on 27 August had dismissed Rimawi from the party, 
Riyad al-Malki was sacked from the SRC /UAR. 6 
On 1 2 October, a Presidential decree appointed Abd 
al-Hakim Amir as asir's pro- consul in the orthern region 
with the purpose of ensuring greater centralisation of 
policy, curbing political factiousness and perhaps, 1 ss 
obviously, countering Sarraj ' s growing power base . 7 
While the Ba 'th, by this time, was highly despondent with 
the ational Uni on and the general conduct of the union, 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Abd an- asir, Spee hes and Interviews 1959, p.287 . 
MEM, 11/28, 12 July 1959. 
Ibid . 
Abu Jab r, op. it., p . 62. 
Qail~tar , 25 August 1959 . 
L 'O ri nt, 15 Septemb r 1959 . Daily Star, 15 September 
1959, referred to the incident as being in conformity 
with anti-Ba'th measures adopted by arraj and asir 
during the elections. 
7 
Interview, Bitar , 17 ov mb r 1967, B irut . 
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°t n v rth 1 ss w 1 om d Amir ' s appoOntm nt, if only 
t t o, 1° t o °to 1 o coun r arraJ s po 1C ac 1V1 S o 
By Dec mb r 1959, Ba ' th- asir politi a relations 
wer reaching rock bottom. Amir was continually 
interfering in th affairs of the SRC / UAR, alt ring 
legislation at will to suit Cairo . On xampl of this 
was the appointment of an overseer committee to implem nt 
the agrarian laws following allegations by landlords of 
2 mal-administration by the Ba ' th partisan, Mustafa Hamdun . 
To Ba ' t h leaders within th SRC / UAR and CC / UAR , this was 
th ' s traw which broke the camel ' s back '. At the nd 
o f De c ember 1959 the bulk of them t nd red their 
r signations as a sign of protest with ' the aim of 
creating more suitable conditions for the internal 
governm nt of the UAR ,. J However, not all were as 
charitable . Hurani upon his return to Hama immediately 
began to malign the leaders of the UAR, especially asir, 
while claiming that the union was littl more than a 
process of ' Egyptianising Syria ,. 4 
Between January 1960 and September 1961, the Ba ' th 
completely detached itself from the affairs of the UAR . 
In the summer of 1960, as-Sahafa argued that democracy 
cou ld not flourish in the UAR without the existence of 
politi cal parties . 5 In October 1960, the Report of the 
Fo u rth ational Congress , among other things, argued 
along similar lines . The Fourth B C was called upon to 
dire c t Arab public opinion against the undemocratic 
processes of government in the UAR ' to correct its 
internal conditions ,. 6 In making this attack, the Report 
to o k special care to mphas ise that the Ba ' th was 
'def nding the unity of the two Regions by objectively 
criticising conditions in the UAR '. For the remaind r 
1 
Interview, Bitar, 17 ovember 1967, Beirut . 
2 
Haddad, op . ci t . , pp . 2J7-J8 . 
J 
idal al-Ba ' th, 01. 4, op . ci t . , p.1J4. 
4 
Abu Jab r, op . it. , :p . 6J . 
5 
Allu sh , op . cit. , pp.1J6-42. 
6 
i d al al-Ba ' th, vol. lj. , op . cit. , p.192 . 
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of th lif of th union, th Ba ' th cont"nu d to a d opt 
this policy criticism . For xampl , at a m ting of th 
Beat Bru mmana, L banon from 14-21 S pt mb r 1961 , it 
was d c id d to uphold th policy of unity ( AR) whil 
at th same time cond mning individualistic rul (as"r ) 
f or w akening it . l A w k later th Ba ' th 1s proph tic 
insight was born out in a coup d ' etat 1 d by disgruntl d 
Syrian army officers and right - wing political factions . 
1 
Razz a z, t - Ta j ribat, p . 7 2 " 
V ; Th Secessionist Phas 
Cracking of the Unity C m nt 
If officially th B ' th did not support th 
se c ssionist movem nt on 28 eptemb r 1961, ne'th r did 
it do very much to try to counter it. Ba ' th criticism 
of the UAR government aft r D c mb r 1959, almost 
assuredly add d fuel to growing popular diss nt in th 
orthern region . By 1961, it was plain to most Syrians 
that the union had be n politically disastrous. In th 
CC/UAR, the majority of portfolios of any worth w re 
reserved for Egyptians, with an overall portfolio and 
senior executive off ' ce ratio of 7:J (see Table 6) . 
The ational Assembly finally came into bing in the 
s ummer of 19601 in r sponse to the ational Union 
elections of the previous year . Yet despite all the 
fan-fares of its inauguration, it possessed very littl 
real power . 
By 1961, real pow r in the orthern region was shared 
between Amir and Sarraj, with the latter becoming a 
d angero us ' partner '. Thus, in August Sarraj was removed 
from the Interior and brought back to Cairo as Vice-
President of the Republic 2 - a move which asir had earlier 
employe d against Hurani in October 1958 . To balance the 
new appointment, Amir returned to the army hough remaining 
in the Northern region . Replacing Amir was Mahmud Riyad,J 
who had earlier been responsible for liaising between 
the Ba ' th and asir in 1957 on unity matters . 
By mid-1961, the union was visibly cracking apart . 
The So c ialist reform laws of July, did little to win the 
support of the Ba ' th, which referred to them as a belat d 
attempt to stem the tide of popular dissatisfaction .
4 
On the other hand, they deeply embittered the busin ss 
community of the orthern region, which had been suffering 
1 
I rr, op. cit., p.28. 
2 
Arab World, 19 and 21 Sept mber 1961. 
J 
Arab World, 22 September 1961. 
4 
idal al-Ba ' th, vol . 4, op. cit., Se 
Report, August 1961 ' , pp . 248-5 1 . 
' The Periodi 
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in r s'ng hardships du to bad s asons, high import 
tar'ffs, curr ncy r gulations, int rrninabl 
pro dur s in busin ss transa tions nd so 
bur aucratl 
1 
on . 
Th s ec ssionist movem nt on 28 pt mb r, climax d 
many months of mounting friction betw n th two R gions 
of th Republic . Politically, asir may hav obviat d 
much of the unrest had h not att mpt d to rule th 
ortnern region wi th th s am iron hand as he had used 
on Egypt since h e came to po wer in 1954 . Ind e d by 
remov'ng all political parties r egardl ss of their 
political programmes and ideologies, h was creating 
a vacuum which could not b adequately filled by th 
cumb rsom ational Union . Clearly, th re was a case 
upon the formation of the union for th r moval of the 
right-wing and Communist parties, whi h w re ither 
luke-warm or oppos d to union in the first place . But 
in removing the Ba ' th , which had supplied the cement 
upon which the union was constructed, asir was, in fact , 
undermining the whol e fabric of th edifi e . Secondly , 
by adopting a policy of appeasement towards Jordan and 
Saudi Arabia and in the summer of J uly 1961 sending 
troops to d efend the oil rich Sheikhdom of Kuwait against 
2 Iraq, asir was in effect appearing to have thrown 
overboard the policy of revolutionary Arab nationalism, 
which had earlier earned him the applomb of millions of 
enthusiastic Arabs and, most of all, the Syrians . 
By August, asir was compelled to amend the existing 
system of separate regional counc ils in the hope of 
integrating them with the CC / UAR in Cairo . Riyad was 
sent to the orthern r gion in the hope of restoring 
better r e lations wi th the disillusione d unionist forces 
with whom h e had earlier worke d to bring the UAR into 
being . But by this time it wa s too late to balance or 
counter the growing wav of opposition to Cairo in the 
orthern r gion. 
For a few days Sarraj hafed under his impressive 
but pow rless offi e in Cairo, then on 26 S ptember , h 
1 
Abu Jab r, op. cit., p.5 8 . Kerr, op. cit ., p . 29. 
2 
K rr , op. it., p . 26 . 
t nd r d his resignation to r turn to Damas us to 
1 remonstrat against as'r ' s high-hand d m nn r . 
M anwhile , his ' betray d ' associat of longstand'ng, 
15 
Akram Hurani , had b n ra~lying p asant and stud nt 
opposition to the r gime sinc his withdrawal from 
offi c in Decemb r 1959 . 2 The Ba ' th unoffi ially in th 
UAR and outside was employing all its propaganda m dia 
for ' reformativ criti ism ' of th gov rnment of th 
UAR . Right-wing political leaders w r smarting und r 
the agrarian and nationalisation laws introduc d arli r . 
Fin ally, Syrian army officers were becoming restl ss as 
they whittled a way their time in semi- xil , while th 
Egyp tian ruled th army and their native homeland with 
ever inc reas ing rigour . J 
Thus on 28 September 1961, a mov ment led by 
disgruntled army o f fi c ers in Qatana,4 arrested Amir and 
his s taf f and put them on a plane for Cairo, whereupon 
t h ey a nnoun ce d Syria ' s secession from the UAR . Ironically , 
i t wa s t h e army whi c h precipitated Syria ' s entry into 
the UAR while in 1961 it forced her out of the union . 
Ba ' th P o li tical Dilemmas 
Between 1959-61, the Ba ' th had adopt d a policy of 
' reformative criticism ' regarding the UAR government . 
Bu t with the secession, the party high command found 
itself in the inconsist nt position of being ideologically 
committed to union with asir while, on the other hand, 
being politically critical of him p rsonally for the 
breakdown of the union . The crucial problem therefore 
fa c ing the Fourth B C, was the n ed to adopt a party 
plat f orm consistent with its ideological and political 
o b j ectives. But how to attain this was no easy matter 
in v i e w of the forces of division r sulting within th 
1 
Arab World , 27 eptember 1961. 
2 
Abu Jab r , op . cit . , pp . 62-6J . 
J 
nt rview, abil Swairy, lJ October 1967, Beirut . 
Du ring th union h was an army officer . Razzaz , at-
Ta j ribat, p . 87 . 
4 
al-Ahram , 29 S pt mb r 1961, reported that six offi ers 
f rom Qatana - Abd ai-Ghani Dalman, Muffaq Asasa, Abd 
al-Iarim an- ahlawi, Haidar Iuzbari, asim al-Hindi and 
Hisham Abd ar-Rabbah - w r responsibl . 
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party from th mom nt of °ts withdrawal from th 
gov rnment of the UAR and xac rbated by th s ss ion . 
Following the s c ssoon Hurani, for xampl 
r f rr d to the off o rs who had led th coup as ' good, 
1 hon st and dashing youngst rs ' and on 2 Octob r , h 
sign d a Sec ssionist manif sto along with r pr s ntativ s 
of the right-wing Peopl ' s and ational parti s and a 
me mb r of th Arab Lib ration Mov m nt. 2 B"tar ' s nam 
also appeare d on th manifesto which r f rr d, among 
oth r things, to ' th god-bl ss e d movement of the Arm d 
Forces (Syrian) [which t rminated ] th tyrannical and 
d e viationist rule imposed by asir in both Egypt and 
Syri a ,. 3 Two d ays later Bitar issued a communique 
in whic h he sought to xplain that by signing th 
manifesto he had not been repudiating further unity 
betwe n Syria and Egypt : ' I believe the true national 
solution to the crisis (secessionism) is in the meeting 
of Egypt a nd Syri a in a quiet atmo s phere for putting the 
basis for federal uni ty in a truly democratic and 
political way ,. 4 Thus from Bitar ' s rational ex post 
fact£, s ecession would permit both countries to prepare 
afr sh and n egotiat for unity as equal partners - an 
impossibility under the Constitution of the previous union . 5 
1 
Aub Jab r, op. cit. , p.63. 
2 
Arab Wo rld, 3 Octob r 1961 . 
3 
Arab World, 3 October 1961. 
4 
Allush, op. cit. , p.371 . 
5 
Interview, Bitar , 17 ovember 1967, Beirut . He held 
that whe n secession occurred he wept bitterly . He continued 
that at the meeting on 1 October 1961, which prepared the 
Secessionist manifesto, he wanted to issue a communique 
attacking secession in principle, but the meeting was 
dominat d by Hurani who refus d to co-op rate . Bitar 
s a id that his strat gy in ac c epting the secession was 
to p rmit himself and, as he hoped, the Ba ' th, to work 
inside th n w regim with the ob j e c tiv of destroying it 
and r turning to union with Egypt . I then aske d Bitar 
why he had not work d through the Ba ' th ' s ational Command 
instead of a d opting individualistic action with Hurani ? 
He r p1i d that it was pow rless and met infr quently . 
His d cision, h said, had to be made on the spot without 
loss of time r f erring the matter to th ational Command . 
Lat r, s aid Bitar, he r alised that h had made a bad 
mOst a k in supporting the ecessionist manifesto for 
which h rant d on th pag s of a1-Ba ' th. Allush, 
op . ci ., p . 37l. 
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But if th r wer som plausibility in Bitar ' s 
communiqu on 4 Octob r, it did not wash off th s ain 
of his having be n id nt'fi d with Hurani and th r ng 
1 aders of the secessionist mov m nt . asir not d 
Bitar ' s action with disdain and later h ld it against 
him (at the Tripartit Unity discussions in March-April 
196J) . 
In the first week of the sec ssion, th Fourth B C 
was torn by factional ind cision on th course of action 
, 1 
t o follow. The pro - asir elements on the B C wanted 
an immediate and unconditional return to unity with th 
UAR and a thorough condemnation of secessionism . Th 
wing which supported Aflaq on the oth r hand, was 
unwilling to see the party further undermined by 
u ncond itional return to union with a man who had done 
all in his power to weaken and' discredit the party . 
Yet it could not overlook the fact that it was 
id ologically committed to union with asir. The 
communique issued on 5 October was therefore couched 
2 
very muc h in the nature of a compromise arrangement : 
The military movement which took place in the 
orthern region of the UAR, is the result of 
the individual regional system of government 
which was applied by asir during the period 
of the union .. . The Ba ' th feels that return to 
union between Syria and Egypt requires the 
organisation of popular democratic forces. 
The communique concluded on the note 
1 
The Ba ' th party which struggled for the sake of 
protecting the union by working to establish 
democratic conditions in the two regions of the 
UAR and to defend the contents of the union ... 
announces to th Arab people today that it will 
Interview , Majdalani, 2J Octob r 1967, Beirut . He said 
that h was sent as an unofficial r presentative of th 
B C to Cairo to ascertain asir's views on return to union 
with Syria . Accord ing to Majdalani,h was told to reassur 
asir of the Ba ' th ' s willingness to respond to any moves 
for imm diate return to union . Howev r when he returned 
to Beirut, he found that the anti- asir forces within 
the party wer gaining ground and th party was adopting 
a highly critical attitude towards asir for the brealdown 
of the union. Razzaz, at-Tajribat, pp.7J-7 4 . 
2 
idal al-Ba ' th, vol. 6, op . cit., pp.1J-14 . 
c ontinue in the struggl for th 
establishm nt of d mocratic onditions 
in both r gions of th UAR which will 
be a guarant for th r n wal of th 
union and its prot tion .. . 
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Th above communiqu clearly diff r ntiat s b tw n 
the mistake s o f th union and the crim of s cession . l 
But in stipulating conditions for any r turn to union, 
the party was by implication qu stionOng th ability of 
asir to govern ff ctiv ly and dir t th affairs of 
any fut u r union. Such a policy gr atly displeas d 
th pro- asir factions of the party, leadOng as w hav 
s en , in many instances to secessions. On th oth r 
hand, proposals to return to union with asir under 
favo u rable conditions equally frightened those memb rs 
of th party who had suffer d under asir ' s heavy hand. 
Most prominent among th se was o Hurani who commanded a 
large p rsonal following . Thus as a counter to the 
B C c ommu nique on 5 October, Hurani issued a communiqu 
in whi c h h e a ccused asir of attempting to liquidate 
the Palestine question und r the guise of Arab unity and 
o f ' i mplementing [the] American policy verbatim ,. 2 
Between October and December 1961, ideological 
divisions within th Ba'th led manifestly to erratic 
politi c al behaviour . Among the ' three doctors ' Aflaq, 
Bitar and Hurani, there were substantially different 
politi cal approaches . Aflaq preferred to adopt a policy 
of n gotiation with asir for ' studied ' union or union 
und r s tipu lated conditions. As for the Secessionist 
regim , he WaS not prepared in the 1 ast to participate 
within it . Bitar was mor pragmatic in his approach . 
Lik Aflaq he believed in ' studied ' union on a federal 
basis , though he saw the need to work within the 
Se c ssionist regime in order to gain power through which 
to be in a stronger bargaining position with asir, when 
unity discussions w r re-op ned. Hurani on the other 
hand, was politically opposed to further dealings with 
asir . or him the ideal solution was a strong Syrian 
party bas from which to influence other Arab states 
1 
Ra zz az, at-Tajriba , p·7J· 
2 
Abu J ber, op. cit . , p . 6J. 
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on qu stions of unity . nity for lIuran' was to b a 
longt rm obj ctive aft r th party had on mor 
succ d d in apturing yr ' a . Thus to this nd h gay 
all his att ntion to c mpaigning for th tions to 
th r e onstitut d yrian Chamber of D puti s in D c mb r 
1961. In this latt r r spect h shar d common political 
obj ctiv s wi th Bitar . 
Wi th the Ba ' th ' s s nior 1 ad rs b 'ng at ' six s nd 
sev ns ' , th party as a f'ghting entity was in no position 
to consid r contesting the elections . The Syrian r gional 
party organisation was officially dissol d and the 
remaining power base of the party had be n smash d by 
asir during the union . The Fourth B C was badly d' id d 
on id ological questions and in no position to g've th 
Syrian partisans any r al direction on th question of 
the 1 ctions . 
Yet despite Aflaq's obvious disapproval on 
ideological grounds, many partisans and f llow travell rs 
of the Ba ' th contested the lections, though the outcom 
a s c an be seen below was hardly very gratifying to th 
party, whi ch thr and a half years earlier had negotiat d 
with asir for union . 
Tabl_7: yrian Chamber of Deputies : 
El ction Results, December 1961 
Ind epend nts 
People's Party 
Ba ' th (unofficial) 
ational Party 
Islamic Bloc 
Parti Populaire Syrien 
Arab Lib ration Movement 
(at-Tahrir) 
76 
32 
24 
20 
16 
1 
1 
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Th majority of Ba ' thists r turned we re support rs 
of Hurani . In Hama, for ample, th ' old gang ', Hurani , 
Kallas , Qannut and IIamdun were lected with substantial 
* Bas d on figur s giv n in Simon Jargy ' s ' L Syri D ' IIi r 
Et D' Auj ourd ' hui in Orie nt 5 / 20 - 1961. 
163 
1 
ma j oriti s , a continuing remind r of th pow r of th 
p rsonal vot in Syrian lections. Els wh r th party 
poll d v ry badly . In Damascus, Bitar was d f at d by 
2 
a right -wing candidat S veral x-Ba ' th'sts w r 
r t u rned from various centres, among th m bing a 
fo u ndation member Jalal as-Sayyad from Dcir ez -Z or,3 
who had r signed from the party following the m rger 
with Hu rani in 1954 . 
Ov raIl , th Ba ' th dropped b low its s ats 
pe rc en tag in 1957 as c an be se n below : 
Table 8 : Ba ' th Ele c tion Results 1949 - 58 
Year o f Ele c tion Seats in Chamber 
194 9 - 54 1 : 114 
1 954 - 58 23 :. 142 
1961 - 63 24 : 170 
and 1961 
P rcentag e 
· 9 
16 . 1 
14 . 1 
On the f a c e of it , a 2 per cent drop would not seem to 
be s i gnif i c ant , c onsidering the fact that the People ' s 
and ational parties had also reduc d majorities in the 
e x panded Chamber . However, it should b noted that the 
greater percentage of all Ba ' th seats were either Hurani ' s 
s u pporters, luke-warm or ex-Ba ' thists, who had earlier 
fallen by the way-side on policy or id ological differences 
with the party high command. Bitar ' s defeat in Damascus 
might be taken as a truer measure of the growing 
unpopularity of the orthodox wing of the Ba ' th, coming 
through from the pre-m rger period (i . e . the nationalists 
or Aflaqiyya) . 
If in law political party lab Is w re forbidden, in 
practic , this did not prevent members of ' old allegianc 
f rom lining- up in the election campaigns or within the 
n e w Chamber . Ma ' ruf Dawalibi was appointed Prime Mini s ter 
1 
Ibid . Arab \ orld, 6 December 1961, reported that 
Hurani ' s greatest str ngth lay in the countryside . 
2 
3 
* 
Ibid . Kerr, op . cit . , p . 48 . 
Arab World, 26 Dec mb r 1961 . 
Se Table 5 . 
of a coalition governm nt larg ly dr wn from th P opl ' s 
and ational parti s. An ex-Ba'thist, J lal as- ayyad 
was appoint d D puty Prim Min'st r and Minist r of 
Agricultur a sure slight to Akram lfurani. azim al-
Qudsi, a longstanding m mb r of th P opl ' s party was 
1 ct d Pr sid nt of th Syrian Arab R publi , whil 
Ma ' mun Kusbari, hith rto id nt'fied with th Arab 
Liberation Movem nt, b cam Speaker of h 1 Chamber. 
In all, about our-fifths of all andidat s r turn d 
were drawn from th right-wing and traditional political 
. 2 partles . It was not surprising that much of asir ' s 
socialist and agrarian reform laws should have been 
undone in the months following . Indeed the only thing 
which stopped the Dawalibi governm nt from going further 
in its denationalisation policy, was the military 
mov ment of unionist offic rs in Aleppo on 28 March 1962 . 
Dawalibi was removed and Bashir al-Azma, a man known for 
his more progressive outlook (who had held office und r 
the union) was appointed under military pressure . The 
policy of denationalisation was stopped and tentativ 
moves made to reverse the trend. The Khumasiyya, for 
example, was renationalised and previous amendments to 
the union agrarian law of 1958, were repealed. J 
Momentarily, the new Syrian government veered towards 
a pro-Cairo orientation and references to Arab unity 
onc more appeared in gov rnment propaganda. Azma made 
the furth r gesture of saying that President asir had 
been ' stabbed in the back by Syria's secession,.4 
Caught in a Vicious Circle 
In ntering the Chamber of Deputies,Hurani and his 
partisans committed themsel es to fight against th 
policy of denationalisation of land and industry . 5 Th 
Ba ' th, on the other hand, on ideological grounds refused 
1 
Ibid. 
2 
Kerr, op. cit., p.46. 
J 
Ibid., p. 51 . 
4 
Ibid . 
5 
Arab World, 4 and 16 January 1962. 
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to parti ipate wi thin th ssionist r gim Th 
r sult of this was that lIurani ros n th stimation 
of th yrian mass s as h was seen to b d f nding th r 
inali nabl rights, whil the Ba ' th app ar d 0 b 
stand'ng m kly on th sid - l ' nes in def nc of 
ideologica l consist nc y . e condly, Hurani 1s 
denunciation of asirlinside and outsid th Chamb r of 
Deputi s gained him the admiration of those who had 
suff red during the union; but in Cairo , Hurani 's 
remarks w re interpr t d a s a pers ona l affront by th 
Ba ' th with whom h e was still officially identified. 
asir retaliated with accusations that th Ba ' th was in 
collusion with the s ecessionists and ipso facto with 
the imp rialists and Zionists . Many pro- asir members 
wer pr pared to beli ve him and in January 1962 Rimawi 
and Rikabi formed a breakaway Ba J th party closely 
ori nted towards Cairo. 2 Anxious to reassure asir of 
its unionis t loyalties the Ba ' th fell into disfavour 
with th Se c essionist regim J 
The policy of ' studied ' union created opposition 
from many quarters within and without the Ba ' th . Thus 
to obv 'ate this intolerable situation and to give the 
party a politi c al strat gy consonant with its ideological 
objectives, Aflaq succeeded in gaining enough support 
from th r egional party organisations to convene the 
Fifth ational Congress in Horns in May 1962 . Indeed 
he may hav d ecided to summon the Congress at that 
moment in the belief that the Azma government would be 
more likely to re s pond favourably to Ba ' th unionist 
proposals . 
The Fifth ational Congress , May 1962 : Th Problem 
The major problem onfronting this Congress was on 
of policy d efinition : what would be th party 's poli Y 
towards secessionism and s condly towards a ' return to 
union ' with asir?4 
1 
Kerr, op . it . , pp.4 -49. Abu Jab r, op. it., p . 64 . 
2 
Arab World, 2 January 1962. 
J 
Abu Jab r, op . it . , pp.65-66 . 
4 
id 1 al-Ba ' th, vol. 6, op . it. S ' An Internal 
Bulletin on th Fifth at'onal Congr ss', pp . 80-9J. 
Th P iod b tw n 0 tob r 1961 nd M y 1962 had 
be n on in whoch th llur nists w re trying to pull th 
B C a w y from a unionist ori ntation two rds a 
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regionalist (i . e . yrian) pproach, whil th pro- asir 
memb rs of th party w r pulling qually as hard on 
th opposit dir ction . ould the party afford to 
ignore both th se trends and still surviv as a united 
political ntity? Th answ r as most d 1 gates r alis d 
all too learly was, that it could not? But would th 
policy of ' studied ' union so much malign d by ach of 
the two major trends suffic to hold th party togeth r 
whilst the same time attaining its politi al objectiv s? 
In bri f, could the party afford to b id ologically 
consist nt at the proc of losing large sections of its 
members? Th s were som of the ' life and death ' 
qu stions confronting th delegates at thos Congress . 
Constructive Solutions 
If unity with asir w re found to be difficult 
during the union, it was plain to many of the delegates 
to the Fifth National Congress, that unity without asir 
would be virtually impossibl in view of his commanding 
influenc in inter-Arab politics. Thus the most 
distructive trend within the party as the Congress saw 
it was the Huranists who were seeking to detach the B C 
from a policy of ' return to union' with asir and 
thereafter by implication Arab national unity . 
The Congress held that there was som justification 
in the fears of the Huranists regarding re-union with 
asir though on the whole, they were misplaced largely 
as a result of a wrong appraisal of the r asons for the 
failure of the union. l It was not the ' unity ideal' 
which had been proven to b false by the secession, 
rath r it was the human mistakes and errors which had 
been high-light d by th ° ° t t 2 seceSSlonlS mov men . Thus 
the party had it within it power to re tify these mistakes 
prior to any furth r r -union with asir. J On the other 
1 
Ibid . , pp.82-8J. 
2 
Ibid . , p.85. 
J 
Ibid. , p.86 . 
° ~ 
hand , to follow th lluranist line would b d taching 
the party ' s popular struggl from its nat·onal (Arab) 
struggl which was s en to b 
in onsist nt . l 
ideologically 
But if r -union with asir w r th affirmed 
ideologi al ob j ectives, the Congr ss was not prepared 
to surr nd r the party to asir in ord r to rep at th 
mistak s of the previous union . Of thos who call d 
f or an imm diate and unconditional return to union, 
the Congr ss held : 
Thos who call for immediate union, though 
their presence in the popular ranks is 
spontaneous are non th less as harmful to 
the outcome of union as the secessionists 
for they differentiate between union (Ber se) 
and the basis without which no popular union 
will be realised (i . e . democratic fre dom and 
popular participation through democratic 
political organisations) . Those emotional 
and irresponsible people by their attitude 
uphold the system of individual rul .. . and 
secondly [give] the great help to the enemies 
of th union . 2 
By u pholding the policy of ' studied ' union, made 
easier by the secession of many pro- asir members , the 
Congress was emphatic that it was not in th least 
recognising or trying to come to terms with the 
s ecessionist movement . It was held that 'sece ssion is 
a new condition which d veloped from the failure of the 
first union ' ,3 while the policy of the Ba'th through 
'studied ' union was designed to obviate th basis of 
any future divisions lik ly to arise in union between 
4 Syria and Egypt . 
To be consistent with its policy of 'studied ' union, 
the Congr ss demanded that all Ba ' thists within the 
government and legislature of the Secessionist regime 
should withdraw their s rvices. Secondly, and in 
conformity with the policy of ' studied ' union, the party 
1 
Ibid . , p . 84 
2 
Ibid . , p . 85 . 
3 
Ibid . , p . 86 . 
4 
Ibid . 
16 
propos d a system of fed ral union bas d on qual " tyof 
partnership .l For xampl, he pr sid nt and vic -
pr sid nt w r not to b drawn from th sam " 2 r glon . 
The fed ral government was to be r sponsibl for 
def nce, foreign affairs, currency regulations , 
d v lopm nt and planning ; J th federal abin t was to 
be composed of memb rs of both countri s or regions aid d 
by consultative councils . 4 A bicam ral system was to 
exist in the f d eral legislature , with th upper hous 
having an qual number of r presentativ s from ach 
region and the lower house elected in proportion to th 
populat i on of each region . In cases of d adlocks between 
th two houses a j oint c ommittee would be called to 
me diate and to compromise on outstanding policy issue . 5 
A fed e ral c ourt wa s propos d to determine the 
constitutionality of laws and to arbitrat in disputes 
6 betwe n the federal and regional governm nts . Finally , 
each region was to have its own governmental apparatus 
to adminis ter purely d omestic matters, a proposal 
consonant wi th the party 's Constitution (Art . 16) and 
fortified by the experiences of the previous union . 7 
The Fifth ational Congress compelled Hurani to 
cho ose between a policy of ' studied ' union or expulsion 
from the party for policy deviation . In disgust with 
Aflaq and Bitar whom he called asir ' s agents, Hurani 
On 18 June he announced t " 8 c h os the latter alterna lve . 
1 
Ibid . idal al-Ba ' th, vol. 6, op . cit . 
Federal Union ' , pp . 71-79 . 
2 
Ibid . , ' The Fed ral Union ' , pp . 76-77 . 
J 
Ibid . , p · 77 · 
4 
Ibid . 
5 
Ibid . 
6 
Ibid . 
7 
Ibid . 
8 
See 'The 
Kerr, op . cit., p . 49 . Abu Jaber, op . cit., pp . 64-65 . 
that h 1 was forming a n w party and th following day 
Aflaq d clar d that Hurani and his follow rs had b n 
2 expell d by the at·onal Congress in May . 
In withdrawing from th Ba' th IIurani took man of 
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his loyal partisans in Syria and L banon out of th party.3 
He continued to work within th Secessionist r gime and 
in F bruary 1963 ent r d into a 'national pact ' w·th 
th Prim Minister, Khalid al -Azm, and th leader of 
th Muslim Brotherhood in th Chamb r, Isam aI-Attar, 
men for whom Hurani would have had scant r gard in an 
earli r phase of his car er . 4 However, following the 
ov rthrow of Qasim on 8 February 1963 by the Iraqi 
Ba ' th and the return of asir 's renew d int e rest in 
Iraq and Syria , Hurani and his partisans withdrew from 
the gov rnment - perhaps to be on the right side if 
and when the coup occurred . 5 
Hurani's expulsion left a gaping hole in the party 
in Syria still largely disorganised by the dissolution 
during the union . Thus with the partisans scattered 
to the various winds of political fortune ,the Fifth B C 
was compelled to reorganise the party from the base 
upwards under its d irect supervision. Fully preoccupied 
with organisational matters ,the B C was completely 
unaware of movements of unionist officers in the army 6 
who were b coming increasingly restless with secessionist 
purges of their ranks and as it seems with the removal 
of progressive legislation directly touching their own 
' lowly ' personal and family interests. 
1 
Kerr, op . cit., p . 49 . 
2 
Ibid . 
3 
Abu Jaber, op. cit., p.64 . 
4 
Kerr , op . cit., p.49. 
5 
6 
Dai~tar, 13 Febru ry 1963 . 
Razzaz, at-Tajribat, p . 90. 
asir ' s R actions: w Strat gy to Me t th 
'::"::==I...=...:=-.=.C ondi t ions 
-------- Chang 
sir ' s i mm di at r action to th s ssion was 
on of dumbfound d unb li f . Lat r this was follow d 
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by a progr ssive mov m nt towards isolation'sm in int r-
Arab politics , with gr at r emphasis b ng placed on 
dey loping the so ialist base of Egypt (it still r tain d 
the name, UAR) . A n w organisation, th Arab Socialist 
Union was form d adopting in May 1962, a Charter of 
ational Action which was a formal dig st of r volutionary 
Arab nationalist and socialist principles . l 
Prior to the secession, Arab solidarity or ' unity 
of th ranks ' (Wahdat as-Saff) had b n a f requent 
point of r ference in asir ' s major spe ch s. After 
secession,however, the mphasis was changed to accommodate 
his n w political strategy, which he referred to as 
' unity of purpose (Wahdat al-Hadaf) . 2 This p rmitted 
him greater flexibility in foreign policy questions. 
Thus , for example, h was in a position to counter 
the accusations of the secessionists and the Ba ' thists 
that he had contributed to the breakdown ox the union 
or had done little to save it after the collapse . His 
reply was simply that union in the first place was ill-
conc ived and ill-conducted not because of anything which 
he might have said or done, but becaus of the presence 
of reactionary forces within the orthern region from 
the inception of the union . J Hence unity could not 
survive in an environment where there was no ' unity of 
purpos 
asir refused to recognise the Syrian secessionist 
regime and a short while later he withdr w his troops 
from the combin d Arab L agu contingent, d f nd'ng 
Kuwait ' s sover ign indep ndenc against Iraqi (Qasim) 
claims to the territory. Within the Arab League, the 
UAR adopted a policy of ' virtuous' isolationism from 
th ' r actionary ' states and at the nd of 1962 withdr w 
from th organisation for ov r a year in protest against 
th unwillingness of th L gue Coun il to en ure Syria 
1 
K rr, op . ci t . , p.40. 
2 
Ibid . , p . J9 . 
J 
Ibid . , p . 4J. 
171 
for its bitt r atta Is g inst th UAR (i . 
recrimina tion ov r the sins 0 th union) at th 
(L banon) s ssions in Aug u st 1962 . 1 
htu a 
In S ptember 1962, asir became invol d in th 
Y m ni r volution on the side of the r publicans (as- alaI) 
against P rince Badr with whom h had earli r alIi d on 
th formation of the AR in 1958. Lat r in th year, 
Nasir committed troops and substantial amounts of 
e quipm nt in th growing struggl with th royalists . 
Th outcom of this policy however, was th furth r 
d eterioration of diplomatic r lations with Saudi Arabia 
and J ordan, who quickly swung to the sid e of the 
royalists, believing like asir in ' unity 01 purpose ' 
° 2 in inter-Arab affalrs . 
By the end of January 1963, th re was very little 
whi ch could be a ccurately described as Arab unity 
s entiment , or 'unit y of purpose ' among th member states 
of the Arab League . Qasim had withdrawn his ambassadors 
from all member states which had rej e cted his claims 
to Kuwait . Egypt (UAR) refused to r cognise Syria and 
continued to harry it internally and ext e rnally. 
Relations between Syria and Lebanon had never recoverd 
from the crisi s of 1958 . Jordan and Saudi Arabia severed 
relations wi th the UAR over Yemen. Syria, Lebanon, and 
Iraq recognised the Y meni republicans , thereby isolating 
themselves from the monarchical Arab state s. Syria, in 
particular, found itself in the inconsistent position of 
conde mning the UAR of Shtura for interference in its 
int rnal affairs, while on the othe r hand, condoning 
Egyptians intervention in the affairs of a member stat 
of th Arab Leagu. 3 Torn by internal right-wing and 
unionist Arab pressures , the Syrian secession regime was 
clearly trying to gain th best of both worlds by its 
poli c y a l ignments . Qasim had littl liking for asir but 
he too, welcomed the opportunity of bing on the 
' progressive revolutionary side ' if only to harry Ibn 
Sa ' ud and Husayn at asir's expens 
1 
Ibid. , p . 52 . 
2 
Ibid. , p . 53 . 
3 
Ibid . , pp . 54-55. 
Contrary to th opinion of Malcolm I 1 asir rr, 
seems to hav been very anxious ov r the lin -up of 
Arab stat s against him in th Arab L agu by th nd 
of 1962 . Tru , he was in th position of bing abl 
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to wav his hand in th fac of the 'r actionary ' stat s 
and proc ed with his own brand of r volutionary 
nationalism, r flective of the principl s of the ational 
Charter of the Arab Socialist Union. But if in Yem n 
asir had the glorious opportunity of t sting the 
ational Charter, he soon cam e to realise that h was 
committ d to a campaign which could not be quickly won. 
Ind d, with Saudi Arabia giving military assistance 
to the royalists, asir was compelled to ov r-extend 
his military resources, d pleting thos which were 
already deployed on the Palestine or Israeli front . 
Being commi tted to an ideological as well as mili tary 
victory in Yemen, asir could not easily withdraw his 
forces and save face . On the other hand, by withdrawing 
troops from the Israeli front he was exposing himself 
to the accusations that he was 'going cold' on the 
liberation of Palestine. 
By the beginning of 1963, asir was in need of allies 
in the Arab East to enable the UAR to exercise the 
' revolutionary potentialities' of the ational Charter 
in Yemen and throughout the Arab World . Thus when 
Qasim was suddenly overthrown by the Iraqi Ba'th on 
8 February 1963, asir was cautiously optimistic . In a 
telegram to the new Head of State Abd as-Salam Arif on 
8 February, he said: 
The people of the UAR have been following the 
events of the great day through which the 
brav people of Iraq have lived in their 
determination to correct the previous 
revolution and2 make it serve its homeland 
and Arabism ... 
On 15 F bruary al-Ahram h Id 'Cairo does not mind who is 
ruling Iraq so long as it is not directed by Britain, 
America , the Communists or r visionists' and on the 
1 
Ibid., p. 54. 
2 
APD , 
asser 
1963' , 
1963, op. cit. ee 'Tel gram s nt by Pr sident 
to Pr sident Abdul Salam Aref of Iraq, 8 F ebruary 
p . 22. 
, .. 
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following day, it r f r d to th raqi Ba ' th as having 
und rtak n a worthwhil m'ssion in ov rthrowing Qasim 
'who was in th proc ss of x cuting Anglo-Am rican 
plans ' . On 21 F bruarY,the pap r indic t d that ' an Iraq' 
delegation 1 d by Ali alih Sa ' di is exp ct d to try to 
r sume military, political and conomi agre m nts whi h 
w r made with th UAR (bri fly) following th 14 July 
revolution ' . Thus in th ory and on the basis of tacti al 
and strategic c onsid ration , a s ir was willing to r stor 
more co rdial relations with th Iraqi Ba ' th since h 
desert d it at the nd of 1959 . At any rat h had not 
come into direct conf lict with the Iraqi Ba ' th either 
before or during the Syrian secessionist phas 1 
With Iraq moving closer to Cairo during February 
1963 , asir ' s hand was str ngthened in applying pressures 
on Syria . The Secessionist government of Khalid al-Azm, 
now found itself dangerously isolat d in the Arab East . 
Prior to the coup of 8 February, al-Azm had been trying 
to establish more cordial political relations with Qasim 
as a foil to Cairo ' s political ambitions in the Fertil 
Crescent . But now that an axis was d veloping between 
Baghdad and Cairo, Syria was forced to turn to Jordan 
and Saudi Arabia, as allies against asir and the Iraqi 
Ba ' th . But both these countries were not on speaking 
terms with the Syrians in view of their support for the 
Yemeni republican caus Thus in desperation, Khalid 
al -Az m was compelled to adopt the ruse of appealing to 
Baghd a d with overtures of friendship and proposals for 
, 2 Syro - Iraqi union, to offset Iraqi-Egyptian (UAR) unlty . 
This strategy, however, simply raised unionist hopes 
within Syrja and in particular within the Syrian army . 
Between 8 February and 8 March 1963, the yrian 
g overnm nt was torn by factionalism, mass r signations 
(Huranists) and by chronic indecision on vital matters 
o f policy . An example of this can be se n on 19 February 
wh n L ' Ori nt report d that Aflaq had been denied 
permission to re-ent r yria following a visit to greet 
1 
Razzaz, at-Tajribat, p.76. 
2 
Ierr , op . cit . , p . 56 . 
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the new Ba ' th rulers in Iraq. How e v r, on 22 F bruary, 
the Times of Ir~ r port d that the Syrian gov rnm nt 
had taken many of Aflaq ' s books ( . g. Fi Sabil al-Ba ' th) 
off the banned list. With the government slowly succumbing 
to pressures emanating from Cairo and Baghdad, unionist 
and Ba ' thist elements w r given the opportunity for 
greater tactic al manoeuvring . On 21 February, the 
anniversary of the UAR,l unionist activities took plac 
2 in Alep po, Horns and other c entres . 
Thus with the Se c essionist government badly 
d emoralised and torn by internal schisms and under 
pressure from Cairo and Baghd ad, it was an easy victim 
fo r the officers of the unionist military committee J 
led by Brigadier Zi ad al-Hariri and independent-minded 
offic er who sei z e d power on 8 March 196J. President 
Qudsi, General Zahr ud-Din, Akram Hurani and other 
leading lights in the Secessionist government, were 
quickly imprisoned and before it was clear who would be 
ruling Syria , demands were being made for tripartite 
union4 (Iraq, UAR and Syria). 
In the space of on month, one might almost say in 
a ' t winkling of an eye ', the power balance in the Arab 
Eas t had changed dramatically . asir ' s ' erstwhile 
reactionary' enemy the Ba ' th party was once more respected, 
if momentarily, in Cairo propaganda . It is to examine 
the out c ome of these changed circumstances from the point 
of vi ew of' the Ba ' th tow hich we turn in the next chapter . 
1 
On 21 February 1958,th UAR was officially proclaimed, 
followihg the plebiscite which showed that 99 . 98 per cent 
of all Syrian voters wanted union . See Arab World , 
24 February 1958. As a useful point in comparison as 
to the ' reliability' or otherwise of Syrian plebiscites, 
it should be noted that 97 . 07 per cent of all voters 
ratified the Secessionist constitution on 1 December 1961 . 
See Kerr, op. cit., p . 46 . 
2 
L ' Orient, 22 February 196J . 
J 
Razzaz, at-Tajribat, p . 90. 
4 
APD, 196J, op. cit. S ' A Syrian-Iraqi Joint Communique, 
Damascus, 10 March 196J ' , pp . 4J-44 . 
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The Ba ' th in Iraq 
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Phase : Road to Political 
23 February 1966 
of Qasim on 
The Ba ' th was formed in Iraq in 1950 and betw n 
1955-58 it co-operat d with the Istiqlal party and pro-
asir 1 ments in attacking th Baghdad Pact and assisting 
in th 
1958 . 1 
overthrow of the Hashemite governm nt on 14 July 
For a short whi le a ft e r the 14 July revolution, 
Iraq veered under Arab nationalist influenc towards 
the UAR, to be followed a few months later by a 
pre c ipitate swing towards the Communist and oviet 
orb i ts .
2 
The Ba ' th was declared illegal by Qasim in 
J anu ary 19603 and for the remainder of the period it was 
4 ' harried by his secret police . The party , however , 
refu sed to be frighten d into inactivity . During th 
Syrian se c essionist p riod, it participated within a 
national front of Arab nationalist and pro - asir elements 
to discr dit and undermine Qasim, whom it branded as an 
' imperialist stooge , . 5 In 1962 , the Ba ' th was particularly 
active in labou r and student circles . It called for 
strikes in the oil fields and for the boycotting of the 
Iraqi elections . 6 Its objective was to undermine 
c onfidenc e in the regim , which it imperiously referred 
to as ' tyrannical and dictatorial ,. 7 
During the Qasim phase (1958-63) , the Ba ' th i n Iraq 
wa s , on the whole , out of contact with the B C in Beirut . 
It wa s only in January 1963 that the B C was informed 
1 
The Ei ghth ational Command . See ' The Causes of the 
Party ' s Debacle in Iraq ', pp . 4 - 14 . 
2 
S e p p . 148-49 . 
3 
L'Orient, 6 January 1960 . 
4 
Intervi w, Bashir Daouk, 9 ovember 1967 , Beirut . See 
' Th Caus s of the Party ' s Debacle in Iraq ' , pp . 14 - 15 . 
5 
idal al-Ba ' th, vol . 7, op . cit . Se a Communique to 
the M mbers (very s cr t), n . d , (probably 1962) , ' Regarding 
th ational Front ', pp.85-95 . 
6 
Ibid . Sea Communique to the Ba ' thists , 1 June 1962 . 
7 
Ibid. 
, ~ 
1 7 6 
1 
a b o u t t he p l anne d c oup . Aflaq in parti cular , was thrown 
into a frenz y by the realisation that if yria followed 
Iraq , the Ba ' th would be unprepared to take advantag of 
th . t· 2 e sl tua lon . Thus with very little warning, Aflaq 
rus he d ba c k to party head quarters in Beirut to pr par 
the org ani sation in Syria for a similar contingency . 
Meanwhile with eight hundred active partisans,3 
Ali Salih Sa ' di , Talib Husayn Shabib and Hashim Jawab, 
t h ree leadi ng fi gu res on the IRC , eff ctiv ly co - ordinat d 
a s e ries of student and worker strikes in January and 
early Febru ary , bringing forward at th same time the 
planne d date of the c oup, through information received 
that the Commu nists were planning a similar movement . 4 
In the final stages of the movement, Sa ' di turned to a 
r etired army officer and the ' hero ' of the 14 July 
revolu tion, Colonel Abd as-Salam' Muhammad Arif , to lead 
the tanks into Baghdad in the penultimate thrust to 
dislodge ' the tyrant ,. 5 Arif was similarly appointed 
Head of State and Chairman of the ational Revolutionary 
Counc il , an offi c e which was later to be used against 
the Ba ' th . Meanwhile fearing a Communist counter - attack, 
the IRC c ast around for other military allies . General 
Tahi r Yahya, an officer with only a loose connection with 
the party , was appointed Chief of Staff while Brigadier 
Ahme d Has san al - Bakr , an offi c er with recent party 
members hip, was appointed Prime Minister. 6 
It is v ery important to noti c e that in Iraq , it 
wa s the c ivilian members of the party who were largely 
i nstru me,ntal in the coup, while the army was only called 
in later to give substance to the new regime and to 
defend it in the event of a sudden Communist offensive . 
Indeed i n the early days of the 8 February movement, 
1 
Interview, Daouk, 9 ovember 1967, B irut . 
2 
Razzaz , at -Ta j ribat, p.89 . 
3 
Razzaz, at-Ta j ribat, p.89 . 
4 
Interview, Daouk, 9 ovember, 1967 , Beirut . Razzaz, 
at - Ta j ribat , pp . 76-78 . 
5 
Ibid . L ' Orient , 16 February 1963 · 
6 
Azma Hi zb al-Ba ' th , pp . 14-15 . 
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th Ba ' th earn d the disapprobation of th Sov" t Union 
for its rural reprisals on the Communist for th Mossal 
massacr s of March 1959 . Thus with int rnal and 
xt rnal pressur s upon th new Ba ' thist gov rnm nt and 
with a 1 gacy of co-operation with pro- asirit 1 m nts, 
it was natural that early offers of fri ndship should 
hav been direct d towards Cairo . On 22 February, th s 
were followed up by proposals from Ali Salih Sa 'di, 
Deputy rime Minister and M"nister of th Interior in 
the IBC , f or a confederation of ' liberat d states ' 
(i . e . Yemen, UAR , Iraq , Algeria and hopefully Syria) . l 
Betwe en 22 February and 11 March, Sa'di broadened his 
original 'liberated confederation' to give the right to 
any of the member states to interfere in the affairs of 
anothe r(s), threatened by internal or external aggression . 
Se condly, he advocated the formation of joint military 
and po lit ical commands for shaping the common policy of 
2 the five (including Syria after the coup of 8 March) . 
Finally on 14 March , Sa ' di amended his previous proposals 
for what could best be termed a ' front of progressive 
states ' to follo w the Syrians to Cairo to discuss 
tripartite union with asir . How can we account for his 
sudden change in policy? To answer this w must now focus 
our attention on Syria on the eve of and shortly after 
the coup of 8 March 1963 . 
The Ba ' th in Syria and the Overthrow of the Syrian 
S cessionist Regime on 8 March 1963 : The Secret Alawite 
Officer Committee 
In Syria the party was confronted by a substantially 
different set of politi c al circumstances from those of 
the party in Iraq . For the party to survive in Iraq it 
wa s forc ed to remain cohesive and integrated within a 
national front of Arab nationali s t elem nts . In Syria 
on the oth r hand, th party was dissolved in 1958 and 
wa s not reorganised until May 1962, und r the jurisdiction 
of the B C. Meanwhile, the Syrian partisans were divided 
1 
L ' Ori nt, 23 February 1963. 
2 
APD, 1963, op . cit . , e ' Pr ss Conf renc h Id in 
Damascus by Mr Ali Sal h al-Sa ' di, Deputy Prime Minister 
and Minister of Int rior of Iraq, 11 March 1963 ' , pp . 44-47 . 
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ideologically and politically, whil at th same tim 
being constantly harass d by the S e cessionist r gim . 
Effective party organisation was only r gain d following 
the expulsion of the Huranists and th s cessions of pro-
asir wings . Yet by th beginning of 196J, the Ba ' th 
in Syria was only a shell of the pre-1958 phase . Th 
Huranists had stripped the organisation of a large 
peasant and artisan base, while the pro- asir Socialist 
Unionist Movement (SUM) and United Arab Front (UAR) , 
(see Table 1) had taken a toll of the intellectual wings 
of the party . How then is it possible to identify the 
Ba'th with the £oup of 8 March 196J ? - a coup which was 
soon to be interpreted as the 'glorious 8 March revolution ' 
To understand this we must turn to examine the part played 
by Ba ' th partisans in the Syrian army during the secession . 
The Se c ret Alawite Officer Committee 
Following the secession in September 1961, many 
Ba'thist officers were removed from the army, some being 
imprisoned others exiled . Some like the Hurani officer 
partisans, isolated themselves from the main stream of 
the Ba ' th by co-operating with the Se cessionis t regime, 
for wpich they were expelled in May 1962 . But there 
remained a small cohesive bloc of Alawite Ba ' thist 
officers led by field commanders Muhammad Umran, Salah 
Jadid, Hafiz Wahish (or as better known Assad), who 
constituted a secret commi ttee , formed in Cairo in the 
latter days of the union. l 
The Alawite officer committee was extremely opposed 
to the party's policy of ' immediate' or ' studied ' re-union 
wi th Nasir . To some extent it had the same ' regionalist ' 
approach as ~he Huranists, being deeply opposed to the 
conservative and ' reactionary ' policies of the 
2 
secessionis t leaders. The political objective of this 
commit t ee, however , was to remain wi thin the Syrian Ba ' th 
party organisation while, at the same time, amassing 
s upport from its officer partisans in the army to direct 
1 
Interview , Bitar, 
at-Tajribat, p . 87 . 
2 
17 ovember 1967, Bei rut. Razzaz, 
See Biographical otes for more details. 
Razzaz, at-Ta jribat, p . 87 . 
, ~ 
and control the policies of the party and, as it so 
happened, the Syrian Ba'th government aft r 8 March 
1963. 1 
The Al awite officer committee op rated silently 
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and effectively in the wings of the unionist (unofficial) 
military committee . It participated in the ahlawi 
officer movement on 28 March 1962, which overthrew the 
Dawalibi government, which was then engaged on a policy 
of d enationalisation of land and industry; but in the 
counter purges which followed, Umran the leading figure 
on the Alawite committee and many members of the unionist 
military committee, were imprisoned, exil d or in 
several instances executed. 
In January-February 1963, the Alawite committee 
operated more freely, though secretly, in view of the 
continuing political crises within al-Azm 's government. 
Following the Iraqi coup cn 8 February, the committee 
co-operated with pro- asir and unionist independent 
officers in a final drive against the Secessionist regime. 
Whether or not the committee was informed about the coup 
being planned by Ziad al-Hariri and the officers of the 
Israeli front, cannot be accurately determined. It 
was very likely that .several groups of officers in various 
military sectors of the country were planning quite 
independently to overthrow al-Azm. What is clear, however, 
is the fact that when Hariri's coup was successful, the 
leading members of the Alawite committee and their 
officer partisans were on hand to exert claims to the 
spoils of office in the name of the Ba'th party. 
Jadid and Umran secured positions on the ational 
Revolutional Council, the highest governmental executive 
body. In addition Jadid became chief of the Premier 
Bureau (Army Personnel), an office which he used to great 
advantage in appointing officers of his own choosing to 
key military offices, while in the Horns Military College 
he gave preference to Alawite officer cadets over all 
other communities. Jadid's growing importance in the 
new regime was high-light d in ovember 1963, following 
1 
Interviews, Bitar, 17 ovember, Majdalani, 2 December 
and Mansur Atrash, 20 December 1967, Beirut. 
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th ixth ational Congr ss of th Ba'th, wh n h was 
appoint d Chief of Staff of the Syrian arm d for s . 
Umran ' s rat of promotion was no 1 ss mpr ssi than 
Jadid ' s . Following th 8 March coup, h b am 
Command r of th Fifth Brigade at Horns and in Jun tool 
command of the S venti th (armour d) Brigad at al-Kiswa 
within striking and intimidating distanc of Damascus . 
In ovemb r h too add d political pow r to his 
impressiv array of military offic s, in being appoint d 
Deputy Prime Minist r under Major-G neral Amin Hafiz, 
(SBC, o . 18 as per Tables) a close associate on the 
NRC and Military Committee. 
Distribution of 'Pow r ' in Syria Following the 8 March coup 
Available evidence, though scanty, would seem to 
suggest that the 8 March coup was entirely sponsored by 
military factions (unlike the Iraqi coup of 8 February) . 
The actual part played by Ba ' thist officers is not clear 
though it would seem that it was after the co~ that 
they began to consolidate their hold over the RC, SBC 
and Military Committee . Civilian politicians, Ba ' thists 
or otherwise were, therefore, not the masters of the 
d estiny of the ' glorious 8 March revolution ' from its 
inception.
l 
Salah ud-Din Bitar, for example, was summoned 
hurriedly to a meeting of victorious military chiefs 
shortly after the coup and told to form a government 
representative of and in proportion to the part played 
and th power ' held ' by the various military and political 
2 parties, in the ev nts of 8 March. 
In Bitar ' s first cabinet (SBC. ro . 15, see Table 8:~ 
the Ba ' th secured 55 per cent of all seats. Outwardly 
it would s m to ha e emerged as the major partner in the 
coalition government . In terms of distribution of 
portfolios, it controlled the Int rior, (Hafiz), Labour 
and Social Affairs (Atrash), Foreign Affairs, (Bitar), 
1 
Razzaz, at-Tajribat, p . 95. 
2 
Int rvi w, Bitar, 17 ovember 1967, Beirut . The follo wing 
offic rs confronted Bitar: Ziad al-Hariri, Chief of taff, 
Luai al-Atasi, Command~ in Chief, Rashid Qutayni , D puty 
Commander in Chief, Jasim Alwan - all Hariri partisans; 
Salah Jadid (Ba ' thist) and Fahd Sha ' ir a Ba ' thist fellow 
trav ller . 
. .,. 
TABLE 8: / 
March 
1963 
Cabinet Nos : 15 
Arab Nationalist 
3 Movement (ANM) 
Arab Socialist 
Union (ASU) 0 
Ba'th Party 11 
Communist Party 0 
Socia~ist Unionist 2 Movement (SUN) 
United Arab Front 2 (UAF) 
Unionist-Independent 2 
Total Known 20 
Total Unknown 0 
Total Seats 20 
DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS ON THE BASIS OF POLITICAL PARTY 
AFFILIATION IN Ttlli SYRIAN BA' TH CABINETS 1963- 66 
May Aug Nov May Oct Sept Dec March Oct . 1966 
63 63 63 64 64 65 65 66 Sept . 1967 
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 No . 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 9. 14 11 17 18 15 15 17 135 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 * 3 * 7 
2 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 7 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
6 9 8 8 3 3 8 1 1 49 
16 18 24 20 20 21 23 20 21 203 
0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 3 
16 18 24 20 22 21 24 20 21 206 
% 
1 . 45 
0 
65 · 5 
3 · 4 
3 · 4 
1. 
23 . 8 
98 . 55 
1. 45 
100 
Listed as pro-Communist, though it cannot be d efinitely confirmed whether they were actually members 
of the Communist Party . 
Sources : Press Report s . 
----
Interviews. 
t-' 
(Xl 
t-' 
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Economy (Zuhur) and AgrarOan R form (Aisami) to mention 
but a f w of the mor important on s. But in fact 
cabin t ' pow r ' , if ' real pow r ' at all, was d ceptiv 
in th situation following the 8 Mar h coup. 
If real power exist d at all, it was poss ssed by th 
military officers controlling the C, Military Committ 
and armoured brigad s in lose proximity to the capital. 
In th NRC, for example, the Ba ' th did no hold a clear 
majority of the seats until July 1963 following th 
overthrow of the Hariri and pro- asir partisans . It is 
estimated that during the p riod of the tripartite unity 
discussions 14 March-14 April 1963,the party controlled 
between seven and el v n out of twenty s ats in th 
Of these, howev r, about one half were civilians with 
v ry little popular backing . As power was associated 
1 RC . 
with tanks and guns it was highly unlikely that the Ba'th 
had a sufficient majority on the RC to direct effectively 
the poli c ies of the State for several months after the 
coup of 8 March . But on the other hand, neither did any 
other military or political faction have the power to 
make a sole bid for power. The Hariri partisans, for 
exampl , controlled the highest military appointments as 
a tribute to the part they played in the overthrow of the 
Secessionist regime, but they lacked reliable cadres of 
offic rs and a well-organised political infra-structure 
to consolidate their power base. Pro- asir officers, 
likewise, were influential in the RC and Military 
Committ bu t, like the Hariri partisans, they lacked 
control of sufficient key military offices and a substantial 
body of co-operative civilian retainers to take over th 
affairs of State. 
But if each of th major military and political 
factions lacked the n cessary power to rul Syria, they 
were not prepared to r lax in their 'glory' while rivals 
attempted to amass pow r in ways only a 'Machiavelli ' 
could thoroughly appr ciate. 
1 
APD, 1963, op . cit. e 'Minutes of Tripartite Union ' , 
pp . 91 and 94. Abu Jaber, op. it., p.72. K rr, op . cit . , 
p . 70. 
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Tripartit Unity Discussions 
In th midst of th ' life and d ath ' struggl for 
pow r within Syri a in th w k foll owing th ~~, 
formal tripartit unity discussions w r op ned in Cairo 
( y ria, Iraq and the UAR) on 14 Mar h. In a s ns 
the se discussions which lasted until 14 April , to b 
climaxed in the 17 April agreem nt, should be seen as th 
outward manife station of the inn r ' Machiav llian ' power 
drama bing e nact e d within the Syrian and Iraqi gov ernm nts . 
Th apparent h esitancy of the Ba ' th in entering into 
fo rmal unity discussions in the week following the coup, 
can be traced to its unc rtainty of bing in an effective 
bargaining position , should Nasir agree to discuss union . 
Sa'di ' s proposals a cc pted by Bitar were contrary to 
th policy of ' studied' union, being littl e more than 
mano uvres to gain time in order to p rmit the party to 
consolidat e its position in both countries. 
The pro- asir SUM , A and UAF on the other hand, 
were a ware of the Ba ' th ' s tactics and in order to counter 
them they sponsored ma ssive unionist d monstrations which 
placed the Ba ' th in the a wkward position of being 
committed to union , whil e seemingly prevaricating on th 
question of ope ning substantive unity discussions wi th 
a sir . The Ba 'th ' s hand wa s played without being fully 
in control of the government and army in Syria and Iraq } 
and it was compelle d by popular unionist opinion to travel 
to Cairo with its rivals to discuss unity with a sir . 
Being suddenly confronted by delegat e s beseaching him 
to e nt er into formal u nity d iscussions, asir would have 
b een justified in replying with a firm negative . His 
experi nc s with the Ba ' th in the first union had been 
dis astrou s and there was an existing legacy of hatred on 
both sid s. Yet Nasir chose not to s nd the delegat e s 
a way but to list n to their proposals for a tripartite 
unitary federation . asir ' s own sinc rity towards unity 
with Syria and Iraq in March-April 1963 may, however, b 
qu e stion d . He was full y ext nded in Yemen and harried 
by Saudi Arabia and Jordan and Israel in the Middl e East . 
To form a federal uni on of yria , Iraq and the UAR , would 
xpos e him to great power int rests in those regions . 
As w have sen, betw en 1959-61, asir had b n confront d 
by ndl ss foreign poli c y dil mmas as th result of having 
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bord rs abutt ing s ph r s of int r sts of th gr at 
powers . S condly, but no 1 ss °mportantly, both yria 
and Iraq we r notoriously f a c tional ridd n countrO s, 
wh re coups s udd nly chang d the pow r balanc on th 
prov rbial ' t winkling o f an y ' . Could h th r for 
afford to tie d own his military and conomic resourc s 
in ord r to police thos r g ons at th xp nse of 
running into opposition from his great po wer suppli rs 
o f arms and t chnica l assistanc? Although asir did 
not say ' 0 ' to the Syrians and Iraqi ' s, h must have 
felt that tripartit union would have involv d him in 
more problems than it could resolve, to his and the 
DAR ' s political a dvantage . Why, then, did h go through 
the motions of list ening to unit y proposals and on 17 
April , agreeing to a Charter , the fram work of a futur 
tripartite union to come into exist nce twenty-five 
months after the signing of the Charter? 
Th answer would se m to lie in a policy of tactical 
mano euvring . Had h e refused to discuss union he would 
have been damning his Arab nationalist image , while 
d enying both regimes a legitimising influence, the outcom 
of which would h ave b en a dvantageous to th opponents 
of Cairo a nd Arab unity. Secondly , he would have been 
r jecting fri endship overtures from his most ' reliabl ' 
alli s, while permi tt ing the Ba ' th not only the opportunity 
to consolidate its hold in Damas cus and Baghdad but to 
que stion his sincerity towards unity. Several months 
later a sir may have found himself compelled to enter 
into unity discussions with two strongly entrenched Ba ' th 
regim s, as he often said at the talks , with the ' UAR 
bing caught betw en th hammer and the anvil ' 1 
It was therefore to asir ' s politi al advantage to 
go through the motions of listening whil imposing his 
own t rms for federal union . This he did with consummat 
skill, which ffectiv 1 checl -mated the Ba ' th . For 
e ampl , by demanding that all progressiv unionist 
2 forc s should parti ipat ' qually ' in national fronts 
as th first stage towards federal int gration of ach 
1 
Ibid ., p . 88 . 
2 
Ibid., p . 1Jl . 
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region, he was employing th strategy o~ limiting 
Ba ' thist gains at the exp nse of his mor r liabl alIi s 
th SUM, ANM and UAF . Such d mands in th ms Iv s w r 
similar to those for which th Ba ' th had struggl d 
during the first UAR . In March- April 1963, the Ba ' th 
saw itself as a growing influenc in both 
Iraq and was hop ful that it would soon b 
yria and 
strong nough 
to form regime s in its own right . It was thus reluctant 
t o agr ee to asir ' s proposals but found itself in th 
a wkward s ituation of being committed to a policy of 
' pro gressive ' unity, in which popular fr edoms would b 
uppermost , while reneging from proposals to share pow r 
with its rivals in national fronts through which fed ral 
union would be brought into existence . 
For th Ba ' th the objective to be attained in the 
Cairo talks was asir ' s official recognition afits rol 
as th s nior partner in the discussions . However, from 
the inception of the talks, asir made it quite plain 
that he did not want to be caught between a Ba ' thist 
' hammer and anvil ' in any federal union . If the Ba ' th 
wanted to discu ss union with him , then it had to agree 
to form an integrated regional leadership through which 
union would be brought into existence . However, leaving 
the talks as an equal partner with pro- asir parties was 
not a pleasant thought considering the fact that asir 
would be likely to strengthen the hand of his partisans 
in the regional fronts at the expense of the Ba ' th . 
Thus to counter this proposal , Ba ' thist negotiators fell 
bac k on the tactic of delaying final ratification of 
the united leadership agreement, while focussing attention 
on se curing agreement in princ iple for the future federal 
union . The formula which they proposed was substantially 
that of the Fifth ational Congress of May 1962 which 
inv ested predominant po wer within a f deral assembly, 
or upp r house in which each of the participant ' regions ' 
wou l d b equally repr sented . l Secondly, a presidential 
counc il was preferred to limit the misus of presidential 
pow r . Either arrangem nt se med well calculated to 
2 
restrict Egyptian power . 
1 
S e pp . 168-69 . 
2 
Kerr, op . cit . , p . 91 . 
Th tripartite unity dIscussions w r throughout 
mar d by f ncing ta ti s and vi ious thrusts rath r 
than by any obv·ous willingn ss to r linqu·sh pow r 
1 6 
for th sak of th ' popularly lov d ' Arab unity. asir 
repeat dly harri d th Ba ' th and in particular its 
1 ad rs Aflaq and Bitar, who w r portray d as s mi-
lit rates and, at oth r times, as d ceitful liars . l 
Any normal delegation might have seiz d th opportunity 
to walk out of the sess·ons under such a torr nt of 
abuse , hut the Ba ' th was in the invidious situation of 
being compelled by id ological commitm nt to remain at 
the discussions , whil 1 tting asir mak all th vital 
moves . On the other hand, for the party to return hom 
accused of sabotaging the d iscussions would have be n 
th lev erage which the pro- asir parti s would have 
welcom d to discredit it further in the yes of the 
people . 
The 17 April Agreement 
The more one d eals with Arab constitutional problems, 
the more he realises that the signed and s aled document 
is not as important, from the point of view of political 
strategy, as the emotional fervour associated with what 
the document purports to attain . On the question of 
Arab unity this statement would be more than true. 
Th 17 April agr em nt was a monstrous fiction from 
the mom nt of signing, but the jubilation and euphoria 
which reverberated throughout the Arah world shortly 
2 
after almost brought Husayn ' s government to its knees, 
while on the other hand, asir ' s image sored in the minds 
of the ' truly ignorant ' masses . For the moment, though 
the hostility of the press and radio media asserted 
otherwise,J the Ba ' th and asir were ' allies in preparation 
for tripartite unity '. 
1 
APD, 196J, op. cit. S the Syro-Egyptian sessions, 
19-21 March196J, pp . 10l-J2, passim. Kerr, op . cit . , p . 76 . 
2 
Abu Jab r, op . cit., pp.70-7l . 
J 
Ahd ar-Rahim, M. , Q·yada Hizb al-Ba ' th al-Murtadda (Th 
L ad rship of the Apostat Ba ' th Party) (ad-Dar al-Qawmiyya, 
Cairo, n . d . ,), pp.lo4-10. K rr, op . · t . , p.86. al-Ba ' th, 
2J and 27 March 196J . al-Ahram, Jl Mar h 196J. 
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Th 17 April agr m nt larg ly m t sOr t s politic 1 
obj ctiv s though th r w r many chinks in its arti 1 s 
to p rmOt the part O ipants pI nty of fr dom to 
manoeuvr . asir ' s d mands for th cr tion of 
int grated national 1 ad rship fronts w r met, whil 
similar provision was mad at the f d raIl v 1 to th 
ffect that ' a unified political 1 adership is to b 
formed, which will lead and unify politi al action in 
th F deration within th fram work of this Chart r , .l 
In th f deral spher , th unremitting policy of 
' ch ck and counter ch ck' demanded by rival factions, 
c an be detect d in the provisions of the agre ment . A 
bicameral system Was to obtain with th ational Assembly 
2 or lower house being lected on a population franchis 
whil the Federal Councilor upper house was to have 
elect ed repr sentation drawn ' equally' from each of th 
r gions . 3 Power was to reside in the low r house which 
was to be empowered to elect the President and Vice-
° 4 Presidents ( ' one from each reglon') . Th President 
was also to be appointed Supreme Commander of the Armed 
Forces . 5 Thus wi th the President elected by and 
responsible to the ational Assembly, in theory at least, 
th misus of presidential power no long r existed . 
However, with the ational Assembly being elected on a 
popular basis , Egyptian representation would be dominant 
and lik ly to support th President, if he should be 
asir . But to counter this, the Ba ' th ' s provision for 
an upper house or Federal Council lect d on the basis 
of qual representation from each of the regions, s emed 
to obviate the unrestricted power of the lower house. 6 
In the ev nt of any major policy disagreem nt, a system 
of arbitration was d vised whereby an equal number of 
delegates from both houses would adjudicate on the question . 7 
1 
APD, 1963, op . cit. , p . 229. 
2 
Ibid . , p . 238 . 
3 
Ibid . 
4 
Ibid . , p . 240 . 
5 
IbOd . 
6 
S pp .168-69 . 
7 
Ibid ., pp . 238-39 . 
° .., 
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n theory, at 1 ast, if th Syrian and raqi d legat'ons 
vot d in bloc,th y would b n a pos't'on to balanc 
Egypt'an dom nation in th lower hous . nd ed on 
might hardly call th's ' trustful ' Arab broth rhood 
so oft n pr ach dj but aft raIl, th Ba ' th had suff r d 
badly in 1958 as r suIt of th fa'lu of 'ts 1 ad rs 
to s cur constitutional saf guards, a th'ng which it 
d'd not want to r peat in 1963 . 
n th r gions th agr m nt prov'd d for a syst m 
of un'- am ral leg'slatures lect d on th basis of a 
popular franch'se to administ r pur ly dom st'c matt rs 
subj ct to a degr e of r quired policy co-ordination 
with the c ntral 1 g'slatur . 1 These 1 gislatur s , 
otherwise, w re to be largely autonomous having th r 
2 
own cabin t appo 'nt d by th r g'onal pr sid nt . 
On both th r gional aId f d ral levels th Ba ' th 
largely succe d d in circ1.lTIwenting unr stricted 
presidential power and excessive Egyptian influ n e 
within the f deral union, on paper at least. asir , 
however , countered this to some ext nt by s cur'ng 
agreement for th cr ation of 'nt grat dId rship 
fronts n which, in th ory, his ' own men ' would hav an 
' equal' voice in th r ffairs . Thus, th only ff ct'v 
w y of ch cling this was for the Ba ' th to app al for 
t'm - t'm 'n which to st ive 'n ord r to s cure a 
pr pond rant pos't'on 'n both r g ons. as and the 
union'st non-Ba ' th parties at th Ca' 0 d's uss'ons 
w not fool d by th Ba ' th ' s d Iay'ng tacti Sj but in 
0 d r to s cu what ga 'ns th y had mad om th Ba ' th 
th y agre d to adopt 
months rom h dat 
18 S pt mb 1963) , 
legislatur sand th 
p p or th d 
a 
0 
du 
p 3 s'd n 'al Coun i . 
1 
bid . I pp. 24·1-42. 
2 
b' d . I p . 241 . 
3 
bid . I pp.242-43 . 
' transit' onal 
the pI b's 't 
'ng wh' h t'm 
dIad 
syst m und 
p r od ' of twenty 
(to be h Id on 
th r g ona 
ont w uid 
th tion of a 
The Breakdown of the Agreement 
One might reasonably doubt that th 17 April 
agre ment was in fact an agreement in the tru s nse 
of th word. On the contrary, it was a docum nt 
especially designed to provide each of th major 
participants with room to manoeuvr at th other ' s 
expense in the name of Arab unity. 
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Within a month after the formal signing of the 
agreement, Syria was in the throes of a bitter 
internecine struggle between Ba ' thists and pro - asirit 
factions . l On 1 May Rashid Qutayni and Fawwa z Muharib, 
who had participated in the Cairo talks, were removed 
from the army and RC. 2 On IJ May thirteen hundred 
soldiers were dismissed, while it was reported that 
seven hundred Ba ' thist officers were appointed in their 
Place . J Pro- asir newspapers were closed down and their 
editors thrown into prison as one decree intimated on 
8 May, because ' they were doing harm to the cause of 
unity ,. 4 In the wake of the purge on asirite forces 
Bitar ' s cabinet (SBC . No . IS) was thrown into a crisis 
with the resignation of several leading asirite 
ministers. S (See Table 8~. 
Bitar's new cabinet seemed to reflect the 
unwillingness of the Ba ' th to share power in any national 
front with pro- asir supporters . Events over the next 
few weeks confirmed the deterioration in relations among 
all the participant factions at the Cairo talks . In Iraq 
1 
Razzaz, at-Tajribat, p .97. 
2 
Abd ar-Rahim, op. cit., p . lo6 . 
J 
Ibid . , p.107. 
good advantage. 
Jadid was using the Premier Bureau to 
4 
Ibid . , p . lo6. Abu Jaber, op. cit., p .72 . 
S 
Abd ar-Rahim, op. cit., p . 108. Those who resigned 
were ihad al-Qasim, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister 
of Justice, who was also leader of the UAFj Abd aI-Wahab 
Homad a Unionist-Independent and Minister of Financej 
Hani Hindi leader of the ANM and Minist r of Planningj 
Sami Sufan,leader of the SUM and Minister of Supply, 
Jihad Dahi, Minister of Communications and a prominent 
pro- asir support rj Abd al-Halim Suweidani, Minister 
of Agriculture and Unionist-Independentj and Darwish 
Alwani, Minister of Waqfs and Unionist-Ind pendent . 
See Biographical ot s for more details. 
, ~ 
on 25 May th gov rnm nt uncover d a p 0- asir plot to 
toppl th go ernm ntl nd a f w days 1 L r an raqi 
d 1 gation arriv d in Damascus to c m nt a Syro-Iraqi 
, 2 military allianc veil dly dir t d ag inst aSlr . 
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During June and July the Ba ' th ' s mil'tary allies 
slowly but ffectiv ly r mov d all the as'rite unionist 
elements from k y positions in the gov rnment , army and 
country . Th Hariri partisans , lik wis , w re stripp d 
of their pow rand Hariri himself was forc d into 
inglorious xile . J On 1 J u ly , the party ' s military lead 
organised the National Guard4 und r the command of Lt . 
Colon 1 Hamad Obaid,5 a IIafiz partisan. The objective 
of th Guard was to protect the country from int rna 1 
and external agression, though it was ffectively 
employed to watch for, and to crush all suspected 
opposition to the Ba ' th regime . 
rs 
Finally in d speration on 18 July, pro- asirite 
elements within the government and army attempted to size 
power f r o m the Ba ' th , bu t with d isastrous consequences . 
Severe r prisals were made on almost all who had an 
inkling of sympathy l eft for asir either inside or 
o u tside th party . On 2J July, asir remonstrated that 
he would have no further dealings with the ' fascist 
movement ' in power in Syria . 6 The Ba ' th replied in kind 
and on 17 S ptember, the day on which th tripartite unity 
plebiscite was to be held , the Fifth B C accused asir 
of the c rime of having withdrawn from th Union and of 
u nwillingness to co-operate or even to live at peace 
with the revolutionary regime led by the Ba ' th in Syria ,. 7 
1 
Abu Jab r, op . cit. , p . 7J . 
2 
Daily ' S tar, 28 May 196J. 
J 
Daily Star, 26 June 196J . 
4 
Abu Jab r, op . cit . , p.7J . 
5 
Se Biographical otes . 
6 
p . JJ2 . al-Ahram, 26 June 196J, APD, 196J, 
ref rred to 
op . cit., 
'The Jungl Rule'in Damascus . 
7 
Ibid . , p . JJ7. 
191 
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Th 18 July movem nt nd d the ~·c ion o~ th 
17 April agreement. asir ' s partisill~ base was d stroy d 
in Syria and considerably waken d in Iraq . But the 
ff cts of this mov m nt w re not solely confirm d to 
pro- asir parties such as the ANM, UM an d UAF . Th r 
w r many members of the Ba ' th who b li ved that Arab 
unity could only be attain d through unity with asir . 
Thus prominent leaders like Jamal al - Atasi and Abd 
al-Karim Zuhur, left th part in d ep d spair . 
In the SRC and IRC elections in July, candidat s 
with regional and socialist orientations were returned 
in the majority of s ats . Aflaq, for example, was 
listed thirteenth in the contest for eight seats on the 
SRC . In Iraq Ali Salih Sa ' di and followers (i . e . the 
. 
Sa ' diyya) secured as many as five out of the eight seats 
on the IRC . The outcome of the election trend was a 
progressive movement towards closer alignment of Syria 
and Iraq in order to withstand expected counter reprisals 
from asir and his local allies. Thus in September and 
Octob r economic and military unions were cemented and 
in October the Sixth ational Congress adopted a proposal 
f f I · f . 1 or th creation 0 a Syro- raql ederal unlon. 
In adopting the principle of Syro-Iraqi federal 
union, the Sixth ational Congress was openly breaking 
with a tradition which since 1955, had looked to asir 
as the focal point of the party ' s unionist objectives. 
While it is true that the Congress did not entirely 
overrule the possibility of unity with Egypt at a future 
date, it made it quite clear that it had no further 
confidence in asir ' s 1 adership of the unionist movement . 
The ational Report stated; ' Abdul asser had involved 
the Party in a conflict that could only be justified by 
2 
the autocratic and dictatorial nature of his regime '. 
This it will be recall d, was the line adopted by the 
Huranists during the secession - a lin for which hand 
his associate s had be n expelled by th Fifth ational 
Congr ss in May 1962. 3 
1 
APD . , 1963 , op . cit . , p . 442 . 
2 
Ibid ., p . 443. 
3 
See pp . 168-69 . 
Th Sixth ational Congress substant'ally am nd d 
th party ' s conc ept of ' studi d ' union s conc iv d 
by th Fifth ational Congr ss . Th socialist 
ori ntation of the Congr ss called for th cr ation of 
a progressiv Arab front ' to be th mbodim nt of th 
u nity of the Arab struggle [to] pav th way for th 
creation of a homogen ous unified Arab r volutionary 
1 organisation throughout th Arab homeland ' . By 
i mplication , th Congress was returning to th conc pt 
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o f a ' liberated states ' confederation ', arli er propos d 
by Sa ' di as the first step, in theory , towards a mor 
2 integrated Arab unifi d entity . How ver, in making 
th s proposals , the Congress did not propos delaying 
the c reation of the Syro-Iraqi federal union because in 
any united Arab fr ont, the combined str ngth of its 
members would be calculat d to ' balanc and check asir ' s 
influ nc e, should h agr e to join . 
In Cairo , proposals for a Syro-Iraqi federal union 
c oul d only be viewe d with dismay . Once more asir was 
con f ronte d with a hostile foe oc c upying the land between 
the ile and the Two Riv ers (Fertile Crescent) . In the 
u nceasing game of political check and counter-check, 
asir was compelled to fall back upon a stratagem 
employed in 1959 and repudiated in 1961 - more cordial 
relations with King Husayn . J Husayn, it would seem, 
welcomed the sudden removal of pressur from Cairo and, 
no dou bt , to the satisfaction of asir, h proceeded to 
intiat fresh purges on the local Ba ' th party . Meanwhile 
in Iraq asir offered overtures of sympathy and aid to 
th Kurds 4 engaged in a bitter ' life and death ' struggle 
with the Ba ' th , which was opposing their demands for 
considerabl regional autonomy. 
Yet it was not in any respect the dividend from asir 
anti-Ba ' th policies in the region, which led to a radical 
s e-sawing of the power balance on 18 Nov mber 196J . 
1 
APD . , 196J , op . ci t . , p . 444 . 
2 
Se p . 177 · 
J 
Abu Jab r, op . ci t . , p.76 . 
4 
Ibid. , p · 7J . 
To account for this, w have to look clos r at th 
p rsonaliti s comprising th Iraqi Ba 'th . Prior to 
assuming pow r on 8 F bruary 1963, th Iraqi Da'th 
had liv d in cellars and dung ons to avoid Qasim ' s 
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1 
secret polic Its m mb rs wer young and in xp ri nc d 
in the art of government, and especially of a country 
like Iraq which was torn by communal and racial dis-
harmony and continually harried by gr at pow r inter sts 
in the area . In opposition to Qasim th party had 
remained as an intergrat d fighting unit; but when 
sudd nly elevat ed to pow r, personal jealousies and 
ideological differences of the members came flooding 
2 to the fore . 
Ali Salih Sa ' di 3in particular, was a man obsess d 
with a cra ving for personal power and prestige, not 
unlik that of Hurani in Syria . As D puty Prime Minister, 
Minister of the Interior, Secretary of th IRC, member 
of the Fifth B C and a prominent member of the most 
powerful executive body, the RC, he was well placed 
to attain his lust for power . But in aspiring to this 
end, as Machiavelli foresaw centuries before, 'the prince 
in rising to power would make enemies as well as 
countless flatterers and self-seekers ' . . Through 
skilful and ruthless exploitation of the ational Guard, 
Sa ' di erected a powerful para-military force around 
himself, which enabled him to extend his political 
influence and extremist socialist doctrines . 4 
Sa ' di ' s major opponents in the NRC and government 
we r e Shabib, Foreign Minister, Hashim Jawab, Minister 
of State and later Minist er of the Interior and most 
important of all, President Arif and the group of officers 
who stood around the ' presidential throne ' - many of 
whom , as we have seen, were luke-warm party members . 
In May, these elements succeeded in removing Sa 'di from 
1 
S e Part 3 for a discussion of comparative age medians . 
2 
Azma Hizb al-Ba ' th, pp . 8-12. 
3 
Se Biographical otes . 
4 
APD . , 1964, op. cit . See 'Minut es of the Extraordinary 
yrian R gional Congress , 2 February 1964 ' , pp . 23 and 
34-36 . 
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th Int rior which f 11 b y d fault to Jawab, a Ba ' thist 
of t w nty-s v en y ars of ag . But th viol ntly anti-
asir swing within th Iraqi Ba'th following th abortiv 
18 July coup in Syria , r stored a 'di ' s pow r bas , his 
followers gaining a majority of s ats a t th IRC 1 ctions , 
which they exploit d with the aid of th ir Syrian ally 
Hamud Sufi , S cretary of the SRC , at th Sixth ational 
Congress in October . 
With the a doption of f e d e ral union and xtremist 
socialist 1 gislation s uch as ' class struggle ' , th 
Sa ' di-Shufi clique offend d Arif and his military alIi s 
a s much as the more politically moderate, though noneth 1 ss 
opportunistically inclined factions, which supported Jawab 
and Shabib . From September to ovemb r , these factions 
wrest l e d with each oth r, while the government of the 
state stagnated or v ered haphazardly as one faction 
gained momentary ascendancy over the other . In September , 
the Fifth B C entered into the contest on the side of 
Arif and the 'mode rat es '. This permitted Arif more room 
to mano uvre l egitimately against Sa ' di and his power 
base in the ational Guard and syndical organisations. 
Matters came to a head on 11 ovember when the IRC 
was summoned to elect a re s erve Regional Command following 
an earl i er resolution at the ational Congress. While 
in s e ssion , the army intervened; Sa 'di, Hamdi Abd al -
Ma jid and s e vera l other pro - Sa ' di m mbers of the IRC 
were arrested, taken to an a irport and placed on a plane 
1 bound for Madrid, minus passports. When news of this 
le a ked out, Sa 'di's supporte rs in the ational Guard ros 
in protest and planes a cquired by the ational Guard 
were used agains t the army and the Pr sidential Palace 
which was straff e d . 2 I n h a st e Aflaq, Jadid and Hafi z 
travell d to Baghdad to try to r e solve the crisis, but 
with the party and IRC breaking-up into rival political 
f a ctions Aflaq summoned the full B C on 14 ovember to 
as sume xtra-jurisdictional power ad interim . J (Se Part 
4 for mor discussion of the e x ecutive powers of the B C) 
1 
Azma IIizb al-Ba 'th, p . 114 . 
2 
K rr, op . cit . , p .124 . 
J 
Azma IIizb al-Ba'th, p . 117. 
. ... 
As a quid pro qUO the B C s nt Shabib a n d Jawah into 
xile in B irut,l hut v nts had gone too far for th's 
to hav any b n fic ' al ff ct . Th army in particular 
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was tired of the un nding factional struggl s within th 
IRC and did not r lish the prosp ct of f deral union in 
which Iraq would b subj ct to th dictat s of th 
strong r Syrian Ba ' th party . Thus with Aflaq in th 
throes of trying to resolv th crisis of the party in 
Iraq , Arif reassert d his ex cutive powers and with 
2 th backing Gen ral Tahir Yahya and th army overthr w 
th Ba'th on 18 ov mber 196J, forcing the B C to make a 
hasty retreat a cross the frontier into Syria . J 
The ationalist - Regionalist Dichotom~d the Coup of 
2J February 1966 
The loss of Iraq had a generally sobering effect 
upon the Ba'th party as a whole. In February 1964, the 
Seventh ational Congress expelled Sa ' di, Shufi and 
followers from the party on the grounds of wilful 
deviationism from accepted party princip les . However, 
with the removal of these elements, vacancies existed 
in the party's senior civilian commands in Syria for 
the entry of military officers subject to the dictates 
of the Military Committee, dominated as it was by 
4 powerful officers such as Hafiz, Umran and Jadid . 
Following the Arif coup on 18 ovember 196J, Iraq 
veered sharply towards the UAR and in the first half of 
1964 , both countries engaged in discussions for 
constit'utional union . It was now Syria 's turn to feel 
herself caught between asir 's proverbial 'hammer and 
anvil' . The e ff ect of this upon the Ba'th government, 
was a progres sive liheralisation of hostility towards 
pro - asir unionist elements in the country, no doubt as a 
q uid pro qUO for more cordial relations with asir . Bi tar ' s 
new gov rnm nt in May 1964, showed a slight increase in 
1 
Kerr , op . cit ., p . 124 . 
2 
Azma Hizb al-Ba ' th, p . 122. 
J 
Int rvi w, Majdalani, 5 ovember 1967 , Beirut, who was 
th n a member of the B C . 
4 
Razzaz, at - TajEibat , pp.llO-12. 
, '" 
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non-Ba ' thist u nionist r pres ntation (s Tabl 80 and 
in J u ne d iscussions w r opened with repr s ntativ s of 
1 the ANM , SUM and UAF for th cr ation of a national front . 
I n th sam month , a g neral amnesty r pri v d all 
a s irite -unionist lem nts imprison d following th 
18 J u ly att mpted coup d ' tat . 2 
With th adoption of more lib ral attitudes towards 
n on-Ba ' thist unionist parties , military-police rule was 
lif te d and power previously held behind th scenes by 
l eading of f icers on the Military Committee, was trans-
f rred to c ivilian leaders . In the n wly constituted 
BPC in May, Bitar and Atrash , t wo leading nationalist 
or unionist Ba ' thist , s c ured positions in the five man 
Co u ncil , u n d er the chairmanship of Amin Hafiz . J In 
Septemb r 1964 , Hafiz and asir met at th second summit 
c onferen c e at Alexandria , where a mor cordial attitud 
exi s te d between the t wo . 4 And in Octob r, representations 
were a c t u ally begun b tween Syria and the UAR for the 
removal of all outstanding policy differences in the 
i n terests of Arab sOlidarity . 5 
Yet the movement towards closer solidarity with th 
UAR was short lived . In the first half of 1965, Ba ' th 
leaders like Hafiz w re blaring insults at asir for 
temporising on the liberation of Palestine . 6 But how is 
it possible to account for this sudden oscillation in 
policy? To t o this it is necessary to look more closely 
at the personalities emerging to power in Syria towards 
the nd o f 1964 . 
1 
Daily Star, 25 Jun 1964 . 
2 
Ibi d . 
J 
Razz a z , at-Ta j ribat, p . 114 . 
4 
Kerr , op . cit . , p . 1J4 . 
5 
al-Ahrar, 2 October 1964 . Hafiz was reported to be 
1 ading a twenty man Syrian delegation to Cairo . 
6 
APD . , 1965, op . cit . See ' Speech of Lieut.-Gen. Amin 
Hafiz, Chairman of the Syrian Council of linisters on 
the Second Anniversary of the March Re olution, Damascus , 
8 March ' , p . 9J . Se also ' Interview grant d by Lieut . -
Gen. Amin Hafiz to the Beirut Daily al- ahar, 6 May 1965 ' 
bid ., p . 190 . 
. .. 
Th mov ment in May 1964 towards a gr at r 
conc ntration of pow r in civilian hands, was short 
lived . n 0 tober th Military Committ th n larg ly 
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under the influ nc or Hafiz and Jadod issu d a command 
to Bitar and Atrash, tha 
1 
was no long r wanted. 
th ir pr neon th 
Bitar ' s government (SBC . 
SBPC 
0 . 19) 
suddenly cased to xist, while a new gov rnm nt Was 
formed under Amin Hafiz, who now held the offices or 
President of State, Prime Minister, Commander-in-Chi f, 
Secretary of th SRC, in addition to memb rShip of th 
S e v nth B C . Thus through Hafiz, th Military Committe 
had succeeded in gaining a strangl hold over the highest 
political executive and military offic s in Syria . 
With the summary r moval of Bitar and Atrash, 
Jad i d and a Hafiz partisan Yusif Zu ' ayyen stepped into 
their places . The outcome of unr stricted military 
control of the SBPC and government, resulted in the 
pendulum suddenly veering towards a regional socialist 
orientation, to be climaxed in the SBPC nationalisation 
decrees of January 1965 . 
If the Military Committee had succeeded in imposing 
its will upon the SBPC and government, it was not without 
cost to itself in terms of internal solidarity . 
Originally, Umran and Jadid had constituted the focal 
point of the Alawite officer committees, which enabled 
the Ba ' th to gain the upper hand in the pow r struggle 
following the 8 March ~£. After the Sixth ational 
Congress policy, differences started to develop between 
them . Umran tended to oppose the extremist socialist 
legislation of the Congr ss and, if only for tactical 
reasons, believed in a more liberal policy towards pro-
asir unionist elements . As Deputy Prime Minister under 
Hafiz , (SBC . 0 . 18) he may have be n responsible for 
establishing more cordial relations with asirite factions 
and it is inter sting to note that he and Bitar repr s nted 
the Ba ' th in discussions for the creation of a national 
fr ont in June 1964 . 2 
1 
nt rview, Bitar, 17 
at - T jribat, p.114 . 
2 
ovember 1967, Beirut . 
Daily Star, 25 June 1964. 
Razzaz, 
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Jadid subscrib d to th 1 tt r of th so ialist 
legislation of th ixth ational Congr ss, although h 
did not approv of civilian d magogu s such as Sa ' di 
and h ufi . Unlike Umran he was oppos d to sharing pow r 
1 
with non- Ba ' thist unionist lements . 
During 1964, th s two officers strov to r cruit 
the backing of their co-religionists in th army . Bing 
more closely allied to Hafiz , Jadid f"nally manag d to 
secur th upperhand over Umran , with the appointm nt of 
offic r allies , such as Hafiz Assad, Abd al-Karim Jundi, 
Mu hammad Rabbah Tawil, to key military offices. 2 Umran 
protested against the ' unwarranted promotions ' 3 and in 
Decemb r 1964, a crisis developed in th army , with 
offi ers taking respectiv sides in th dis put e. Finding 
that Jadid was gaining the upperhand, Umran fell back 
upon th Sev nth ational Command in the hope that it 
wo u l d u s its supr me executive offic e in the party to 
remove Jadid (for more discussion of this role see Part 
4) from the SRC , th reby terminating the life of the 
SBPC and SBC sub j e c t to his di c tates . 4 Jadid, however, 
p i tted his s u pport in the army against the supreme 
exe cut ive c ommand of th party and finally emerged 
vic torious over Umran, who was expelled from the army 
and g ove r nment and sent into exile in Madrid - a favourite 
exile post for the Ba ' th ' s vanquished . 5 
The Battle of the Giants 
With the removal of Umran, Hafiz and Jadid became 
the t wo most powerful officers on the Military Committee , 
the SRC and SBPC . During the period from 8 March 1963 
to D cember 1964, Hafiz worked closely with Jadid and 
Umran . It was largely due to their combined efforts that 
the asirite forces were crushed on 18 July 1963 . Being 
a SunniMu slim , Hafiz was the most suitable officer to 
h old th highest military and political appointments 
1 
Int rvi w , Bitar , 17 ovember 1967, B irut. 
2 
MEM 16/ 50, 12 D mb r 1964 . 
3 
Ibid . 
4 
Razzaz, t-Ta,jriba!, pp . 114-15 . 
5 
Ibid . 
" '" 
199 
in a country in which clos to s v nty p r c nt of th 
p ople we r e Sunnis . 
fact and as Alawit es 
Jadid and Umran w r awar of this 
(s e App endix 2) th Y operat d 
through Hafi z as their front man . Hafiz s ms to hav 
co-op rated and tog ther they succ ded in ousting all 
pro- asir and unionist elements from th party , and 
pr cipitating it onto a regional socialist orientation . 
However , during 1964 , Hafiz seems to have be n in som 
doubts as to the wisdom of continuing to fan anti - asir 
opposition in Syria , especially since Syria was isolat d 
in the Middle East following the loss of Iraq in 
ovember 1963 . Thus at the Alexandria summit in Septemb r 
1964, Hafiz adopted a more cordial attitude towards asir 
which Was reciprocated, as asir also was looking for 
new allies to defend his policies in Yemen . 
One c an only surmise Jadid t s reaction towards a 
policy of r~ochement with asir at this time . Clearly 
if Hafiz were successful in this line of policy, he 
would be likely to gain the support of pro - asir unionist 
elements inside and outside the party - a powerful leaver 
to use against Jadid on the Military Committee . Secondly , 
as Umran was also toying with the creation of a national 
f ront of Ba t thists and non- Ba t thists , Jadid may have 
suspected that both Hafiz and Umran would move closer 
together and with the employment of pra- asir Ba tthis t 
and non - Ba t thist unionist elements , oust his own regional 
socialist civilian and officer factions from power . If 
this reasoning is sound, then it would account for Jadid 
taking -advantage of Hafiz ts sudden visit to Paris for a 
kidney operation at the e nd of October 1964, to 
consolidate his officer and civilian partisan bases which 
he used to dismiss Umran and later against Hafiz in 1965 . 
(See Part 4 for more details of this struggle). 
During 1965 the Hafiz - Jadid struggle grew in int ensity 
as each tri d to und rmine the other t s power base in the 
army, government and party . In April -M ay the Eighth 
ational Congress attempted to arbitrate in a conflict 
which was dividing th army and civilian party commands . 
A Military Bureau was formed to replace the Military 
Committ e which had previously acted as th unofficial 
organisation of th party in the army , though it was not 
, ~ 
subj ct to the jurisdi tion of th 1 SRC or B C . Th 
Military Bureau was to r pr s nt th qui valent of a 
200 
party branch in th army, and Was to b mad subj t to 
same rul s of party conduct and disciplin applicabl 
t "1' b h 2 o any C1Vl lan ranc . 
Party rules and r gulations, howev r, could not 
disp 1 the bitter power struggle within th army . 
Ind d all that th B C succeeded in doing was involving 
its If in a dispute which it had no power to resolv 
An even worse miscalculation on th part of the B C 
resulted from the fact that it began to support Hafiz 
against Jadid towards the end of 1965. Jadid on the 
oth r hand, moved closer to the SRC and through it h 
succeeded in consolidating a large partisan base which 
he later employed against Hafiz and the B C on 23 F bruary 
1966 . 
vii : Evaluation 
Those who rise from private citizens to be 
princes merely by fortune have little trouble 
in rising but very much in maintaining their 
position. They meet with no difficulties on 
th way as they fl y over them, but all their 
difficulties arise when they are established . 
Machiavelli, The Prince. 
Three Characteristic Phases 
In the Formative phase, the Ba ' th appeared on the 
streets of Damascus a s a student-in t llectual action 
party seeking fulfilment of its ideals in the recreation 
(Ba ' th) of the Arab nation (see Fig. i). It assume d the 
role of continuing the tradition of the Arab Revolt which 
had be n thwarted in yria by the French . Thus from its 
inception, the party adopted a hostile attitude towards 
the French and oth r colonialist gov rnments d enying the 
Arabs national unity and human progr ss. Following 
Syrian ind pendence in April 1946, th party switched 
1 
Ibid . , p .120 . 
2 
Ibid . , p. 134 . S Part 4 for mor d tails . 
, .. 
its attacks against th Kutla from whi h it d mand d 
progressive social, polit:cal and conomi r forms . 
n th Formativ phas ~ th m mb rs of th party 
w r larg ly drawn from lower-middle la s urban and 
rural families which had not hith rto played a 1 ading 
role in the Syrian nationalist movem nt. Th young 
Ba ' thists on the oth r hand, beli ved that their 
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advanc d education gave them th righ to participat in 
transforming the fac e of the old order slumb r'ng und r 
a w Iter of outworn socio-r ligious traditions - traditions 
which nabled the imperialists and colonialist powers to 
divid e and rule the Arab homeland . Ba ' this t ideals 
for tified them with hope of a progressive order in which 
th new Arab generation would transform the face of the 
old order, thereby restoring the original creative vitality 
of th historic Arab nation (s~e Fig . i) . 
The Ba ' th may n ver have emerg d from the Formative 
phas e had it not been for the Palestine war of 1948-49 , 
and the traumatic e ff ect which the Arab d feat had upon 
the minds of countless p ople of all walks of life . 
Prior to 1948, the Ba ' th had been largely ignored by 
many intellectuals as being too idealistic in its ultimate 
ob j ectives . The humiliating defeat of the participant 
Arab armies in the Palestine war, however , pertinently 
underlined the truth of Ba ' thist ideology, that unless 
the Arab states were fully unified and popularly 
oriented they could never hope to attain successful 
national liberation of the homeland . Thus in the years 
following the Palestine debacle , Ba ' thism gradually came 
to the notice of many people looking for a radical 
solution to efface the 1 gacy of Palestine and the g neral 
social, economic and political backwardness of the Arab 
pe o pl 
By 1956 the Ba ' th had established branches or cells 
in th majority of Arab states. The party ' s most 
singular success, however, was in Syria wh re in February 
1954, it m rged with Hurani 's Arab S ocialist party to 
form th Arab Ba ' th ocialist party . It is important 
to noti c that with the m rger the original intellectual-
id alistic character of the Ba ' th was changed . Hurani 
brought into th Ba ' th a large work rand p asant base 
and, mor importantly, military alli s. The Ba ' th now 
, .. 
poss ss d an all round mass bas and a n w lead rship 
which tr at d pol ' tics as a gam to acqu'r pow r at 
any cos t . 
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Thus between 1957-58 (February), th Ba ' th alIi d 
with the Communist party to crush and radi ate th PPS 
and th pro-Western traditional parti s such as th 
People ' s and 
succe ded in 
ational parties . Through Hurani th party 
becoming th main contender for power in 
Syria - a goal which was only hindered by th Communist 
party and its leftist allies . Failure to ov rcom th 
Con~unist presence precipitated the Ba ' th into union 
with asir without full preparation and realisation of 
the consequences of the action . 
Th asir phas e is by far the most important of the 
Three, for thro u gh its association with asir the Ba ' th 
a c quired enormous prestige prior to the union of February 
1958 . However , in withdrawing from the government of 
the union in De c ember 1959 , the Ba'th received the full 
f ury of asir ' s hostility, which had d eleterious effects 
Pro-upon the party as a whole from that moment onwards . 
asir factions seceded from the Ba ' th in response to 
Nas ir ' s criticism of the party ' s reactionary character. 
At the other extremity, the Huranists were expelled 
because of their departure from the B C IS policy of 
' studied ' union adopted to appease contending political 
and ideological factions . The policy, however, pleased 
no one and only embittered asir who saw it as a slight 
to his own powers of personal leadership of the union . 
The cumulative eff ct of asir ' s opposition to the 
Ba ' th in Syria was to undermine the power and influence 
of those who sinc erely believed in return to union, if 
on th basis of 'studie d ' union, whil e at the same time 
permitting the Alawit officer committe e to operate in 
opposition to the policy of future union with asir . 
Thus when the unionist military committe finally succeeded 
in ov erthrowing the Secessionist regime on 8 March 1963 , 
the 1 a d ing officers of the Alawite committee were on the 
spot to demand the spoils of office and to be in a strong 
position to dictat t rms to the truncated party 
organisation in Syria which was hurriedly summoned to 
fo rm a coalition gov rnm nt with oth r unionist parties . 
. ., 
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Th Gov rnm ntal phas in yrOa was dominat d from 
the b ginning by th Military Committ , promin nt 
within which was th Alawit officer cliqu . Whil 
Syria was exp riencing a momentary r surg nc of pro-
asir f ling,the Alawite officers wer cont nt to 
operat behind the scen s , while going through th 
motions of subscribing to the party ' s policy of ent ring 
into ' studied' union with asir on th basis of the 
17 April agreement . How ver, asir ' s bitt r criticism 
of the party ' s 1 ad rs such as Aflaq and Bi tar permi tt d 
the military officers room to manoeuvr and, following 
the abortive Nasirite ~~ on 18 July, to r move or 
further weaken the unionist elements remaining within 
the party . 
The Iraqi Governmental phase was conditioned by a 
differ nt set of exp riences . During the Syrian 
secessionist phase the Iraqi Ba ' th had remained united 
in its opposition to Qasim, but upon attaining power on 
8 February 196J, personal power jealousies and suspicions 
und rmined the base of the party . But perhaps its most 
s erious miscalcul ation of all which led to its destruction 
on 18 ovember, was the failure to ensure that the party 
organisation retained control of the army . 
The loss of Iraq had serious consequences for the 
Syrian Ba ' th government and party as a whole. 1vi th Arif 
inclining towards asir , Syria was caught between the 
proverbial ' hammer and anvil '. This created fresh 
difficulties within the Military Corrunitte as senior 
officers fell into quarrelling over the course of policy 
to pursue regarding asir . Umran as we have seen, favoured 
an improvem nt in relations with asir perhaps with the 
calculation that he could employ this against Jadid for 
th leadership of the Alawit officers in th army . Jadid 
on th other hand , adopted th policy of weakening and 
discrediting asirit el ments within the party and country 
at large thus creating continuing hostility with asir . 
In D c mber 1964 Umran was overthrown and on 2J February 
1966 Jadid succeeded in removing Hafiz with the aid of 
regional socialists in the Syrian party organisation and 
in the army . 
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Ironically, asir ' s continuing hostility towards 
th Ba ' th almost c rta "nly discr dit d th nationalists 
of th party who b li v d in Arab unity nd nabl d Jadid 
and the r gional socialists to merge as th sol 
champions of the party " 
PART J . 
SOCIOLOGY OF THE BA ' TH 
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Introdu ction 
In this Part th basic obj cti is to ask wh th r 
it is possibl to learn anyth"ng .from th so ial 
typo l ogy of th Ba ' th which might nabl th 
inv stigator to clari.fy the origin, natur and aus s 
o f th organisational disint gration on 23 F bruary 
1966 . While th Ba ' th ' s governmental and non-
gov rnmental wings w"ll constitut th focal point 
of th inv stigation, it is also int nd d to put th 
party into sociological perspectiv by comparing and 
contrasting its sociologi al charact risti s with 
thos of government systems in Syria, Iraq, Israel, 
L banon and several non-Middle Eastern countries . 
i : Age Indices 
Comparativ Age Diff rentials 
n a study ' Syrian Deputies and Cabinet Minist rs, 
1919-59 ' , R . Bayly Winder shows that the age median o.f 
cab i net ministers and deputies remained fairly constant 
th h 1 " d 1 IJ b over . e w . o e perlo .le 0 serves : 
The infusion of n wand young blood seems 
to have been a continuous proc ss, and almost 
th only trends that are discerned are : that 
young men ... came in at an even fast r 2 rate than usual following 1 orld War II .. ' 
From this observation, Bayly Winder concludes that with 
s uc h a rapid turn over of personnel, ' no stable party 
system could survive ,. 3 
Bayly Winder ' s study concludes in 1959, but in this 
chapt r the question is pos d: in what respect is the 
period from 1958, including th Ba ' thist phase from 
1963 - 66 (and continuing) , essentiaJly similar or diff rent 
in t rms of age m dian from previous yrian political 
gen rations? The obj tiv of this investigation is to 
put the Ba ' th into g n r tional p rsp tive in terms of 
ag comparison . 
1 
MEJ, 16/ 4 - 1962, Prt.i, op. cit., p.423 . 
Table 3 . 
2 
Ib " d . , p. L' l 9 . 
3 
Ibid . 
e Wind r ' 
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Tab] s 9 and 10 show Lhat ·n the ~olwation of th 
AR in F bruary 1958 mu h young r m n w brought into 
o:ffi. in th SRC / UAR and CC / UAR . ng B yly Wind r ' s 
age ind , the m dian of' th s v n pr 
- AR yr an 
cabin ts is gi n aL ahouL Lt9 years. By ompari on 
th r is a drop of t n years in th m dian ag of th 
SRC / UAR and ight years Cor the CC / AR . Thus according 
to Bayly Winder ' s index, a m dian of 39 years is the 
low st ver r corded for a Syrian cabin t . The pr vious 
low was 42 years for a cabinet in 192 3 . 1 
The s cessionist coup of 28 S pt mb r 1961, brought 
into the Syrian gov rnment (S / SC) men on an averg of 
eight to ten years old r than th pan-Arabists of the 
UAR phase. The preponderant age group of the / C is 
th 50-55 year olds, wh reas in th CC / UAR it is the 
40-45 and 35-40 year olds, respectively. Syrian pan-
Arabists would, therefore, seem to be younger than th ir 
Egyptian partners . Thus if the Egyptians are the 'big-
brothers ' of the Syrians during the UAR phase, the men 
of th S/SC are the ' big-brothers ' of the 'big-brothers ' 
Without pushing. the analogy to absurdity, the age 
differential betwe n th SRC / UAR and the S / SC is 
considerable and represents a complete reversal of the 
trend of 1958 towards more youthful ministers in office . 
(See Table 9). 
The age differential between th S / SC and the SBC 
is ten years (see Tabl s 9 and 10). By comparison the 
age medians of the IBC and SBC have ery much in common 
in t rmi of generational affinity. The 35-40 years age 
group is preponderant in both the SBC and IBC. The IBC, 
howev r, is weighted more towards the younger age group 
on the scale, the 30-35 y ar olds. Table 10 accentuates 
the age differential between the two countri s, showing 
that on an average, Ba ' thists in the IBC could xp t 
to r ach the most senior political offices on an average 
two years arlier than their Syrian ounterparts (see 
Table 11) . 
The age medians of the non-gov rnm ntal wings of 
the Ba ' th, show very striling similariti s. For exampl , 
1 
Ibid., pp.409 and 423. 
TABLE 9 
AGES OF MINISTERS AND SENIOR EXECtTI'IVES IN OFFICE 
UAR ~Y~~dil n~~ona~ ~OunC1i$* 
- ............. ... ~ 
- --_ ....... V~, C 1 Cab· UAR Svri 
. t Ca.binet ~ £~~ ~~~~~~~~~ 
Cabinets: 
~: 
65 - 60 
60-55 
55-50 
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45-40 
40-J5 
J5-Jo 
Mar 
1958 
1 
2 
4 
2 
Median 
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T.,., Known, le 
Total Unknown: J 
Total Seats: 1 
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58 60 
2 J 
1 J 
J 1 
1 
J 6 
2 2 
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2 2 
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6 J1.6 
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~O 
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1961 
9 
2 
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J 
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47 
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12 
o 
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61 
10 
1 
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J 
J 
1 
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48 
48 
12 
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1 
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47 
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o 
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62 
12 
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2 
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Sources: Archives Biographigue Permanentes Du Monde Arabe v o1s . 1 and 2. 
The Middle East (Europa Publications, London), vol 1948-67. See 'Who's Who in the Middle East'. 
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TABLE ~O 
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AGES OF SYRIAN AND IRAQI BA'TH MINISTERS AND COUNCI LLO RS 
CABINETS PRESIDENCY COUNCILS + IRAQI BA'TH CABINETS 
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* One of t he minis t ers, Hashim Jawab , was under JO years . For more detai~s on Jawab see BiograPhicu Notes . 
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TABLE 11 
Prime Minis ter 
Foreign Af'f'airs 
Justice 
Def'ence 
Finance 
Interior 
Labour and 
Social A£f'airs 
Education 
Agrarian 
Ref'orm 
Culture and 
GUidance 
SYRIAN AND mAQI BA 'TH CABINETS: 
AVERAGE AGE OF THE TOP TEN MINISTERS + 
SYRIAN SA' TH 
--/of.arch ~lay Aug Nov May Oct Sept ~ Mch Oct li~3 63 n 63 64 65 65 6-5 66 66 16 18 1,.2 20 21 22 21 24 Av: Med: 
51 51 51 41 52 42 34 54 35 35 46 51 51 51 51 36 37 37 35 54 36 36 42 37 57 41 43 43 44 39 40 47 48 42 45 43 38 37 38 38 37 37 37 43 34 34 37 37 48 57 57 57 58 41 42 38 38 38 47 48 
41 41 34 34 36 32 35 38 36 36 37 36 
38 38 38 38 33 35 36 40 39 39 37 38 45 33 42 38 39 39 40 42 41 37 40 39 
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"JJ4N '<0 
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63 1 63 6 8 Av: 
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31 31 32 31 
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35 35 35 35 
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+ 
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* Age uncertain. 
Sources; 
Archives Biographigue Permanentes' Du Monde Arabe, vols. 1 and 2. 
The Middle East (Europa Publications, LOndon), vols. 1963-67. See 'Who's Who in the Middle East' . 
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Med: 
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'-' 
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th B C has an ov r J1 ag m dian of 37 ye r with Lh 
ag diff r ntial bing From J2 cO J9 r . This i 
almost id ntical to th SRC, with an ag m dian or 36 
years and an ag dirt' r ntial only s li ghtly less Lhan 
that or the B C - J5 Lo J9 years (s e T bL 11 ) . As 
with th gov rnmental wings o.f th party, th J5 to 40 
ag group is pr pond rant. The B C, how v r, is 
slightly weight d mor towards the und r J5 ag group 
than th RC, though the age dif er ntial is not 
significant . On th oth r hand, th B C I S high r 
p rcentage above 45 y ars can be ac ount d for by Mich 1 
Aflaq ' s maturation in offic ov r a consid rable period 
of time . 
High governmental and party exe utiv offi es in 
the Ba ' th can, to some xt nt be corr lat d with ag 
s niority, though it is within a very narrow age 
differential. Tables 10, 11 and 12, .for example , show 
that a Syrian Ba ' thist would most probably reach th 
senior posts in government at 38 years, while his Iraqi 
counterpart would b , on an average, two y ars younger 
(J6 years) . The age at which th Syrian Ba ' thist might, 
in theorY,expect to reach the apex o.f the senior posts 
in go ernm nt, is 40-L,1 years with perhaps the minus two 
years age differential op rating in the IBC. As these 
Tables show a dramatic falling o.ff in r presentation 
above the age of 45 years, it might be argued that the 
political life-span of th senior cadres who survive 
intra-party putschs is a maximum of 7 y ars, while th 
personnel at the ap x of the party ' s hierarchy can count 
on 3 to 4 years with the same provisos operating. 
~e Constancy 
Constancy and erratic fluctuation in the median ag 
over a period of tim would seem to suggest th failur 
of the particular political party or gov rnm ntal syst m 
to eff t a political consensus among its lading 
political cadre (s) . (s Tabl s 10 , 11 an d 12) . On 
th oth r hand, a go rrun nt or politi al party 
consolid ting its hold ov r the af.fairs of stat , th r by 
e.ff cting at least th v - stig of t bi gov rnm nt, 
could be e p t d to show a normal ag maLuration cur 
(S Fig . 2). Tabl I J, .f 0 rex am p 1 , illusLrates til. 
steady maturation o.f th lsraeli cabin is ' m dian ag 
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Comparative Median Ages. 
British. Syrian and Israeli Governments 1957-66' 
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J 2 J 2 4 1 1 J 4 J J 
1 1 1 1 1 1 J 2 2 1 1 
0 0 0 1 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
.5.5 56 55 59 55 55 59 59 61 61 
54 55 58 56 55 57 57 60 61 
7 7 9 11 10 IJ IJ 14 111 14 16 
5 6 :j 5 4 2 J 2 1 0 2 
12 IJ 12 16 14 15 16 16 15 14 18 
Despite the relatively high percentage oC unknowns, the prevailing 
trend is markedly towards the 55-50 age group. 
The Middle East (Europa Publioations, London), vole. 1948-67. 
See 'Who's Who in the Middle East'. 
Press Reports. 
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No. ~ 
1 
.6 
6 J.5 
21 12. 
27 15·5 
27 15·5 
Jl 17.8 
17 9.8 
5 2.8 
0 0 
0 0 
57 
57 
IJ5 77.6 
' J9 22.4 
174 100 
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between 1948-66. By contrast, Tables 9 and 10 show th 
erratic median age fluctuation of Egyptian, Syrian and 
Iraqi cabinet ministers, including the Ba'th phase . 
During the Syrian and Iraqi Ba'th phases there would 
appear to have been a constant inflow of young blood, 
such as Bayly Winder observes for pre-UAR Syrian cabinets, 
1919-58. Clearly the society which hatched the pre-UAR 
political generations would seem to have altered very 
little insofar as it managed to produce stable political 
party and governmental traditions . The only appreciable 
difference between the Syrian Ba'th and pre-UAR phases 
in terms of median age, is the fact that in the former 
case men rise to senior political and ministerial offices 
at leas t ten years earlier in the latter case . The 
reason for this noticeable drop in the median age may 
be accounted for in part by the decline in the national 
median age in the post-independence era. For example, 
in the mid-1950s, 52 . 6 per cent of all Syrians were 
under the age of 21 years, a trend which was continuing 
towards a disproportionate imbalance in the population 
1 
of under 20 year olds. Therefore, considering these 
figures , a man reaching ministerial office at the age 
of 38 years in Syria would not be , relatively speaking, 
a ' young man ' . 
Political Generations 
Tables 9 and 10 illustrate that it is possible to 
speak of a Syrian political generation within a five to 
eight years age differential. The unionists or Arab 
nationalists of the SRC/UAR are, for example, on an 
average eight years younger than the preceding Syrian 
cabinet of Sabri al-Asali, December 1956-February 1958 . 
The ministers of the S/SC who reversed the unionist and 
socialist trends of the UAR phase are, on the other hand, 
upwards of eight years older than the men they displaced . 
In terms of age, the S / SC would seem to be the younger 
'brothers ' of the pre-UAR Syrian cabinets . By the same 
reasoning, the SBC which attempted to restore many of the 
1 
Syria : GeOgra}hY and HistoEY (A Syrian Government 
Publication 1955 , vol. 1, p . 55 . 
union~st and socialist policie of th OAR phas i 
on an av rag, 11 y ars young r than th / C whoch it 
overthr w . 
Sp culative Corr lations 
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yria ' s entry into tripartite unity discussions in 
March-April 1963, an b correlat d with th return to 
the government (SBC . 0 . 15) 
Ba ' thists and unionists (i . 
of ' older ' (s Tabl 10) 
ANM SUM and UAF) , who 
had participated in som form or other in th gov rnm nts 
of th UAR (i . e . SRC /UAR or CC /UAR). Syria ' s r jection 
of tripartite union with asir, can be positively 
correlat d with a four year drop in the SBC ( o . lS) 
median age (viz . 40 to 36 years in a spac of nine months). 
As we hav seen, the Sixth ational Congress put mor 
emphasis on the socialist orientation of the Ba ' th than 
previous ational Congresses. There would seem to be 
some justification in the argument (see Tables 10 and 12) 
that with the movem nt towards a socialist orientation, 
party members on an average three to four years younger 
(see SBC . 0 . 15 with o . lS) than the unionists or 
nationalists of th party, were rising to senior political 
and governmental offices . ( Cf. Table 10, SBC . o . lS 
with Table 12, SRC . 0 . 1) . 
Zusif Zu ' ayyen's first government (SBC. 0 . 21) 
shows xtreme 'youthfulness ' with an average and median 
age of 36 years . Politically this government was regional 
socialist in orientation and considerably under the 
influence of the RC and its new Deputy S cretary, Salah 
Jad id . Bitar ' s fifth government by comparison ( 0 . 22) 
of January 1966, has a median age of 40 years . As a 
general trend, Bitar's five governments ( os.15, 16 17, 
19 and 22) have a median age which is at least one to two 
years old r than eith r Hafiz'sl( os.lS and 20) or 
Zu ' ayy n ' s governments ( os.21, 23, 24 and after) . In 
the brief spell he was in office (January-February 1966) 
Bitar tried to re erse some of th xtr mist socialist 
1 
It hould be noti ed, however, that in late 1965 Hafiz 
changed his orOginal politO al orientation to subscribe 
to th unionist-nationalis t policies of th Eighth B C . 
Se pp.19S-200 for mor d etai ls. 
1 gi lation or th Zu'ayy n go rnment with similar 
over ur s to asir Lor more cordial politi 
How v r , the lif of hi gov rnm nt ( BC . 
1 r lation 
0 . 22) was 
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curtaoled on 23 F bruary 1966, by the r gional so ialOst 
coup 1 d by 0adid . Zu1ayyen ' s second gov rnm nt ( 0 02 3) 
m anwhile shows a drop (s e Tabl 10) in th median ag 
of the pr vious cabinet by three y ars which it lat r 
maintain d ( 0 . 24) . 
Similar irregular median ag patt rns can b s n 
in th SRC (see Tabl 12 ) . For exampl , the median ag 
o f SRC . 0 . 4 is 36 years . Following its dismissal by 
the B C on 21 December 1965, the Suprem Council of all 
trend s (i . e . S~C . No . 5) suddenly rose to a median age of 
39 years . This Council was largely under the direct 
influ enc e of the B C, and was nationalist in oreintation . 
Bu t on 23 F bru ary 1966 following the regional socialist 
co u p , t h e Supreme Council was overthrown and in its place 
the SRC ( 0 . 6) under Jadid has a m dian age of 35 years . 
Age and Political Behaviour 
One of the important points to emerge from this 
chapter is the fact that with particular governmental 
systems (i . e. S / SC,SRC / UAR, CC / UAR, SBC and IBC) and 
major intra-party factional trends significant median ag 
patt rns can be determined. This was seen by median ag 
comparison between the pre-UAR and post-UAR governments. 
During the Ba ' th phase, intra-factional trends (regionalists 
and nationalists) were se n to have an age differential 
of u p to four years . It is interesting to notice at this 
stage, that Bitar drew a large percentage of his cabinet 
ministers from Damascus (see Table 14), the orthodox 
crad le of the Ba ' th, while the regional socialists of 
Zu ' ayyen ' s governments came from the rural areas of Lattakia, 
Deir z-Zor, Hama, Suweida and so on. (We shall return to 
the importance of Muhafazat representation later in this 
Part) . 
It would of course, b fallacious to argue that 
age alone d termined political behaviour. But as a 
gen ral tr nd, it an b shown on th basis of the vidence 
in Tables 10 and 12, that minist rs or s nior party 
ex cutives in coming to offi e at 36 y rs or under would 
most probably subs crib to the regional o ialis wing 
TABLE 14 
Mar 
63 
15 
Lat t akia 35 
Idlib 33 
Aleppo 40 
Rakka 0 
Dei r e z-Zor 0 
Has s ake 0 
Hama. 40 
Homs 46 
Damascus 47 
Dera'a 40 
Suweida 35 
AGE MEDIAN BY MUHAFAZAT : 
BA'TH CABI NETS 1 96 3-66 . 
T"'lAl . (, '" I"t'f-t May Aug Nov May Oc t Sept ~ 
.i:a:a Oct 63 63 63 64 64 65 ""6'5 66 66 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
42 38 38 39 39 36 41 39 36 
33 0 33 36 3/.j 35 38 38 36 
37 32 37 45 37 36 39 38 38 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
35 35 35 36 0 35 0 36 34 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
38 39 38 38 37 36 39 37 39 
0 37 36 37 35 36 35 37 37 
- -
43 43 43 44 41 39 42 38 41 
0 33 33 0 34 37 4 0 36 36 
36 36 36 0 34 36 40 36 0 
Sources : Archives Biographigue Pe rmanen te s Du Monde ,Arabe , v ol s . 1 and 2 . 
The Middle Eas t (Europa Public ation s , London) , vols. 1948-67. 
See 'Who ' s Who i n the Middle Eas t'. 
Press Report s. Inter views . 
Me d i an 
Age 
38 
35 
37 
0 
35 
0 
38 
37 
42 
36 
36 
I\) 
f-
-..-J 
of th party whil , onv rsely thos bov 39 y ars} 
would giv th ir all gian 
tradition of the party . 
to th older nationalist 
Age is only on variable in det rmining politi al 
behavioural trends . In the following chapter we will 
attempt to show a positive orrelation betw n ag 
constancy and continuity n offic . 
ii : Continuity in Offic 
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From Ba yly Winder ' s study of ' repeaters and first 
termers in office, 1919-59 ' ,1 it is clear (s e e Table 15-
23) that there is not a markedly significant increase in 
the lev Is of membership continuity in the post-UAR 
governmental and political party systems . The Syrian 
and Iraqi Ba ' th phases are typical of the general trend 
of the period and, in particular, show all the classical 
instabil i ty features . (See Tables 18, 19 and 21) . There 
is overall a v ery rapid change of membership with 
continuity in office rating 40.8 per cent in the SBC and 
L~ 4 . per c ent in the SBPC . In the IBC it is slightly 
high r with 57 . 1 per cent. The life-span of each SBC 
is 4 . 4 months, 4 . 2 months for the SBPC , and 3 . 3 months 
for the IBC . (S ee Table 24) . 
Rapid changes in party personnel can be seen in the 
non-gov rnmental wings of the Ba ' th such as the B C and 
SRC. (See Table 23) . D spite the relative longevity 
of th BNC, viz., 28 . 25 months over eighteen years , 
continuity in office from one B C to another is only 47 . 5 
of the total membership. The continuity rating for the 
SRC is ven lower with 36 . 6 and an averag life-span of 
5 months . 
Stable 1 adership cl arly do es not appear to have 
surviv d at the apex of th party and governmental 
structures to give continuity of policy and leadership 
to the cadr s throughout the Arab world . 
1 
~EJ . ,16/4-1962, p . 422. 
TABLE 15 
Numbe r of Seats 
Pre.vio usly Oc c u pied 
Continui t y in Offi ce* 
Total Repea ters 
Total First Terme r s 
Total Se a t s 
i 
ii 
iii 
iv 
v 
'J I C) 
MI ISTERIAL REPEATERS AND FIRST TERNERS I THE 
SYRIAN REGIO AL COUNCIL OF T~m UAR , 1958-61 
Mar 
58 
Oct 
58 
Mar 
60 
Sept . 60 
Aug . 61 
L-l _____ 2 ______ 3_____ 4 __ ~J l~N._O_. ________ % ____ ~ 
1 5 4 5 
----
15 26 . 3 
I 0 4 5 t--- 10 17 · 5 
- -2 1 1 
.1 7 12.3 
--0 1 0 1 
t--
'-2 3 . 5 
0 0 1 0 --I 1.8 
2 7 10 L4 3J 
-4 7 10 15 J6 6J.2 
--7 7 7 0 21 36 . 8 
--II I 14 17 15 r------------.-1 57 100 
-
* F r om the Syrian National Un i on cabinet of Sabri al-Asali 
dis s ol v ed to make way for the union on 1 February 1958. 
S ourc es : Press Repo r ts . 
TABLE 16 
Number of Seats 
Previously Occupied 
i 
ii 
iii 
iv 
v 
vi 
vii 
Mar 
58 
Syr. 
0 
2 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
Eg. 
5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
. 0 
9* 
SYRIAN AND EGYPI'IAN MINISTERIAL AND EXECUTIVE 0FFICERS: + 
REPEATERS AND FIRST TERMERS IN THE CENTRAL CABINET OF 
THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, 1958-61. 
Oct Sept Aug . 61 
to 58 60 Sept. 61 
Syr. Eg. Syr. Eg. Syr. Eg. Syr. 
6 7 8 No . % 
0 4 2 0 0 4 2 6.9 
0 0 2 J 6 7 10 J4.5 
0 0 1 0 J 1 4 IJ . 8 
0 0 0 0 2 0 J 10.J . 
J 0 0 0 0 0 J 1O.J 
0 0 1 0 2 0 J 10.J 
No. 
8 
10 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 11* 0 12* 0 IJ* 0 0 45 
Eg. 
% 
l1.J 
14 . 1 
1.4 , 
0 
0 
0 
6J . 4 
2 9 2 8 1 15 6 16 
Syrian-Egyptian 
Grand Total Per Cent : 
Continuity in Office 59 
11 J7·9 48 67.6 
Total Repeaters 89 J 9 J 15 6 15 IJ 25 25 86.2 64 90 . 1 
0 0 J 0 0 2 1./ ~ 4 IJ.8 7 9 . 9 J Total First Termers 11 12 21 2J 29 100 71 100 Total Seats ;n 100 
* Primarily the remnants of the original 'Free Officers' who survived the early purges of 1952 -54. 
+ Syr. Syrian. 
Eg. = Egyptian. 
Sources: Press Reports. 
T\) 
T\) 
o 
TABLE 17 
Number of Seats 
Previously OCcupied 
i 
ii 
iii 
iv 
v 
v i 
vii 
viii 
ix 
X 
Continuity in office* 
Total Re peaters 
Total Firs t Te rmers 
Total Sea t s 
MINISTERIAL REPEATERS .AND FmST TERMERS m THE 
SYRIAN SECESS IONIST CABINETS 1961-63. 
Sept 
61 
9X 
2 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
,0 
3 
9 
12 
No v 
61 
lOX 
7 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
8 
9 
J 
12 
Dec 
61 
II 
4 
1 
2 
1 
'0 
0 
0 
, 0 
0 
0 
0* 
8 
8 
16 
* F r om the UAR c abinets . 
Ap l 
62 
12 
1 
1 
0 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
5 
10 
1 5 
June Sept 62 
62 ~Iar bJ 
lJ 14 
6 2 
1 6 
0 1 
0 0 
3 0 
0 2 
0 0 
0 0 
0 1+ 
0 0 
1 0 7 
10 12 
6 8 
16 20 
I No.~ I 
22 24.2 
11 12.1 
3 3·3 
5 5·5 
3 3·3 
2 2.2 
0 0 
0 0 
1 1.1 
0 0 
26 28 . 6 I 
47 51·7 I 
44 48. J J 
91 100 J 
'x Provisional until the r atificat ion of the Secessionist constitution 
on 1 Decemb e r 1961 . 
+ Khalid al-Azm. 
Sour ces : Press Reports . f0 
f0 
TABLE 18 
Number of Seats 
Previous1y OccUDied 
Conti.nu.i.ty in office 
Total. Repeaters 
Total. firs t Tenaers 
Total. Seats 
i 
ii 
iii 
iv 
v 
vi 
vii 
viii 
ix 
x 
Cabinets 
Harc.h May ~ug Nav 
196) 6) 6) 6) 
15 16 17 18 
1 5 5 6 
1 4 10 
1 1 
1 1 
2 1 
1 
1 
M1lITSTERIAL REPEATERS AND FIRST TERMERs IN 
1lIE SYRIA..'" BA'm CAHINETs 196}-66. 
May Oct Sept Jan Mar Oct/Sept 64 64 65 66 66 66 67 
19 20 21 22 2) 24 
) 2 10 6 4 9 
2 4 ) 2 ) 
4 2 ) -1 1 
-1 2 1 4 1 
1 ) 
1 
1 
NO.=r 'f. 
51 24.8 
29 14.1 
1) 6.) 
11 5·) 
7 ).4 
1 
.5 
2 1-
1 
·5 
1 7 10 14 9 6 14 4 2 17 I 84 ' 40 . 8 
5 7 
15 9 
20 16 
Sources: 
II 18 
7 6 
18 24 
Press Reports. 
Interviews. 
11 10 
9 12 
20 22 
15 11 10 17 115 55·9 
6 1) 10 4 91 44.1 
21 24 20 21 206 1.00 
N 
N 
N 
TABLE 19 
Con tinuity in office 
Total Repeaters 
To tal Firs t Te rmers 
Total Seats 
REPEATERS AND FIRST TER~mRS IN THL 
SYRIAN PRESIDENCY GOUNCIL 1964-66. 
r---:;-
It'\ ;O~ \0 ..-:t ..-:t r----.------____ ~ 
i 
ii 
iii 
iv 
\0 
'" 
\0 \0 
.-i 
:>, 
.., . .., .., 0 P- o 
.0 ro 0 CI) CI) CI) CI) ;:;: 0 0 rJl 0 r.. 
1 2 3 4 5ID 
-
No . I % 
0 3 2 1 0 6 24. 
0 0 2 0 1 3 12 . 
0 0 0 2 0 2 8. 
0 0 0 0 ,1+ I L- . I 1 I ,4. 
... 3 4 2 2 11 44 . 
0 3 4 3 2 12 48. 
5 2 1 2 3 13 52 . 
5 5 5 5 5 2 5 100 
... Presidency Council of S yrian Ba'th was 
1'ormed in Ma y 1964. All the members were 
e Ither senior party , g ov ernmental or 
military leade rs. 
--
+ Amin Ha fiz, Chai rman, a nd President 01' State . 
(See Diographical otes for 1II 0re d c lJ.iLs). 
o The P rpsirl e ncy Council was abolished f ollowing 
the Syrian coup d'etat on 2] February L9 66. 
"CHlr ' C"(' : PI ' PBS HPJ.HH t ~ . 
lilt P I vi fl W S . 
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TABLE 20 
To t a l Repe a t ers 
Tot a l First Te rmers 
Total Seats 
m NISTERIAL nEPl!:ATERS AND FIRST TERMERS 
I IRAQ CABINETS . 1958 - 62. 
'Qasimite Cabinets 
F:b]] E-~ ~--~ ____ ~2 _____ ~J ______ ~4 ______ ~2_~ No . %~ 
July Fe . 
1958 59 
----------------------------_.-
20 27 5 7 4 2 r---------.--____________________ _ 
15 20 . J 
1 5 8 1 
8 10 . 8 
o 1 J 4 
2 2·7 
o o o 2 
----- - -------~-----------.----
'-
~======6=====1=J=====1==5 ===1=0=~ ~---~ 
2 6 lJ 15 
· 9 45 60.8 
10 4 7 2 6 r-------------__________________ _ 2 9 J9.2 
12 lJ 17 17 15 74 100 
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"Brig . Abd aI-Karim Qasim was the leader of the Iraqi revol u tion on 
14 July 1958 (i.e. Cabinet No.1) which overthrew the Hashemite 
governm"nt. murdering the royal family and several lead ing politicians, 
among whom was Nuri ae-Said . Qasim later inclined towards pro-
COlllmunis t Sovie t Union orbi ts in late 1958, thereby declaring war on 
all Arab nationalists elements within Iraq. He was particularly vicious 
towards the Ba'th, forcing its p artisans underground , while those he 
caught were imprisoned and dealt harsh s e ntences by the People's 
(i.e . Nahdawi) Court. On 8 February 196J
J
(i.e. Cabinet No.5) the Ba'th 
s ucceeded in overt h ro wing Qasim in a bloody ~. 
Souroes: Press Repor ts . 
TABLE 21 
Number of Seats 
Pre v iously Occupied 
Continuity in office 
Total Repeaters 
Total First Termers 
Total Seats 
i 
ii 
iii 
iv 
v 
vi 
BA' TH CABI NETS 
Feb . May 
1963 63 
6 7 
2 18 
1 0 
0 1 
0 0 
0 b 
0 0 
Oct / Nov * 
63 
8 No . 
20 
16 17 
0 l 
--
1 1 
MINISTERI AL REPEATERS AND FIRST TERMERS 
IN I RAQ CABINETS ! 1 963- 66 
UNI ONISTS (ARIF) NON - BA' TH CABI NETS. 
Nov. June Nov J u ly Sept Nov ApI/May 
1963 64 64 65 65 65 66 
% 9 10 11 1 2 13 14 15 
31. 7 2 11 6 1 6 7 4 
27 . 0 1 10 6 0 3 3 
1.6 5 0 1 6 2 0 1 
r--' 
1. 6 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
------ t--
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
o ~~1[ 36 ~E~ 
r J9 61 .9' I . 
1 0 16 15 5 11 
3 1~ 1'1 7 IJ 18 15 8 
18 2 4 24 38 . 1 14 7 4 7 9 
100 21 21 21 6J 
! 
21 20 22 2 2 17 
L No . 
r-
. , 
I 
23 
15 
3 
3 
1 
I~ 
* The Ba'th came to power in Iraq by coup d ' etat on 8 February 1963 . On 18 November 1963 
(i.e . No . 8) it was overthrown by President Arif . Several Ba'thists were retain ed in the 
new Cabinet, though by June 1964 (i . e . No . 10) they were being phased out . 
Sources: Press R·epoTts .. 
% 
27.6 
17 . 2 
11.2 
2.2 
--
2.2 
--
. 8 
~ 
61.2 
38 . 8 
100 
i..: 
I~ 
~( 
TABLE 22 
Continu! ty in 01'f100 
Total Ropeaters 
Total Fire t Tonners 
Total Seat8 
1 
~§.TIill!~~~~~ 
IN TilE ISRAELI CAOINET, ill~. 
----------
'" .:t 0 ... t"I .:t V'\ 
'" 
... 
'" '" 
V'\ V'\ V'\ V'\ V'\ 
'" '" '5 .; 
.; Ii .; Ii .; 0 ; ii § u u 0 0 ~ 0 x 0 0 Q "> Z Z 
-------------
J 6 
'" 
'" 
'" V'\ ... 
'" >- a ~ X "> 
5 7 8 9 10 11 12 ~-------.------------------
.------------------~ 
o o 5 4 1---------_._--------------o 11 1 1-----------------------------o o 6 o 1 o 
---------------------o o o o . o o 
------_._----
o o o o o o o t---------____________ _ 
o o o o o o o o 1-------------------------o o o 
o 
o o o o 
-----------------------o o o o o o o o 1----------------------------1 o o o o o o o o o 1----------------------------, 
o 0000000011 
o 
1J 
1J 
_0 ___ 0 __ 0 ___ 0___ 0____ 0 ___ 0 ___ 0 __ ~ __ 0 tl 
9 
_ ~~ __ 9 _ __..:.:.. __ 8 __ ~ __ 1_'._~:.._.~~ 
P 8 11 1J 11 F 12 15 1J 14 
24 51 5 ~ 4014 
1J 12 16 14 16 16 16 15 14 10 
9 
12 
Now Cabinot8 or Major Reshuffles. 
JJ J8.9 
Jl 17·7 
19 10 . 85 
11 6.J 
9 5.1 
8 4.6 
7 4. 
-----
2.85 
J 1.7 
2 1.1 
.6 
----
r---------_ 
H8 67.4 
129 13.7 
1------
46 26.J 
f--.-------
17' 100 
Dehor Shltreet, Minister of' Polioe and Soourity continuously. 
:f'" Hoeho Shapiro , Minieter o f' the Interior, Sooial WolCaro, Religious 
Arcairs and In~lgration. 
~I Pr088 Report s . 
TABLE 2) 
Number of' Seats 
Previously Occupied 
i 
ii 
iii 
iv 
vi 
vii 
CantLnuity ~ Office 
Total Repeat e rs 
Total First Termers 
Total Seats 
.!!.!!£: 
C'-
"" 
'" 
"" 
'" ... 
"" ~ ~ C Q, 
" < ..., 
1 2 
0 2 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
REPEATED AND FIRST TERMERS IN 
THE NATIONAL COMMAND A!ID SYRIAN REGIONAL 
COMMAND OF THE !IA'TH PARTY 
'" 
'" '" '" 
0 
'" '" '" '" 
<""\ 
"" 
... 
'" " '" '" 
0 ... 
'" ... ~ 
~ ~ 
.0 .... 
.0 Q, '" ,., ~ ~ ~ 
" 
d 0 ~ Q, ~ rn rn :.: 0 ... 
) 5 6 7 8 No . 
2 4 2 J J J 19 
1 1 J 1 2 2 10 
0 1 ·1 1 0 2 5 
0 0 1 0 1 0 2 
0 0 0 1 0 1@ 2 
0 0 0 0 1 0 1. 
... 0 0 0 0 0 1 1. 
~: 
<""\ 
'" '" '" 
'" '" '" '" '" '" 
.... 
"" '" '" '" 
.... ... 
'" '" '" 
0 
.c .c~ 
..; ~ 
.0 0 ~ 0 Q, ~ 0 
" 
Q, .. .. 
" " 
.. 
" 
.. rn ... ::E: < 0 :.: rn 
'f, 1+ 2 J 4 5~ 6 I No . 'f, 
2J.8 
12.5 
J 2 5 J 2 J 
0 2 0 5 0 4 
1.8 2J·7 
1.1. 1.4·5 
6.1 0 0 2 1. 1. 4 8 1.0·5 
2.5 0 0 0 2 0 1. J J·9 
2·5 0 0 0 0 0 1. 1. 1..J 
1..J 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
l.J 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
L 0 2 7 ~ J9 47.5 I J 4 7 7 1. 2 ~.: .• 6 J 6 6 6 0 2 J 6 7 6 7 9 40 
4 
4 
50 J 4 7 1.1. 
5 7 4 J 7 6 4 
7 1.0 10 10 1.J 1J 1J 
-
40 50 I 
80 100 I 
5 1.1 4 5 
8 1.5 1.1. 1.6 
This represents the SRC reformed by the BNe at the Firth Nationa~ Congress in May 1962. The provious S RC was disso1ved in 1958. 
-r: Hiche.l AClaq, S eere tary-General until. the Eighth Nationa.l Congre!lS. Htm..i£ Razz
az 
S 
became his successor. (See Biographical Notes ror more det~s). 
Supreme Council of' all. trends rormed by the SNe to administer the Syrian region unt L1 the election of a nev SRC. 
Sources: Intervie w_ 
Press Reports. 
J 
8 
1.1 
Document on Party Membership Tabled at tbe Eighth Nationa..1 Congress i.e April.-Hay 1965. 
1.J 41 5J·9 
2 J5 46 . 1 
1.5 76 100 
, 
T'0 
T.) 
--J 
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It is clear , how v r , from Tabl 24 that continuity 
levels of th SEC , SBPC, IBC , B C and RC ar not 
significantly differ nt from oth r Middl East rn 
patt rns . The one e xc ption to this g n ra l ls at l on 
is the State of Israel . Table 13 shows th significant 
increase in the median age of Israeli cabinets ov r 
eighteen years . Table 22 confirms that increase in th 
median age index can be positively correlated with high 
lev Is in membership con tinuity . Tables 22 in comparison 
to Tabl e 24 , tends to suggest that high continuity in 
office ratings is a measure of political stability , 
whil e contrariwise constant or rapidly fluctuating age 
medians c ou~led to lower c ontinuity in office ratings , 
show just the reverse . The Israeli cabinets, for example , 
with a repeat membership of 73 . 7 per c ent and a con t inuity 
in office rating of 67 .4 pe r cent, have an average c abinet 
life-s pan of 17 . 2 months - more than four times that of 
the SBC . Broken down furthe r, the Israeli c abinet minist e r 
co u ld expe ct on an average, 68 . 8 months in office, compared 
to 8 . 8 months for the ministers of the SBC , 8 . 4 months 
for the SBPC , and 6 . 6 months for the IBC ( s ee Table 24). 
Thus a simple observation confirms that an Israeli 
c abinet minister has a six to eight times greater period 
in office within which to develop the polici es of his 
ministry, than his Ba ' thist counterparts . There would 
seem to be an obvious c orrelat i on here beteen pol i tical 
1 
s tability and general national development . The Swedish 
model on Table 24 would s eem to c onfirm this view point , 
while the Indonesian and Brazilian models , which show a 
very high degree o f pers onnel change , would seem to confirm 
2 
an instabiiity correlation . 
Rapid turn over of polit ical personnel is particularly 
akin to developing countries with ethnic, religious, 
regional or e conomic diversities . Syria and Iraq both 
1 
MEJ ., 16/ 4 - 1962 . 
2 
Of cours e it would be fallacious to argue this on the 
strength of c abinet analysis alone , and with such limited 
documentation . Rather, it is argued that the c abinet is 
a barometer of a stabl e o r unstable political system . 
The main intention is, o verall, to compare and contrast 
these systems with Ba ' thist political systems . Conclusions 
are thus more relevant to the Ba ' thist models than 
unive rsal general is ation abo ut polit ical s tability in 
advanc ed or developing c ountries . 
TABLE 2!t 
Middle Eas t: 
Cabinets: x1919-58 
SYrian Regional Councils 1958-61 
Central Cabinets: 1958-61 
Secessionist Cabinets: 1961-63 
Ba'th Cabinets: 1963-66 
Ba'th Presidency CouncilS 1964-66 
Qasimite Cabinets: 1958-63 
Ba't2 Cabinets: 1963 (Feb.-Nov .) 
Ari£ite: Unionist Non-Ba'th 
Cabinets: 1963-66 
Cabinets: 1957-66 
Cabinets: 1948- 66 
REPEATERS AND FIRST TEIDIERS IN OFFICE 
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:> 
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.... " 0 <' ... <:: <. C, ::l. ... C JJ 0 E 
" .... 0 
" >< :§ 
" 
"'a: .,.., > ..J E > fiI 
'"' 
0 0 ... ..: ..: 
SYRIA 
57 43 18.zP 41 445 f"1l.25 2+ I 
U. A.R 
63 . 2 36 . 8 56 . 7 4 36 9 2 + I 
89 II 59 4 37 9 .. 25 2+ 
SYRIA 
51.7 48·3 28.6 6 18 3 2+ 
55.8 44.2 40.8 10 44 4.4 2+ 
48 52 44 5 21 4.2 2+ 
IRAQ 
60.8 39·2 59·5 5 47 9.4 2+ 
61.9 38.i 57.1 3 10 3·3 2+ 
61.2 38.8 56.6 6 31 5 . 2 2+ 
LEBANON 
60.7 39 . 3 20 13 112 8.6 2+ 
ISRAEL 
I 73.7 26.3 67 .4 12 216 18. 3+ I 
continued on p. 
I\) 
I\) 
\0 
TABLE 24 (ontd . ) 
Latin America . 
Cabinets. 1955-64 
Southeas t Asia. 
Cabinets. 1956-62 
Scandanavia. 
Cabinets. 1951-66 
Non-Governments. 
8a ' th National Commands. 194 7 - 66 
Reg:ional Commands. 19 63-66 
·1 
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REPEATERS AND "IRST TERMERS IN OFFICE 
BRAZIL 
10 90 1.5 7 * 90 12 . 9 1 I 
INDONESIA 
40 60 35 . 4 5 72 14 . 4 ~ 
.. 
IJ 
." 
'" " " '" 
IJ 
'" 
~ IJ 0 
." § 
." ." 
'" '" 
~ 
'" Jl >-'" ." 0 " ., IJ 0 
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., ~ § 
" 
~ 
., .~ j~ ~ IJ s.. 0 ." ., ." ." " 8 .t:J IJ 
'" 
>-E >-
'" " 
.... IJ ~ ., OM .~ U '" 0 ~ " ." ~~ ~ " Eo< :l !'o CiI Jl fa'(; ., .~ 
'" 
., 
.~ ~ .. "'"., 
'" " " " 
., 
" s.. '" = s.. '" '" 
s.. 
= .t:J .. 2 "." 0 " ~ " ." 0 "'~ ~..:l 8 _~ CiI ~ r., u u 
SWEDEN xx 
88 . 3 11.7 83 . 3 4 133 33 . 25 3 
PAN-ARAB 
50 50 47 . 5 8 226 28 . 25 2+1 
SYRIA 
53 .9 46.1 36.6 6 30 5 2+1 
x Based on Bayly Winder ' s 'Repeaters in Office ', Table 4 in~, 
16/4 - 1962, p . 427 . 
o From 1949 - 58 only . 
1f From 1949 the average is 5 . 5 · months . 
* This is a very conservative estimate . In fact, this whole 
period was punctuated by resignations, political assassinations, 
army intervention, political scandals and cabinet t u rmo i l 
unparalled e ven by ~!i\:ldle lEas tern standards. 
' XX 
Here , we believe , is an ideal model of cabinet stability. 
antithesis of this is the Drazilian mod el. The 
~: Press Reports. 
231 
fall into this cat g ry, as do many oth r Arab c untri s. 
Rapid turnov r of politO al p rsonn 1 n d not b 
ph nom non of d 
fa"l d to initi t 
lop"ng ountri s whi h hav so f r 
polit"cal or nation 1 ons nsus 
among d"ss"dent pol"ti al lit s. Fran in th arly 
1950s, nvinc d a v ry high p rsonn 1 turno r at th 
abin t 1 v 1. Whil outwardly th Fr n h abin t of 
this time approximat d statisti ally th Braz"lian on 
Ba ' th mod Is previously consid red (Tabl 24), Fran 
was not thrown on to th v rge o~ polito al disint gration 
b caus of th pr senc 
as the civil s rvic , 
of stabilising instituions su h 
h church, th arm d ~or es and 
dev lop d popular national and polIti al traditions, 
which would have obviat d mov ments to anarchical social 
and political dis"nt gration . 
It s in th dev loping soci ties which do not hav 
well articulated political traditions and a civil servic 
immun from outsid political int rf r n that political 
instability verging on anarchy r sults from inter or intra-
factional disputes among contending lites . yrian 
governments have continually meddled in th affairs of 
the civil service, j udiciary and the army . Sinecures 
hav b en given to reliable party men and the top posts 
in th army and civil s rvic departments have been 
r serv d for those most trusted by th faction in pow r 
at th mom nt. Th result has b en, as Lern robs r d 
in th arly 1950s, that the mass of civil servants have 
b n k pt on the low r rungs of th s rvi to make way 
for political appointe s to s ns i tiv and influ ntial 
"t" 1 I d d f posllons . n ee, or a civil ser ant or army o£fic r 
to aspir to seniority and prominen e, h had to id nt"fy 
hims If with an influ ntial faction or political 
p rsonality . eed it be said, that th fall of th latter 
from pow r would, ipso facto curtail the ar r of th 
asp "rIng civil s rvant or army offi r, unl ss for sight 
obvi t d th catastroph . 
D spit th frustr t"on which th young Ba ' thists 
felt for th political syst ms whi h th Y ov rthr w in 
1963 th y , in turn, hav no signifi ntly am nded it . 
1 
L rn r, op. cit . , pp . 275-287, in part" ular, p.27 . 
All ley posi ions n th ivil s r L , th army and 
th nationalis d ndu tr s (196~-65), w r d li r d 
ov to Ba ' this or sympath tic r I low trav 11 rs. 
Th itu ation was imllar in Iraq . In both ountri s , 
thos who had particlpat d in k y po itlons und r Lh 
pr -Ba ' th governm nts , w r d prl d 0:[ all politi 1 
rights , many wer imprisoned and oth rs :[orc d to :[1 
to B iru t 1 or Europe for sanctuary . On th 9 March 
196J , t h d ay a f ter acc ssion to pow r , th ational 
Rev olu tionary Command (h reafter RC) of th Syrian 
Ba ' th declare d : 
Th~ R ~ C considers recognition of the new 
national regim in yria a beginning of a 
process to wipe out secession , uproot its 
c a us es 2 fo rever , and e s tablish strong Arab 
u n i ty . 
On 19 July, followin g an attempted asirit sponsor d 
~oup , in Syria , Ali alih Sa ' di, Deputy Prime Minist r 
of the Iraqi Ba ' th , wired to Amin Hafiz, the Chairman 
of t h NRC : 
Cru sh the bones, the very b ones, of all 
cringing mercenari s of reaction and all 
who traffic in slogans .. . Let us trample 
upon those fom ntors of malice, for the 
p ople and history are on our side .. .. 
Death and dishonour to reactionary and 
m rcenary en mi s of the people . J 
2J2 
It cannot b estimated what percentage of the civil 
s rvice , the army and judiciary were immune from the 
Ba ' thist purge in 196J. t would seem, however, that 
all the departmental chiefs 0:[ th civil service, the 
army and the judiciary were staffed by Ba ' thists or 
fellow travellers . The ' frustrated young effendis ' did 
their utmost to eras the personnel and policies of th 
pre c d i n g regime . In Iraq it took the form of a 
wholesome purge on th Communists and Kurds who had 
s u pport d the Communists during th Qasime phase . 
In Syria it took the form of purging all with sec ssionist 
1 
Daily Star, Be"rut, 26 March 196J, and 4 May 196J . 
2 
S APD , vol . 196J, op. cit . , pp . J15-18 . Inter i w 
anonymo u s w" th non-Ba ' th industrial"st in Aleppo 2J 
ov mb r 1967 . 
J 
Ibid . Seth full t xt of th t legram, p.J18 . 
tend nci s, and 1at r following th att mpt d ~ 
on 18 July 196J, as'riL support rs w r purged f om 
th BC (see Tabl 8p, the civil s rvic and rmy. 
lIas th Ba ' th party consolidaL d 'ts hold ov r 
Syria since 196J? S ondly, has 't d lop d a 
political cons nsu amongst its own 1 ading adr? 
To thes qu stions a definit 0 ' must b submitt d. 
In the uphoria o~ oming to pow r , Lhe Ba ' thists ' 
ideals of Arab unity, freedom and socIalism, s m d to 
of~ r the solution 0 th lack o~ social and economic 
progress confronting Lh Arab world. In th ory, at 
least, th Ba ' th ' s aims and objectiv s, as w have 
pr viously se n, were admirable, but th men who w r 
given th responsibility for implem nting th m wer 
by no mans in agr em nt as to most suitable ways of 
attaining these ends . Table 18, for example, shows th 
2JJ 
rapid turn-over of party personnel . A cabin t average 
continuity of 6 new m n to 4 rep ats in office is an 
extremely low figure for a party of dedicated idealists 
seeking to convert the whole Arab world to Ba ' thist 
principles . 
In the following section it is proposed to examine 
the communal and r gional composition of the Ba ' th's 
leading political cadres as a possibl means of explaining 
the failure of the party ' s governmental and non-
governmental wings to develop a unified and workable 
political consensus. 
111: Regional and Communal 
Patterns of Political Representation 
Comparative Communal Mod ls 
Th major aim of this chapter is to inquire into the 
possibility of ac ounting for the appar nt lacl of 
political stability of the Ba'th ' s senior policy making 
bodies in terms of ri alling and omp ting intra-party 
interests based on communal and r gional d'fferences. 
On of the most significant f atur s of the Syrian 
Ba ' th phas by ompar'son with pr vious governmental 
syst ms, is th v st Increase in minority community 
repr s ntation . Tabl s 25-28 show that ov rall th most 
Majority 
Communi ty 
1 Sunni Muslims 
Min ority 
Communities 
A1awi te 
Isma'i1i 
Shi 'i 
Druze 
Greek Orthodox 
Christian 
Majority 
Co mmunity 
Min o r ity 
Comm uni ties 
Total Known 
Total Unknown 
Total Seats & 
Portfolios 
TABLE 25 REPRESENTATION OF RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN THE 
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, 1958-61 
Syrian Regional Councils UAR , 
Mar Oct 
Central Cabinet s UAR 
~lar Sept.60 
1958 58 60 Aug. 61 Mar Oct Sept Aug/ 1 958 58 60 Se pt 
1 2 J 4 No. % No . % 61 5 6* 7* 8 
+P S P S P S P S 
--
P S P 5 P S P 5 P 5 
12 11 15 14 16 15 15 14 58 95 · 1 54 94 · 7 1 J 12 24 21 26 2J 49 42 
-
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
-
-
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
-
-0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
-
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
-
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1.J d 0 0 o 0 0 0 o 0 
2 J.6 2 
-l 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 ·0 0 0 
12 11 15 14 16 15 15 14 58 95 · 1 54 94 . 7 1J 12 24 21 26 2J 49 42 
1 I 
0 0 0 0 2 2 1 J 4.9 J 5·J o 0 o o o o 2 2 
12 11 15 14 i8 17 16 15 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
61 100 I 57 1~ , J 12 24 21 26 2J 51 44 0 · 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 11 15 14 18 17 16 15 61 100 I 57 100J ~J 12 24 21 26 2J 51$ 44 
+ P Portfolio and/o r Execut i v e Office such as President . 
5 = Seat . 
* Not inclusive of the Chairme n (2) of the SRC/UAR and the ERC/UAR. 
G This Figure includes 8 executive officers (7 Vice-Presid ents and the Presiden t) . 
Sources: Archives Biographigue Permanentes Du Monde Arabe, vo1s. 1 and 2. 
No . % No . 
P S 
112 98 . 2 98 
1 
.9 1 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
1 
· 9 1 
0 0 0 
112 98.2 98 
2 1.8 2 
114 lOO 100 
0 0 0 
114 100 100 
The Middle East (Europa Publications, London), vo1s . 1948-62. See 'Who's Who in the Middle East' . 
Press Reports . 
% 
98 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
98 
2 
100 
0 
100 
r-J 
W 
~ 
TABLE 26 REPRESENTATION OF RELI GIOUS COMMUNITIES ON SYRIAN CABINETS" 1961-6). 
Secessionist Cabinets 
Continued Sept . Nov Dec Apl June Se pt/Mar 
6 1 61 6~ 62 62 6~
Cabinet Nos . 9 10 11 12 1) 14 No. % No. % 
P S P S P S P S P S P S P S 
S unni Musl-:ims 15 10 16 9 15 11 17 12 16 1) 17 16 
--
94 76.4 I 69 75.8 
Alawite 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 
Isma'ili 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 1.5 2 
--=J 
0 0 0 0 
Shi ' i 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1. 1 1.1 
Druze 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 4 ).) 4 4 . 4 
Greek Orthodox 4 2 4 ) 4 ) ) 2 4 2 ) ) Christian 22 17.8 15 16·5 
l'Iaj ority 
15 10 16 Communi ty 9 15 11 17 12 15 12 16 15 
Minori t y 4 2 4 6 4 Communities ) 5 ) 6 4 5 5 
94 76i~ 75.8 
29 2) . 6 22 24 . 2 
Total Known 19 12 20 12 21 16 21 15 21 16 21 20 12 ) 100 91 100 
Total Unknown 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Seats & 
19 Portfolios 12 20 1 2 21 16 21 15 21 16 21 20 \J.2 ) 100 91 100 
Sources: Published Cabinet Lists. 
Archives Biographique Perrnanentes Du Monde Arabe , vols . 1 and 2 . 
The Middle East (Europa Publications, London), vols. 1948-67. See 'Who's Who in the Middle East'. 
Press Reports. 
Interviews . ~, 
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significant proportional incr ase in this respect is 
mad by the Ala wit c ommunity of Latt kia in north 
west rn Syria . Tabl 29 is a br akdown of Al a wit 
communal repr s ntation from 1958-66 : 
TABLE 29 
Alawite Political Representation , 1958-66 
SRC /UAR CC /UAR S / S C 
1 . 8 1 . 1 2 . 2 
SBC SBPC SRC 
17 · 16 . 22 . 4 
B C Syrian Percent age 
7 · 5 11. 5 
Based on Tables 0 . 25 - 28 . See Appendix 2 , Credal 
Differences, for more detailp . 
2J8 
Like the Alawit e s the Druz e a ls o made a significant 
rise to politi c a l p romin enc e in Syri a during the Ba ' th 
p h a se . Although in perc entage tbe ir mono polisation of 
senior Ba ' th a dminis trat ive bodies wa s not quite on the 
magnitude of the Alawit e s, it wa s, nev rtheless, 
significantly above th€ total Syrian p rcentage . 
TABLE JO 
Druze Political Representation, 1958-66 
SRC / UAR CC / UAR S / SC 
3 · 5 1 . 1 4.4 
SBC SBPC SRC 
5 . 8 12 15 · 8 
BNC Syrian Percentage 
6 . 25 3 · 
Based on Tabl es 25 - 28 . See App endix 2 , Cre dal 
Differences , for more d tails. 
Like the Ala wit s , the participation of the Druz 
community in Syrian national politics has taken plac e 
since independ enc e in 1946 . Figur 3 shows that the 
Alawites and oth r rural minority communiti e s, with th 
pos sible exception of th Christians, played no significant 
role in Syrian national politics which wer dominat d 
.j..l 
s:: 
Q) 
u 
$.I 
Q) 
Po. 
Fig . 3 
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Minority Community Represent ation on Syrian Cabinet s ,1958-66 
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UAR phase, 
1958-61. 
14 ; Secession-
ist phase, 
1961-63. 
24;Ba 'th 
phase, 
1963- 66 . 
Majority 
Minority 
r0 
-..J 
~ 
in th d cad aft rind p nd nc , by th main urb n 
c ntr s of Damas us and Aleppo in who h th NatOonal 
Party and th Peoples ' Party, r pr s ntativ of 
c omm rcial and land d °nt r sts, flourish d . Th 
240 
s 
of th impov rish d rural minoriti s occurr daft th 
br akdown of th UAR and, in particular durOng th Ba ' th 
phase . (See Tabl s 25-28) . 
Christian 
SRC/UAR 
0 
SBC 
4 . 9 
B C 
15 · 
Based on Tables 25-28 . 
for more d eta ils . 
TABLE 31 
sentation, 1958-66 
CC / UAR S / SC 
0 16 . 5 
SBPC SRC 
0 5 . 3 
Syrian Perc ntage 
14 . 5 
See Appendix 2, Credal Differenc s, 
Christian representation, with the one exception of 
the B C is considerably below the national population 
perc entage . Actually, the B C percentage is misleading 
as it is c omprised of only three men measured over s veral 
B Cs . Considering the fact that the founder of the party 
was a Christian, Christains as a whole did not greatly 
participate in Ba'th party senior commands, such as ar 
under consideration in this study . Even in Lebanon, with 
a population of around 41 per cent, Christians, with one 
or two notable exc ptions,do not appear to have played a 
very significant part on the Lebanese Regional Command l 
(LRC) . 
1 
Communal statistics are not availabl for the LRC On 
d tail . How v er , from conversations with leading 
Lebanese Ba ' thists, th writer is 1 d to believ that 
hi'i and Sunni Muslims dominate the party ' s base and 
leading political cadre . The present ecretary of the 
LRC , Ali Khalil, is a hi ' i from southern L banon . 
Strong party support has from time to time come from 
th Biqa town of Baalbe k, with a p rc ntag of 67 .5 
hi ' i and Tripoli with a Sunni majority of 77 . 2 For 
statistical information s Baer, op . cit., p .114. 
Cu1 turally, th hristain ommuniLy in yri nd 
L banon inc1in d mor towards Europ and Am ri a than 
th Ar b-Islamic h art1 nds . A P n-Ar b nation would 
almost c rtainly poss ss a cultural p tt rn r fl ti 
of th maj rity community - th Sunni Muslims. 
Christians, with on or two exc ptions, r sist d ov rt 
partOcipation in the Arab na ionalist mov m nt . D wn 
obs rv s , for xampl , that in 192 6, Chris t ° ans wi th 
a national average of 10 to 12 p r nt of th total 
yrian population ompris d only 6 p r ent of th 
Arab nationalist n t . 1 mov m Chris ti n r sistanc to 
241 
pr ssures in 1958 to include Lebanon in th United Ar b 
R public, furth r confirm their ontinuing opposition t 
th creation of an all mbracing Arab nation . 
A second plausible planation Jor th relativ 
paucity of Christian representation in the Syrian Ba ' th, 
may b attributed to the party ' s mphasis on unity and 
socialism . Although proportionat ly a small community, 
(viz . 14 . 5) Christians wer by no means a hapless 
minority . They poss ssed a very high degr e of lOt racy 
and in comm rcial, professional and bureaucratic lif 
of the urban centr s, th ir influ nc was far in xcess 
2 
of their minority status . Any violent upset of th 
status~uo would have been abhorr nt to the Christians 
who would have had v ry much to lose, economically and 
politically . 
Table 28 t nds to confirm th fact that the Christian 
community was more cont nt to participat in conservative 
anti ~unionist right-wing r gim s such as th / SC, 1961-6 J, 
than ither the SRC / UAR or CC / UAR of the UAR or th BC 
or IBC . 
Statistically, the ommun° y to los th gr at s L 
proportional representation during th Ba ' th phase in 
gov rnment was the unni Muslim : 
1 
M J ., 16 / l.j. - 196 2 , p . 15J . 
2 
L rn r, op . it ., p . 272. 
* 
SRc / uAR 
94 . 7 
BC 
66 . 5 
B C 
55 
TABLE 32 
cci AR 
98 . 2 
BPC 
72 
yrian P rc nt ge 
68.7 
I' c 
75· 
RC 
42 . 1 
Based on Tabl s 25-28. See Appendix 2, Cr dal 
Dif f renc es, for more details . 
2~2 
Acc ording to Dawn and Antonius, unni Muslims compris d 
the bulk of the m mbership of th Arab nationalist 
movement within Syria in the pre- and post-World War I 
1 
phases . Lern r observes th continuance of unni 
prepond rance among the d puties and cabin t minist rs 
of the Syrian Parliam nt in 1936. 2 Figure 3 confirms 
the fact that during the 1950s the Sunni maintained 
well over ninety p r cent of all abin t appointment 
Th z nith of Sunni influence am in th CC / UAR whi h 
returned a Sunni communal representation of 98 per c nt. 
Arab unity by its If did not poss ss the same fright ning 
cons quences of cultural dilution for th Sunni whi h it 
had for the Christians and the Islamic sects. Unity 
to the Sunni, was a very natural mo ment to redress the 
divisiveness p rpetuated, and accentuated during th 
colonial and mandatory phases among th 'Brethren' . 
Communal and Regional Patterns 1 ithin the Ba'th 
t was primarily during th Ba ' th phas that th 
first major assault was made upon the fabric of Sunni 
Muslim political domination of Syria . ( ee Fig . 3) 
Tabl s 33, 34 and 35, for xampl , show that with th 
proportional decr as in urban repres ntation from 
Damascus and Aleppo, there is a corr sponding and 
dramatic incr ase in rural r pr s nt tion from the 
1 
bid ., p . 153; Antonius, op. it . , p.lll. 
2 
Lern r, op . cit . , p.272. 
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Muhafazats of north, llorLh w stern, ntral and ~outh rn 
Syria . Thus it is poss·ble to how in tabular form Lhat 
for th first im in yrian politi al histo y, that 
Alawlt , Druzes , Isma ' ·lis are rising through th 
Ba ' th party to monopolis and domina the organs of 
political power . (S e Tabl s 27 and 28) . 
Is it possible to b more pr cis and to isolat 
th moment at which th minoriti s began to dominat th 
SBC , SBPC, SRC and B C? Part 2, Chapt r 1, for xampl , 
s hows that in t rms of communal r pr s ntation (se 
Table 2) , Sunni Muslim constitut 68 . p r c nt of th 
foundation members, a figure almost id ntical with th 
national population percentage (s Table 4) . Table 28 
shows that during th 1950s minority community 
representation on th BNC, with the notabl exc ption 
of the First B C, did not exceed two thirds of the total 
Sunni Muslim membership . The Fourth B C, held at th 
moment when the Ba ' th had withdrawn from the UAR,brought 
in a parity of minority-majority community representation 
( vi z . , 5 t 0 5) . Yet it was not until the Seventh and 
Eighth B Cs of February 1964 and April 1965, that 
minority execeeded majority communal representation 
( viz . , 7 to 6 and 7 to 6 respectively). Table 28 shows 
that in February 1964, the SRC had a greater percentage 
of minority communal representation (viz., J : 2) . 
Although the communal balance oscillated slightly, the 
trend as measur d in Tables 27 and 28 is towards great r 
minority representation in the majori y of the Ba ' th ' s 
organs of political power . 
Fro m ou r Tables it would appear that minority 
commu nal representation (i . e . Alawite) , began to increase 
s ignif icantly towards the end of 1964, and by February 
1966 it was strong enough to take over the B C, SBC, 
SBPC and SRC . 
Statistically it can be shown that by the 1960s~ 
rural minorities were rising to challenge the traditional 
politi c al domination of the Sunni Muslim majority 
c ommunity . How is it possibl to account for their 
u npred ictable rise to power, specially within the Ba ' th? 
o one answer would be satisfactory, though sev ral may 
b v alid . Firstly, th rise of the rural and backward 
minorities of Syria, as in th r st of the countries of 
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the developing world, was part of a wid social 
phenomenon of th mid-tw ntieth c ntury . This , in 
part, r suIted from th spread and ac ptanc of n w 
social values thems Iv s r flectiv of th W st rnising 
process in regions hitherto subjec to patr Oarchal or 
feudal systems of government . alu s abo e and b yond 
the famil y , clan or tribe were fost red hrough stat 
sponsored e ducation , which plac ed loyal y upon th 
' nation ', as understood from Europ an models . Th growth 
of state sponso re d mass media , similarly contribut d to 
the widening of mental horizons or , as L rner calls it, 
' empathy ' ,1 in minds hitherto ossified by centuri s of 
enforced isolat ion . 
With a population percentage to the total Syrian 
population of 11.5 per c ent, entry into the main stream 
of national life was clearly no criterion that the 
Alawites would some d ay control Syria . While their 
communal cohesive ness is ouch greater than the unni, 
the Alawite like the Druz e and Isma 'l i, started to climb 
the ' political power ladder ' after independence, as 
e x tremely unprepare d and backward emancipated rural 
minorities . Politically , they may nev r hav risen to 
prominence had it not been for the army . After 
independe nc e in April 1946, men from poor urban and 
rural communi ties entered the Syrian army in gre at numb e rs. 
Among them were the Alawites, Druzes and Isma ' ilis, 
who were later to join and dominate the Ba ' th party . 
Alawite Ba ' thist officers, led by Salah Jadid , Hafiz 
Assad and Muhammad Umran and others, u tilised the communal 
cohesive ness of their communi ty within the army, to be 
in a position of strength to dictate to the Ba ' th party, 
the government and the Syrian officer cadre, at the 
2 
moment when the Ba ' th s ei zed power in March 1963 . Mass 
retrenc hments of secessionist and asirite offic ers were 
subsequently replaced by large p ercentag es of Ala wi te 
officers and o the r r ank s , while the influential Alawit e 
1 
Lerner , op . cit . , p . 43 f f . 
2 
See p p . 178 - 80 . 
offic r committ succ ded in p1ac·ng many Alawi 
officer recruits in th military a ad mi s of IIoms and 
1 Al ppo . 
f we acc pt th theory of communal ' Machia 11-
ianism ' , let us now pose the qu stion : what, asid 
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from personal or v n communal aggrandis m nt initially 
attracted the minorities to the Ba ' th party? Fir tly, 
Ba ' th socialism may hav been app aling to ' have not ' 
rural communities . Unlike the Sunni or Christian 
ntrepr neurial class s of th citi s , th y had nothing 
to lose and everything to gain from agrarian r form and 
nationalisation of industry . Dore n Warriner writ s: 
D tached observers regard th party (Ba ' th) 
as canalising a social movement, which in 
one form or another was bound to appear as 
the natural outcome of .conditions in th 
Homs-Hama district, and representing 
d mands which th progress of the country 
should be able to meet . 2 
Secondly, rural minorities might have been attract d 
to the Ba ' th, because of its non-sectarian polici s. 
Within the Ba ' th they would start, in theory, as equals 
with other communities thus, in fact, obviating 
traditional discriminations against minority communiti s . 
Communist parties of Lebanon and Syria, for example , 
recruited members from small, sometimes ostracised 
communities (e.g. Armenians) for much the same reason 
1 
Interview with the brother of Presid nt Amin Hafiz's 
Aid -de-CamE, Beirut, 2J October 1967 . He held that 
following the Ba ' th takeover, of the 700 officers 
retrenched, th Alawite officer committee headed by 
Salah Jadid, succeeded in securing half the replacem nts 
with A1awit es . 
Interview, Bitar, Beirut, 16 ovember 1967 . He 
held that the Alawit e officer committee had conspir d 
for some time to tak over the Syrian army and the 
civilian administration. He recalled that as Prime 
Minist r after the coup of March 196J, h constantly ran 
into Alawit interference in the governments, direct d 
through the ational Revolutionary Council and later th 
Military Committ and finally th Regional Command. 
Interview, Atrash, Beirut, 20 D c mber 1967 . 
2 
Warriner, D . , Land R form and DeveloP7ent in the Middle 
East , A Study of Egypt , yria and Iraq Oxford University 
Press, First Edition 1957, Second Edition 1962), pp . 108-
109 . The obs rva tlon of the Ba' th w s made in th mid -
1950s . 
J 
Laq u ur, Communism and ationa1ism in t,=..h.:....:....-=-:...:.:....:..;..:;:=-:_ E_< ast, 
p . ll, 1, ~s s im . 
J 
Onc again this might b xplain d by th psychological 
s curity which minority communiti s s k in so ialist 
non-s ctarian and int rnational organisations. 
ocialism and non-s ctarianism w r certainly 
motivating factors in attracting m mb rs of rural 
minority communities to the Ba ' th . On the question of 
Arab unity, the main platform of th Ba ' th, th attitud 
of the minorities, seems to have be n som what 
ambivalent . Arab unity may here be n a comforting 
thought, as it impli d a strengthening of political 
and economic resources to offset Zionist or colonialist 
(as the mass media often stated) intrigu s in the Arab 
homeland . But while national enthusiasm pulled one 
way, communal realities tugged in the other . With 
poorly developed economic potentialities, limited 
professional expertise and relatively little overall 
political influenc outside Syria, minority communities 
inter se had little for which to hope in an all-embracing 
Arab (Sunni Muslim) nation . Culturally, despite the 
Ba ' th ' s a d vo c a c y of non-sectarianism, Sunni Muslims 
would triumph as they constituted well over 80 per cent 
of the total Arab population . The ideal of Ba'th non-
sectarianism and the reality of the moment, may have 
created grave doubts in the minds of Ba ' thists minority 
community members, regarding the wisdom of Arab unity . 
During the UAR phase, for example, Egyptianisation may 
in fact have been identified with Sunni Muslim 
acculturation of the Union . l Some Syrian minority 
community army officers certainly came to this conclusion 
as they sat in the coffee houses of Cairo, drinking away 
the hours while watching the Egyptianisation of every 
facet of Syrian administration. 
1 
Interview with abil Swairy, brother-in-law of Mansur 
Atrash, Beirut, lJ October 1967. During the Union he was 
an army officer . He said that Syrian officers at this 
time became highly conscious of their confessional 
loyalties whereas before the formation of the UAR 
' nobody considered them ' . wairy hims If is a Christain 
from Damascus . S e, Biographical otes for more details . 
250 
Communal and R Speculativ_ 
It is now necessary to pose a vital question in this 
chapter : is it possible to account for political 
instability, with particular relation to the Ba ' th, on 
the basis of conflicting communal and regional (i.e. 
rural-urban) self-interest ? Before attempting to answ r 
this question, let us briefly consid r the communal and 
regional representational patterns extant in pr -Ba'th 
governmen ts , as a point of comparison with Ba ' th 
governments after 1963: 
TABLE 36 
Communal and Regional Representation: 
Pre-Ba'th Governments* 
Sunni Muslim: 
Urban Representation: 
(Estimated) 
* 
SRC/UAR 
94.7 
83.3 
CC/UAR 
98. 
68 . 
S/SC 
75.8 
79.4 
Based on Tabl s 25, 26, 27, 33 and 34. In th pre-war 
phase, it is stimated that Sunni Muslim representation 
was running at 90 per cent with possibly 65-70 per cent 
urban (Damascus - Al eppo) representation in the Syrian 
government. 
I have taken as my urban model, centres with a 
settled and integrated population providing educational, 
occupational, commercial and industrial facilities for 
their inhabitants. I have classified a man with ' urban 
representation' if he has been born in a centre meeting 
the above requirements. I am of the opinion that in 
Syria today men who come to live in Damascus, Roms, 
Aleppo, Rama or other major 'urban centres' from 
surrounding villages still identify themselves with 
the village rather than the town. R nce by my calculation 
they are rural r pr s ntatives. 
By comparison, comparable figures for the SBC: 
TABLE 37 COMMUNAL AND REGIONAL REPRESENTATION : TI~ SBC , 1963 - 66 
Mar May Aug Nov May Oc t Sept Jan Mar Oc t 
63 63 63 63 64 64 65 66 66 66 
Cabinets * 15 16 17 IS 19 2 0 21 22 23 24 
Sunni Muslims 75 6S . S 66 . 7 69 . 6 S5 61 . 9 57 . S Sl . S 55 57 . 2 
Urban Representation : 35 50 33·3 39 . 1 55 3S . 1 30 55 25 30 
-l(. 
Based on Table s 27 and 35 . 
Cabinet Nos . 15 March 1963 Prime Minister (Hereafter PM) Salah 
16 May 1963 P . M. Bitar . 
17 Aug 1963 P.M. Bitar . 
IS Nov 1963 P . M. Amin Hafi 
19 May 1964. P.M . Bitar . 
20 Oct 1964 P . M. Hafiz, also President of State . 21 Sept 1965 P.M. Yusif Zu ' ayyen . 
22 Jan 1966 P.M. Bitar . 
23 March 1966 P.M . Zu ' ayyen. 
24 Oct 1966 P . M. Zu ' ayyen . 
l\.) 
\.n 
f-' 
Th abov Tabl s should b m asur d alongs1d th 
national tr nds : 
ational Communal and R gional Distribution* 
Sunni Urban Rural B douin mi- omad 
30. 58 . 3 · 5 
-)(-
tatistics given in Syria: I-list£EL.:::a:.:n~d=---=-.:::....:::.=:....=:.= 
vol. 1, op . cit . , p .45. Th perc n ag s 
for the mid-1950s . Since then there has n a 
continuing trend towards great r urbanisation, though 
in th late 1960s more than 60 p r cent of Syria ' s 
population is still rural . Se Baer for communal 
statistics, op. cit., p . 109 . 
In pre-Ba ' th Syrian governments (see Table 36), 
Sunni -urbanit es from the two major urban centres, 
Damascus and Al eppo preponderate; the zenith of their 
influenc is attain d in the SRC / UAR and th CC/ AR. 
Thus it might b inferred that those favouring Arab 
unity most of all would seem to have b en Sunni-
urbanites - the traditional business men of the Arab 
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world . It may be accidental or coincidental but Table 28 
shows that the Second B C which, in th ory, brought 
th Ba ' th into union wi th asir, had a percentage of 
ov r 70 per cent Sunni Muslim with 2 out of 3 
Syrian m mbers on th Command coming from Damascus. 
(S e Table 39) . Sectarian and rural communities do not 
se m to have played a very significant part in the SRC / UAR, 
CC / UAR or the B C, in the case of the latter before 1960. 
(See Table 28) . It might be argued that unni-urbanit s 
would have more to exp ct from an Arab-Muslim nation 
than th backward rural minorities of yria. 
Table 36 shows a general d clin in unni-urban 
representation during the S / SC, 1961-63 and a orr sponding1y 
high r percentag of se tarian rural repre entation . 
How v r , the figure of 79 . 4 per ent 1s inflated b 
Christians from th uIban c ntres of Al ppo, Damas us 
and Lattakia (se Tabl 26) . The d clin on Sunni-urban 
r pres ntation On thOs p riod might b attr1but d to a 
w ak ning of th political and e onomi dominat1on of th 
TABLE J9 
BA'TH NATIONAL COM}~D: 
MEMBERSHIP REPRESENTATION BY MUHUFAZAT AND STATE , 1947-66 
r-. 
'" 
\Q 
-g, o:t 0\ 0 \Q \Q 
'" '" 
\Q 
'" "" 
~ 0\ 0\ ,.... \Q \Q \Q ...; ...; § p +> 0 .. 0. 0. >, +> 
.0 
.. +>.0 0. ~ ~ <IS <.l ~ 0. ~ « .-, m m ::;: 0 r.. « r.. 
Command Nos: 1 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 1 No . % 
1r-. ~ 0\ 0 tfI \Q ~ U"\U"'\\OC\lC"l..:t \0\0 0\ \Q \Q \Q 0\ 0\ 
I""'i 4> ~ ~ ~o~ 
8. § g- g- ~ ~ .g 8.+>~ 
«"' rn m ::;: or.. < r.. 
1 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 INo. % l Command Nos: 
Country Pan-Arab Membership Representation . Muhafazat 
Syrian Membership Representation 
Syria 14 J 1 1 1 4 6 6 1 26 J2.5 Lattakia 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 6 2J . l _ 
I Lebano n JO 2 1 21 4 1 4 4 4 2 26.25 Idlib 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
I Jordan 0 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 III lJ .75 rAleppo I 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 J 11 . 5 
l Iraq 
1 0 J T 18 1 2 J J 5 1 22·5 
I Deir ez -Zor 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 J . 85 
[ Saudi Arabia JO 1 I J o o 1 o o 1 J · 75 I H=. 1
0
' 0 0 0 0 0 0 , J 8'/ 
Horns 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
j ... or I 0 0 , 0 0 0 0 0 /' ",/ Damascus 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 J8.5 
Suweida 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 5 19.2 _ 
, 
Total Kno wn 4 7 10 10 10 1J . lJ lJ 80 100 
Total Unknown 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Seats 4 7 10 10 10 lJ lJ lJ 80 100 I 
Syrian Only 14 J 1 1 1 4 6 6 /26 100 
Syrian to Non-Syrian J2 ·5 
Total Seats 14 7 10 10 10 lJ lJ lJ 180 100 
Sources: Interviews. 
Document on Party Membership Tabled at The Eighth National Congress in April _ May 1965. 
Press Reports . 
i 
i\J 
VI 
W 
Sunni-urban mlddle 
Onc again it may b 
la s during th UAR phas 
oin idental, but Tabl 2 
1 5 -61. 
shows 
that from th mom nt wh n the Ba'th b gan to withdr w 
its support from th UAR (sRc / uAR and ccl AR) th r i 
a corresponding incr as in minority r pr s ntation on 
the Fourth B C bringing it to parity with th majorOty 
community . Can it be argu d that rtain communal and 
regional r present tional ratios ontribut to, or 
nullify basic party fundamental r g rding Arab unity? 
The above Tables would s m to sugg st that ther 
might b an element of truth in this hypoth sis. 
Syrian governm nts (Sunni and urban) political 
stability is no greater, if measur d in tim, continuity 
or membership and development of uniform political 
traditions than during the Ba'th phase. Lern r, for 
example, holds that betwe n the 1920s and 1950s, political 
instability was the result of contending socio- conomi 
elites from roughly the same classes who w re trying to 
displace their rivals from power in order to monopolise 
it for their own limited self-interests. l Dawn, writing 
about the struggles between the Ottomanists and the 
Arabists b fore and during the First World War, shows 
that th y were of similar if not id ntical socio-
economic class status and were overwhelmingly Sunni and 
urban, with Damas us supplying over 80 per cent of all 
2 
contestants. The nature of the political conflicts 
in Syria, according to both writ ers, would seem to have 
been a struggle for power and prestige in the government, 
the civil service and to a lesser extent the army, 
played above the heads of the mass of rural and urban 
lower classes. 
During the Syrian Ba 'th phase, th traditional 
power struggle remained constant enough, but the socio-
e conomic composition of the rivalling intra-party elites 
political struggles changed. Tabl s 27 and 35 show that the 
elite competing for the politi al domination of th 
Syrian Ba'th, is primarily rural and s ctarian, and 
comprises 'younger' (i .. up to four y ars) men from 
1 
L rn r, op.cit . , p . 275. 
2 
Dawn in MEJ, 16 / 4 - 1962, p.152-54. 
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low r socio-economic origins . Th party elit bing 
challeng d from the mom nt th party m to pow r in 
1963 and finally displa ed on 23 February 1966 , is 
primarily Sunni Muslim (see Tabl 27), urban (s Tabl 
i . . mainly Damas n e ) and of low r-middl socio-e onomi 
1 " 1 c ass orlglns . 
Table 35 shows that with the formation of th SBC 
there is a marked decline in urban r pr s ntation from 
Damas cus and Aleppo, such as c an b se n in Tabl 34 
regarding the s/sc . Men from ov rwhelmingly rural 
Mllhafazats are rising to pol itical pow r in the SBC and 
Ba 'th phase generally after 1963. (ee Tables 28 and 
35) . 
'35 
Do all SBCs show a progressive tr nd towards greater 
rural and sectarian representation? The answer is that 
the trend can be seen to be leading in this direction, 
though it is from time to time marked with erratic 
repr sentational patterns . To some extent it can be 
shown that communal and regional representational 
patterns can be correlated with political behavioural 
trends in the SBC, SBPC, SRC and to a 1 sser extent in 
the B C. Let us test this observation on th SBC . 
Bitar ' s cabinets ( os.15, 16, 17, 19 and 22) show 
a trend towards incr asing Sunni and urban ministerial 
representation (se Table 35) . These cabinets are 
unionist and moderate socialist in orientation . By 
comparison Hafiz 's cabinets ( os . 18 and 20) have on an 
average a lower urban representational pattern than Bitar ' s 
cabinets. Until late in 1965 Hafiz tended to support 
the regional socialist trend in the party . Under his 
second cabinet ( ~ 0 . 20), extensive nationalisation laws 
were implemented . 
If communal and regional representation is not 
markedly different in ither Bitar ' s or Hafiz ' s 
governm nts, the composition of Zu ' ayy n ' s cabinets stand 
out pat ntly clear in contrast. Zu'ayyen, a Sunni 
Muslim, came from th rural Muhafazat of Deir ez -Z or in 
north ast rn Syria . At the age of 35 y ars, when h 
1 
The question of socio-economic class origin will b 
discuss d on pp. 260-309 . e Tabl 46, p . 268 . 
b cam Prime Minist r h r pr s nt d th 
' young r ' 
regional socialist wing or the party who h was ba k d 
and dir ct d by th Alawit of£i ommitt nd its 
milOtary alli s. Zu'ayyen's cabin t show a cl ar 
pr pond rance of rural representation with Lattakia 
gaining many s nior portfolios at a ratio of 7 . 3 (se 
Tabl 35), with Sunni Muslim r pr s ntation rating 
5 . 5:4.5 over the minority communiti s. (Se Tabl 40). 
Compared with Bitar ' s cabin ts, Zu' ayy n adopt d an 
extreme r egional socialist orientation which among 
oth r things, opposed any form of unity or even an 
improvement in political relations with asir . 
Representational Patterns on the Eve of the 23 February 
1966 Coup 
After the Zu'ayyen government was dismissed by the 
Eighth B C (see Part 4) on 21 D cember 1965, Bitar ' s 
fifth government (No . 22) increas d the unni Muslim 
representation from 57.8 per cent to 81.8 per cent 
(No . 21) and urban representation from 30 per cent to 
55 p r cent. Of the 55 per cent urban representation, 
42.9 per cent are Damascenes (see Tables 35) a stronghold 
of the moderate unionist wing of the Ba ' th . 
On 23 February 1966, the regional socialists 
retaliated ; Bitar and Hafiz, the President of State were 
imprisoned . Alfaq and the new Secretary-General of the 
B C, Munif Razzaz, were forced to fl e the country . Many 
nationalists including members of the B C and Bitar ' s 
ill-fat d governm nt ( 0 . 22) were imprisoned and in some 
instances expelled from the party by the 
Septemb r 1966. 
inth B C in 
With the overthrow and annihiliation of the 
nationalists , the regional socialists became the undisputed 
masters of the SBC, RC and BNC . Zu ' ayyen 's second and 
third cabinets ( os . 23 and 24) show vastly differ nt 
r presentational patt rns from Bitar 's ill-fated 
gov rnment ( 0 . 22). (ee Tables 27 and 35) . Urban 
r pres ntation (i . e. primarily Damasc ne) is reduced by 
half (25 . per cent) and unni Muslim by over one quart r . 
Thos to gain th most after the coup ar Ba ' thists from 
rural and s ctarian con~unities, with Alawites bing th 
strong st and most r pr sent d ommunity in the senior 
offic s of th party and go ernments . 
North Wo e t I 
Lot.takio. 
I~llb 
Sub-t.otal 
~I 
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No rt.h Entl t I 
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~I 
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Sub-to tal 
~I 
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Explanatory 
Hav we su e d d in isolating variabl s bas d on 
communal and r g'onal r presentation patt rns to a oun 
for Ba ' th political ins ability - an 'nstab'lity whi h 
led to the virtual d struction of th organisation on 
23 F bruary 1966? Th answer would s m to b that if 
th tabular analys s ar accurat, and with p viously 
express d qualifica ions, the tr nd would s em to 
indicat th pr s nc 
Sunni dichotomies . 
of rural-s t rarian and urb n 
To this might b add d th m dian 
ag differential showing the regional socialists to b 
at least four years (or by our classification, half a 
political generation) younger than th nationalists or 
orthodox Ba ' thists of th Aflaqiyya tradition . How v r, 
it should be made quite clear that if the existence of 
incompatible dichotomies are determined, it should not 
be thought that a complete bifur ation of party memb rship 
o c curred alo ng rural-sectarian and urban- unni lin s. 
Following the 23 February 1966 coup, Sunnis from urban 
centres continu ed to work alongsid sectarian and rural 
leaders of the party although, perhaps, as junior partners. 
Alawites, Druz and Christian supporters of the B C and 
th ill-fated Supreme Council of all tr nds were ove rthr own 
and forced into exile with the Sunni nationalist associates. 
Yet despite these exceptions the overall trend 
toward representational dichotomi s is not invalidated. 
Of cours other factors such as personal malice, s If-
interest, opportunism and a whole host of other 
contributory variables not easily measurable in tabular 
analysis must not b overlooked as possible causative 
agents of unrest and division . But with thes reservations, 
it is believed that significant explanatory variable s h a ve 
be n shown to account for the coup of 23 February 1966 . 
. .; 
v : Education 
Traditions of Education 
In this chapter it is propos d to xamin th 
educational traditions of th 1 ading Ba ' th political 
cadres, in th hop that it might throw furth r light 
on th variables of discord and disunity pat ntly 
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evid nt in the party at th moment of its disint egration 
on 23 February 1966 . But firstly, in ord r to put th 
Ba ' th into educational persp ctiv alongside traditions 
of ducation op rating in other governm ntal syst ms, 
the following Tables have been set out blow : 
TABLE 41 
Syrian D puties : Centres of lligher 
Education, 1919-58 * 
Parliament 
1919 
1928 
1932 
1936 
1943 
1947 
191~9 
1953 
1954-58 
European a nd 
American 
0 
19 
18 
25 
18 
51 
31 
19 
35 
Middle Eastern 
(excluding Syria ) 
100 
71 
68 
63 
56 
22 
24 
19 
10 
Known Syrian percent-
age 
0 100 
10 100 
14 100 
12 100 
26 100 
27 100 
45 100 
61 100 
55 100 
Bas d on Bayly Winder ' s Table 4 in MEJ . , 17/ 1 - 1963, p . 46. 
By comparison in the post- AR phas 
TABLE 42 
S yri an (UAR) and I..::.r,.:::a:;.:::9l.,:l=..· --...::::C,.:::a~..:b::..:i=-n~....:::...~:::.::.:..:::.:::....::.::::...=...~ 
Executive Offic rs ' Centres of 
SRC / UAR 
1958 - 61 
CC / UAR 
1958 - 61 
S / SC 
1961 - 63 
SBC 
1963-66 
SBPC 
1964 - 66 
IBC 
Feb- ov 
1963 
EuroE an and 
Americ~ 
24 . 6 
2 3 . 
51 . 7 
27 . 7 
16 . 
27 . 
Middl East rn 
(excluding Syria) 
3 · 5 
46 . 
4 . 4 
If . 4 
12 . 
73 · 
(Iraq only) 
Based on Tables 43 and 44 . 
* 
Syrian 
49 . 1 
20 . * 
44 . 
67 . 9 
72 . 
o 
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~ 
77 . 2 
89 . 
100 
100 
100 
100 
This percentage would seem to be out of character with the 
general trend . The reason for this is that it is measuring 
Syrian and Egyptian representation in the CC / UAR . If 
the respective educational percentages are broken down 
into their appropriate categories, it can be seen that 
over 60 per cent of Egyptians and Syrians took higher 
education in th ir home country and approximately 25 p e r 
cent Egyptians and 28 per cent Syrians studied in Europ e 
or America . 
\ 
TABLE: lq 
CE!iTRES Of' 
HICHE R EDUCATION 
BELGIlJ)( 
CA..'iADA 
FRA..'OCE 
GER.."'lA..'i'Y 
ITALY 
SOVIET UNIO N 
SVTI'ZERLA.'IO 
UNITED KINGDOM 
mrITED STATES 
YUGOSUVll 
OTHER EUROPEAN 
CE YT'RES 
SUB-l'OTA.L 
ECYl'T (UAR AFTE R 
SE PT. 61) 
IRAQ 
lE8A.'iOS 
TURKEY 
OTHER MIDDLE 
EASTERN CENTRES 
SUB T OTAL 
SYRIA 
TOTAL D OWN 
TOTAL UN"KNO\lN' 
TO"UL SEATS 
0 
0 
) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
SYRI..A...'l RE GIONAL COml'CILS . OAF 
furch 
1 958 
0 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
· 0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
Sept . 1960/ 
.Aug . 1901 
So. 
0 0 
0 0 
) 11 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 ) 
0 0 
0 0 
~ I 
0 
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19 . ) 
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0 
0 
5.) 
0 
0 
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continued on p . 26J 
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TA..SLE ~ J 
CE~'TRES OF 
HIGHER EOUCATION 
BELGIUM 
CA.'I'ADA 
FRA.,. .. CE 
GER..'tA...\j"y 
ITALY 
SOVIET UNION 
S .... TrZERLAN·U 
UNITED ~GDOM 
UNITED STATES 
YUGOSLAVIA 
OTHER EUROPE A...N' 
CENTRES . 
S UB-TOTAL 
EGYPT(UAR AFTER 
SEPT.6L) 
IRAQ. 
LEBA... .. ON 
TUlUCEY 
OTHER MIDDLE 
EASTE.:l.N CENTRES 
SUB-TOTAL 
SYRIA 
TOTAl.. KNOWN 
TOTAL ITN1QlOWN 
TOTAL SEATS 
contd. SYRIAN. UAR A.l\fl) IRA.9I GOVDtNl1ENTS: 
Mar 
196) 
15 
0 
0 
• 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
1 
0 
0 
~ay 
6) 
16 
1 
0 
4 
0 
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1 
0 
0 
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0 
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SYR.T.A.. .. B.A'TH CABI~ 
Au g Nov Hay Oct Sept Jan 
6) 6) 64 64 65 66 
L7 18 19 20 21 22 2) 
1 1 L 1 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
) ) 8 ) ) 7 L 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 
0 ., 0 0 1 0 2 
2 2 1 0 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
, 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
CE~"TRES OF HIGHER EDUCATIOK OF 
MDo."ISTE.IU.AL A..".-n EXECUTIVE OFFICERS. 
S\."RI.A.. .. SA. ' TB PRESIDESCY C OUNCn..s 
Oct. 1966/ 
Sept . 1967 
H ~y Oc t Dec Sept Dec , 05 
6" 64 6. 65 Feb . 66 
2. I No. :< I No. 
E1.ilWPE A..\l) A..."lERICA 
0 6 2.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 )6 17·5 2 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 6 2.9 0 1 1 0 0 2 
0 7 ).4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 2 1. 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IRAQI SA. ' m CABINETS 
Feb. ~y Oct Xo". 
·6) 6) 6 
~ INa. ,. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 1 1 J •. 8 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 2 2 1 5 7.9 
0 2 2 2 6 9.5 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 1 1 ) :..81 
La 6 7 I 57 27·7 I 2 0 /. 16 I 6 6 ! 17;7: 
THE MIDDLE EAST EXCLUDIS'G SYRIA 
1 0 0 0 
" 
0 0 0 ) 1.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 15 16 46 7J. 
0 1 L 1 0 0 1 1 6 2 . 9 0 0 0 0 0 U 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
- --
-- - --
o 1 0 0 I 9 • •• I I 0 0 I) 12 I 115 15 16 /46 7;. 
~ 
11) 10 11 16 17 15 17 L5 17 /140 67 .9 1/ :-------------...,..11-8---72-" ·1 0 0 0 I 0 0 I 
5 5 5 5 5 25 100 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 5 5 5 5 25 LOO 
f 2: 
I 21 
20 16 18 2. 20 22 21 24 20 21 206 LOO 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 16 18 2. 20 22 21 24 20 2L 206 LOO I 
Sources: Archives Sic hi tie Pe:.manentes Du :-ionde Araba, vols. 1 and 2. 
The '{idd..lo Ea.st EtU"Opa Pub1ications. l..oooon) , v o ls . 1948-67. See 'Who's Vbo in the M.idd.le Ea.3t'. 
21 
0 
21 
21 6) 100 
0 0 0 
21 6) LOO 
Press Reports, 
Interv'1.eva. 
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TABLE 44 
COMMANDS : 
Ce n tres of Highe r 
Education 
BELGIUM 
CANADA 
FRANCE 
GERMANY 
ITALY 
SOVIET UNION 
S WI TZERLAND 
UNITED KINGDOM 
UNITED STATES 
YUGOS LAVIA 
OTHER EURO PEAN 
CENTRES 
r--
..:r 
0\ 
... 
... 
.... 
.. 
0. 
...: 
1 
0 
0 
2 
O . 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
..:r 
It'\ 
on § 
..., 
2 
0 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
BA' TH NAT I ONAL AND SYRIAN REGI ONAL COMMANDS: 
BA' TH NATIONAL COMMANDS 
""' \0 0 0\ 0 0\ \0 It'\ \0 C"'I 
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Interviews. 
Document on Parry M ember~hip TabL ed at tbe Eighth Nationai 
Congress. ApriL-May L96S. 
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0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 16 11 15 I 76 100 
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In the non-gov rnm ntal wings of th Ba r h: 
Th Ba r th Party: C ntres of High r Education, 1947-66 
PartI" European and 
yrian American 
.E 
SRC ~ 
1963-66 10 · 5 0 89 · 5 100 
B C 
1947-66 25 . 2 46.3 28 · 5 100 
Based on Tables 43 and 44 
The abo ve Tables put the Barth phase into educational 
perspective showing that it does not represent a radical 
departure from previously developing trends . The 
percentage preference for local (i . e . Syrian) education 
commences at zero with the Syrian Congress of 1919 and 
rises to its zenith in the SBPC of 72 . per cent and 73 . 
per cent for the IBC . Middle Eastern (excluding Syrian) 
preferences decline from 100 per cent in 1919 (i . e . 
primarily Ottoman) to 4.4 per cent in the SBC and zero in 
the IBC , to be followed by a gradual decline until the 
S/SC of 1961 - 63, when a c omparable peak of 51 . 7 per cent 
is realised for a short while to be fOllowed by a decline 
of 50 per cent and more in the SBC and SBPC . 
Educational traditions in the B C and SRC are similar to 
those of the governmental wings of the party . The B C 
has a 75. pe r cent e ducated Arab personnel of which 28 . 5 
are Syrian . According to Tables 41-45, the leading 
political cadres of the Ba rth received their higher education 
in Arab centres by a ratio of 7:3 over those who studied 
in Europe or America . In this respect the Barth ratio 
is in many ways similar to that of the RC / UAR and CC/ UAR . 
During the 1950s much greater use Was made of local 
educational faciliti es. During the period from 1952 to 
1964, the Syrian University in Damascus increased its 
student population from two and a half thousand to twenty 
eight thousand two hundred. In 1966, this figure exc eede d 
thirty thousand . l Much the same rate of e ducational 
1 
Lern r , op . cit ., p . 276 . Statistical Yearbook, 
ations 1966, p . 741 . United 
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advanc m nt was b ing made at th primary and s condary 
lev Is . Was it simply national loyalty alon that brought 
about th d clin in th p rcentag of W st rn ducat d 
train d p rsonn 1 among the leading political cadres in 
Syria and Iraq? Loyalty to the Arab fath rland may 
i nflu n c ed the d cisions of som to study locally, 
making use of th expanded educational facilities . 
hav 
How v r , one c onstantly n c ount rs th ph nom non in th 
Arab wo r ld o f e x t r emist anti - W stern nationalists 
evincing by t h e ir mann r o f dr ss and living , ways mor 
We s te rn t han t h e ' We s terner '. Lern r shows that despite 
mental frustration with the West, the ' young effendis ' 
of Syria were a s s i duous in adopting v stern forms of 
1 .. 1 l V lng . 
While i t may have been thought to be patriotic to 
study lo c ally , it s eems that more i mportant issues were 
inv o l e d in the decision . Financ e would seem to have 
been t h e greatest obstacle to aspiring young men . The 
c lasse s whi ch c ould traditionally afford to send their 
sons overseas were , in the course of the 1950s and 1960s , 
gradu ally stri pped of their landed and capital interests . 
o longer c oul d they be assured of buying their We stern 
edu cated sons into the senior ranks of the government 
or bureauc racy . Instead , men from lower socio - economic 
classes (see Table 46) were rising up the social ladder 
to claim a share of the important offices of state 
traditionally monopolised by men of ' good breeding ' and 
f amily f ortune . 
E duc ationa~ecialisation 
It has f requ ently been said by c ommentators on the 
politics of d eveloping areas , that nativ e elites are 
us ually highly educated profe s sional men . Can this be 
s a id of Syri a and Iraq and i n particular , of the Ba ' th 
phas e i n the s e c ountries? Set out below i s a typology 
of educ at i onal sp c ialisation in which the Ba ' th has 
bee n pla c ed f o r c omparativ e analysis , with other 
go v ernm ntal systems. 
1 
Lern r , op . cit ., p . 275 ff . In particular see pp . 284 - 85 . 
Upp r Class: 
TABLE 46 
Socio-E conomic Class 
on th Basis .~~~~~~~~~~ 
Big Rural Landown rs 
Bankers 
Industrialists 
High Central Administration 
Bureaucrats (D partment Heads) 
Religious Dignitaries (i . . MU£ti, Sh ikh) 
Upper Judiciary 
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University Educators (i . e . D an, Rector, Pr sid nt) 
Army Officers (Chiefs of Staff)+ 
Big Merchants 
Middle To Upper Class: 
University Educators (Permanent Staff) 
Lawyers / Magistrat s 
Physicians 
Diplomats 
Career Politicians 
Senior Civil Servants 
Army Staff Offic ers (Colonel, Brigadier, General) 
Engineer 
Scientist 
Dentist 
Lower to Middle Class: 
Lower levels of the Civil Service 
e ws paper Owner 
Journalists / Writer / Editor 
Pharmacists 
Librarian 
Organised Labour Officials 
S chool Teachers 
Army Officers (commissioned ranks to Colonel)+ 
Whit e -Collar Workers (i.e . Clerks, Accountants) 
(Factory and Farm Managers) 
Proletarian Classes : 
Small Merchants 
Artisans 
Labourers 
Guides / Service Workers 
Army on-C ommissioned Officers 
Rural: 
* 
Small Landed Peasants 
Landless Peasants 
omads 
For more details see B rger, op. cit., Chap . 7, and 
especially p . 268; also Baer , op. cit . , pp . 204-J9 . 
+ Th cla ss of army officers is one of the more difficult 
on s to classi f y satisfactorily . While, undoubtedly, it 
rat s high on the professional scale, its socio- conomic 
' importance seems to have been very limited . Army officers 
in Syri a have never forme d the s emi-arist o crati c class as 
( cntd . on p . 269) 
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(cntd . from p . 268) 
the senior officers in Thailand . During the Ba ' thist 
phase officers from relatively humble social origins rose 
up the promotions ladder to become the rulers of the army 
and indire c tly the rulers of the Syrian government. But 
while they shouldered an air of authority equal to the 
greatest in the land, the civilian upper and middle class 
professionals tended to regard them as upstarts , 
' political creations ', ' men of the moment ' , while the 
rural and urban masses, accustomed to respect authority 
based on ' good bre ding ' , did not welcome them as one of 
their kind ' made good '. Again, the military officer was 
often identified with sectarian communities (Alawite , 
Dru ze , Isma ' ili) and this sometimes led to suspicion 
about the intentions of the community he supposedly 
represented . Finally , the relative impermanence of 
membership of this professional class tended overall to 
diminish its socio - economic importance in the community . 
Chi fs of Staff and field commanders wer , during the 
Ba ' thist phase and v n b fore, imperiously known as 
, sixty day wonders '. A lieutenant on day, a colonel 
th next and a gen ral on the next day : only the medieval 
church could rival this in its scale of promotions from 
priest , to bishop and c ardinal all in th space of a 
benedi c tion . 
T :YI~es of Syrian 
Special- Cbnt. 
isatior. 1919-58 
No 0 
Education 
Primary 1 Only 
Secondary 18 Only 
Military 1,,1\ 
Graduate 
University 70 Gradua t e 
(Bachelor Pass 
Degree) 
(Tertiary 
College 
Diploma) 
Post-Grad . 11 
(Masters ' 
Doctoral) 
Total 100 
Known 
Percent 
TABLE 47 
Educational Specialisation 
Governmental : 1919-66 
SRC/UAR CC/UAR S/SC SBC 
1958- 1958- 1961- 1963-
61 61 63 66 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 
43 46 9 15 
34 32 51 51 
23 22 41 33 
100 100 100 100 
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SBPC IBC 
1964- 1963 
66 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
40 29 
40 46 
20 25 
100 100 
Based on Winder ' s Table 7 in MEJ., 16/4 - 1962, p.429, and my own 
Tables 43 and 44 . 
ile ,,,-
On a point of classification, it is not clear whether Winder is 
measuring military graduates under his graduate sample. His high 
graduate percentage, however, would seem to indicate that he might 
be including other than university pass graduates. It is estimated 
that from 1950-58, military graduates constituted 10 per cent at a 
maximum of all the personnel of the Syrian governments. Under 
Shishakli ' s governments the percentage may have been slightly above 
ten per cent. On the whole the Syrian military were content to 
remain in the background in the period from 1950 to 1958, though it 
would be wrong to say that they did not exercise a good deal of 
influence over the civilian personnel of each respective government. 
It is urged that these percentages be taken with some degree of 
caution in view of an unknown floating percentage of 24. for the 
SRC/UAR and 11 for the CC/UAR. Winder is also working with a 30 
per cent unknown factor . Despite the expressed caution, it is 
believed that if all the members in the sample were known it would 
not invalidate the trend appreciably. On a point of classification, 
I have adopted the principle of classifying physicians and dentists 
with the post-graduate sample, despite in some instances , the fact 
that only a bachelor's degree was possessed. Clearly the value 
of a pass medical degree is equivalent in most cases to a post-
graduate degree in other faculties . 
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TABLE 48 
:IYEes of S pecial- B C SRC 
isation : 1947-66 1963-66 
0 Educ ation 0 0 
Primary Only 0 0 
Se c ondary Only 0 1 
Military Graduate 14 42 
University Graduate 
(Bachelor Pass Degre ) 
(Tertiary College Diploma) 
68 35 
Post-Graduate 18 22 
(Masters ' Doctoral) 
--
Total Known Percentage: 100 100 
The Tables above are clearly illustrative of the 
high educational specialisation of the ruling political 
elites in Syria and Iraq . Taken overall, the Ba ' thist 
phase is generally typi c al of the high educational 
profi ci en c y . The SBC has the highest graduate percentage 
of all other Ba ' thist organs in our sample . With 33 
per c ent post-graduates, it is only s cond to the S / SC, 
with 41 per cent . The IBC has a somewhat lower graduate 
(non-military) percentage than its Syrian counterpart, 
though it has a slightly higher educational proficiency 
than th SRC / UAR and CC / UAR . The governments to possess 
the highest e d u c ational proficiency are the S / SCs, 1961-63. 
With 41 per c ent post - graduate , 75 per cent of which is 
doctoral, they are 8 per cent above their nearest rival, 
the SBC . In terms of pass graduates , the S / SC and the 
SBC ar identical, though the distribution of the remaining 
percentag of graduates needs some explanation . 
Bayly Winder has not included military graduates in 
his Table 7 on ' High r Education ' , but it is estimated 
that from 1950 to 1958 no more than 10 per cent of all 
cabinet ministers were military graduates . While the 
military were never very far from the political scene , 
th traditional system elevated the civilian politician 
with a good family nam and education to the forefront 
of the syst m . With th formation of the UAR in 1958 , 
young r nationalist 1 aders began to asc nd to political 
promin nce through th army and oth r unionist parties 
such as the Ba ' th , th A M and th lik . A displac ment 
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of th traditional ruling elit can b shown in t rms of 
the traditions of ducation which 1 vat d th local 
university and t rtiary institution ov r Europ an and 
other traditions which had, until th lat 1940s , 
supplied th bulk of the Syrian political lite . Th 
appearance of the military graduat in p rcentag s 
well abov the pr - UAR figure, was anoth r significant 
departur . Table 47 shows clearly that from 1958, with 
on xception, which w 
graduate or army offic 
will discuss shortly, th 
r was not pr pared to hid 
military 
b hind 
the facade of the civilian politician . Henceforth, 
the army officer was to see himself as a vital part of 
the nationalist revolution which he had instigated in 
the mid-1950s, and through the creation of the UAR in 
1958 . The tradition that the army was simply there to 
fight to defend the nation was modified by the politics 
of the 1950s, to the effect that the army was there to 
lead, to guide, and to remove from office the incapable 
civilian politicians in the name o f national revolution. 
The one exception to a substantial representation 
of mili tary graduates was the S / SC . (S e Table 47). In 
th case of educational specialisation, the pattern is 
somewhat reminiscent of the pre - UAR phase in Syria . The 
percentage of university graduates is raised considerably 
over the UAR governments and by contrast , the military 
percentage, it is b lieved, represented a figure not 
untypical of the period from 1950-58 . While it would 
be wrong to suppos that the army compl tely returned to 
its barracks during the s e cessionist phase , Table 47 
shows that the new rulers of the army were more incline d 
to present the appearance of a return to the traditional 
system in which th civilian politician was the master 
of the nation's d stiny - and not the politicized army 
officer . G nerally speal ing, the S / SCs were a ' throw-
back ' of th traditional forces which had opposed the 
growth of unionist and socialist tendencies in Syria 
and n th rest of th Arab world . Th y represented an 
old r g neration which resented th growing influence of 
1 ss privileged socio- c onomic class s. 
Th Ba ' thist phas s in Syria and Iraq, restore a 
patt rn of r pr sentation more in k ping with th UAR 
phas The SBC , and BC, it is tru , do not hav the 
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sam high p rc ntag of military graduat s as th UAR 
phase and in som r spects th BC is v n clos r in 
p rc ntag to the S/ C . In th yrian Ba ' th party at 
leas t , the military w re substantially r pr s nt d on 
the organs that r ally mattered, such as th BPC , and 
the RC . In thes alon , the patt rn is not unlik th 
UAR phas (See Table 47) . 
The non-governmental wings of th Ba ' th show a high 
perc entag of train d personnel ; the B C has the high st 
percentage of pass gradu at e s and the low st , although 
only by 1 per cent , military graduate r pr sentation of 
all Ba ' th organs . Although there are no r e liable figures 
for the Ba ' th outside Syria , and to some e xt en t Iraq , 
the representational figures of the B C would seem to 
suggest that the kind of young men entering into the high r 
lev Is of the pary structure possessed at least a univ rsity 
pass degree and in some cases a post - graduate e ducation . 
The overall ratio of the post - graduate to other graduates 
in the Ba ' th (including military graduates) ac c ording to 
Table 48 is abo u t 1 : 4 in most cases . Wi th these relatively 
high graduate rat i ngs , it is no surpris that the Ba ' th 
mainly flouris he d in the c entres of higher learning among 
the prof ess i onal c lasses . Only 1 per c ent of all our 
Ba'thist s ample had less than a tertiary education . It 
is also estimated that about 5 per c ent of the graduate 
sample failed to get pass degrees . Thus while the 
Ba ' thist phases do not have the educational proficiency 
level of the S / SC they possess , nevertheless, trained 
cadres with generally higher quali f i c ations than any 
oth r government shown on Table 47 . The Ba ' th seems to 
have comblned relatively high university graduate 
representation with that of military graduates . One is 
led to surmise whether the highly trained university 
graduate would be mentally in conformity with the military 
graduat in the government and senior party commands . 
It is now propos d to consider the subject 
specialisation of the governments being considered in 
Tabl 47 . 
* 
TABLE 49 SUBJECT SPECIALISATION GOVERNMENTAL ; 1919 - 66 * 
Subject Syrian SRC / UAR CC / UAR S / SC SBC SBPC Cabinets 1958-61 1958-61 1961-63 1963-66 1964-66 Rating 
1919-58 
High 1 Law Army Army Law Education Army 
2 Army Law Law Education Law Education 
3 Medicine Education Agricul- Medicine Army Medicine 
ture 
Low 4 Education Engineer- Education Army Medicine Economics 
ing 
Based on Bayly W~nderls Table 7 in MEJ., 16 / 5 - 1962, p .429 and .my own Table 43. 
Tables shows that the degree of educational specialisation to tertiary level is 
generally much higher in the Syrian cabinets than in the parliaments over the 
same period. Education would seem to be one factor conditioning political 
influence in the period from 1919 to 1958 . My own columns show that from 1958 
to 1966 the pattern is not altered in the least. Indeed as will be discussed, 
the degree of post-graduate specialisation increases noticeably during the period 
from 1958. 
IBC 
1963 
Army 
Education 
Engineering 
Medicine 
/'V 
-..,J 
+=-
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Basic lly, th d gr of subj t div rsifi ation 's 
not ov r 11 very gr at from gov rnm nt to gov rnm nt in 
th P riod from 1919-58 . Howev r, subj t ratings d 
diff r considerably mor in the p riod from 1958 and 
several n w subj t pr fer nces r minis cent of th rising 
importan e of the t hnocrats app ar n our sampl , for 
the first tim Law graduates ompris th bulk of all 
graduates prior to 1958, but from th UAR phas , military 
graduat s for the most part rat d in th high r graduate 
pr f r nces. (S e Table 49) . Th major xception to 
this tr nd is the S / SC, in which army graduat s ar 
rated fourth on the scale of preferenc . 
In some ways also, the SBC is an exception to the 
trend towards military graduate prepond rance. Education 
and law ar rated high r than the army in the scale of 
preference . In the SBPC and IBC, army graduates ar 
rat d first, followed in each case by ducation . It 
is not quite clear why the army should be rated third 
in the SBC, below education and law . One reason may be 
postulated, that in terms of political power and 
influ nce alone, th BC was not vital in the military 
scheme of things, th r fore it could be fronted by m n 
representing wider professional interests and national 
values. The military graduate is more than adequately 
represented on th organs of the party, hidden from the 
glare of the public . Operating from a strategy of 
clandestinity, the army could and did remove troublesom 
civilian politicians at will, without itself receiving 
th brunt of public discontent for the political 
ineptitudes of the ivilian politician . l 
Perhaps one of the basic reasons for the lack of 
subject diversifi ation to any mark d xt nt, may be 
accounted for by the paucity of local facilities for 
2 
sci ntific and technological specialisation . If this 
wer the case, a diff rent rate of subj ct preferenc s 
of graduates studying overseas, might b shown. Tabl 
measur d the gen ral tr nd of subject specialisation; 
now let us onsid r the subjects tak n by those who 
studi d outsid th ountry of birth. 
1 
Int rview, Bitar, 17 ov mber 1967, B irut . 
2 
Lern r, op. cit ., p.276. 
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Ov rs as Education 
Tabl 50 shows a much great r div rsification 
patt rn than pr viously imagined . The / C is onc mor 
the exc eption, although there is quit a high d gr of 
diversifi c ation . Law is the subject most favour d by 
the old er secessionists who trav 11 d ov rseas in th 
1930s . Medic ine is next in the rat of pr ferenc 
although only a third of the law graduat percentag 
Engin ring , and arts, follow at less than a quart r 
1 
of the law graduate percentage; th subj c t 
diversification pattern is more mark d in the Ba ' th and 
UAR phases. Whil law is still the most favoured 
subject, the gap between it and more t e chnological and 
scientific subjects is evident . Th SBC, for exampl , 
has as its first preference an equal percentage of law 
and science (general) degrees . Arts followed by 
engineering occur next on the scale of preferences . Law 
followed by arts with an equal percentage with engineering, 
closely followed by medicine, mark the SRC / UAR and CC / UAR . 
The IBC , surprisingly, has no law graduates . The bulk 
of the cabinet personnel is comprised of engineering 
graduates , followed by military and economics graduates 
with about a third of the engineering percentages and 
arts slightly more than one fifth of engineering . The 
relatively high technological personnel can, in some ways, 
be explained by the policies of the Iraq governments 
during the 1950s, which used increasing revenue from oil 
royalties to send promising and ' worthy ' young men over-
seas for scientific and technological training . Syria, 
not having the same lucrative oil revenues, could not 
generally afford lavish scholarships for its own promising 
2 young technocrats. Again, with large Iraq Petroleum 
Company oil installations, worthwhile care ers were 
immediately opened to young Iraqis in the oil fields. 
To their poorer yrian 'brothers ' , s rvice in the 
government bur aucracy was probably the safest and hence 
the most sought after career. 3 This might account for 
1 
Ibid . , p.276 for further confirmation of this trend . 
2 
Intervi w, Daouk, B irut, 17 October 1967 . He r called 
that when he was taking post - graduat education in London, 
th Iraq students had by far mor g n rous scholarship 
allowances than the Syrians. 
3 
L rner, op . cit . , p.277. 
TA.BLE 50 
FACULTIES: 
LAW 
ARTS ( GENERAL ) 
ENGINEERING (GENERAL) 
SCIENCE (GENERAL) 
MEDICINE 
AGRICULTURE 
MILITARY EDUCATION 
(ADVANCED) 
ECONOMICS 
POLITICAL SCIENCE 
COMMERCE 
TOTALS : 
EDUCATION ABROAD PRIOR TO ELEVATION 
* TO CABINET STATUS. 
SRCiUAR-CCiUAR: 
19:28 - 61 
SiSC: 1961-6) SBC: 1963- 66 
No. % No. % No. % 
9 21.9 24 47 . 1 1) 20 
8 19.5 5 9 . 8 9 1).8 
8 19·5 6 11 . 8 8 12. ) 
2 4 . 9 0 0 1) 20 
1 2.4 8 15·7 6 9 . 2 
6 14.6 2 ) .9 6 9.2 
7 17.1 2 )·9 0 0 
0 0 4 7 .8 5 7 · 7 
0 0 0 0 4 6 . 2 
0 0 0 0 1 1.5 
-41 100. 51 100. 65 100. 
IBC: FEB-NOV 
19i1J 
No. % 
0 0 
2 11.75 
9 52 . 8 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
) 17·75 
) 17·75 
0 0 
0 0 
17 100. 
* This Table also includes those who studied in the Middle East outside country oC birth. 
~. 
SRC/UAR: Syrian RegiOnal Councils, UAR . 
cc/uAR: Central Cabinets , UAR . 
S/sc: Secessionist Cabinets . 
SBC: Syrian Ba'th Cabinets. 
IBC: Iraq Ba'th Cabinets. 
l\:> 
-..J 
-..J 
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th h gh, hough d m'nishing rat of 1 w graduat s 
among th young r postwar g n rat'on whi h ros to pow r 
and influ ne n th lat 1950s . 
Y t d spit th eontinu'ng h'gh t of law graduat s 
to all oth r gradua s, th yri n Barth phas shows th 
gr t st ov rall d gr 0 subj et d'v rsif' ation. 
ubj ets th t m'ght broadly b d fin d s th se n s, 
viz ., seiene (g n r 1), agrieultur , ngin ring and 
medi in , eonstitut 50 . 7 pre nt 0 th tot 1 sampl 
Law nd arts tog ther eompr's 33.8 pre nt and 
ee onom s, politi al se' ne and eomm re , th latt r 
two bing uniqu only to th BC, mak up the rem ining 
p r ntag of 15.4 per e nt . The UAR gOY rnm nts hay 
a high degre of subjee divers ' t 'on but not to 
quit the sam ext nt s th Ba r th. Th s ien s 
eonstitut 41.4 p r compar d wi h an 'd n ieal 
p re ntage for law and arts while h r maind r 
ompris d of 17.1 p rent for mil'tary graduat s . Th 
/S C show an v n gr at r bias for non-se' n 'f'e subj 
Only 31 . 4 pre nt ould b elassi d as fall'ng w' h'n 
the eat gory of th sine s . B s'd gur, s 
56 . 9 per nt for law and rtlB (w' h 1 w g ning by a 
th larg st lic of th I ak I ). Th r ma'nd s mad 
up of 11 . 7 per nt for m'l'tary nd onomi s gr duat 
Th / C figur s would s m to ind' t that thos 
who tr yell d ov rs s for t rt' ry due t'on d'd s 
with whit ollar jobs n th 1 g 1 prof ss ons 0 th 
gOY rnm nt bu eau raey in m'nd. On th 0 h r h nd , 
young m n pursu ng sc nt f e du on w ' br neh'ng 
out into th d p ' as w'th th p uc'ty of nt'f' 
and t hnolog c al opportuniti s in yr th r was no 
gUaran th t suitabl 
m t their prof ssion 1 qu 
nt would b found 0 
tons . 
I s highly p obabl h t man 0 h young 
prof ss onsals of h Ba'th found th m 1 s nv 1 d in 
th pro s s of gOY rrun n (' th r b d f ul t han by 
s If- ons 'ous du ational p par t'on. I was moun ng 
f'ru ra ion 0 or th £' 11ing 'd of p on n 
th 1950 , th t roy m ny of' th I f' ust at d young 
w Lh n 'd 01 gi ff' ndl I into th r 111 s 0 p t1 
and r vOlu ion r b ' 1 1a . It m'ght b rgu , that 
1 
Lb d . , pp.276-77. 
1 
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prof ssionals r a hing political pow r ia this road, 
consti ut d a v ry diff rent breed of politicians from 
th 'traditionals' who ros to pow r and pr stig 
through walth, good families, n potism and an advanc d 
t rtiary education in law and th humaniti s. 
Tabl 50 shows that substantially diff r nt 
ratings result d among thos who studi d abroad as 
compared with those who took local tertiary education . 
(See Table 49) . Th most significant d cline is among 
military graduat s who rate third in th SRC/UAR-CC/UAR , 
equal sixth in the S/SC and were in th SBC, and qual 
third in the IBC . From this it might be deduced, that 
unlike other graduates, military graduates are more 
likely to be firmly rooted in the local environment by 
birth , education and general military xperienc 
Conceivably an Alawit e from a remote mountain village 
could enter the Homs Military Academy, take an officer 
commission, rise through the scale of officer promotions, 
join the Ba ' th, asc nd to positions of leadership and, 
in the meantime , have very little knowledge of the wider 
world of Europe and America which, among other things, 
spawned the State of Israel. Of course, much of the 
same thing could be said of local graduates who enter d 
the Ba ' th with v ry little first hand knowledge of the 
outside world. Perhaps basic educational limitations 
did create unfounded fears and naiveties about the 
political forces operating outside Syria and the Arab 
world whil , at th oth r end of the spectrum, an advanced 
and extended period of education abroad in Europe or 
America would operate in the opposite fashion of instilling 
purely W stern values and norms to the detriment of the 
local product . 
It has been seen that in the 1950s with the growing 
antagonism of Syria towards the West, ther was a marked 
declin in the percentag of European trained graduates 
offering themselves for political posts in the governments. 
This trend was maintained during the UAR phase . By 
contrast the / SCs which sought to mod rate Syria 's 
strain d political relations with the \ estern powers, 
and which took a 'regionalist! as opposed to a unionist 
policy in int r-Arab politics, brought in a substantial 
incr ase in European train d graduat (S Table 4J) . 
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Th BC alter d th tr nd to a pr pond ranc of 10 lly 
train d graduates . Th ontention that governm nts with 
mor xtr m forms ( . g . , unionist nd socialist) of 
Arab nationalism will bring in a pr pond ran 
of local 
graduat s, would se m to b born out by th g n ral 
tr nd that has b e n observ d over fifty years and mor 
If this observation is tru b twe n governments 
also be true of the personnel comprising th m? 
an it 
L t us 
proceed to ask wh ther "t is possibl to mak sp culativ 
correlations betw en political b haviour and th typ 
of p rsonnel as represent d by the educational traditions 
previously consider d. 
Ba ' th . 
The focus will be centred on th 
Let us consider firstly the educational trends and 
patterns in the SBC . Bitar's governm nts ( os . 15, 16, 
17 , 19 and 22 ) show a considerably higher European 
trained cadre than either Hafiz's ( os . 18 and 20) or 
Zu 'ayy n's (Nos . 2l, 2J and 24) governments . The average 
for Bitar's cabinets is J4 per cent with five per cent 
in add ition having a Middle Eastern (excluding Syria) 
education; 22 per cent European , four per cent Middle 
Eastern (exc luding Syria) for Hafiz; and 20 per c nt 
Europ an and J per cent Middle Eastern (excluding Syria) 
for Zu'ayyen's governments. (See Table 4J) . In the 
majority of cases , Bitar's governments respond to t~ 
hypothesis that an increase in Western trained personn 1 
also appears to be related to the ascendancy of th 
nationalist political elements within the party . By 
comparison , Hafiz's gov rnment ( 0 . 18) formed after the 
Sixth ational Congress in October 196J, brought in 
considerably fewer Western educated personnel than either 
of Bitar ' s previous go rnments (1 os.16 and 17) . How ver 
the nationalists regroup d following the 'loss of Iraq' 
and in February 1964 they reasserted, if briefly, th ir 
authority over th s nior commands of the party in yria 
and th Arab world (i . e . B C) . A new SRC ( 0 . 2) was 
lect d with 7 . p r c nt of its personn 1 having a 
Europ an ducation. This p rcentage would seem to be 
r lativ ly small, but in comparison with the RC ( 0 . 1) 
of S pt mber 196J with a regional socialist majority , 
W stern train d graduat s had no repres ntation at all . 
2 1 
Th B C shows dramatic, if mom ntary, as ndancy 
of th nationalists 'n th arly p rt of 1964. Th 
ixth B C r duc d th European train d p rsonn 1 on 
th B C from 20 p r c nt in th Fifth B C to 8 p r nt . 
The Seventh B C und r nationalists influ nce (i . 
Aflaq), return d 37 p r cent Europ an trained cadr 
Meanwhile Bitar's fourth government ( 0 . 19) which 
corresponds in tim with the bri f r turn to pow r of 
th nationalists , has a 50 per c nt Europ an train d 
cadr . Indeed this government repr sents th zenith of 
Europ an trained personnel within any Ba ' th gov rnment . 
(Se Table 43) . The SBPC similarly shows at this point 
an overseas graduate representation of 40 p r cent of 
its p rsonnel . 
The decline of nationalist influence in th Ba'th 
OCcurr d towards the nd of i964 (see Part 2) . Hafiz ' s 
second government ( 0.20) of Octob r 1964, brought in 
18 per cent as compared with 50 per c nt European trained 
personnel in the outgoing government of Bitar which had 
resigned in protest against mounting army interference in 
1 
the government . The composition of the SBPC, educationally, 
shows a marked decrease in European trained personnel . 
In the early part of 1965, economic and political 
unrest in Syria following the extensive nationalisation 
laws brought down under Hafiz, forc d both of the major 
factions of the Ba'th to work more closely together out 
of f ar of being overthrown. Aflaq, who had been a 
constant source of annoyance and irritation to the 
regional socialists, agreed to stand down from the offic 
of Secretary-General of the Beat th Eighth ational 
Congress in April 1965, and Munif Razzaz, a man more 
acceptable to both factions, was elected in his place . 
The army, similarly, promised to keep out of the affairs 
of th civilian politicians and the troublesome Military 
Committe was mad mor amenabl in theory (see Part 4) 
2 
to party discipline. All this was in the nature of a 
compromise betwe n the factions of th party, and might 
1 
Int r i w with Salah ud-Din Bitar, 17 0 emb r 1967, 
B irut . 
2 
Razzaz, at-Tajribat al-Mura, op. cit., p . 118 ff . 
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a ount in part for th in on lusi n s of th 
du ational indi (i. th W rn - 10 al t ain d 
graduat dichotomy) in th arly part of 1965 . 
Th attempt at mor cordial intra-party r lations 
which characteris d th Eighth ational Congr ss w r , 
how v r, short liv d. Th r gional socialists and th ir 
alli s in th s cr t Alawit offic r committ r ass rt d 
their influence within th civilian and military wings 
of the Ba'th .
l 
This 1 d to serious conflicts within 
the army and the civilian wings of the gov rnm nt . 
Statistically , th growing influence of the extr mists 
can b seen in th d clin of th perc ntage of for ign 
trained graduates . ( ee tables 4J and 44) . P rhaps 
the one noticeable exc ption to our hypothesis is 
Zusif Zu ' ayyen's first government ( 0 . 21) of Sept mb r 
1965 which increas d the foreign trained personn 1 by 
10 P r cent over Hafiz's previous cabinet . The reason 
for this is not at all clear, though it might have 
r presented a gesture of compromis on the part of 
Zu ' ayy n who want d to ensure the widest support for his 
government in the party . On the oth r committees and 
councils of importance such as the SRC and the SBPC, 
a marked decline in the p rcentage of European graduate 
p rsonnel can effectiv ly be correlated with the 
monopolisation of th se by the extremist army and civilian 
members of the party . (See Tables 4J and 44) . 
The final nationalist onslaught against the 
regionalists occurred on 21 Decemb r 1965 . Demonstrated 
statistic al l y , th nationalists' brief take-over of the 
leading party commands and governm nt also resulted in a 
significant increase (see Tables 4J and 44) in 1 estern 
trained graduates . The counter-coup by the regionalists 
on 2J February 1966, r versed the tr nd in favour of 
locally trained graduates . For example, the new SRC 
( 0 . 6) (se Tabl 44), r duced the Western graduate 
r pres ntation to only 7 . per cent of th total Command 
memb rShip . Zu ' ayyen's second governm nt (SBC . o . 2J) 
reduced Bitar's figure from 29 p r nt to 20 per cent, 
1 
IbId., p.1J5-48. 
Jadid '. 
S e 'Th CrisIs Be we n Hafiz and 
2 3 
and on his third gov rnm nt ( BC. 
0 0 24), it is 
r duc d to 14 p r nt West rn traon d p rsonnel . An 
inter sting obseJvation of this gov rnm nt (SBC . 0 . 24) 
is th fact that since th arly 1920s th Fr n h 
tradition of ducation had been compl t 1y work d out . l 
( ee Table L~3) . 
ow that it has be n demonstrat d that a sp ulative 
corr lation exists b tween educational traditions and 
particular governmental systems and , mor importantly 
from th point of vi w of this study, with personaliti s 
and intra - party factions, it is necessary to ask wh ther 
it is possible to d duce anything more of sociological 
significance from education that might h Ip to clarify 
the reason(s) for the failure of the Ba ' th ' s leading 
political cadres to r ach a workable and durable 
political consensus? 
Firstly, it is postulated that tertiary education 
in most countri s can be related to degrees of wealth 
and with what Lerner would call 'empathY ' ;to appreciate 
th importance of education in furthering one's personal 
care r . In the mor advanced countries, however, 
governments have, in recent decades, been providing more 
tertiary scholarships for the talent d needy . Thus, in 
fact, the postulation might not be as true of advanced 
nations as of poor, developing nations with Eer capita 
income between US$100-200 . Thus in the case of Syria~ 
with a per c apita income of US$135 in 1949,3 it might 
be argu d that only the more affluent social classes 
could afford to send their sons overseas for an extend d 
tertiary education . Of course, this n ed not be true in 
e v ery case as scholarships were available in limited 
quantities to 'worthy' candidates . Again socially and 
r ligiously, conservative families, which could afford 
an ov rs as education for their ons , might have b en 
pr v nted from s nding their sons abroad out of fear of 
' worldly contamination' . Of cours , many other objections 
1 
MEJ . , 17 / 1 - 1963. 
and Cabin t Ministers, 
2 
S e Bayly Winder ' s ' Syrian Deputi s 
1919-59', p . 36, passim . 
L rn r, op. cit ., pp .49-S4 . 
3 
Ibid . , p . 268 . 
2 4 
and qualifi ation ould b mad r r Jimiting th flow 
of scholars to 
thes in th ms 
t rti ry in ti tution 0 ' r e a . But whi L 
Iv m y b highly r L ant, th y in n 
wis invalidate th postulation that walth and ability 
p rmitt d th hulk of graduat s to study abroad whil , 
conv rs ly , ability with limit d walth contribut d to 
th incr ase of th local graduat s . 
Thus in the cas of th P rsonn 1 of th Ba ' th 
ducational repr sentation might off r a us ful tool 
for classifying wi th mor pr cis ion degr s of socio-
e conomic priviJ g or affluence of th r spectiv 
governments . Bitar's governments, for example, which 
show a r latively higher Western traine d p rsonn 1 
compared with Zu' ayyen 's or Hafiz ' s governments , would 
th refore, be exp cted to have a greater percentag 
of m mbers from more ' afflue'nt' famili s than the oth r 
two . If there is truth in this proposition, the n xt 
question which it is pertinent to ask is, from where or 
what ar as did Bitar and Zu'ayyen draw the bulk of their 
members? Can this give a clue as to the socio - economic 
class origins of the personnel? The answer is (s 
Tabl 35), that both draw their membership from the rural 
areas , though this is more true of Zu ' ayy n than of Bitar. 
Bitar ' s urban perc ntage is, on an average, 45 per c nt 
compared with 38 per c nt for Hafiz and 26 per cent for 
Zu'ayyen . Conversely Bitar's rural representation is 
considerably less than Zu'ayyen's . In terms of communal 
repr s ntation (see Table 27) Bitar's gov rnments ar 
75 p r cent Sunni Muslim compared with Zu'ayyen's 56 
per cent . The remainder of the memb rship in each instance 
is comprised of s ctarian communities from, in many 
instances, outlying Muhafazats in north western, central 
and south rn Syria . 
To conlude this chapt r : is it possible to account 
for the coup d'etat on 23 February 1966 on the basis ofa 
socio- conomic class di ision? On the basis of the 
evidenc contain d abov there is justification in 
attributing som of the unr st among th leading politi al 
cadr s of the Ba'th on this ground . It is highly probable 
that th young professionals of th r gionalist socialist 
e tr mist wing wer lrom th poor rural Muhafazats of 
north w stern, c ntral and south rn Syria (s Tabl 35) 
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and as su h w r th 
'hav nots' of th par y. Thus i 
may be argued that th y would ha f w r s rupl s n 
advoc t'ng xtr m 1 ft-wing so ialism b caus th Y had 
v rything to g in f om xproprlation of middl class 
prop rty and walth and v ry littl th ms Iv s to los 
Th Y were , in addition to being hostll to th middl 
classes of the iti s, d eply susp· ious to the outsid 
world of which ducationally th y had v ry littl first 
hand xperi nce . 
Th nationalists of the Ba'th on the other hand, 
resided , as has been s en, in the urban ar as and 
primarily Damascus. They were the prof ssional bourg oisi 
of th party and most probably th ir families had a 
r latively higher d egree of affluenc and with it social 
prestige, than the young 'hill-men' of th regional 
socialist wing . Having a greater perc ntage of Western 
trained personnel the nationalists were less lik ly to 
be suspicious of the political forces operating in the 
wider international community in vi w of the fact that 
th y had travelled overseas and had first hand experience 
of the people and th governments in many countries. 
Again as the 'hill-men' resented th affluence of the 
urbanites, so th city dwellers r sented any challenge 
from the rural regions to their traditional economic and 
political superiority. Thus while the Ba'th in Syria 
was the harbinger of an ideological revolution in the 
Arab world it, too, was very much a victim of the social 
forces which had traditionally sector d Syria into ruling 
and ruled communi ties. 
Finally socio- conomic class divisions (see Table 46) 
might therefore have b en the origin of the national-
socialist (Part 1) regionalist-nationalist (Part 2) 
dichotomies which led the party to self-immolation on 
2J February 1966. 
2 6 
In his hapt it is propos d to amin th 
o cupational stru Lur of th Ba ' th in r lation to its 
pred c Ssors in gOY rnm nt, as a basis for comparati 
occupational analysis. Secondly, it s propos d to 
examine the oc upational infra-stru tur of th Ba'th's 
gOY rnm ntal and non-gov rnmental wings in ord r to s 
if it is possible to learn anything more about the 
socio- conomic class orig'ns of th party ' s leading 
political cadr s. To facilitat discussion, Tabl s 51, 
52, 53, and 54 analysing these propositions have be n 
pr pared . Bayly Winder's Table 14, covers what might b 
t rm d the traditional system of occupat'onal 
representation in the Syrian government. The leading 
prof essionals overall are lawyers with 27 per cent, 
central administration bureaucrats with 17 per c nt and 
rural landlords with 11 per cent of all the cabin t 
1 
seats. By comparison, the Syrian parliaments according 
to Winder's Table 12, over the period from 1919-58, show 
that the most numerous occupational group are rural 
landlords with 31 p rent of th seats. Between 1928-49, 
th Y hav doubl e the percentage of the next highest 
occupational group, the lawyers, and in 1943 they almost 
quadruple the seat representation of lawyers . At the 
parliamentary election of 1954, when Syria was moving 
into an anti -Western phase, 26 per cent of all elected 
d puties were rural landlords. This semi-traditional 
representation patt rn existed until the formation of 
the UAR in February 1948 . 2 
Military offic rs are represented in the SRc / uAR-
CC / UAR by a ratio of more than 6 :1 ov r the pre-UAR phase . 
(Se Table 51). Torrey writes of the military officers 
of this p riod : 
1 
Th Syrian army was not looked upon as a 
springboard to political office and hence, 
was not consid red suitably attractiv for 
many representativ s of oligarchical families; 
MEJ., 171 1 - 1963. Table 14, ' Minis te r Occupations: 
Primary Life Work', pp . 52 -53 . 
2 
bid . ee Tabl 
Lif Work', p . 50. 
12, 'D puties 0 upations : Primary 
TABLE 51 
Categories: Occupations: 
A 
B 
C 
D 
ii 
iii 
iv A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
vi 
vii 
Central 
Adminis tra tion 
Local 
Adminis t ra tian 
Judiciary 
Diplomatic 
Staf'f' 
Army Of'f'icer 
State Banker 
Educator: 
Univers ity 
Educator: 
Primary 
Secondary 
Ed ucation 
Inspector 
University 
Administrator 
Studen t Organiser: 
University 
State Librarian 
Agricultural 
Scientist 
Engineer: 
Al.I classes 
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TABLE 51 
Categ o r ies: 
nii A 
B 
C 
1x 
A 
B 
x i A 
B 
C 
x ii A 
B 
C 
cntd . 
Occupations: 
Organized 
Labou r Of'f'icia~ 
Permanen t Politica 
Party Ex ecu tive 
Caree r Politician 
Lawye r /Barr ister 
Journalis t/Wri ta r 
Ne wspape r Owner/ 
.Ed i cor 
Physl.:.cXan 
'l?entist 
PharmaCist 
Landlord 
Commerc ialist 
( Me r chan t ) 
Indus t r ial :is t 
To ta l Kno wn 
Total Unkno wn 
Total Seats 
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Source 
Archives Bio g raphi9ue Perman e n tes Du Ho nd e Arabe . vols . 1. and 2. 
Tbe Middle East (Europa Publications, London), v ols. 1948-64. 
See I Who '.s Who in the Middle Eas t I • 
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TABLE 52 
Cate~ries : 
i A 
B 
C 
D 
H 
iii 
i v A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
vi 
vii 
Occ uEations : 
Central 
Administration 
Loca l. 
Admini.s t ra t ion 
Judiciary 
Diploma tic 
Staff' 
Army O.rt"i c e r 
State Ba.nker 
Educator: 
University 
Educa t o r : 
Primary, 
Secondary 
Educa t or: 
Inspec t or 
Universi ty 
Administrator 
Student 
Organiser 
State Librarian 
Agr1.cu .ltura..l 
Scie o tia t 
Engi.neor : 
All. Cla.5ses 
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I..and~Ord 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Comme rciails t 
(Men:haJ>t ) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Indus tr:ta.li.:s t 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tota..l Known 
' 20 16 18 24 20 22 U 2. 
Total Unknovn I 0 a a 0 a a 0 0 
Tota.! Seats f20 16 18 2. 20 22 21 24 
~: Interviows .. 
Pre~s Reports . 
OCCCPATIO~AL STRUc-nrRE OF TSE 5YR.I.A...'\ A.'ill 
IRAqI BA''Il! PARTY GOVER.'"!<E~'I'S, 196)-66, 
?R.DU.Ry LD"'E VORK_ 
SYIU4N B4'TB PR8SIn:."CY COm;CILS!IRAQ,I I14'TB C4B~'ETS 
'0 
"' 
'0 
'"' '"' 
..., 
'0 '0 
" r'\ '0 
'" 
'0 
'" '" 
'" '" 
'0 .,. .,. 
'" '" '" 
0-
'" 
- 0:- '0 
'" -
- '"' - -
.c 
. J .; '0 0 
'" 
0 
0 
.; ::. . ~ . 
..; . ~ . " ~ " >- ~ o -" >- ~ > c 0 a; : 0 . , . . 
" 
0 0 0 " 
0 
- => 
'" - -2) 2. I ,so . 
" 
2 ) fso . 1- 6 7 8 i..-;o. 
'» 
PERIPHERAL GO~--R.\'"\{ESI' SERVICE (c.ntd I  entd . ) 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 .. 1 1 1 I) 4.1 
0 0 5 2. ' 1 0 0 0 ;) 1 .. 2 1 1 4 6. 
0 0 0 C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ( 
5 6 ) 6 17·5 0 0 a 0 a 0 0 1 1 1 ) 4.0 
0 0 1 
·5 0 0 0 a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
a a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
) ) 25 /2 . 1 1 1 2 1 a 5 20. 1 1 1 ) 4.8 
0 0 
" 
2. 0 a 0 0 0 0 0 a 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 
·5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
a a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a 0 1 1 0 2 ).2 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0- 0 0 0 0 
20 21 206 IDC 5 5 5 5 5 /25 100 21 21 21 ~) 1 00 
a 0 0 0 a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 2.1 206 100 5 5 5 5 5 1>5 lCO 2 1 21 21 ) 100 
.f.rc.b.:1ves Biograpb.:lgue Per.:anent: •• Du H OXJd . A.ra.be . "'0.1 .. 2 . 
1'0 
0::> 
\0 
" ... 
'" ... ... 
'" ... 
.... e 
" § C. 
« .., 
1 2 
Cato g o rie s I Ooc upati ons l 
A Oentral 
Admi nis tra t i on 0 0 
B Loca l 
Administ r atio n 0 0 
C Judiciary 0 0 
D Diplo matio 
Sta!'!' 0 0 
i1 Ar my Of'fi oe r 0 0 
f--. 
ii i Sta te Banker 0 0 
iv A Ed u oato r l 
Univers i ty 0 0 
B Eduoato r l 
Primary , 0 1 
Secon dary 1-. 
C Edu c a t i o n 
Ins pe oto r 0 0 
D Uni v e r si t y 
Admin is t rato r 0 0 
E S t ud e n t 
Organ i se r 0 0 f---
S ta t e Librarian 0 0 
vi Agri cul ture 
So i e n t ie t 0 0 
vii Engi neer: 
All Clas s g e 0 
OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTUHE OF TilE DA' TII 
NATIONAL AND SYRIAN REGIONAL COMMA NDS: 
PHHWIY LH'E " ORl(. 
BA'TIl NATIONAL COMHA NDS SYRI AN REGIONAL CQMMANDS 
'" 
'" '" '" 
0 
'" '" 
'" '" 
n ... ... 
'" N 
'" '" 
0 ... 
'" 
... .. 
.. .. D .... D Q. Q. 
'" 
.. 
" e e :l! 0 e Q. e III III 0 r.. « r.. 
n 
'" '" 
'" '" '" 
'" '" '" ... ... on 
'" '" 
... ... 
'" '" '" '" 
0 
.d" 
.. D ,;, .; 0 .. Q. ~ ; C. e Q ~ ~ • III r.. >: « >: III 
3 4 5 6 7 8 No . 1>, 1 2 3 4 5 6 No. 
DIRECT GOVEHNMENT SEnVICE 
'--' 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1. 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 4 4 3 11 13. 7 5 3 7 4 9 2 7 32 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 2 2 2 8 10 1 2 3 2 2 2 12 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
r--
0 0 0 1 1 1 3 3·75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
-------
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PERIPHE RAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
11: 12.
50
1 
E o 0 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 0 0 2 010 
cntd . on p. 29J 
290 
'" 
2.63 
0 
0 
0 
42.1 
0 
0 
15 · 7 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2.6: I 
viii A 
D 
C 
ix 
A 
D 
xi A 
D 
C 
xiJ A 
B 
C 
cntd. 
Organi z ed 
Labour Of fioial 
Permanont 
Po li t i cal Party 
Exocuti va 
Carecr 
Politician 
Lawyer/ 
Dorris t o r 
Journal is t/ 
Writer 
No wspapo r Owner '1 
Edit.or 
Physician 
Dontie t 
Phannllcie t 
Landlord 
Commeroialist 
(Horchant) 
Indu8trialist 
Total Kno wn 
Total Unkno wn 
Total Seats 
OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE Of' TilE DA' I'll 
NATIONAL AND SYRIAN REGIONAL COMMA NDS: 
PIUHARY LIn; 1i0RK. 
291 
DA ITII NATIONAL CmlMAND SYRIAN REGIONAL COHMAN D 
--
--
n 
'" ~ '" '" '" '" '" ... '" OIl '" '" .... .... 
'" 
OJ) 
'" '" ,; .a 0 • 
.0 .. o ~ ~ 0. ~ 0 I, 0. ~ • ~ 
.!: ~ ~ III .. >: .. x III 
.... 
'" '" 
'" '" '" '" 
0 
'" '" .... '" '" '" 
n 
'" 
... 
'" 
'" 
OJ 
'" '" 
.... 
.... 
'" 
.... 0 
... • ~ ~ ..... 
.0 I, § 0. 0. 
'" 
.. .a I, 
0. • • ~ 0 • 0. • .. ..., III III >: 0 .. .. 
"' 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 No. % 1 2 ) 4 ~ 6 No. '/. 
f!ill!~HAL GOVEIlNME NT SERVICE (ontd. ) 
,.---' 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 3 ).94 
2 2 ) 
" 
2 2 2 ) 20 25. 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 2.6) 
--
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
t---
1 0 0 0 2 ) 2 2 10 12.5 1 2 0 1 0 1 ~ 6.6 
r---
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1. 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1.31 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1. )1 
1 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 1) 16.25 2 2 3 2 2 4 15 19.7" 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1. )1 
f--. 
--
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 2·5 0 r) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
--
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
f--. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
'--
7 10 10 10 1) 1) 1) 80 100 8 15 11 16 11 15 76 100' 
o o o o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 10 10 10 1) 1) 1) 80 100 8 15 11 16 11 15 76 100 
Peroentage discrepancy due to nounding. 
Sources: Archivos Bio g raphigue Du Honde Arabe, v ol. 2. 
Document of Party Membership Tabled at the Eighth National Congres s 
in April-May 1965. 
Intorviews. 
Prot'arenoe 
Ratings 
i 
ii 
iii 
iv 
v 
vi 
vii 
viii 
ix 
x 
xi 
xii 
s nC/UAll: 1919-58 1 9~8-6 1 
Lawyer Military 
Of'fioer 
Cent . Admin. Lawyer 
Bureaucrat 
Rural Edu c ator: 
Landlord Universit y 
Administrator l 
Universl ty 
Indus trlalls t Engineor 
Diploma t 
Military Ca roer 
Off'ioer Politio ian 
Physician Cont. Admin. 
Eduoator Dureauc rat 
Journalist/ 
-
Writer 
Merohant 
-
- -
- -
- -
- -
COMPARATIVE OCCUPATIONAL PREFERENCES 
S YRI A./f (UAR'}- AND I1lAQI GOV~IOOIENTS . L919-66 
CC / UAIl : S/SC: S BC : I SDPC: 19 58-61 1961-6 ) 196)-66 1964 -66 
Military Eduoator : Lawyer Military 
Offi oer University 01'1'icor 
Lawyer Lawyer Military Eduoatorl 
Or.r1.cer Prim. &. 
Seoondary 
Care o r Physioian Eduoatorl Physioian 
Politioian Prim . & 
Secondary 
Diplomat Banker Physician Politioal 
Military Party 
Of'fioor Exeoutive 
Enginee r 
Agricul tUrial Cent . Admin . Banker 
Soientist Judioiary Bureauorat OrganJ. sod 
Labour 
OC Ctoinl 
Educator: Cent . Admin. Engineer 
-University Bureauo rat 
Physician Local Admin. Eduoator: 
-Cent. Admin . 
Dureaucrat 
Bureauo rat Universi ty 
Engineer Organised Agri c ul tural 
-
Political La bour Soientist 
Pa rty O.f.fi c ial Local. Admin. 
Exeoutivo Dureacurat 
Conunerc ialiat Edu oato r: Diplo mat 
-(Merchant) Prim . &. Political. 
Adrninis trator I Se o ondary Party 
University Education Exeoutive 
Judioiary Inspector 
Journalist/ 
Wri ter 
Comme r oi a l.is t 
(Merchant) 
Career 
Politician 
-
- Dentist 
-
Bankor 
- - Judiciary -
- - Librarian -
J ournalis t / 
Writer 
Organised 
Labour 
O1'1'ioial 
Pharmacist 
mc : 
F.~~~~v 
Military 
Of'Cioor 
Engineer 
Educ ator: 
Universl ty 
Educator l 
Prim. &. 
Sooondary 
Judiciary 
Politioal 
Party 
Exeoutiv e 
Lawyer 
Physioian 
Cent . Admin. 
Bureauc rat. 
Org . Lab. 
OrUcial 
Rural 
Notable 
-
-
-
-
-
R. Bayl.y Winderls ISyrian ,Deputies and Cabinet Mini.sters, 1919-.59', Pte . 1. -and 2 in ~ 16/ 4 and 
17/ 1 - 1962-196). 
Archives Biographigue Permanentos Du Monde Arabe, vola . l. and 2 . 
Pross Reports . 
Interviewa. 
1919-58: 
SRC/UAIl: 
CC/ UAIl : 
S/ SC : 
SDC: 
S BPC : 
IDC: 
DNC, 
SRC: 
Syrian Governments prior to the UAR. 
Syrian Regional Counc il. o .f t h e UAR. 
Central Cabinets o f' t he UAR. 
Syrian Secessionist Cabinets . 
Syrian 8a'th Cabinets. 
Syrian Ba l th Presidency Counoils. 
Iraqi Ba l th Cabinets. 
8a l th National Commands . 
Syrian Regional CommandS. 
TABLE 54 
(cntd . ) 
Pref renc 
Rating: 
i 
ii 
iii 
iv 
v 
vi 
vii 
viii 
ix 
x 
xi 
xii 
OMPARAT 
BA 'TE 
B C: 
1947-66 
Political 
Party 
Ex cutive 
Physician 
Military 
Officer 
Engineer 
Lawyer 
Educator : 
Prim. & 
Secondary 
Pharmacist 
Student 
Organiser 
Career 
Politician 
Journalist 
Diplomat 
RC : 
1963-66 
Military 
Offic r 
Physician 
Educator : 
Prim . & 
Secondary 
Lawy r 
Organised 
Labour 
Official 
Engineer 
Cent . Admin. 
Official 
Permanent 
Political 
Party 
Ex ecutive 
Journalist/ 
ewspaper 
Editor 
Dentist 
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bett r oppor uniti s lay in th fi lds of law , 
medicine , trade , nd stat man g m nt from 
wh nc political car ers could b based . This 
wa s specially so after ind p nd nc 
However th army did off r opportunities for 
prestig and a dvancem nt, as w 11 as a 
comf ortable lif , for sons of low r -c las s 
f amilies . l 
In the cours of the 1950s, military off icers with 
Ba ' thist and asirit sympathies , through r p at d 
purges of their right-wing enemies, gradually c ame to 
dominate the leading officer c a d r by late 1957 . 
Ac c ord ing t o one estimate , their str ngth lay at 70 
. 2 per c nt of all Syrian army offlcers . It was these 
young unionist officers who took a 1 ading part in the 
cr ation and administration of the gov rnments of th 
UAR . I n t rms of class status , their Egyptian army 
count rpart s who participated in the government , wer 
of similarly low origins . One has only to consider m n 
like Abd an - asir whose father was a village postmaster, 
to confirm this point of view . J 
Military offic rs in the UAR clearly predominate 
over the next highest professional group by a ratio of 
J : l . Lawyers in t u rn have a ratio of 2 : 1 over the next 
highest prof essional representation, university 
e d ucato rs. (See Tables 51 and 54) . Central administration 
bureaucrats rate low in the UAR ' s occupational structure . 
In the pre - UAR phase, they rated second only to lawyers, 
whereas i n the UAR they rate sixth in the SRC / UAR and 
sev enth in the CC / UAR . The i r comparatively low rating 
would seem to suggest that the UAR government upon assuming 
power mad e a complete purge o f the central bureaucracy 
which had supplied on an average 17 per cent of all 
cabinet s eats in the pre - UAR phase . 
The S / SC which overthrew the unionists on 28 eptember 
1961 by a military coup , brought in a considerably different 
1 
Fish r, S . (Ed . ) . , The Military in the Middle East 
(Ohio State University Press, Columbus, 196J ). ee Gordon 
II . Torrey ' s ' The Rol of the Military in Syria ' , p . 55 . 
2 
Inter i w, Maj . -G n ral Hamad Obaid, 2 December 1967, in 
Beirut . 
J 
For confirmation of th similarity of social class 
origin, see G org Kirk's ' The Role of th Military in 
Soci ty and Go ernm nt : Egypt ' , in Fisher, op . cit . , 
p·7J · 
2 5 
0 cup tional stru tur whi h mat h d th ir vastly 
dif'f r nt politi al on eptions. ( T bl s 51 and 
54) . For ampl , th y se m d to mod rat h hold o.f 
th mil" tary ov r h c vilian wings of gov rnm nt for 
a wh "l Y t they did not, ind d th Y could not, 
resurrect the pre-1958 occupational r pr sentation n 
its ent"rety . The UAR socio-economic r volution had 
financially ruined many of th 'fifty' traditional ruling 
family elites . Som had wi thdrawn th ir capital ass ts 
and had fled to Beirut and Europe or America . Those 
who survived the agrarian and nationalisation laws 
were less capable of restoring the traditional upper 
middle class dominance over the governm nt and the 
nation . Although disunited following the breakdown of 
the UAR, intense unionist sympathies within the army and 
in some civilian professional quarters, acted as a 
barrier against any return to the ancient regime in Syria. 
The occupational group in pr ponderance during th 
s j sc, is the university educator - a highly prestigeous 
and socially respectable profession . (S e Table 54) . 
Lawyers and phys icians follow a small margin behind . 
The most significant comparative tr nd is in the low 
rating of the military officer in the s j SC . The ratio 
is 1 : 5 in comparison to the SRC j UAR and CC j UAR, and is 
very close to th pre-UAR phase, 1919-59. (See Tables 
51 and 54). On the scale of preference rating, officers 
are qual fourth in the s j sc and fifth in the pre- AR 
phase . 
Comparatively speaking, the s j sc shows a relatively 
high d egree of occupational diversification. Engineers 
rate qual fourth with bankers and military officers 
though their ratio to the leading professional group is 
1 : 2 . Compared to th UAR occupational pattern, the s j sc 
has a much higher 'white collar ' professional content 
and a slightly low r technical competency. 
Professionals lik ly to be in the middle-upper 
socio-e onomi lass bracket (see Table 46), se m to 
preponderate in the s j SC. In t rms of class alignments 
th s j sc has more in common with th pr -UAR phase 
oc up tional stru tur than with ith r the UAR or Ba ' th 
phas S. Y t a signifi ant br ak with th traditional 
oc upational stru tur should not go unnoticed. Under 
th traditional syst m of governm nt, 
and weal tb was p rhaps mor valuabl 
aspirant than prof ssional ability . 
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f milial patronag 
o th poli ical 
For xample, a 
lawy r from a w althy and pow rfu family might acquir 
portfolio3 such as Planning, Industry , and such, 
requiring some technical competency . In th / C th r 
is evidence that ministers w re bing appoint d to 
offices as much for their technical and prof ssional 
ability as for th ir powerful family connections and 
personal weal th o (S e Tables 51 and 54) . In fact th 
occupational pattern s ems to sugg st that the class s 
supporting the secessionists were anxious to repudiat 
the criticisms of the younger 'frustrated effendis ' of 
the UAR phase that th y lacked th nec e ssary professional 
expertise to run the government. By its occupational 
representation, the S / SC (s.ee Tabl s 51 and 54) is in 
effect , attesting to the fact that ability and not 
ascribed merit constitute the necessary qualifications 
for ministerial office. This as will be seen, was a 
significant departure from the traditional pattern of 
governmental appointments. 
It has been proposed that the occupational patt rn 
of representation is a useful baromet r, firstly in 
ascertaining the socio-economic status of governmental 
personnel and secondly, in identifying types of political 
behaviour . It has been seen that governments which have 
a pr ponderance of university educators, rural landlords, 
industrialists, central administration bureaucrats and 
the like (see Tables 51, 52 and 54), tend to be less 
actively Arab nationalist and socialist than governments 
with a preponderance of military officers and occupations 
drawn from lower (see Table 46) socio-economic professional 
classes . Let us t st this observation further by making 
several comparative investigations between the Ba 'th 
which in theory is unionist and socialist in orientation 
and the S / SC which 's anti-unionist and anti-socialist . 
Set out below are Tables 55 and 56 describing 
occupational preferen e rating for the Ba ' th (governmental 
and non-governmental) and the S / SC; 
TABLE 55 
S ! C Occupat'onal 
Occupation 
University Educ ator 
Lawyer 
Physician 
Bank r 
Military 
Officer 
Engineer 
Judiciary 
(Magistrate 
Judg ) 
Central Administration 
Bureaucrat 
Lo c al Adminis tration 
Bureaucrat 
Diplomat 
Organis ed Labour 
Official 
chool Teacher 
Primary and Secondary 
Education 
Inspe ctor 
Journalist ! 
Writer 
Commercialist 
(Merchant) 
Career Politician 
R = .Rating 
R 
1 
2 
3 
4 
4 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
8 
9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
Ratin~ 
P 
19 . 8 
16 . 5 
12 .1 
8 . 8 
8 . 8 
8 . 8 
6 . 6 
5 · 5 
3 · 3 
2 . 2 
2 . 2 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
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Based on Table 51 . Fractional variation due to rounding . 
Military 
Offic r 
School 
Teacher 
Primary and 
Second ary 
Physician 
Lawyer 
Central Admin . 
Bureaucrat 
Pol' tical Party 
Executive 
Engine r 
Organised 
Labour Official 
Educator 
Univ rsity 
Banker 
Dentist 
Agricultural 
S cientist 
Lo c al Admin . 
Bureauc rat 
Diplomat 
Journalist / 
Writer 
e ws paper 
Editor/ Owner 
Judiciary 
(Magistrate 
Judge) 
Pharmacist 
Librarian 
R = Rating . 
R 
2 
3 
4 
1 
5 
9 
6 
12 
7 
10 
10 
8 
8 
9 
12 
o 
11 
12 
12 
TABLE 56 
BC 
% 
15 · 
13 . 6 
12 . 1 
17 · 5 
10.2 . 
2 . 4 
7 . 2 
· 5 
6 . 8 
2 . 
2. 
2 . 9 
2 . 9 
2 . 4 
. 5 
o 
1 . 
·5 
. 5 
SBPC 
R % 
1 40 . 
2 
3 20 . 
o o 
o o 
4 6 . 7 
o o 
5 3 · 3 
o o 
5 3 · 3 
o o 
o o 
o o 
o o 
o o 
o o 
o o 
o o 
o o 
Ratigg : 
SRC 
R % 
1 42 . 1 
3 
2 19 · 7 
4 6 . 6 
6 2 . 6 
6 2 . 6 
6 2 . 6 
5 4 . 
o o 
o o 
7 1.3 
o o 
o o 
o o 
7 1 · 3 
7 1.3 
o o 
o o 
o o 
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32 . 3 
17 · 3 
8 . 
4 . 3 
3 · 9 
3 · 3 
2 . 6 
2 · 3 
1.8 
1.1 
1. 
1. 
.8 
. 6 
.4 
·3 
. 2 
.2 
Bas d on Tables 51, 52, 53 and 54. Fractional variation 
d1.l to rounding . 
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R lat 'ng th s two Tables, som highly signif'cant 
socio- conomic infer n s might b m d from th 
occupational patt rns. In th Ba ' thist abl th 
oc upational patt rn t nds to sugg st that th party is 
drawing the bulk of its m mb rShip from low r a ad mi 
and soc'ally prest'gious prof ss'onal lass s. Thi 
might be inferr d from the prepond ran e of military 
offic rs and school tach rs who tog th r constitut 
over 50 per cent of all th personnel . By contrast, 
thes sam prof ssions in the S / SC constitute less than 
10 per c nt of all the p rsonnel. Conv rs ly , th 
university educator predominates in the S / SC , wher as 
in the Ba ' th he rates a relatively low ninth, with only 
2 . 3 of the percentage total . Bankers, another traditional 
middle and upper class profession , rat qual fourth in 
the S/SC , while in the Ba ' th , they rate t nth behind 
university e d ucators . (See Table 54) . 
Th professional classes of the Ba ' th have some 
highly prestigious occupations such as lawyers, physicians, 
central administration bureaucrats and the like, but 
overall the preponderance seems to have been weighted 
towards the lower professional classes . In the S / SC, 
there seems to hav been a more equitable sharing of 
political functions among highly prestigious professional 
classes such as university educators, lawyers, physicians 
and to a lesser extent bankers, military officers and 
ngin ers. In the Ba'th, the bulk of the occupational 
r pres ntation is shared between three professions: 
military officers (32.3) school teachers (18 . 7) and 
physicians (17.3) . The fourth rating, lawyers, have a 
ratio of less than 1:2 to physicians and below lawyers 
th r is a wide diversifi ation of occupations ranging 
down from librarian to pharmacist with only point 2 p r 
c nt of all the s ats. 
n as a whole, the occupational structures in 
Tables 55 and 56 differ considerably as do the political 
behavioural trends of each system . It might be postulated 
that the Ba ' th repr sents the lower professional ' have 
not' classes, wher as the secessionists by virtue of mor 
afflu nt families, good education and ag seniority in 
which to attain societal standing, ar h professional 
and political ' hav s' for the moment . Th secessionists 
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might hav seen Arab unity and so ialism as a thr at to 
th stat~uo in which they poss ss d a privil g d 
role . By comparison , th Ba ' thists b li v d in Arab 
unity and socialism as a means for d mol"shing 
entrenched socio-economic privileg in th inter st 
of national progress . 
Elsewhere, it has b en shown that other variabl 
indic s can be correlated with particular political 
systems . The occupational variabl e in no wis 
invalidates this observation , rather it confirms th 
existence of a socio-economic differ ntial operating 
between the respective political systems under 
consideration and in particular, it underlines a 
sociological reason as to why the Ba'thists might 
wish to overthrow the secessionists. 
A Comparative Analysis of the Occupational Structure of 
the SBC : Bitar, Hafi7- and Zu ' ayyen Governments, 1963-66 
If distinctive occupational patterns can be equate d 
to some extent with various political systems, is it 
possible to isolate occupational dichotomi es operating 
within particular systems, in this cas the SBC? Set 
out below are Tables 57, 58 and 59 describing 
occupational preference ratings and percentage averages 
for each of the three Ba ' thist government leaders, Bitar, 
Hafiz and Zu ' ayyen . 
TABLE 21 
SBC Occup tional 
DiLar ' s 
Cabin os : 15, 16, 17 
19 and 22 
Occul2ations : n 
Lawy r 1 
Central Admin. 2 Bureaucrat 
S chool Teacher 
Primary and 3 
Secondary 
Military Officer 3 
Physician 4 
Educ at or 
5 University 
Engineer 6 
Political Party 
7 Executive 
Diplomat 8 
Dentist 9 
Agricultural 
9 Scientist 
Local Admin . 10 Bureaucrat 
Judiciary 
(Magistrate 10 
Judge) 
Journalist / 10 Writer 
Pharmacist 10 
Librarian 10 
Banker 0 
Organised Labour 0 Official 
R = Rating 
For mor details se Table 
due to rounding . 
% 
17 · 3 
13 · 3 
11.2 
11 . 2 
10 . 2 
9 . 2 
7 · 1 
5 · 1 
4.1 
3·1 
3·1 
1 . 
1. 
1 . 
1 . 
1. 
0 
0 
52 . 
Average for 
all Cabin ts 
R % 
1 17·5 
5 10 . 2 
3 13 . 6 
2 15 · 
4 12.1 
7 6 . 8 
6 7 . 2 
9 2.4 
9 2 .4 
10 2 . 
8 2 . 9 
8 2.9 
11 1 . 
12 
·5 
12 
·5 
12 
·5 
10 2 . 
12 
·5 
Fractional variations 
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TABLE 58 
SBC Occupational Pref 
os. 
Oc cupations 
S chool Teachers 
Primary and 
Se condary 
Militar y Officer 
Lawyer 
Physician 
Engineer 
Local Admin. 
Bureaucrat 
Agricul tural 
Scientist 
Educator 
University 
Banker 
Organised 
Labour Official 
JUdiciary 
(Magistrate 
Judge) 
Diplomat 
Central Admin . 
Bureaucrat 
Dentist 
Politi c al Party 
Exe cutive 
Librarian 
Journalist / 
Writer 
Pharmac ist 
R = Rating 
IIafi z ' s 
18 and 20 
R 
1 
2 
J 
J 
4 
5 
6 
6 
6 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
o 
o 
o 
o 
% 
19. 6 
17 . 4 
lJ . 
lJ . 
4 . 4 
4 . J 
4 . J 
4 . J 
2 . 2 
2 . 2 
2.2 
2 . 2 
2 . 2 
o 
o 
o 
o 
For more details s e Tabl 52 . 
J02 
Rating : 
R 
J 
2 
1 
4 
6 
8 
8 
7 
10 
12 
11 
9 
5 
10 
9 
12 
12 
12 
Averag for 
all Cabin ts 
% 
lJ . 6 
15 · 
17 · 5 
12 . 1 
2 . 9 
2 . 9 
6 . 8 
2 . 
· 5 
1. 
2 . 4 
10 . 2 
2 . 
2 . 4 
· 5 
· 5 
· 5 
Cabinet os. 
occupations 
Lawy r 
Military Officer 
Physician 
School Teacher 
Primary and 
Secondary 
Central Admin. 
Bureaucrat 
Engineer 
Local Admin . 
Bureaucrat 
Educ ator 
University 
Banker 
Agricultural 
Scient ist 
Diplomat 
Political Party 
Executive 
Dentist 
JUdiciary 
(Magistrate 
Judge) 
Librarian 
Journalist / 
Writ r 
Organised Labour 
Official 
Pharmacist 
R = Rating 
For more details s 
TABLE 59 
21, 2J and 24 
R 
1 
2 
J 
4 
5 
6 
7 
7 
8 
9 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
% 
21. 
19 . 4 
14 . 5 
12 . 9 
11. J 
6.5 
4 . 8 
4 . 8 
J . 2 
1 . 6 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
Table 52 . 
JOJ 
Rating : 
ts 
R % 
1 17 · 5 
2 15 · 
4 12 . 1 
J IJ.6 
5 10 . 2 
6 7 . 2 
8 2.9 
7 6 . 8 
10 2 . 
8 2 . 9 
9 2 . 4 
9 2 . 4 
10 2 . 
11 1. 
12 
·5 
12 
·5 
12 
· 5 
12 
·5 
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Taking Tables 57 , 58 and 59 a s a whol th r is 
not any ma jor occupati ona l variat"on such scan b s n 
b tw n the s i sc and BC . Th r ar , n v rth I ss, minor 
v a riations wh "ch warrant some inv stigation . n terms 
of o c cupational prefer nc rating, m"litary offic rs and 
school teachers rate equal third in Bitar's c abin ts 
or gove rnments behind lawyers and c ntral a dministration 
bureaucrats; in Hafiz's cabinets school teachers and 
military officers rate first and second r spectiv ly and 
in Zu' ayyen 's c abinets military offic rs and school 
tach rs are rated second and fourth r spectively, 
although the aggregat percentages for th se professions 
are still over 6 per cent higher than for th sam 
professions i n Bitar's cabinets. 
Univ ersity educators who pre d ominat in the s l sc , 
rate quite low in the three cabinet groupings, although 
Bitar 's c abinets have a significantly higher percentag 
of this pro f essional group than either Hafiz or Zu ' ayyen ' s 
cabinets. The importance of this obs rvation might lie 
in the fact that the moderate or nationalist wing of the 
party tended to draw more support from the universities 
and socio-economically afflu ent prof ssional groups than 
the regional socialist extremists who recruite d many of 
their senior c abinet personnel from school teachers and 
military officers - professions on the lower socio-
economi c leve ls of society (see Table 46) . 
The overall d egree of occupational diversification 
tends to be greater in Bitar 's cabinets than in either 
of the other two . One obvious r ason for this might lie 
in the f a ct that Bitar 's cabinet personnel compris s five 
cabinet formations compared wi th t wo for Hafiz and three 
for Zu' ayyen . How ver, another plausible explanation 
may be that Bitar shared a much wider professional 
popularity on account of his moderate national socialist 
po licies than either of th socialist xtremist cabin t 
groups . Zu'ayyen for example, re ruited professionals 
from ten , as compared to Bitar's sixteen occupational 
groups . 
Tabl s 57, 58 and 59 show that th r is a slightly 
high r percentag of technocrats in the r gional 
socialist cabin ts (i. Hafiz and Zu'ayyen) than in those 
o f Bitar. The h"gh st p rcentag of t hnocrats is to be 
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found in Hafiz's c bin ts wh r ngin rs rat fourth 
with 8 . 7 p r c nt and agricultural s n 'sts s'xth w' h 
4 . 3 per c nt . In Zu'ayy n ' s cabin ts, ng'n rs rat 
sixth with 7 . 2 p r c nt and ninth in agricultural 
scientists with 2 . 9 p r c nt . In Bitar ' s nationalist 
cabinets, engineers rate sixth with 7 . 1 p r c nt and on 
top of this there s a r latively small p rcentag of 
agricultural sc' ntists rating ninth with 3 . 1 p r nt . 
The total per entage differ ntial b tween the 
nationalist and regional socialist cabin ts on the 
basis of technocrat representation, is c rtainly minimal, 
but in confirms nevertheless an e arlier observation that 
a greater degree of technical occupations existed among 
young r Syrian professionals of th post-independence 
era , and was in ke ping with the trend towards increasing 
social mobility d ue to the 'continuing process of 
Westernisation . There may be some significance in the 
slightly higher content of technocrats in the regional 
socialist cabinets, just as there was in the UAR cabinets 
(SRC / UAR-CC/ UAR) compared with the occupational structure 
of the pre-UAR phase (see Table 51) . For example, it 
might be postulated that the technocrats entered the 
regional socialist cabinets in slightly greater numbers 
as a result of their mounting frustration with the 
nationalists' failur to expand the industrial base of 
the country at a pace quick enough to guarantee them and 
their professional colleagues opportunities for careers 
consonant with their advanced technical qualifications. 
On the other hand, the relatively higher percentage and 
rating of central administration bureaucrats in Bitar's 
cabinets might tend to confirm the fact that the zealous 
and id alistic young technocrats and professionals 
generally, were the political 'have nots' within the 
leading d cision making departments of the party and 
government . 
From Tables 57, 58 and 59 it is clear that overall 
the relative degree of professional class variance is 
not v ry substantial b tween the three cabinet groups . 
How ver, the observation that school teachers and military 
officers predominate in the regional socialist cabin ts 
by 10 per cent ov r th nationalist cabinets, tends to 
sugg st that the former is drawing its personnel from 
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low r so io - conomic 1 vels of so i ty than th latt r . 
Let u s t s t t h is obs r v tion furth r by m king a s ri s 
o f c r o s s-comparis ons b t we n th r g ona so c ialist and 
nat · onalist occupational struc tur s t the mom nt of 
th party ' s political d·sintegration on 23 F bruary 1966 . 
Occu pational Patt rns and Tr 
Disintegration : 23 F 
nt of 
Tabl s 52 and 53 show an increasing perc ntag of 
military pers onnel on the Ba ' th ' s s nior politi c al 
commands between 1963 - 66 . In August 1965, 56 per c nt 
of the membership of th SRC ( 0 . 4) are military 
officers . On 21 D c mber 1965, following th SRC ' s 
dismissal by the B C, military repr s ntation is r duced 
to 18 per cent, the low st figure since 1963 . How v r, 
following the coup of 23 February 1966, military 
representation in the SRC ( 0 . 6) rose to 47 per c nt -
a figure easily sufficient to permit the military to 
control the party. 
In the SBC a smiliar though less dramatic drop 
occured in military r presentation following the B C I S 
coup d main on 21 December 1965 . (Se Table 53) . 
Bitar's fifth cabinet of January 1966 r duced Zu'ayyen ' s 
military representation from 19 per cent to 8 per c nt 
of the total cabinet personnel . Th occupational 
structure of c abinet 0 . 22, formed on the eve of 
23 February is worth a brief comment . Instead of 
military off i c ers and school teach rs which had constitut d 
33 per c ent of Zu'ayyen's cabinet ( 0 . 21), Bitar reduced 
the c ombi n e d aggregate of the two professions to 13 per 
cent and t u rned to university educators and central 
a dministration bureaucrats to mak up the deficit 
(38 per c ent ) . 
The regional socialist coup on 23 February 1966 , 
introdu ced signif·cant oc upational variations . Zu ' ayyen ' s 
second cabinet ( 0 . 23) has a military repr sentation of 
20 p r cent, a figure more than two and a half times 
gr at r than that of Bitar ' s national (Arab) oriented 
cabinet ( 0 . 22) . By comparison, uni ersity educators 
and entral administration bureaucrats rec ive only 
20 p r cent of the s ats (s e Tables) ; military offi ers 
and school tach rs r c iv 33 p r c nt, in fact a 
complet r versal of th occupational pattern xisting 
b fore the coup . 
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Final l y , it would b unwi e to read too much into 
t he occupational patt rns xisting betwe n the riv al l ing 
wings of the party at t h e moment of its death knell . 
On t he basis of available eviden e, it an be shown 
t h at Bitar ' s cabinet r cruited their personnel from 
pro fes sionals on a higher socio-economic level than 
either o f Hafiz' s or Zu'ayyen ' s regional sociali s t 
cabinets . They seem to have recruited a g r ater 
percentage of their personne l f rom school teachers and 
military officers - two professions traditionally 
represente d b y the lowe r middle classes (See Table 46) . 
Of course, Bitar also drew from these professions but 
to a l esser extent . 
The occupational variable tends to underline the 
existenc e of a socio-economic class dichotomy, although 
statistically it is b y no means as demonstrable as it 
is between the S/SC and t he SBC as a whole . Coupled to 
the generational, communal, r egional and e ducational 
dichotomies previously isolated, the occupational 
variable would seem to have exacerbated the sociological 
dichotomy existing between t he nationalists and the 
regionalists of t h e party - a dichotomy which may have 
nullified any hopes of the party ever attaining 
collect i ve leadership and party unity . 
vi Evaluation 
Research Problem 
The results of this investigation which took place 
in Syria a nd Lebanon in 1967 are both revealing and 
disappointing . In the latter instance, several factors 
acted as barriers towards a deeper and clearer appraisal 
of the sociology of t h e Ba'th . Firstly, the moment of 
the inv e tigation happened to coin ide with the Six-Day-War 
and its aftermath. Suspecting enemy agents at e v ery 
turn, Syrian and Lebanese Ba 'thists tended to be h ighly 
reticent about the sociological and political aspects 
of the party . Hence I was inconvenience d in my 
inv estigations by the l a k o f reliable statistics and 
by a general unwillingn of Ba'thists to talk about 
the party and it problem . Inv est'gations of n eces sity 
had to be onfined to t h top political cadres who fo r 
on reason or another had come unde r t he spot l ight of 
public scrutiny or who in disgust h a d broken with the 
pa ty and w re living in x'l in B 
the lim·t d do um n atlon to h and, 
and support of many leading Ba'th'st 
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·rut . Y t with 
nd through the h lp 
xiles .. t is 
J 
on ider d that us f ul xplanatory var'abl s hav b n 
isolated to account for the existence of division and 
finally po l itical disintegration of the Ba'th on 
23 February 1966. 
What Has Been Shown 
The fo rego ing chapters have s hown that it is 
possible to correlate so iological ind ices with aspects 
of political behaviour . The isolation of sociological 
di hotomies - majority-minority community, rural-urban, 
Western e ducate d-lo a l educated, upper professional-lower 
professional , military-civilian, generational gap - were 
s hown to be present in t he ' party at the moment of its 
political d isintegration on 23 February 1966. I am not 
asserting t hat socio logical dichotomies were the onl y 
agents of d iscord within the party as Part 1 and 2 show . 
Howeve r I do think there is some worth in the argument 
that t he se d ich otomies singul ar l y or together accentuated 
the agents of discord manifested through ideological 
and po l iti al fa tionalism. 
Giv en the presence of these sociological dichotomies, 
were they espe iallyakin to the Ba'th or could they 
b said to be part of a wider social phenomenon within 
the Arab world? In a sense, the Ba'th was the victim 
of a triple rev o l ution - social, economic and political -
which was occurring t h roughout the more Westernised 
regions of t he Arab wo rld, gaining in momentum since t h e 
Second Wo r ld War . Trad itional Arab-Islamic values with 
stress on fami l ial , c lass and communal solidarity, were 
b re aking down and new ' national'loyalties were being 
fo stered by r adical po l itical movements such as the 
Ba 'th, the ANM, t he SUM, state socialist parties and 
others who we re them elves the uncons ious v ictims of the 
Westernising proc ss . Yet the replacement of o ld v alues 
by new ones had its own problems . The inte lle ctual and 
pro f ssional c l ass may have appreciated the need f or 
a non-s ctarian viable na ional entity, uniting all 
Arab people togeth r, but to the mas es of urban and 
rural i ll iterates, national l oyalti s were unreal 
substitutes fo r the se urity of familiar and communal 
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solidarity . Ev n among th prof ssional elites, as ha 
been seen in the case of the Ba'th, there was a vast 
difference of opinion over the ideal form the Arab 
nation should take when realised . 
Within the Ba'th the question of 'loyalty ' was a 
ve ry real issue, although in theory it should not have 
troub led those who subscribe d to the objective goals 
of the Constitution. However, this que stion went 
deeper than outward profession of fa ith in Unity, 
Free dom and Socialism . In fact, evidence would seem 
to suggest that the membe rs of the Ba'th epitomised 
within themselves elements of the wider sociological 
dichotomy based on the class of traditional and modern 
values - a potentially disruptive force. For example 
Alawites, Druzes, Isma ' ilis and other sectarian 
communities who entered the Ba'th, had been brought up 
to feel that they were different from each other and 
collectively from the Sunni Muslim majority community . 
Centuries of enforced exile in mountain fastnesses, 
intersperced by Sunni Muslim persecution, had 
indelibly inscribed this upon the minds of their 
communities . The sudden elevation of the members of 
these communities into the mainstream of political 
life during 1960s did not, indeed it could not e rase 
centuries of communal separateness and suspicion. 
As the Ba'th grew to power in Syria, it inherited 
the legacy of communal traditional rivalries which 
were not of its making and which it was powerless to 
control. The Alawites in particular carried their 
communal so l i darity into the party and army, which they 
proceeded to use in their own interests against their 
traditional enemies, the Sunni middle classes of the 
cities . Trad itional rivalries between the countryside 
and the city, between the professional 'haves' and 
the professional 'have nots ', which bore no relation 
to the Ba ' th's political and ideological objectives, 
similarly weakened and undermined the party. The 
Ba'th's ideal of an Arab nation stretching from the 
Taurus Mountains to the Maghrib based on Freedom and 
Socialism seems to have been a concept far in advance 
of the mental developm nt of the average member of 
the party who had not managed to resolve the elementary 
confl ict betwe n loyalty to his family, community 
and social class and loyalty to the ' nation '. 
PART 4 
ORGA STRUCTURE 
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i Constitutional Foundations 
Organisational structure 
The central theme of the Ba 1th party Constitution 
of April 1947, held 'the Arab fatherland constitutes 
an indivisibl e political and economic unity, . l o 
Arab country (Iqlim) can live apar t from others,2 . 
Around this proposition the Ba ' th organisation unfolded 
at the First ational Congress of the party in 
Damascus in Apri l 1947 . Under the ' General Principles' , 
the Constitution stated 'The Party of the Arab Ba'th 
is a universa l Arab party . It has branches in all Arab 
countries, . 3 In fact in 1947, this was rather 
wishfu l thinking on the part of the formulators of the 
Constitution, but it nevertheless testified to the 
fact that one day they sought to establish a ring of 
branches rad iating out from Damascus throughout the 
Arab world . The majcr objective of the Ba'th was to 
cr e ate in the Arab people a sense of belonging to one 
Arab f amily and nation . The party organisation itself 
was in t h eory to be the embryo of the future Arab nation, 
growing as it instilled national consciousness into the 
minds of the Arab people . 4 
At the First ational Congress a Central Executive 
Committee or ational Command (B C) of four was 
nominated to administer and direct the affairs of the 
regions ' in the higher interests of the Arab cause , 5 . 
By t h e very fact of the immensity of its proposed 
objective, (Arab unity), the party developed an 
. 6 hierarchical or pyramldal structure. The B C with 
its chairman, the Secretary-General, was in theory to 
be responsible for the national policy of the party . 
Below it were the regional organisations, themselves 
miniatures of the national organisation (al-Hizb) . 
1 
Constitution Fundamental Principles. ee Ap pe ndix 1 . 
2 
Ibid . 
3 
Ibid . , Art.l . 
4 
Ibid . , Art · 3 · See Fi Sabil, op . cit . , p . 171 . 
5 
Constitution, Art . l . 
6 
See Fig . 4 . 
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In t heory, they were to be larg ly autonomous of the 
1 national organisation on purely regional matt rs , but 
we r e to b e sub jec t to the ove rriding directiv of the 
B C on matters affecting Arab national issues2 , su h as 
defence, attitude towards Israel, the West, capitalism 
and the like. Issues such as labour and peasant 
organisation, party organisation in the city, town, village, 
university, college, factory we re the prime concern of 
the reg ional organisations . 
In 1947, the Ba'th h a d on l y one c ntre of operation, 
Syria . Only the skeleton of t he party's organisation 
and structure wa s di sce rnible in the Constitution and 
in the r esolutions adopted by the Fir st ational 
Congres s . However, the rudiments of the future 
hie rarchi cal structure we re in evidence. As th party 
establi s hed b ranche s in Jordon 1948, Lebanon 1949, 
Iraq 1950, Libya 1954, Kuwait 1955, Yemen and Aden 
1955-56, it began to e volve a more refined system of 
party gove rnment . Pro v ision was made for the calling 
of ational Congre sses to lay down and plan work on 
a national l e vel to be, in theory, enacted in the form 
of directives by the B C to the regional organi s ations. 
Members of the National Congress were to be drawn f r om 
the regional organisations and the secretary of the 
regional executive, t he Regional Command was 
automatica lly to become a member of the B C . 3 At the 
reg ional level a similar process was operative . Regional 
c ongresses we re to mee t annually to plan work f or the 
coming year ' strictly in accordance with the policy 
projected by the ational Co mmand' and by the ational 
Co ngress of delega t es. 4 
1 
Laqueur, op.cit See Majdalani ' s . ' The Ar ab Socialist 
Movement'. pp.338 -39 . Ma jdalani is a prominent 
Lebanese Ba ' t h ist and wa s f rom time to time a member 
of the LRC . 
2 
Ibid . 
3 
Ibid. Also interv iew Daouk, 9 ovember 1967, Beirut . 
He said that the policy of the Ba ' th before 1959, was to 
give representation of the B C by region . The Third 
ational Congress, howev r, institut d a system of 
el ec ting a Command member by ability to contribute to 
t h e national programme of the Ba ' th. 
4 
Ibid . 
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Regional congres es were to draw their membership 
from the regional organisation, including the Regional 
Command , (al-Qutr), Branch (al-Fur ' ), Section (ash- hu-'ba), 
Division (al-Firq a), cell (al-Halaqa) and friends cell 
(Halaq at al-Ansar) , on a descending scale of pre fe ren 
The Ba'th organisation and structure as it 
unf old ed in the 1950s had much in common with the 
Communist party system . Power was to radiate vertically 
from top to bottom . But by an intricate system of 
party congresses radiating up from the partisan bases 
to the Regional Congress, in theory at least, the 
bases were to have considerable responsibility in 
formulating party policy. The Ba'th's organisational 
system provided for the principle of centralised 
democratic party government, but how in fact did it 
work in the decade after the First ational Congress 
in April 1947? 
ii The Problem of Party Leadership: Personal 
or Collective 1947-59 
Prior to the Third National Congress in 1959, 
major policy decisions within the Ba'th appear to have 
been made by the ' three doctors' of the B C , Aflaq, 
Bitar and Hurani. From 1947, branches were established 
in several Arab countries, but the r elationships between 
these and B C headquarters in Damascus appears to have 
been very loose and unco-ordinated in the main . l 
Between 1 947 and 1958, only two ational Congresses 
were convened (April 1947 and June 1954), but their 
powers of supervision over the B C appear to have been 
very slight . 2 The B C met very infrequently in these 
years.3 Practical difficulties often prevented Command 
members from attending sessions in Damascus, thus the 
power of decision making and party organisational 
administration wa s entrusted, to some extent by default, 
to the three Syrian delegates - the 'three party doctors ' . 
Unti l the Third ational Congress they directed the 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Interview, Bitar, Beirut, 1 6 ovember 1967 . 
Ibid. 
Ibid . 
Ibid . 
4 
JIJ 
affairs of the mother branch of the party in Syria and 
in a somewhat loose and unco-ordinated manner, the wid r 
national interests of the party. 
Substantial increases in party membership in 
1 2 Syria, Iraq, Jordon and Lebanon, between 1955-57, 
however, precipitated movements within the party 
organisation for a more democratic sharing of political 
responsibilities . At the annual conference of the 
Syrian Council of the Ba'th on 9 July 1957, voices w re 
raised fo r a reappraisal of the party's system of 
government. Whi le the final communique of this body 
restressed t h e need for a dominant centralised party 
leadership ( i .e. the B C), it also upheld in prinCiple 
democratic central ism in party organisation: 
The party holds that democracy in the party's 
work means unity in trends and planning and 
the attitude between party members and its 
different organisations and commands, and the 
realisation of u~ity is by free participation 
between all members and organisations based on 
the respect of opinion and constructiv e discussion 
and agreements aimed at adopting the ideas 
which are expressed by the majority in every 
party organisation . J 
Inherent in this statement was a confession that 
hitherto the national l eadership of the party had 
failed to implement centralised democratic government 
in the administration of the party . 
The 'three do ctors ' appear to have given little 
attention to the demands of the organisational reformers . 
Six months later t h ey agreed to dissolve the mother 
branch of t he Ba'th in Syria as a condition for union 
with President asir without reference to the ational 
Congress . 4 
1 
Laqueur, op.cit. See Majdalani ' s essay, p .J42. 
2 
Communique to Active Members, 25 June 1959, Beirut 
Branch of the Ba ' t h. It refers, among other things, to 
a substantial increase in supporter or friends' cells 
(Halaqat al-Ansar) from forty to one hundred in the years 
1958-59. A ce ll, according to the Party Rules of 1959, 
numbere d three to seven members . 
J 
4 
al-Ba'th , 19 July 1957. 
Interv iew Bitar, 16 ovember, Beirut, 1967 . 
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This action seemed to v iolate th whole 
principle of party d mocracy as stated by the Syri n 
Council for t he party in July 1957 . A s hort whi l e 
later it wa s to spark off the most serious organisation 
crisis which the Ba'th had up till then f aced . The 
rank and file memb ersh ip o f the party outside Syria 
were incensed at such a disregard for the canons of 
1 party government . Had the party profitted by the 
di ssolution of the mo t her branch in Syria or the UAR, 
the r ank and f i le may have been more disposed to accept 
the action as the wor k of 'inspire d le a dersh ip ' . But 
as it turned out, a f ter sev eral months in the UAR, the 
party began t o lo se political influence and by the end 
of 1959, its l eade rs who h ad partic i pated in the 
National Union and the Syrian Regional and Central 
Gove r nment s of the UAR, resigned in protest against 
Nasir ' s d ictatorial a dministration . 2 
By 1959 Aflaq appears to have become extremely 
alarmed at the lack of confidence which the party 
organisation held fo r this leadership . All round 
him he saw signs of f actional secession . J Ideologically, 
the party was torn into those who wanted it to 
merge co mple tely its identity with Nasirite forces 
in the union and t h ose who sought to make the Ba' t h 
once more politically independent of as ir . 4 Sometime 
in 1959, Aflaq took a decision which was to have a 
significant bear ing on the future organisation and 
structure of the party. He c alled together a 
Preparatory Committee to prepare for the Third ational 
Congress in September 1959, the first to be held in 
f i v e y ears. 5 This Committee convened and acting on 
1 
idal a l-Ba ' t h , vol. 4, op . cit . See ' Pe riodi cal 
Report of the Fourth ational Congress' , p . 198 
2 
I b i d . See ' The a tiona 1 Report, Ma rch 196 0 
Periodical Report (confidential to members only)' The 
Repo r t i mpl ied, among othe r things that the resignations 
were designed to reform the government of the UAR not to 
withdraw conf i dence from the union, p .1 J 5 
J 
Se e pp . 158 - 60 . 
4 
Ibid . 
5 
idal al-Ba'th,vo1.4. op . cit . S e R port on 
t he-Th ird ational Congress, 27 August-l Septembe r 1959' , 
Beirut , pp . 88 - 91 . 
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instru tions from the Se retary-Gen ral, or responding 
to the e igenci s of the moment,l it w s d "d d that 
the ational Congress should be ' an xceptional one 
in which the party ' s organisational bas s would be 
repres nted through th process of d ir t elections,2. 
For the first time the partisan bases were to b given 
the opportunity of making and examining executive party 
policies . 3 To provide for this sUbstantial amendments 
had to be made to the Party Rules. 
The Th ird ational Congress met in September 
1959 and quickl y ratified the amended Party Rules 
(hereafter Rules) . Perhaps out of the need to preserve 
organisational unity, this Congress veiled its criticisms 
of the prev ious ational Command lead rShip .4 It 
ratifie d the action of the leadership in dissolving 
the party in the DAR,5 but in its adoption of the 
amended Rules, it accepted in principle that henceforth 
the leadership of the party would be required to answer 
to the ational Congress for all its actions . 
The Fourth ational Congress which met in 
September 1960, when the political fortunes of the Ba'th 
in the DAR had sunk even lower, was less condescending 
towards the party leadership . Exercising its powers 
of supervision over the National Command by the 
amended Rules of 1959, it stated : 
1 
2 
3 
The Congress feel s that the party did not 
rise to the standard of its national 
responsibilities fo r its leadership indulged 
most of the time in regional problems and 
ran after political gains important to one 
Ibid. 
Ibid . 
Hitherto it would seem that the member hip of the 
ational Cong ress, when it met, was nominated by the 
various Regional Commands . According to Majdalani, 
Regional Command secretaries were 'ipso facto members of 
the ational Command'. The Third ational Congress 
proposed that in fu ture all Command offices (with the 
exception of the Secretary-General) w re to be 
elective, See Party Rules 1959 . 
4 
Subsumed with the amend d Party Rules of 1959 · 
5 
idal al-Ba'th, vol.4., op . cit., pp . 88-91 . 
region only. 
Art . xvii (a) 
Command t o : 
The Congress thus 
to (f), 1959) LltC' 
sks ( See 
ational 
(a) Care fo r party work on a national scale 
and c r eate party organisations in a ll Arab 
regions and superv ise t he ir affairs . 
(b) Give priority in politIcal wo r k to 
important national problems and to follow 
the national policy which is in harmony with 
the national welfare of the party and han dle 
r egional matte rs through t he national policy 
of the party. 
(c) Pur i fy the party of all alien trend s which 
came in as a resul t of the weakness of the 
ational Co mmand . l 
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The Congre ss was not completely satisfied with the amended 
Rules as they stood, feel ing the necessity of making 
sev eral important interpolations. It held, for exampl 
that the organisational crisis of the party could have 
been effectively reso lved by a more oncerted effort 
by t he party le a de rship and commands to renew contacts 
in an ' objective and scientific ' manner among popular 
based organisations: 
1 
2 
turning towards popular circles and by 
strengthening the labour bases . Giving the 
peasant and labour bureaus executive powers 
in the popular syndical field and by according 
them substantial r epresentation at party 
congresses. 
(b) dividing party organisations on a 
p r ofessional basis as f~r as possible ... 
taking care in t r a ining competent party cadres 
in public re l ations and syndical organisation . 
(c) giving popular commands wide authority 
in local popular work in order to hel p them form 
societies and d istrict committees to be a show 
piece of the party organisation in local a ffairs, 
especially in the ba tt le of the peoples' local 
demand s ... to ask the different party 
o r ganisations to work for permitting cultural 
womens' associations which will assist the 
party in reaching t he people . 
(d) .. . Eve ry command should work during the 
comrng two years ( i .e. between ational Congress, 
held biennially, (See Art. ,( i) 1959) on raising 
the percentage of labourers, peasants and 
artisans in its organisation. The ational Co mmand 
should supervi se popular circles ' pro je cts in all 
organisations and s hould present to the incoming 
ational Congres s statistics on th changes which 
tool place in the party during this period . 2 
Ibid . , pp . 185-86. 
Ibid., p . 209 . 
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To ensure that the ational Command and Secretary-
General kept in close contact with the wider regional 
organisations, the Congress requested a system of 
regular command reports on its policies and activities : 
[ That ] the ational Command should issue a 
periodical report and newspaper at the 
popular level which handles economic, social, 
sydical and political problems. l 
The major emphasis on the organisational aspects 
of the Periodical Report of the Fourth ational 
Congres s , was that the Ba 'th had been led to the 
brink of organisational disintegration thr ough the 
failure of the ational Command and the Secretary- Gener al 
to employ an effective system of democratic sharing of 
responsibilities from the apex to the base . Henceforth, 
the Congress would be unwilling to entrust the party 
(al-Hizb) into the hands of a small coterie of ' inspir ed 
leaders ' . The amended Rules of 1959 and the 
interpolations of the Fourth ational Congress, sought 
to make the party organisation and system of administration 
more efficient and scientifically operable in the daily 
political l ife of the party. The principle of 
centralised democratic party government was stated in 
the Rules to permit freedom of discussion and amendment 
within all levels of the party's pyramidal s t r u cture 
until such time as a majority decision had been reached; 
complete obedience bound all members regardle ss of 
individual differences of opinion . 2 
Let us now proceed to discuss and evaluate the 
amended ~ules of 1959 considering where necessary late r 
interpolations and amendments . 
11 Amended Organisation and Structure 
The Bases : 
The amended Rules of 1959 and 196 3 did not 
substantially alter the pyramid al struc t u r e o f t h e 
Ba'th as originally conceived at the First ational 
Congress in April 1947 . However, they did contribute 
largely to the reorientation of the parts of the pyramid 
1 
Ibid . , p . 210 . 
2 
Rules 1959, Art. ii . 
into a more corporate relati nship, based on the 
principle of ' centralised democracy'. A n w syst m 
J18 
of vertical responsibiliti s operating upwards as w 11 
as downwards replaced the older system in which dire tiv s 
flowed downwards through a loos ly ill- o-ordinat d 
1 organisation to the party ' s bases. 
Under the amended Rules, the smallest entity of 
the party, the cell (al-Halaqa) became th vital link 
in theory between the organisation and the mass s . 
Hitherto, the party cell had functioned haphazardly 
and without any real co-ordinated direction from the 
higher echelons of the party pyramid. From 1959, however, 
the party f ound in the cell a means fo r the transference 
of Ba'thist ideology in a wide range of fields. Cells 
were thus grouped into two major categories : area and 
occupational or professional divisions. Members were 
drawn into the party through the activities of the cells. 
The Rules of 1959 provided for a system of supporters 
of friends' cells (Halaqat al-Ansar) in which prospective 
candidates for party membership would serve one year 
under the guidance and supervision of active members, 
to ensure their full-readiness for membership.2 A par ty 
publication in April 1960 stated on the functions of 
the cell: 
The cell is a wide field for the publication 
of our ideas, for clarifying them on the one 
hand and explaining our ideas and political 
attitudes on the other and for pointing to 
our revolutionary struggle and our relations 
with other political parties ... J 
An important aspect of the organisation of party cells, 
was the f act that they were not permitted to have 
4 horizontal contacts with each other. In this respect 
t hey resembled Communist cells. Linkage between cells 
came through the intermediary of the Division (al-Firqa), 
1 
See Fig .4. 
2 
Rules 1959. See Art . viii, and Arts ix,x, 196J. 
J 
A l ook at the Historical Roles of the Ba 'th Movement; 
7 April 1960 (Probably publish~d by B C Headquarters, 
Beirut) . 
4 
Abu Jaber, op.cit., p.14J . Rules, 1959, Arts . Xlll, 
xiv . Unless otherwise stated, no amendments were made 
in the Rules. 
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the basi of lowe t adm·ni trativ unit within the 
pyramidial structure . l As conceived in the Rules of 
1959 and 196 3, al-Firqa wa s composed of from three to 
sev en cells of which some could be area (village, suburb 
etc . ) and others occupational or profess·onal (i.e . 
2 factory, university, college, army, etc.) . E isting 
alongside these were friends or supporters' cells 
(Halaqat al-Ansar) . The membership of each cell wa s 
from three to sev en. 3 The point of vertical contract 
or liaison between al-Halaqa and al-Firqa came through 
the secretary (Amin Sir) (lit . Keeper of the Secret) 
4 
of al-Halaq a . He was appointed by the Division Co mmand 
which was elected originally by the totality of active 
cell members within al-Firqa or the Division. 5 The 
directive to the secretary of a cell was ' to lead his 
cell in executing orders of his Division' 6 
The members of the Division Command were elected 
by the active members of the cells in a local assembly. 
The secretary of the Division Command was, at least up 
until 1963 , to be elected by the Division Command . 7 
1 
Rules, 1959, Art . xiii, (a) 
2 
Rules, 1959, Art . xiii . 
3 
Ibid . 
4 
Ibid . Art . xix. 
5 
Ibid . , Art . xiii. 
6 
Ibid . , Art. xix. 
7 
Abu Jaber, op.cit., pp.14o-4l. He insists that the 
secretaries of the Division (al-Firqa) and Section 
(ash-Shu ' ba) were appointed by the next highest 
administrative body. This, however, was certainly not 
the case in the Rules of 1959 which state, in the case 
of the secretary of al-Firqa : ' The Division Command 
(al-Firqa) elects a secretary from among its members' , 
See Art . xiv . F or the Section Co mmand (ash-Shu'ba), 
Art . xiv, (2) 'The Section s ecretary is elected by the 
Section Command from among its members '. Abu Jaber, 
seems to be basing his observation on the Rules of 1963 
which delete these two Articles and substitute several 
ambiguous articles whi ch imply that the lowest 
administrativ e units do not have quite the same degree 
of freedom in elect ing their own coordinating secretaries, 
Art . xxii. The reason behind this hange of emphasis 
might have resulted as a reaction to the ' elective 
principle ' brought in by the Third ational Congress 
against the principle of nomination or appointment of 
party lead rs in the era discredited by this Congress . 
By amending the direct election of the base secretaries, 
the party leaders would be in a much stronger position to 
control effectively th lowest and most vital links on 
the party chain. 
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The existence of al-Firqa was legalised ' by appr ova l of 
the Section (ash-Shu'ba), , the next highest administrative 
unit on the pyramid . l The secretary of the Div ision 
was the liaison officer between a l-Firq a and ash-Shu'ba 
on the vertical chain . His f unction was , in effect, to 
be the ch airman, chief oordinating and supervisory 
officer between the Commands of al-Firq a and ash-Shu'ba . 2 
Directives to al-Firq a were ' It shall lead, 
guide, develop t h e Division . It shall r ceive and 
i mplement t he party's instructions . It shall striv e . 
It s h all organise 
b h · , 3 mem ers lp . .. 
It shall receive applications fo r 
Indeed, the right of independent pol i cy 
f ormul ation at this level would seem t o have been 
minimal . In t h eory, the members of par ty bases were 
not 'hamstrung ' as by the principle or direct election; 
they we re empowered to elect through a Section Congress 
the next h ighest body of the party pyramid, the Section 
4 Command . According ·co the Rules of 1959, though the 
matter is les s clear in t he Rules of 1963, the Sec tion 
Command elected its own secretary who formed its 
liaison betwe en t he next highe st organ , the Branch 
(al-Fur') to whom it owed its legal eXistence . 5 
The S e ction Command was entrusted with the 
r esponsibil ity of directing the activities of the Division 
while be ing, in turn, answerable for its actions to 
1 
Rule s, 1959, Art . xiii (b) . 
2 
Ibid. Art . xix. 
3 
Ibid . Art . XVlli . Rules 1963, Art . xxi . The dogma t ic 
stress on complete responsibility to the Section Command 
is ve ry evident in b oth sets of Rules . 
4 
Rule s, 1959, Art. xiv . 
5 
Ibid., Art. xiv (3). Rules 1963 simpl y state 'It 
( Section Congress) shall e le ct the Section ' s Command ' 
See Art . xxvii (c), but it does not mention whether 
the secretary is to be ' electe d' or 'appointed'. Art . xxix, 
1963 , contains the authorities and duties of the secretar y 
and clea r l y states his function as liaison officer between 
the Section and Branch Commands . But to whom he originally 
owed h is appointment is not stipul ated . The silence in 
t h is respect might seem to indicate that the Rule makers 
we re trying to cover up appointment from a bove, an issue 
which t he advo cates of party democracy would be sure to 
oppose . 
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the Branch . l A Section , accor d ing to the Rul e s of 1959 
and 1963, was to be composed 'of no less than two 
Divisions , 2 Abu Jaber confuses the size of al-Firqa 
and ash-Shu'ba when he writes3 ' The area encompassed 
4 by a company (he translates al Firqa as company ) may 
include a small town a village or an ent ire s ect i on 
of a city' . The Rule s of 1959 state ' The Section 
(ash-Shu ' ba) is the form of the party in al-Qa da or 
district, a big v illage attached to a city ... 5, 
By implication a l-Firqa would seem to comprise a very 
much s ma l ler entity than Abu Jaber suggests, probably a 
group of colleges, a s mall vill age or a factory complex . 
Of course, uniformity of size would be almost 
impossible to achieve in this respect. 
The Section Command possessed much the same 
administrative functions as the lower commands, a l though 
its responsibilities we r e considerably greater. The 
wording of the di r ect i ves to the Section Command 
underline its greater importance ' To le ad, guide and 
develop the Section . T o receive Party orders and 
instructions ... T o r eceive from secretaries of 
Divisions all sugge stions and complaints, discuss and 
6 submit them in writing to the Branch Command . . . ' The 
dogmatic 'shall' wa s reserved more f or the lower 
commands. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Rules, 1959, Art.xviii ( 2) . 
Ibid . , Art . xiii (b), 1959 . 
Abu Jaber, op . c it . p . 141. 
Art . xxv, 196 3 . 
Wehr, H . A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic , edited 
by J . Milton Dowan ( Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 
New York 2nd Edition 1966 ), p . 708 . See Firq a - part, 
portion, division, section, unit ; band company ... 
Some confus ion might arise in trans lat i on of al-Firqa 
into English if preferences are held fo r e ach of t he se 
English translations . F o r example, I have u s ed 'divi sion ' 
while Abu Jaber prefers 'company' 
5 
6 
Rules, 1959, Art . xiii (b) 
Ibid . , Ar t . xviii ( 2) . 
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The Branch (aI-Fur') f ormed t he next l ink in the 
chain of vertical commands ( Se e Fig.LI) . It wa s composed 
of no le ss than two Sections and, l ike the lower 
organisations , owed its existence to the bo dy i mmediately 
above it - the Region (al-Qut r ) . l The area covered by 
a Branch mi ght inc lude a large city or a governorate 
(Muhafazat) 2 . Once more the functions of the Branch we re 
duplicated in comparison to t he lower organisations, but 
on an extended scale and with more responsibility . The 
Branch Congress was composed of secretaries f ro m Section 
Commands in addition to members elected as delega tes 
by the respectiv e Sectional Commands under the 
administrative j urisdiction of the Branch . 3 The Congress 
elected the Command and the l atter its own secretary, 
who acted as the liaison officer in the transference 
of directives and recommenqa tions between the Regional 
and Branch Co mmand s . 4 
The a dministrative powers of the Branch were 
considerabl y greate r than the Sec tion . Seve n departments 
were attached to each Branch Command to facilitate its 
activ ities . The se included : 
(;1 
The 
The 
f~ The The 
i~l The The The 
1 
Ibid . , Art . 
2 
Ibid. , Art . 
3 
Ibid. Art. 
4 
Secretariat 
Financial Department 
Cul tural and Re search Department 
Propaganda, Publications and 
Information Department 
Peasants Department 
Labour Department 5 
Party Organisation Department 
xv iii, 3 ( j ) . 
xiii, ( c) . 
xiv, 3· 
Ibid . Art . xix, 4 (d) . There is no ambiguity in the 
' election ' of the Branch secretary in the Rules of 1963 , 
See Art . xxxiii : ' The Branch Command e l ects its 
secre tary f rom among its members '. It might be argued 
t h at at this h eigh t on the pyramidal structure th 
party leadersh ip could be f airl y certain that t h e 
Branch secretary would be a ' reasonably safe ' party 
man . 
5 
..R11.1 s ., 1959, 
Lii, 1963. 
See ' The Offices of Departments ' , Art . 
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The Branch was the lowest body on the party pyramid to 
be entrusted with the responsibility of ' organising the 
education of members in ideological, political, 
organisational and scientific affairs . l , It poss s d 
in addition, wider deliberative powers 'to study 
local problems, suggest appropriate measures for th ir 
solution, work to implement such measures', and 'to 
admit or reject applications for membership' 2. Branch 
Command administration was annually submitted to the 
Branch Congress for consideration and recommendation . 3 
Recommendations from the Branch on all aspects of 
administration were made through the liaison of the 
secretary to the Regional Command, the highest party 
functionary within the regional organisation (See Fig. 4). 
The Top of the Party Pyramid: Regional and ational 
Organisations 
The Region (al-Qutr) constituted the highest party 
authority within an Arab state . 4 In party theory, every 
Arab state was to possess its own regional organisation 
of t h e party ' in the higher interests of the Arab 
(national) cause,.5 Even outside the Arab world the 
Ba ' th did not preclude the formation of regional 
organisations among Arab students, political exiles 
" t 6 or lmmlgran s . 
1 
Rules, 1959, Art . xviii, 3 (c), Art. xxxii, (e), 1963 
inserts ' scientific affairs' 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Ibid . , Art . xviii, (h), 1959. 
Ibid . , Arts. xx, A (i), and xx, (i), 1959 . 
Ibid . , Art . xiii (d), 1959. 
Ba'th Constitution, General Principles, Art.l. See 
Appendix i . 
6 
al-Munadil, 0.6, 1966 (for members only). Reference 
is made to 'Yugoslavian Liberian and Spanish Commands, 
which were expressing their views on the preparation 
for the inth ational Congress in Damascus in September 
1966. From time to time this periodical also mentions 
party commands in Germany, France and the USSR . How 
effective these branches of the party are among Arab 
students,immigrants and political exiles is hard to 
determine . Abu Jaber, op . cit . , p . 142 mentions the 
existence of party organisations among students in 
Britain, France and the United States . See also Art . 
XLiii 1963 . 
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The Regional Command like the commands of the lower 
party organisations (al-Firqa, ash·' Shu'ba, aI-Fur'), wa s 
elected by an annual Congress comprising secretaries 
of Branches and Sections, in addition to members lected 
by Branch and Section Commands within al-Qutr . l The 
Regional Command elected its own secretary in a manner 
reduplicated down the party pyramid to al-Firqa . The 
membership of the Regional Command according to the 
BuIes of 1959, was eight, t h ough in 1963 this was 
increased to sixteen f or t h e Syrian and Iraqi Regional 
Commands which had inherited vastly increased administrative 
responsibilities through their seizure of governmental 
authority . 2 In the following section we will consider 
how they handled their dual administrative functions . 
The Regional Congres s possessed by far the 
greatest deliberative powers of any Ba'th congress 
within a l-Qutr . 3 All issues affecting the party in 
a l-Qutr came under its jurisdiction . The Congress wa s 
only sub j ect to one overriding power, the ational 
Congress which , in theory, took the role of supervisor 
and coordinator of Regional organisations 'in the 
national (Arab nation) interest, . 4 The Regional 
Congress assumed powers of almost a semi-legislative 
nature . The Regional Co mmand, the highes t executive 
authority within al-Qutr, was compelled to answer to 
it in the exercise of its administrative fun ctions . 5 
If dissatisfied with the Command, the Congress posse ssed 
powers of censure and dismissal . 6 
Subject to its answerabili ty to the Congress , the 
Regional Command possessed wide powers to direct the 
regional organisation, politically, culturally and 
ideological ly, within the bounds of the overall national 
strategy formulated by the ational Comm~nd . 
1 
Rul es, 1959, Art . xiv, 4 . 
2 
Ibid . , Art, xiv, 4 ( c) and Art . xxxvii, 1963 . 
3 
Ibid . , Art . x v ii, 2 
4 
( a) to ( e) , 1959 . 
Ibid . , Art . xviii, 5, 1959 · 
5 
Ibid . , Art . xviii, 4 (i) , 1959 . 
6 
Ibid . , Art . xvii, 2 (3), 1959 · 
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Admini tratively, It po es d"d n "cal departments to 
t h e Branch ommand, though with va ly In re a se d pow rs 
and responsibil"ties . l In addit "on, the Command had a 
Po l itical Bureau fo r fo r mulat ing and implementing p rty 
politi al directive s . 2 Extensiv punitiv pow rs were 
simil arly held by the ommand . Lower party commands 
could be suspended or di miss d f or basic deviatio n 
f rom accepted party policy as laid down by Regional 
Command3 and party memb s punish d a co d ing to an 
a scending scale of mi s demeanour s : 
a Calling the members attention to something 
b Warning him 
c Depriv ing him f rom party responsibilit ies 
d Withdrawing hi s membe rsh ip 
e Suspending h i m 
f Di s mi ssing him4 
The Regional Tribunal of three, ele te d by the Congress 
from its own members , constitute d t h e h ighe st and f inal 
court of appeal for the regional party organisation. 5 
1 
Rules, 1959, 'The Offi ces '. Art . Lii , 19 6 3 . The 
Syrian Regional Command increased its administrative 
departments from sev en to nine after the formulation of 
the Rules of 1963. The two new departments we r e created 
to look after the ational Guard and the Popular 
Resi s tance Mov ement . 
2 
3 
4 
Ibid , Art . xiv, 4 (c), 1959 . 
Ibid . , Art . x v iii, 4, 1959 . 
Ibid., Party Penalt i e s , 1959 . Art . xciv, 1963 . 
Imprisonment exile or execution we re added to this 
list in I r aq and Syria when the party s eized power . One 
of the mo s t amu ing reasons fo r dismissal wa s noted in 
the charge levelled by the Syrian Regional Command 
against a certain Hamad Jiba'ai on 17 Octobe r 1 9 65 , to 
wit ' He stole utensils owned by the ational Gua r d ' 
The charge sheet so lemnly requested t he Guard to 
pursue 'the man' and bring him to court . Mustafa 
as-Sattaf, of the Rakka branch was d i missed on t h e same 
charge sheet for (1) refusal to attend party meet ings 
(2) not paying subscriptions fo r a period of more than 
three months (3) re f u ing t o ans we r correspondence wi t h 
party headquarters . Wiess Sardu of the Dier-ez-Zor 
branch wa s al so di smi sse d for (1) intentional degre dation 
of the party ( 2 ) ind i v i dualism. A woman, Jarjait Atiyyeh 
of Qunai tra branch wa s dismi s d b cause of (1) re fusal 
to abide by Party Rule s (2) an indiv"dual attitude 
conflicting wi t h the party (3) intentional degr adation 
of the party . The se d i smissal orders were typical of 
the way in which the party ought to pre erve internal 
dis cipl ine among its me mbers . S al-Munadil, 0.1 
ovember 1965 . Re so lut ion 172,SY ian R gional Command, 
17 October 1965. 
5 
Ibid., ' The Party Court s ', 1959 . 
1963 . 
Arts.cix, cxi, xcii, 
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Co mmand members, however, could only be dismissed from 
1 the party by a ruling from the B However, unlike th~ 
provisions of appeal for the lower party cadres, 
Command member s had a right of appeal to the ational 
Tribunal of three elected by the ational Congress from 
its members . This body was the supreme judicial 
authority in the party (al-Hizb). 
At the extreme apex of the party pyramid, stood 
the national organisation (al-Qawmi), in theory the 
supreme policy making and directing body within the 
whole party (al-Hizb) inside and outside the Arab world. 2 
With these extensive powers of jurisdiction, the national 
organisation possessed considerable punitive powers to 
be employed against any deviant party command or member. J 
The major function of the Ba'th's national organisation, 
was to formulate and implement policies applicable to 
the whole Arab wor ld (al-Qawm) with the ultimate 
objective of bringing the Arab people into a greater 
corporate awareness of their common Arab nationality . 4 
Like the lower party commands, the national 
organisation possessed a Congress and ational Command . 
In its administration of the party (al-Hizb), the 
National Command had f ive departments: 
ational Secretariat 
Culture and Research 
Propaganda, Publications and Information 
Liaison 
Finance5 
In addition, it had a Political Bureau which was the 
overseer of national political strategy within the 
wider Organi sation . 6 In appearance the role of the 
national organisation of the Ba'th was that of a 
coordinating and directing federalised institution . 7 
1 
Ibid. , 1959, Art. cx, 19 6 J . 
2 
Ibid. , Art . xiii, (J),1959. 
J 
Ibid. , Art. xviii, (5) , 1959. 
4 
Constitution, 1947, ' General Principles' ,esp. Art . J . 
5 
6 
7 
Rules, 1959, ' The Departments.' 
..lbid . , Art. iv , 2 (a), 1959 . 
S ee Fig.4 . Constitution ,1947, 
Par ty " e s p. Art. 16, pas s im . 
'Internal Policy of the 
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The ational Congr ss, a w hav seen , met 
extremely irr gularly before the Third ational Congress 
in September 1959. The amended Rul s of 1959, 
stipulated that in future, Congresses were to be h ld 
biennially . In th Rule s of 19 63, this was further 
amended to annually, the intention being to make the 
supreme policy making body more frequently answerable 
for its actions to the supreme 'democratic' institution 
1 
within the party, the ational Congr ss . 
The ational Congress drew its membership from 
all Regional Command members and 'such members as are 
elected by the Regional Congre sses f ro m among their 
2 
members' . In addition, a limited number of delegates 
were elected directly from the lower party organisations 
such as ash-Shu'ba and al-Fur,.3 There we re examples 
in some National Congresses where delegates came from 
countries outside the Arab world . 4 Membership would 
seem to hav e been purposely drawn from a very wide 
sector of the party's organisation, the theory behind 
this being the need to avoid the pitfalls into which 
t h e ENC had fallen in the pre-Third ational Congress 
era, when it had been the monopoly of 'the three 
doctors ' . 
After 1959, the E C was elected directly on the 
basis of a majority decision of all attending delegates . 5 
Stimultaneously a Reserve ational Command was elec ted 
by the same process to fill any immediate vacancy in 
the supreme Command . A similar procedure was also adopted 
6 
at Regional Congresse s . In the period before 1959, 
BNC members were nominated from Reg ional Co mmands and the 
secretary of the Regional Co mmand was, according to 
1 
Rules, 1959, Art. xx, (i) . 
2 
Rules, 1963, Art. Lxxii, (i) . 
3 
Ibid . , Art . xv, 1959. 
4 
al-Munadil, 0 . 10, October 19 66 . Delegates attending 
the ational Congress we re said to have come from 
Germany, Spain, France, the USSR, Britain and the Sierra 
Leone, in addition to a wi de representation of delegates 
from Arab countries. 
5 
Rules, 1959, Art. xv. 
6 
Rules, 1963, Art. Lxxvii & Art . Lx ix . Four members 
constituted the Re erve ational Command . 0 figures were 
given for the Re serve Regional Command. These Articles 
(foo tnote ontinued on p . 329) 
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Majdalani, ipso facto a member of the ational Co mmand. l 
The policy of nominating member s see ms to have been to 
give representation to all active regions of th party 
organisation . The amended Rule s of 1959, inaugurated 
the principle of direct election to all party commands . 
Thereafter a man was elected to the B C in theory, on 
the basis of his ability to contribute to the wider 
2 
national programme of the party . But in actual fact, 
in the period from 1959, the stronger regions of the 
party utilised their increased representation at ational 
Congresses to ensure the return of a large number of 
members sympathetic to their own regional political and 
ideological interests. (See Tables 39 and 60) . 
Fo l lowing the procedure laid down for lower party 
commands, the ational Command directly elected its 
own chairman, the Secretary-General of the Ba ' th 
party . 3 This constituted a significant amendment to the 
earlier Rules . In the Rules of 1959, it was not stated 
how t h e Secretary-General was to be appointed . The 
reason f or t h is is not clear, though it may be surmised 
that the preparatory committee which formulated the 
Rules saw in Aflaq the only person who symboli se d the 
continuity of the Ba'thist revolution in its moment of 
crisis . It was unwilling to sacrifice him and his office 
to t h e principle of direct election, fearing that the 
Third ational Congress might dismiss him . But at 
the Sixth ational Congress in October 196 3, Aflaq's 
popul arity among the younger party revolutionaries had 
4 
sunk to a v ery low ebb . The party organisation was 
(footnote 6 continued from p . 328) . 
amended the Rul es of 1959, where no provisions had been 
made for Reserve Commands . These were designed 
specifically for a situation in which a large number of 
ational Command members were arrested by hostile authorities, 
or where dismissal s of Regional Command members by the 
ational Command could be replaced immediately without 
undue dislocation to the regional organisation . 
1 
In Laqueur, op . it., pp.338-39 . 
2 
Interview, Bashir Daouk, 9 ovember 1967 , Beirut . 
3 
Rules, 196 3, Art . L . Abu Jaber, op . cit., p . 142, once 
more misreads th Rule s when he writes : ' Thi convention 
(i . e . ational Congre s) lects the ational Command and 
the Secretary-General of the party' 
4 
APD, 1964, op.cit. See 'Minute s of the Extraordinary 
Syrian Regional Congress of the Arab Ba'th Socialist 
Party, Damascus, 2 February 1964 ' 
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North West: 
Lattakia 
Idlib 
Sub-total 
North :' 
Aleppo 
Sub-total 
North East: 
Rakka 
Deir ez-Zo 
Haz zake 
Sub-total 
Central : 
Hama 
Horns 
Sub-total 
Suwe ::"da 
Sub-total 
Total Known 
Total Unknown 
Total Seats 
, 
I 
C""I \0 \0 \0 \0 .::t lI"\ lI"\ lI"\ 0\ \0 0\ \0 \0 ' \0 \0 ~ 0\ ~ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ O~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~..., . 
..., . . u ..., 0. .0 ~ bJl u ~ 0. C1> : ~ ~ ~ C1> C/) C/) 
1 2 3 4 5 * 6 No . % 
2 4 1 2 2 4 15 19·7 
0 1 1 0 0 0 2 2.6 
2 5 2 2 2 4 17 22.4 
2 2 1 1 1 0 7 9 . 2 
2 2 1 1 1 0 7 9.2 
0 0 0 0 Q 0 0 0 
0 1 1 3 0 !3 8 10·5 
0 0 0 0 G) G) 0 0 
0 1 1 3 0 3 8 1 0 · 5 
0 2 0 1 0 1 4 
' · 3 
--
I 2 1 1 1 1 7 9.2 
f--
1 4 1 2 1 2 11 14 . 5 
I--
0 0 2 0 4 iL 7 9 · 2 
0 1 1 2 0 2 6 7 · 9 
1--' 
2 2 2 3 2 1 12 15 . 8 
2 3 5 5 6 4 25 32 . 9 
-" 
.. 
7 15 10 13 10 ilj3 68 89 . 5 
1 0 1 3 1 2 8 10 · 5 
1---. 
8 15 11 16 11 15 76 100 
* Supreme Council of all tr ends formed by the BNC 
as a temporary measure until the election of a 
new SRC: 
Sources: Archives Bi0E!:aphigue Permanentes ,Ji)u 
Monde Arabe , vol . 2 . 
The Middle East (Europa Publicatio~s, 
London), vols . 1963-67. 
Interviews . 
Press Repor t s. 
JJO 
TABLE 61 BA ' TH NATIONAL COMMAND, APRIL 1947 - SEPTEMBER 1966 : 
METHOD OF APPOINTMENT BY THE NATIONAL CONGRESS . 
Command No : Date : Members : Appointment: Sec retary- Appointment: Headquarters : General: 
1 April 1947 4 Nomination Aflaq Nomination Damascus 
2 June 1954 7 Nomination Aflaq Nomination Damascus 
3 Sept . 1959 10 Direct Election Aflaq Nomination Beirut 
4 Sept . 1960 10 Direct Election Aflaq Nomination Beirut 
5 May 1962 10 Direct Election Aflaq Nomination Beirut * 
6 Oct . 1963 13 Direct Election Aflaq Direct Election Damascus 
7 Feb . 1964 13 Direct Election Aflaq Direct Election Damas cus 
8 April 1965 13 Direct Election Razzaz Direct Election Damascus 
9 Sept . 1966 17 Direct Election Atasi Direct Election Damascus 
-~-
The National Congress actually held its sessions in Horns . This was the only e xample 
of a National Congress being held other than at the place of its National Headquarters . 
I 
w 
W 
I-' 
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tearing itself apart in Iraq, while factionalism within 
Syria was similarly rife . l Aflaq's leadership of the 
party was held responsible for the organisational ° 2 cr1.ses. 
While some of the more extremist followers of Ali Salih 
Sa' di of Iraq and Hamud Shufi of Syria, called for 
Afla q 's removal, the majority of the Congress were not 
prepared to take a step which would have furthered 
increased factional and organisational difficulties. 3 
Under pressure from the advocates of party democracy and 
Afl aq's many enemies within the ational Congress, the 
Congress took the extreme step of adopting, in principle, 
the election of the office of Secretary-General . This, 
in effect, was a broad hint to Aflaq that the party no 
longer regarded him as indispensible. E ighteen months 
later at the Eighth National Congress, he resigned in 
the face of growing hostility towards his leadership of 
4 
the party . In his place, Munif Razzaz was elected 
Secretary-General of the B C , a position which he held 
until 23 February 1966. 5 
Evaluation 
Th e amended Rules of 1959 and 1963 contained in 
essence the principle of centralised democratic party 
organisation . In theory, party directives were to 
descend along a vertical column from the apex, the B C 
to the partisan bases in the various regions . Convers ely, 
through a process of direct election from commands on 
the lower level of the pyramid (al-Firqa, ash-Shu'ba, 
aI-Fur', al-Qutr), the rank and file were, theoretically, 
enabled to influence decision making a t the highest 
executive levels . 
1 
Ibid., pp . 33-37 . Sa'di's criticism of Aflaq and the 
BNC for failing to take a firm lead in uniting the many 
discordant elements within both Regional organisations . 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Ibid . , p . 37 . 
Ibid . , p . 3l. 
Interv iew, Salah ud-Din Bitar, 17 ovember 1967, Beirut. 
Ibid . Bitar insisted that the Military Committee led 
by Maj or-Goeneral Salah Jadid nominated Razzaz as Aflaq' s 
successor . Bitar ' s implication seemed to be that 
powerf ul party factions could manipulate the elective 
process with impunity. 
JJJ 
n th ory th am nd d Rules achi v d an outst nding 
f at of party r organisation compar d w" th that xist"ng 
before th Third ational Congr ss in pt mb r 1959 . 
Th Y permitted th whol party organisation to fun t"on 
as a more politi c ally int grat d ntity . A syst m of 
strict vertical contacts betw en party commands through 
t h liaison of a s cretary , provid d for th organisation 
to op rate clandestinely wh n pr ss d by hostil 
authorities. 
On of the things the formulators of the amended 
Rul s could not overcome as easily as organisational 
reform , was a reform of individual m ntality . On pap r, 
the B C possessed ext nsive powers of sup rvision and 
dir ction over lower party commands . However , despit 
all its impressive powers, it was totally dependent 
upon the goodwill and receptivity of the Regional 
Commands to its dictates, to implement its directives 
to the level of the partisan bases. Failure on th 
part of the Regional Command to imp 1 m nt B C dire ctives 
coul d be ans wered wi th immediate dismissal and the 
re - election of a new R gional Command by a Regional 
Congress . This was an ultimate sanction, but not on 
to facilitate organisational harmony or unity . Dismissal 
of a Regional Command which owed its election to a 
regional party organisation was, in its If, a grave 
slight to the whol party edifice within the region. 
Direct assumption of executive powers ad interim, by the 
BNC while perhaps filling the executiv vacuum of the 
r gional organisation could in no wise command the sam 
respect of the regional organisation as the lawfully 
1 cted Regional Command by regional partisans . 
Th B C was in the anomalous situation of having 
consid rabl pap r power without possessing an effective 
pow r base upon which to implement its d cisions . On 
r calls the analogy of ' the king who wears the crown 
without a sword ' . Ind d as s holars of international 
relations are awar , many international organisations 
have failed to fun tion as designed b caus they lack d 
an ffectiv system of power to command the nations 
und r th ir charge . The B C (by W st rn standards an 
int rnational organis tions as it was ntrusted with 
party administration throughout th states of th Arab 
world), was no xc ption to this . For th full xercise 
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of its national prerogatives, it was ntirely dependent 
upon the ' national ' consciousn ss of the regions of the 
party . In fact, for the party organisation to function 
as designed, the regional administrators had to be willing 
to sacrifice some of their sovereignty to the B C . 
But power is by no means as easy thing to forego even 
for a cause such as Arab nationalism . This, the 
formulators of the amended Rules found to their horror 
shortly after they were adopted . 
"ii : 
The 
Th amend d Rul s of 1959 and 1963 r organis d 
the system of party a dministration, but th y did not 
succe d in making the B C into a pow rful dir ting 
agency. Having only t nuous links with th partisan 
bases of the regional organisations, the B C had no 
eff ctive power bas and tend e d, during 1959-63, to 
r main something of a ' lame duck '. Th Fifth ational 
Congr ss in May 1962, complained of th obscurity of 
B C policies towards the regional organisations . l 
But, in fact, by the very nature of th circumstances 
confronting th B C, it was powerles s to act otherwis 
For xample, to give policy guidanc to th various 
R gional Commands it had to be kept fully inform d as 
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to what was actually transpiring within the regional 
organisations . An ffective system of party communiqu ' s 
may have circumvented this difficulty . However , Ba ' thist 
regional administrators either omittted to send these 
through ov ersight , or in some instances, through th ir 
unwillingness to permit interfer nce by the B C in the 
2 
affairs of the regional organisation. Hence it was 
not surprising that Ba ' th headquarters in Beirut should 
have been ignorant of regional trends and developments. 
This was particularly true of Ba ' thist activities in the 
Syrian army. An att mpted Ba ' thist-unionist officer 
co~ on 28 March 1962, took the B C completely by 
surprise. 3 Even after the B Chad r constituted the 
Syrian regional organisation of the party under its 
direction in May 1962, it was no better informed as 
to what Ba ' thist army officers were planning . 4 When 
Brigadier Zia d al-Hariri, in conjunction with Ba ' thist 
and other unionist officers finally succeeded 
1 
idal al-Bath, vol . 6, op . cit . See ' An Internal 
Bulletin on the Fifth ational Congress ', May 1962, dated 
June 1962, p . 9l . 
2 
Int rview, Daouk, 9 
suggested this to the 
1967, B irut. 
3 
ovember 1967, Beirut . 
writer, int rview, 17 
Bitar also 
ovember 
Razzaz , at-Tajribat al-Mura, op . cit., pp . 90-9l. 
4 
Ibid . 
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in ov rthrow ing th s c ssionist reg'm 
1 
onstru tiv rol 
on 8 Mar h 1963, 
t h B C play d no 
Whil th B C may hav b n pr par d to tol rat 
military dominanc ov r th party organisation in th 
extenu ating circumstanc s of the months imm diat ly 
2 f ollowing the 8 Mar c h coup d ' etat , 't was d ply 
anx i ous to resolv onc and for all th whol qu stion 
of j urisdictional responsibilities within th party 
pyrami d . In Oc tob r 1963 , t h e Sixth ational Congr ss 
gav c onside r ab l att nt i on t o this v itally i mportant 
que s tio n . 3 It r e s olv d, among other things : ' The Party 
(al-Hizb) i s t h e lead er and d irector of the Governm nt ' s 
(Iraq and Syria at the time c onstituted Ba ' th governm nts) 
g eneral pOli c y , . 4 The Congres s c ould not f ail to overlook 
the fac t that Ba ' thist military offic rs were the real 
holders o f power , despit ' paper pow r ' held by th 
party ' s c i v ilian commands . The solution which th Congress 
fo u n d a c ceptable, ind ed it was pow rl ss to resolve 
otherwise , was to ' ideologise ' the army and to male it a 
co-partner with th civilian commands ' in a single 
r volu tionary destiny ' . 5 
A re - statement such as this, however, could not alter 
the fact that the Military Committee of the ational 
Revolutionary Council ( C), by virtue of its hold over 
the army , also controlled the only effective centre of 
1 
Ibid . 
2 
Intervi e w, Salah- ud - Din Bitar , 17 ovember 1967 , Beirut . 
Mansur Atrash who was Minister for Labour and Social 
Affai r s i n the f irst Ba ' this t cabinet and a member of the 
atio n al Revo lutionary Council , told the writer that a 
po w r f ul military clique of Ba ' thist officers was running 
the aff airs of the party and government from the earliest 
mo ment of the 8 March coup . Interview , Beirut , 20 December 
1967 . 
3 
See the amend ed Rules of 1963 in AP~, 1963 , op . cit . , 
pp . 445 - 61 . 
4 
Ibid . Se ' Re s olutions of the Sixth ational Congress 
of the ational Command of the Arab Ba ' th Socialist Party, 
Damascus, 27 Oc tober 1963 '. The q u otation is taken from 
' Th R lationships of the Party with the Authorities, p.440 . 
5 
Ibid . S e ' Id ological Education 'n the Army ' , p . 442 . 
1 pow r . , d ologisOng ' m mb rs of th rmy did nothing 
to 1 ssen th ir hold on the pow r of h gun. Th 
MilOtary Committ fun tion d as th unofficial army 
t Oo to 2 par lsan organlsa lon . ts m mb rs w r s n·or 
offic rs and the army 's chi f politi 1 commissars . 3 
Th cr tary-G n ral of th B C was d ni d th right 
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of access to this Committe and was xpr ssly forbidd n, 
or rath r discouraged by the Military Committ 
interf ring in military affairs . 4 
, from 
ronically, it was th Secr tary-G neral who 
p rmitt d Ba ' thist army officers to enter the Syrian 
Regional Command in arly 1964. 5 Aflaq had attribut d 
the ov rthrow of th RC on 18 ov mb e r 1963, to th 
work of xtremist socialist factions 1 d by Ali alih 
Sa ' di . 6 Fearing that the RC might suffer a similar fat, 
h brought about its dissolution in late January 1964, 
and appealed to the military to participate in it and 
save Syria. 7 Aflaq ' s strategy may have been calculat d 
to bring the leading military offic rs into the full 
glare of the r gional party organisation, thus in fact, 
making them more amenable to party disciplin . 
his action proved to be a great tactic 1 rror. 
How ver, 
Memb rs 
of the Military Committee and their offic rallies, 
willingly accepted the 'commissi on ' and then shortly 
afterwards they proceeded to manipulate the RC and the 
civilian partisan bas s for their own political 
1 
Interview, Bitar, 17 ovember 1967, B irut. Also 
int rview with Mansur Atrash who confirmed the power 
and influence of the Military Committee over tye party, 
government, as w 11 as th army, Beirut, 20 December 1967. 
2 
Interview, Atrash. 
3 
Razzaz, op . cit . , p . 95 . Intervi w, Bitar. 
4 
Razzaz, op . cit . , pp . 92-94 . 
5 
Int rview, Daouk, 17 0 tob r 1967, Be irut . 
6 
APD., 1964, op . cit . S e The cretary G neral's 
Remarks in ' Minut s of the Extraordinary Syrian Regional 
Congr ss of th Arab Ba ' th Socialist Party', Damascus, 
2 F bruary 1964, pp . 25-32. 
7 
Int rvi ws, Daouk, 17 Octob r ; Majd lani, 5 ov mb r j 
Bitar, 16-17 ov mber 1967, Beirut . 
1 
aggrandis m nt . Th "nfluenc of th B C was th r for 
furth r w ak ned by th stranglehold which th military 
now poss ssed over th civilian and military partisan 
organisations of the RC . 
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Meanwhile despit growing military influ nce ov r 
th civilian party commands , th re was a consid rabl 
body of party support rs who favour d th implem ntation 
o f a regional constitution which would overcom conf icting 
rights of jurisdiction in the best int r sts of th party , 
governm nt and stat If Syria had s t h r hopes on 
17 April 1963 of entering into tripartite union with 
Iraq and the UAR, by 18 July 1963, all such hopes had 
" 2 
vanlshed . The Sixth ational Congre ss had adopted in 
principle bipartite f deral union between Syria and 
Iraq,3but with the party 's overthrow in Iraq on 18 ovember 
1963, all hopes of union dwindled . 
Pressures also emanated from the large centres of 
the Syrian population for more democratic reforms . 4 In 
the early months of 1964, these led to serious riots and 
a considerable loss of life following severe military 
reprisals in the centres of opposition to the government 
in Hama and Homs . 5 This only serv d to aggravate an 
already tense situation . Labour strikes and merchant 
shut-outs occurred in Damascus, Lattakia and Aleppo 
1 
Ibid . Razzaz, at -Tajribat, p . 94. 
2 
APD . , 1963, op . cit . See 'Statement by the Syrian 
ational Revolutionary Council Concerning the Unsuc c essful 
( a sirite sponsored) Coup D ' Etat Against the Regime ', 
pp . 3l5 - 16 . See also asir's reply pp .32 l-34 . 
3 
Ibid ., p . 442 . 
4 
Abu Jaber, op . cit . , pp . 89 -92 . 
5 
al -Ahram, 16 April 1964, interpreted the situation in 
Hama ' as a bloody battl between the people and the army ' 
an- ahar, 16 April 1964, reported that Damascus Radio had 
accus d 'fe udalists and capitalists, who feared the Ba ' ttis 
socialist legislation, with instigating the troubles' . 
On 21 April 1964 it reported that the Chairman of the 
ational Revolutionary Council , Lieutenant General Amin 
Hafiz had accuS d th UAR and Iraqi embassies in Beirut 
of financing insurrection in Hama. The Ba 'this t newspaper 
in Beirut al-Ahrar, 30 April 1964 saw a giant conspiracy 
being hatched in Baghdad, Cairo and Amman against the 
Syrian Ba ' th government . 
JJ9 
b t w n F bruary-April 1964 . 1 Politi 1 f ctions hostil 
to th Ba ! th gOY rnm nt such as th Musl·m Broth rhood 
and th br akaway Huranist wing of th Ba ! th may also 
ha fann d th s·tuation in th hop of toppling h 
dis r dited party whi h had, at that mom nt, v ry slim 
2 
roots among the masses . ing th situation g tting 
out of ontrol, th Military Committ mom ntarily 
panick d and r turn d cons iderabl xe uti ve pow rs to 
th c·vilian commands of th party . J A const·tutional 
commiss·on was hurriedly conven d and on 24 April 196 4, 
an Interim Constitution was promulgat d. Before 
proce ding to dis uss the outcome of this Constitution, 
it is n cessary to consid r briefly its provision in 
order to see how it attempted to r solve r spective 
pow rs of jurisdiction within the Syrian government 
a dministration . 
The Syrian Interim Constitution : 24 April 1964 
The most obvious change in th syst m of governm nt 
resulted in the NRC . Since the party seized power in 
Syria on 8 March 196J, the RC of twenty members had 
combined powers of executive and 1 gislative 
functionary. 4 Deep in the inner recesses of this body, 
the Military Committee had manipulated the power structure . 
Th Int rim Constitution of 24 April 1964 (hereaft e r 
Constitution), substantially altere d the functions a nd 
powers of the C. In theory, this body was to mad e 
into a popular assembly drawn from a wid e sector of 
popular organisations . 5 Its me mbership was to be expande d 
1 
Abu Jaber, op. it., pp.90-9l. All the main Arab 
newspapers in April 1964 contained graphic accounts or 
the situation in Syria, though interpretations ari d 
normously . nterview, Bitar, 17 ov mber 1967, B irut, 
who h ld ! that Jadid and his clique ! w r responsible 
for th bloody Hama r prisals !. H (Bitar) was not 
directly involved. 
2 
Daily Star, 18 April and 1 May 1964 . al-Ahrar JO April 
1964 also involved Akram Hurani in the Hama insurrection 
J 
Razzaz, at-Tajribat, p . 114 . 
4 
APD . , 196J, op. cit. e !Prerogativ s of 
th ational Revolut'onary Council!, L gislative De r e, 
0 . 68, esp . Arts.2 and J, pp . 284-85 . 
5 
~., 1964, op. it. Art . JJ, p.1J8. 
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onsid rably to p rmit this hang of mpha is . In 
th ory, th NRC was to poss ss xt nsiv pow rs w· th 
which 0 formulat gov rnm ntal 1 g·slat·on, a f a ur 
which ·t had in common with th ational Ass mbl 01 
the Provisional Constitution of th AR.l 0 pro s·ons 
w re in Iud d for th m thod of m mb rship appoin m nt, 
an omission which s med to indicat a ertain amount 
of reticence on the part of the formulators of th 
Constitution to op n th governm nt to th full 
xercise of democratic popular el ction . 2 Ba ' thist 
n gotiators at the Cairo talks in March-April 196J, had 
explicitly informed President asir of th party's 
unwillingness to sacrifice ' his revolution ' by hast ning 
d mocratic and popular el ctions. Abd aI-Karim Zuhur 
put the matter succinctly when h said : 
We cannot hold el ctions now for w should 
hav to rig th m to avoid Mam ' um Kuzbari 
from getting into power . We must have a 
long period of a strong regim which can 
achieve something before holding elections. J 
This was the sentim nt, it seems, behind the lack of 
provision for more popular democratic government in the 
Constitution. 
Executive powers previously held by the NRC (March 
196J-April 1964) w re to be ested in a Presidential 
Council (SBPC) of five and a Cabinet (SBC).4 In th ory, 
legislation was to be formulated by the expanded RC 
and passed upwards to the SBPC to be embodied in th 
form of policy dir ctives,5 which w re th n to flow 
through the SBC to the various government ministries and 
1 
Ibid . Arts.Jl and J2, Syria; Art.47, UAR, p.90 . 
2 
APD ., 1965, op . cit. Se text on interview 
between an - ahar , Beirut, 6 May 1965, and the Syrian 
Presid nt of State, Lieutenant-General Amin Hafiz in 
Damascus. Hafiz said that members of the C wo uld be 
appointed on the basis of the popular organisations they 
repr sented . H discounted sharing power in the RC 
wi th oth r ' political movements ' , p.189. 
J 
APD . , 196J, op. ci t . , P . 200 . 
4 
bid., Arts.47 and 48, p.lJ9 . 
5 
Ibid., Arts.Jl and 44, p .l J8 . 
1 
ag nci s. Th BP ould, if It thought n ssa y, annul 
or am nd any SBC d 
' un onstitut'onal ' 
ision if it susp t d that it was 
2 
or not in ' the publ' in rest '. 
The SBPC ' s jurisdiction also ncompass d th s n itiv 
fi ld of making appointments, dismissals or transf r 
of s n or civil and army offic rs. 3 In th nt of v 
RC not b ng in s ssion, the SBPC also had pow rs of 
enact'ng 1 gislation ad interim, until such tim as 
the RC conven d to ither ratify or r j ct it.4 
th 
The m mb rs of th SBPC including a chairman and 
vic -chairman, w re to b elected by the RC . 5 Whil 
the Constitution emphasised the SBPC's coIl ctiv 
responsibility towards th RC,6 it ma d no provisions 
for dismissal of the senior executive ommittee in 
the face of majority ( C) censure. Once more it would 
seem that the formulators of the Constitution were 
trying to temper th power of popular democrati 
election and with it, the right of majority censure of 
government . As to who had the power to dismiss the 
SBPC, was left undecided in the Constitution, not because 
of oversight, but b cause several party organs were 
claiming the right of jurisdiction. The outcome of this 
we will discuss shortly . 
The SBC, according to the Constitution, constitut e d 
the junior and easily dispensible executive partner in 
government. On the one hand it was to be collectively 
responsible for its actions and polici s to the NRC and, 
on th other, to the SBPC as the executive overseer. 7 
By contrast, in the Interim Constitution of Iraq, the 
Cabin t was the highest executive and administrative body 
next to the President of State . 8 Caught in theory betw en 
1 
Ibid . , Arts.54 and 62, p . 140 . 
2 
Ibid . , Art.54(b) . 
3 
bid . , Art . 55 . 
4 
Ibid. , Arts · 5l and 52, p . 139. 
5 
Ibid . , Arts. 32 (a) and 48(a), pp . 138 -39. 
6 
Ibid . , Art . 48 (b), p.139. 
7 
Ibid . , Ar .54 (b), p . lLJO. 
8 
Ibid. , Art . 65, p . 152 . 
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b t we n a popular ' nvil ' and an x utiv ' hamm 
th BC powers w onsid rably ir urns rib d . I s 
mandat , a cording to th provisions 0 t h Cons tit u L . 0 n 
w s, s follows : 
Th Cabin t runs the affairs of stat , unifi s 
and organises work among min'stri Sj it also 
drafts th int rim plan and impl m nts it on 
·t has be n rat'fi d, and outlin saIl programm s 
which would ensur that plan ' s 'mpl m ntation 
'n th light of ov raIl national poli y, stat 
security and prot ct'on of th rights of 
c'tiz nS j furth rmor the Cabin t pr par s nd 
impl ments th budg t after ·ts ratification 
and ex cutes th gen ral policy oflth stat 
in the field of for ign relations. 
Th chairman of the SBC, th Prim Minist r, was 
2 
also a member of th Cj he was to b appointed from 
the members of the NRC by the SBPC. 3 Ministers ow d 
their appointments to the SBPC,4 not the Prime Minist r. 
Th office of th Prim Minister was thus, in eff t, 
th co-ordinator-supervisor of government ministries 
in th exercise of policy directives, flowing through 
to the SBC from the SBPC . 5 
Finally, with provisions for making the Judiciary 
independent of the executiv 6 the Constitution, it was 
stated ' shall remain in effect until th people hav 
approved of a Permanent Constitution within a period 
7 
of no longer than on year from the date of the 
publication of this Constitution (i. 24 April 1964) ' 
An xtraordinary s ssion of the Syrian Regional Congr ss 
on 22 July 1965, am nd d this provision to the effect 
that, ' The Provisions of the Interim Constitution shall 
be enfor ed until th people ratify a Permanent 
Constitution which the ational Ass mbly (i . e . anoth r 
1 
Ibid . , Art . 62, p.140. 
2 
Ibid. , Art . 64. 
3 
Ib ·d., Art · 50, p.139. 
4 
Ibid. In actual fa t B·tar maintain d to the writ r 
that he was larg ly fr to appoint his own cablnet 
ministers after th promulgation of th Interim 
Constitution. Int rvi w, Beirut, 17 ovember 1967. 
5 
APD. , 
6 
1964, op. it. , Art. 64 (b) , p.140. 
Ibid. , Art . 66, p .141-
7 
Ibid. , Art . BO. 
nam for the expand d RC) shall draw up nd pr s nt 
in a national plebiscit b for 31 July 1967 ,. 1 Th 
expand d RC was conv n d for th first tOm on 
2 S pt mber 1965 und r th 2 chairmanship of Mansur Atr sh . 
How ver, on 23 February 1966, it was abolish d and Lh 
exp riment in constitutional d mocracy r mov d from th 
sch dule of the n w rulers of the yrian r gional 
organisation of the Ba ' th. 3 
Pow rs of Jurisdiction und r D-spute: from th 
Promulgation of th Interim Constitution until 
the Eighth ational Congress , April 1962 
The Interim Constitution 01 24 April 1964, was th 
first serious attempt by the Ba ' th at 10rmulating a 
system of constitutional government. In theory, th 
principle of democratic centralism was embodied within 
the articles of the Constitution. Th people as 
represented in the expanded NRC, w r to possess ext nsive 
powers to formulat and enact legislation . The exe uti e 
(SBPC and SBC ) wer in theory to be collectively 
responsible to the NRC in the exercise of their ex cutive 
functions . In this r spect the RC resembled the 
congresses of the party which acted as forums for 
scrutinising executive command policies . The Interim 
Constitution of April 1964 had the overall effect of 
4 
allaying, if temporarily, popular opposition to the RC. 
For a while it seem d that monopolisation of executiv 
powers by a small military elite within the RC would 
ceas as outwardly more executive pow rs were handed over 
to civilian members in the Ba ' th gov rnment and on th 
newly constituted SBPC in- May 1964. 5 
1 
APD . , 1965, op. cit., p.259. 
2 
Daily Star, 3 September 1965 · 
membership composition 
See Table 62 for 
3 
Interview, Mansur Atrash, 20 D cember 1967, B irut. 
4 
Abu Jaber, op . it . , pp. 91-2 . Razzaz, at-Tajribat, p.114 . 
5 
Razzaz, at-Tajribat, p . 114. 
n the fi Id 0 1 bour legislation, D cr 
enact d by the RC on 16 April 1964, also provid d for 
a syst m of worker s If-manag m nt and 011 c iv 
1 own rship of nationalis d industri s . t profits 
from th s conc rns were to b d'vided b tw n th st t 
and the workers, JO p r c nt going to th stat and th 
G n ral Reserve Fund, JO per c nt to b sp nt by th 
stat on industrial xpansion in ord r to mploy th 
labour force, 25 p r nt to the work rs, 5 p r c nt 
for social services provided by th f'rm, and 10 p r 
. 2 
cent for workers ' houslng . The RC was to select th 
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governm nt representative on the board of factory manag -
ment, who was also to act as its chairman . J He was to 
be giv n extensive powers to direct fa tory managem nt 
legislation on behalf of the RC and on all disputed 
questions , the matter was to be referred to the Socialist 
Industrial Organisation, the executi functionary of 
the Ba ' th ' s syndical 0rganisations. 4 Each factory board 
was to be composed of seven members representing the 
factory workers (four), the trades union council, the 
party, and the chairman appointed by the RC . 5 Factory 
6 boards were to hold office for t wo yars. Periodic 
conferences of factory boards every six months were to 
be held with the intention of exchanging technical and 
a dministrative advances ' and the best means of raising 
production ,. 7 Recommendations from these conferences 
wer in turn to be passed up to the Socialist Industrial 
Organisation which studied and formulat d policy 
directives, 'in the light of the national economi 
interest , . 8 Lik the Interim Constitution, the Decre 
1 
APD . , 1964, op . cit. Legislative Decree No.55, Providing 
for the Implementation of the Principl of elf-Managem nt, 
Damascus, 16 April 1964, Art . l . , pp . 1J4-J5. 
2 
Ibid . , Art . ll., p.1J4. 
J 
Ibid. , Art . J. 
4 
Ibid . 
5 
Ibid. , Art . 2 
6 
Ibid . , Art. 2 . 
7 
Ibid. , Ar t . 12 . , p. 1 J 5 . 
8 
Ibid . , Art . 1J. 
Providing for th mpl m ntat'on of 
o b provisional . l Until such tim 
If-Manag m nt w s 
as a perman nt 
syst m of industrial manag m nt was adop d, var'ou 
boards of factory man g m nt w r to b appoint d by 
the Minist r of Labour and ocial Affairs. 2 
Th nterim Constitution and th If-Manag m nt 
Decree could be said to have b n d sign d to pla at 
popular dissatisfaction with th ex cutive gov rnm nt 
of the RC as originally constitut d in March 1963 . 
Whil they opened the way to a syst m of democratic 
governm nt within a socialist state, th y only skirt d 
th major problem confronting the Ba ' th: the 
apportioning of jurisdiction between th party, governm nt 
and army . The Interim Constitution faiJed to r conc'l 
wher ultimate ex cutiv and 1 gislative responsibilities 
wer to lie . Was th government xecutive, for xample, 
to be ntirely autonomous in ord r to imp lem nt 
legislation originally formulated by the e xpande d RC? 
Was the SBPC to be permitted to control civil and military 
appointments without responsibility to a higher exe cutive 
functionary? Was the RC to have the main powers for 
co-ordinating and directing the factory boards a nd 
conf rences in the fields of factory management and 
industrial legislation? And during the transition 
period of the Self-Management Decree, was the Minister 
for Labour and Social Affairs to be entirely responsibl 
for appointing factory boards, or was he to receive 
guidance from a higher executive authority? If so, was 
this to be governmental or non-governmental (i . e . party)? 
To these questions the Interim Constitution and th elf-
Management Decree gav ' no' or at best, only ambiguous 
answ rs to the effect, that executiv functionaries w r 
at all time ' to be bound by the law'. But what was this 
'law ' and who was r sponsible for making the final law 
of conduct, policy and direction? 
The hesitancy of the formulators of the Int rim 
Constitution and Self-Management D cr in providing 
answ rs to thes qu stions, result d not from oversight, 
------------1 
Ibid., Art . 14 . 
2 
Ibid . 
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but from an awar n ss Lhat within th Ba ' th h s 
quest'ons were still unr onc·led. Th ixth a ional 
Congr ss jn Octob r 1963, had r sol d that th party 
or of th Gov rnm nt ' s g n r 1 ' is the lead rand d'r 
pOlicy , . l Th sp ial yrian R gional Congr ss whi h 
conv ned on 1 February 1964, also mphasis d th P rty ' s 
right of jurisdiction ov r partisan organisations and 
party activiti s within Syria. 2 It also called for a 
very special effort to b mad in formulating a syst m 
of relationships b tw en the party and r gim . 3 Th 
implic ations of th r solutions of this Congress w r 
that the regional organisation of th party, by virtu 
of the fact that it was the highest e xecutiv functionary 
of the party within Syria, was to hav e xtensive pow rs 
of jurisdiction ov raIl aspects of partisan activities 
inside the regional organisation, th gov rnment and th 
4 
army . It omitted to resolve on the actual overriding 
authority of the B C in Syria as the supreme party 
functionary, though it foresaw the n c ssi ty for this 
to be carefully considered and powers of jurisdiction 
apportioned accordingly . 5 
The vagueness of this Regional Congress in defining 
jurisdictional pow rs, resulted from the fact that the 
Military Committee members of the 
main centre of effective power, th 
RC controlled the 
6 
army; through the 
army they could exert their power 0 er the party and 
government. 7 In the course of 1964 the SRC develop d 
into a powerful xecutive functionary as a result of 
its capture by th m mbers of the Military Committe 
1 
Ibid ., 1963, p . 140. 
2 
The Syrian Regional Command : R solutions of the econd 
Ordinary R gional Congress of the Syrian R gion held 
from 18 March to 4 April 1965 (Published by the D partment 
of Cultur , Propaganda and Information, Damascus, June 
1966), p . 23 ff . 
3 
Ibid . Resolution 7 · 
4 
Tbid . Resolutions 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 · 
5 
Ibid . Resolution 7· 
6 
Int rvi w,Bitar, 17 o emb r 1967, Beirut . 
7 
Razzaz , at-Tajribat, pp . 112-114. 
in F bruary 1964. 1 Through th R, th military m mb r 
pro c e d d to str ngth n th or hold 0 r th low r party 
commands, expelling all command m mb rs who oppo d 
part th ir policy dir ctOv s.2 With a hold ov r th 
executive, th military members could manipulat 
partisan activiti s in th army and among the civilian 
members of the regional organisation, th SBC and th 
SBPC . 3 
The Military Committ e lack d th on ess ntial 
thing to give it compl te mastery ov r the Ba ' th : control 
of the B C . In February 1964 it had secured s v n out 
of fifteen seats on the SRC,4 but only four out of thirte n 
on the B C . (See Tabl 53). But its pot ntiality for 
increasing this numb r was considerable in view of its 
growing influence over the lower party commands. 5 Whil 
the BNC managed to remain independent of military 
interf rence, it pos d as a constant source of annoyanc 
to the Military Commi tee as it had the power to question 
the legitimacy of the military to direct the affairs of 
the Syrian regional organisation. With this continual 
undermining force within its midst, the Military Committ e 
could only feel a sense of political insecurity within the 
regional organisation and the wid r party . It was in 
the anomalous situation of controlling the power structure 
of the regional organisation, while never knowing when its 
life would be terminated, at least in theory, by th B C. 
The B C took the view that Ba ' thist army officers 
w re entitled to participate alongside civilian memb rs 
of the party in the id ological revolutionary struggle 
against the enemies of the people, at the same time, bing 
6 bound by the Rules applying to all members of the Ba ' th. 
1 
Razzaz, at-Tajribat, pp . llO-12. For details about 
military representation on the Syrian Regional Command, 
see Table 53 
2 
Razzaz, at-Tajribat, p .llO. 
3 
4 
Ibid . 
Ibid . , pp.111-12. 
m mb rship details. 
5 
an- ahar, 
Razzaz, at-Tajribat, p .llO. 
6 
11 F bruary 1964. 
~., 1963, op. cit., pp .4 3 8 - 44 . 
See 
J48 
However , as the events unfolded in D mb r 1964, 
Ba ' thist military offic rs of th M'litary Committ 
wer continuing to ex rt a powerful hold ov r th 
regional party organisation at th sam tim maintaining 
a complete unwillingn ss to permit th B C th right 
to e xtend its right of supervision and direction [ ven J 
'in the national interest' of the party, ov r th low r 
party commands, including the SRC . Th cr tary-G n ral 
of the B C was deni ed access to th partisan congr ss s 
of the ' ideological army ', and was xpressly forbidd n 
from attempting to impose B_ C directiv s upon Ba ' thist 
militar y o fficers. l The Military Committee was in the 
commanding p osition of knowing precisely what was 
transpiring within civilian party commands, including 
the B C, while the latter was entirely in the dark as 
to policy directives being given to political commissars 
by the Military Committee . 2 
A crisis point in the relations between th B C 
and SRC was reached in December 1964, following a 
revelation by one of the leading Ba ' thist officers on 
the Military Committee, that contingency plans exist d 
for the eventual domination of the Ba ' th by the Military 
Committee . J The motives behind Major-General Muhammad 
Umran ' s disclosure have been discussed elsewhere . 4 
This, of course, did not come as a shock or surprise 
to the B C, which had been anxiously watching the 
unofficial activities of the Military Committee since 
the party seized power in March 196J . Umran ' s disclosure, 
however, gave the B C the excuse it had been seeking to 
call for the resignation of the SRC. 5 Despite the unr st 
in the party following Umran ' s sudden dismissal from th 
Military Committee, the SBPC and the SRC, Jadid and Hafiz 
had sufficient allies within the army and the regional 
1 
Razzaz, at-Ta\jribat, p.120. 
2 
Ibid. , p.92 . 
J 
4 
Ibid . , p . 114. 
See Part 2, pp . 
5 
Razzaz , at-Tajribat, p.114 . As usual th Arab pres 
relish d such a struggl for power within Syria and many 
interpretations wer applied to it. al-Ahram, 11 D c mb r 
1964, Saw it as a ' lif -and-death ' struggle betwe n Umran 
(cntd. on p .J49 ) . 
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organisation to d fy th B C I S dir ctiv to r sign. 1 
Inst ad th RC appeal d to its partisan bases of 
th regional organisation over wh'ch it had xt nd d its 
influ nce for a vot of confidenc and imp riously 
r fused to accept a committee appoint d by th B C to 
assume executive powers ad interim until th el ction 
2 
of a new SRC. The action of th B C was black n d 
by the SRC as a capitalist, imp rialist plot to topple 
the lawful representative organ of the yrian r gional 
organisation . Such an appeal was in itself calculat d 
to win the support of many young r socialist and 
revolutionary extremist members of th r gional 
organisation, who were deeply hostil e to the policies 
of moderate socialism proferred by the membership of th 
B C . 3 
Confrontation between the B C and SRC had a 
deleterious effect upon party unity and it clearly 
underlined the grave need for an immediate objective 
stat ment of the respective jurisdiction of both 
Commands and perhaps more importantly, the role of the 
Military Committee in the regional organisation. 
Somewhat enthused by its successful trial of stre ngth 
with the B C and with the vote of confid ence which it 
received from the partisan bases of the army and civilian 
commands, the SRC convened a Regional Congress on 18 
March 1965, which formulated the respective powers of 
jurisdiction of the SRC, the Military Committee and the 
B C within the Syrian regional organisation . On th 
~cntd-.-from p.348 ) 
and Jadid for complete mastery of the army and Ba'th 
party . It asserted that during the absence of the 
Command er-in-Chief, Amin Hafiz, Umran and Jadid had tried 
to consolidate their hold over the army, thus leading to 
intens rivalry and almost military disunity as a result . 
an- ahar ' s presci nt 1 ader writer, Abu Jawdeh, 15 
Dec mb r 1964 , comm nt d sarcastically that Hafiz and 
Jadid had succeed d in ousting Umran, but the future 
struggl would b b tw en these two for complete mastery 
over the centres of effective power in the army and party. 
This is, in fact, what happ ned by mid-1965 and the coup 
of 23 February 1966 in many wa s was dir ctly related to 
th Hafiz-Jadid struggle mbodi d in th ational and 
Regional Commands' struggle for domination of the Ba ' th . 
1 
Razzaz, at-Tajribat, p.114. 
2 
Ibid. 
J 
Ibid. 
follow 'ng month , th B C conv n d th E'ghth ational 
Congr ss which, 'n turn, proc d d to valua th 
SRC ' s r solutions and to I y down its own r solutions 
for r so l ving th conflicting jurisdi tional 
r sponsibiliti s of both Commands . pp rmost in th 
consideration of th's Congress was th rol of th 
military in th party. 
iv : Jurisdictional Formul e 
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The Second Syrian R gional Congress, 18 March-4 April 1965 
Central to many of the resolutions adopted, was th 
view that in regional party administration, the SRC wa 
th main executive functionary which was only subject to 
one self-limitation, ' policy guidanc and supervision by 
the B C ,. l This was little more than a r -stat ment OI 
the Ru les of 1963 . (Art . 1L, A to D) . What this meant 
when trans lated into xecutive jurisdiction was left 
unde f ine d. On de f ining the jurisdiction of the R 
within the party, th government executiv (SBPC and B ) 
and the army, the Congress was infinit ly more pr cise 
and objectiv e . 
One of the first things to which the Congress gave 
its attention was a statement defining the jurisdi tion 
of the RC in relation to the government executive. The 
Interim Constitution of April 1964 had failed to clarify 
sufficiently the natur of the party ' s jurisdiction within 
the gov rnmen t . S condly, it Was not clear if the 
gov rnment were to be independent of the party in th 
g neral exercise of its administration, or wh th r it was 
to b bound by policy directives initiated in senior party 
commands. Thus for a y ar or more betwe n the Int rim 
Constitution and the R gional Congr ss, fri tion had 
arisen betw en go rnment experts (i . ministers) and 
party apparatchiks 0 rthe right to Iormulat and impl m nt 
1 
yrian R gional Comman~SRQl: Th R solutions of 
th S cond Ordinar R gional Congr ss of the Syrian R g'on 
(in Arabic), 18 March-4 April 1965 (D partm nt of 
Prop gand a, Culture and Information, Damascus Jun 
Se ' R comm ndations to the Eighth ational Congr 
1966) . 
ss ' , p . 56 . 
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o 0 1 policy d C1Slons. Th R gional Congr ss a t mp d to 
d fine th resp ctOv pow rs o f jurisdi ition to b 
held by the party and gov rnm nt . Att ntion was also 
giv n to this qu stOon by the ational Congr ss whi h 
convened sev ral w ks later in Damas us . Th R gional 
Congres s strongly reaffirmed that th gov rnm nt was not 
ind pend nt of th party but was entir ly responsibl 
to it in the exercise of its functions. Contrary to th 
stipulations of th Interim Constitution which mad th 
SBPC the supreme ex cutive committ of the gov rnm nt 
( Arts .47 - 5 8 ) wi th powers to make major policy decisions 
and senior pers onnel appointments in th civil 
administration and th army (Art . 55), the Congress gav 
ext nsive powers of jurisdiction to th SRC , consonant 
with its role as the highest executive functionary 
within the region. It was to nominat the President of 
State and the memb rs of the SBPC, the Prime Minister 
and the members of SB~, army chiefs of staff and senior 
2 field commanders . The secretary of the SRC was ips~ 
fact~ , the chairman of the SBPC and as such President 
of Syria . J The Interim Constitution had given the SBPC 
the power to appoint senior civilian and military offic rs 
(Art . 55) , the Prime Minister and Cabinet (Art.50) and to 
dismiss them if required in default of duty . The only 
limitation on the e xecutive powers of the SBPC as defin d 
in the Interim Constitution, was its collective 
responsibility to the NRC (Art.48(b)) in the e xercise of 
its executive functions . The Regional Congress complete ly 
trans f err d the centre of effective d cision making to 
the SRC . 4 In so doing, the future rol of the RC was 
left some what uncertain . 
A c ommittee formed by the Congress to define the 
futur role of the ' ideological army ' in the regional 
party organisation, not only confirmed th present of the 
1 
Int rview with Dr Abdull a h Abd ' Da ' im, 6 October 1967, 
Beirut . 
2 
SRC . See ' Party Jurisdiction ' , pp . 5J-56, 12 May 1965 · 
J 
SRC . See ' Relations Between Party H adquarters and 
Th~ Respective Jurisdictions ' , 12 May 1965 , Communiqu' 
0 . 1 , p . 4 . 
4 
Ibid . 
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army offi r in i iIi par ty ommands, but ga th 
unofficial M"litary Commit th r"ght of autom ti 
memb rship of th Regional Congr ss 
1 though still embryon"c, NR Th 
and th xpand d, 
iili tary Commit t 
howev r, was in theory, mad subordinat to th RC in 
the direction of partisan activiti s within th r gion 1 
party organisation insid and outside th army, and it 
gave the Polit o Bureau powers to nominat th Command r-
in - Chief , c hiefs of staff and senior f' Id command rs.2 
In f u ture Regional Congress s, provisions w r to b 
made for an expand d military representation through th 
admittanc of the chi fs of staff of army h adquart rs, 
field commanders and the Commander-in-Chi f . 3 
The Congress had made the Military Committee 
subordinate to the SRC in the administration and dir ction 
of Ba ' thist army officers and in control of senior army 
p rsonn 1 appointments, transfers and dismissals. 4 Ye t 
th military officer was by no means relegated to an 
inferior position vis-a-vis his civilian counterpart. 
On the contrary , army domination over the SRC and regional 
party organisation and future Regional Congresses was 
mad mor complete by (1) legitimising its pr sence in the 
civ ilian party commands and (2) by increasing its 
representation . 5 
Assuming direct control over the government executive, 
the Congress also legislated on changes to the Provisional 
Self-Management Decree O . 55 of 16 April 1964 . Originally, 
each factory was to have its own board of management with 
the RC appointing the chairman or president and the party, 
the synd ical organisation and worker r presentatives each 
having a place on the board . However, this system proved 
costly and difficult to co-ordinate and administer. 
Following the spate of nationalised industries in the early 
months of 1965, the Congr ss adopted a more efficient syst m 
of factory administration . It pro id d for a merger of 
1 
Ibid . S e 'The Committ in Charg of Military-Politi al 
R la tions ' , p.l . 
2 
Ibid. 
3 
Ibid . 
4 
Ibid. 
5 
Ibid . 
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national · sed compani s into administrat·v units ach 
having its own presid nt and board m mb r ppo·nt d by 
1 
th P rty . Thus it was th r gional p rty organisation 
wh·ch directly controll d appointm nts ith r from th 
syndical organisation, th governm nt x utiv or any 
other such inter sted organisation to factory boards . 
On 13 May L gislativ D cr e o. 84 was inst·tuted by 
the SBPC for the creation of a central administrativ 
organisation and council to supervis nationalis d 
industries und r th aegis of the Minist r for Industry 
and through him the SRC of the party , thus the party 
sought to integrat itself more closely with the 
incr asing industrial public sector . 2 
One ominous resolution held that if the B C were 
to be c ome ' negligent ' in the administration of party 
affairs, th SRC 'will be guided by partisan Congress 
(i . e . Regional) resolutions or, failing this, by its 
own s If-judgement ,. 3 This resolution was modelled on 
an e x treme interpretation of the Rules of 1963, which 
gave the SRC po wers (Art . CXIII) to dispense with the 
Rules und er ' Emergency Conditions '. What was understood 
by ' Emergency Conditions ' was undefin d. However, it 
permitted the Congress to exert further pressure upon 
the B C to be wary of the consequences of giving policy 
' guidance ' which was not in accordance wi th the will 
(i . e . Regional Congress resolutions) or the wishes of 
the Syrian regional party organisation . 
The Eighth National Congress, 21 April-4 May 1965 
The resolutions of the Second Regional Congress, 
whil defining the jurisdiction of the SRC in the 
regional party organisation, failed to clarify, except 
in a vague and indefinit manner, the precise nature of 
the ex cutive powers which it was prepared to accord to 
th B C in the fulfilm nt of its role as th ' supreme 
command of the Party ' . (See Rules, 1963, Art . IL) . 
1 
2 
R 
3 
MEM . , 17 / 12, 20 March 1965 . 
SRC . , p . 4 . 
Socialist En 
1965), pp .35-45. 
cteur Public 
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Th significance of this attitud was °nt rpr t d by 
th d 1 gat s of th Eighth ational Congr ss (thr 
quarters of whom w r non- yrian) . l s s rious ffront 
to th 1 ad rship of th B C . 2 Wh n th r solutOons of 
th R gional Congr ss w r submitted for formal appro al 
by the ational Congr ss, substantOal am ndm nts w r 
introduc d in accord n with th Congr ss's 
of th role of th B C in r lations hip to th 
SBPC and army . 
onc ption 
RC, th 
In d fining th natur of th B C I S jurisdiction 
over th whol party, th Congress re-stat d the pr mis 
which was embodi d in the Rul s of 1959 and 196J, that in 
party affairs, the B C constitutes the supreme party 
command. J Its powers of jurisdiction included the 
initiation and implem ntation of policies r lated to 
issues of a national character affecting all party 
organisations and bodies throughout the Arab world (al-
Qawm). 4 It was solely responsible for the formation, 
interpretation, elucidation and modification of 
i d eological questions affecting the whole party . 5 
Provided that the B C was acting constitutionally in 
accordance with the Rule~ and with policy guide-lines 
previously adopted by the ational Congress, its 
d irectives in these fields were totally inviolable and 
had to be immediately xecuted by the R gional Commands 
in accordance with prevailing domestic ircumstances 
° t o 6 affecting the regional party organlsa lons. 
Th Eighth ational Congress saw the definite ne d 
for more than just a statement of who constituted the 
supreme party lead rship . For the organisation to function 
1 
Razzaz, at-Tajribat, p.118 . 
2 
Th National Command (B C), 21 May 1965. See 'Th 
P riodical Stat ment Regarding the Party ' s Re lations with 
th Gov rnment (i . . spe ifi ally r f rring to Syria 
though appli abl if th Party w r to onstitute th 
Go ernm nt Isewher) which the Eighth ational Congr ss 
Resolv d ' (in Arabi ), p.J. 
J 
Ibid . , P . 1. 
4 
Ibid. Se ' Jurisdi tion of th ational Command', (a), p . 2. 
5 
bid. 
6 
bid . 
a s a co-ordinated ntity, ntrally dir ct d by th 
B C on national issu s, it b Ii ved th t th B C 
should not b made to stand on th sid ' -lin s in th 
hop that th r spe tive R gional Commands would 
implem nt it s policy d ir c tiv s. It was s n that h 
liais on channels b t w n th B C and R gional Commands 
had constantly brok n down becaus th c ntral 
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lead ership was inform d haphaz ardly or not at all about 
r g i onal party affairs which had a d ir ct baring on 
the party ' s national strategy . As th supreme party 
organisation, the Congr ss held that th B C should 
hav the right of direct ntry to the policy-making 
executive committees of the regional party organisations, 
as only in this way could it be reliably informed as to 
the circumstances confronting the regional party 
administrators . The Congr ss thus adopted a resolution 
which permitted the Secr tary-General and his deputy 
the right of entry into the committ e sessions of all 
lower party commands with powers to authorise policy 
decisions in accordance with previously stipulated B C 
and SRC Command directives . l 
Moving on to a definition of th jurisdiction of 
the Regional Command within its own region, the Congress 
stated that it was to be bound firstly by policy guide-
lines (resolutions) of the B C and on purely regional 
2 i s sues, by the resolutions of the Regional Congress. 
Regular monthly reporting to the B C was deemed essential 
i f the party were to func tion as envisag d in the Rules. J 
The Congress in an endeavour to bring greater co-ordination 
between the Regional Command the lower regional party 
commands under its charge , permitted the Regional Command 
se c retary and his deputy the right of entry into low r 
party c ommands to authorise and direct its activities 
I 
Ibid . , (c) . 
2 
Ibid . See ' Jurisdiction of the Regional Command ' (a) . 
J 
Ibid . , 
in accord ance with pr viously stipulat d policy gu'd -
1 · 1 0 lnes . n c e more th 'nt ntion s ms to h v b n to 
ci rcumvent strangulati on of policy as it filt red down 
through th n twork of fe d r r gional organisat'ons 
(aI-Fur', ash - hu ' ba , al - Firg a), to th partisan bas s 
and th masses (see Fig . 4). 
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A system of collective me tings was also institut d 
to str amlin party administration and co-ordination of 
2 policies b t we en the B C an d th Regional Commands. 
The cretary-General and the Regional Command s cr tary 
had the power to call fo r a meeting of the joint 
Commands to discuss ' emergency ' or pressing matters 
dir ctly a ffecting both organisations. 3 This was a 
sensibl approach to the problem of liaison between the 
senior political and executiv e commands of the party, 
which had plaqued th Ba ' th since its inc ption . Simpl 
majority d cisions were xpected to b binding on both 
4 Commands. 
Th ational Congress had its own views on who was 
to be r esponsible for making senior gov rnmental and 
military appointments . Considerable am ndments were 
made to the Regional Congress 's resolutions which 
ent rus te d the SRC wit h these sole po wers. The Congress 
held that both the B C and the SRC should be empowered 
to nominate and appoint senior administrative personnel 
at a s pe cially convened joint meeting . 5 At this meeting, 
members of the SBPC, including the President, the Prime 
Minis ter, and the Commander-in-Chief, provide d they wer 
6 party members , were to be nominated by majority decision. 
Senior offices , it wa s held, could be grouped if nec e ss ary 
in one person. 7 The Regional Command secretary wa s, 
1 
bid . , ( c) . 
2 
Ibid . See 'Collectiv M tings ' . 
3 
Ibid . 
4 
Ibid. 
5 
Ibid . See ominations for Executiv Office' . 
6 
Ibid. 
7 
Ibid . (It should b not· c d that th' s provision was 
xplicitly r vok d by th joint Command sessions ( ational 
and R gional) in early August 1965 . 
ipso fa to, also Pr sid nt of the BPC a w 11 as 
Pr s·d nt of the yrian Arab R public . l 
Connected with th sam them of bringing a 
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gr ater deal of co-ordinat io n and party str amlining , 
th Congr ss a do pt d a system of a joint Polit o Bur au, 
consisting of the Presid nt and members of the SBPC , 
the Secretary-Gen ral of the B C and his d puty, th 
Regional Command secr tary and his d puty, the Prim 
2 Minist r and his deput y , and the Command r-in-Chief . 
The President of the BPC (i . e . also th Regional 
Command secretary) or th ecretary-G n ral of th 
B C had the power to call the Polito Bur au into 
s ssion . J The significance of this body was that it 
stood mid-way between the BNC and R gional Commands in 
th dir ction of policy to governmental organs of th 
party in Syria (Fig.4). It seems to hav been devis d as 
a means for ensuring that policy directives from the 
B C were e xpeditiously conveyed through the senior 
regional organisation administrators to the government 
d epartments and the syndical and peasant organisations 
which operated under the jurisdiction of government 
departments. Similarly, through the presence of th 
Commander-in-Chief in the Polito Bureau, the B Chad 
for th first time, direct access to the centre of army 
authority . 
The role and function of the 'ideological army ' was 
given scrupulous attention by the Congress . A committee 
comprising representatives of the B C, Military Committe 
(Syrian army), and from each of the regional delegations 
at the Congress, was appointed to examine the place of 
the army in the regional party organisation in Syria , 
and to propose a solution to the organisational crisis 
which had beset the SRC and B C as a result of overt 
military interference on senior governm ntal and party 
(regional) xecuti e commands . 4 The committee conferred 
1 
Ibid. 
2 
bid . Se ' Th Gov rnment Political Bureau ' . 
J 
Ibid . 
4 
Razzaz, at-Tajribat, p .120 . 
J5 
and finally came to the conclusion that th whol probl m 
had aris n as a r sult of uncI ar pow rs of jurisd' ction 
covering the role functions of Ba ' thist m'litary and 
civilian Regional and ational Commands . A simpl 
definition of r spectiv powers of jurisdiction wouJd, 
it c laimed, be sufficient to allay th organisational 
crisis wi thin the yrian r gion . l It was th r for 
proposed that Ba ' thist military offic rs had th right, 
a s th military vanguard of th party, to participat 
in the leadership of th Regional and ational Commands, 
but in th role of primus int r pares . How v r, if th Y 
were to b admitted to the leadership commands of th 
party , th y also had to be bound by th system of party 
jurisdiction which gave the B C supreme xecutive powers 
2 
over the whole party network . Th Military Committ e, 
which had operat d unofficially, was denied the right to 
be the sole agency for directing partisan affairs in the 
army . J A Military Bureau , the equivalent of a civilian 
command Branch (al-Fur ' ), was to be constituted in its 
place and brought directly under the administration of 
the SRC as the highest r gional functionary .4 The 
Military Bureau was to be appointed by the SRC from the 
Ba ' thist partisans in the army, while the secretary of 
this organisation was to be appointed from among the 
military officers of the SRC . 5 The effect of this was 
to bring the Military Bureau indirectly under the 
jurisdiction of the ational Command which had been 
given the right through its Secretary-General and his 
deputy to attend and supervise the sessions of the lower 
6 party commands . Thus, it might be argued that as a price 
for being officially legitimised as bon fide participants 
in the Syrian regional organisation, Ba ' thist military 
1 
Ibid . 
2 
Ibid . B C, 21 May 1965 . See ' Party Organisation in th 
Army and its (Army ' s) Relations with the Party ' , p.J. 
J 
B C , 21 May 1965, p.J . 4 --
Razzaz, at-Tajribat, p . 120 . 
5 
Ibid ., p . 120 . B C, 21 May 1965, p . J . 
6 
B C, 21 May 1965 . See ' Jurisdiction of the ational 
Command ' . 
offic rs w r to b subj t to th sam ov rrid Ong 
powers of jurisdiction as hose bOndOng iviloan 
1 
memb rs of the party . Th xecutiv pow rs of th 
Military Committ w r , in th ory, to b r duc d to 
recomm nding offic r transfers, dismissals or 
appointm nts to th joint Polit o Bur au, on which th 
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B C had representation through the S cr tary-G n ral and 
2 his d puty . As a guid pro guo, th ational Congr ss 
agr d wi th the Regional Congress in p rmitting m mb rs 
of the Military Committee to become m mb rs of th 
expanded RC . 3 In addition , it also gave the m mbers of 
the Military Bureau, th Minister of D fence, the 
Commander-in-Chief, the Chief of Staff and s nior fi ld 
and h adquarter staff officers, repres ntation on th 
RC, with the proviso, that their candidature was approved 
by th SRC and that it did not exceed 20 per cent of the 
total membership . 4 
On the ques tion ofo governmen t-party relations, the 
ational Congress largely supported the resolutions of 
th Regional Congress, but once more with the stipulation 
that the B C should not be excluded from the right to 
make and direct policy decisions to the effective centres 
of government ministries and departm nts. 
the new Command on 4 May held : 
A statement by 
The regime (i.e . Syrian government) represents 
the party in power . Its task is to carry out 
the d irectives and plans of the Party (see Resol . 4 
Sixth ational Congress) and to enact legislation 
in every country where the Party is in power . 5 
As an arm of the party, the government was subject to the 
same overriding powers of jurisdiction flowing from the 
B C to the respective Regional Commands and through th 
government executive, the civil servic and government 
departm nts to the Arab people. 
1 
Razzaz, at-Tajribat, p.120. 
2 
~_, 21 May 1965 . S 'Party Organisation in the Army 
and its R lations with the Party', p . 3 . 
3 
Ibid . 
4 
IbOd . 
5 
APD . , 1965, op . it . ' Stat ment by the rational 
Command of the Ba ' th Party Conc rning th Eighth ational 
Congr ss of the Party '. Damascus, 4 May 1965, p . 185 . 
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While the governm nt was to b ntir ly responsible 
to the party for receiving major guid -lin s of policy, 
the Congress stipulat d that this did not p rmit 
apparatchiks th right to meddle in th daily affairs of 
government administration to the d triment of th 1 gaily 
appointed minister or s cretary-general or a governm nt 
1 department . All matters directly aff cting the 
government had to be channelled through the senior 
exe cutive commands of the party and the directiv s to 
2 the minister were to come from this source alone . 
Penalties for enthusiastic apparatchiks violating this 
principle were to be introduced in order to streamline 
the process of policy decision making. 3 Conversely, the 
Congress stipulated that government executives had no 
jurisdiction to interfere in or supervise the work of the 
party apparatus 'since government emanates from the Party 
(al-Hizb) and not vice-versa, . 4 
On the question of the army, the Congress ever 
mindf ul of the problem of its continual interference in 
government, held that 'the army cannot interfere in the 
daily affairs of government except insofar as such 
affairs are of its concern. 5 It cannot, likewise, interfere 
6 in the work of the party apparatus. And by similar logic: 
' Party members must not interfere in military affairs 
through channels other than their relevant and responsibE 
party commands, . 7 
The resolutions of the Eighth ational Congress 
sought to re-state in a more realistic and practical way 
the supreme executive role function of the B C in relation 
to the regional organisations. In so doing, they attempted 
to give the B C a 'crown' and in its hand ' a sword' . 
1 
Ibid. 
2 
Ibid . 
3 
Ibid . 
4 
Ibid . 
5 
Ibid . 
6 
Ibid . 
7 
Ibid . 
To b an ffe tiv ntralis d party organ, th Congr ss 
saw an imp rativ n d to op n th way in th low r 
party commands for th B C to ex r s "ts n wly a quir d 
x cutiv powers. In taking this point of vi w, th 
Congr ss was trying to obviate the situation which had 
obtained in Iraq (February - ovemb r 1963) and in 
Syria from March 1963, when the B Chad b n forc d to 
remain a pliant, helpl ss victim of r gional party 
administrators. Iraq as a consequ nc had be n lost and 
the Syrian r gional organisation was s n to hav b n 
slowly tearing itself apart as a r sult of unclear 
powers of jurisdiction among the respectiv participant 
commands, and betw en the Regional and B Cs. For th 
Ba'th to fulfil its ideological mission, the Congress 
believed that the B C had to be made into a centralis d 
authority commanding an effective pow r base upon which 
to operate and compel diviant and dissident party members 
and commands to conform . 
The test of the Congress's mandate to the B C could 
only be effectively guaged if the SRC,and more importantly 
the army officers, were prepared to surrender some of 
their executive powers. After all, ational Congress 
resolutions were made by delegates three quarters of whom 
were non-Syrian; it was simple for them to concede fresh 
powers of jurisdiction to the ational Command. As for 
th Syrians who controlled the effe tive centres of 
military and civilian party power, they w re to be faced 
with a decision of whether to surrender power in the 
hope that by so doing they would be facilitating Arab 
unity, or retaining it personally to strengthen their 
own regional power base. The outcome of this decision 
will be discussed in the following chap ters. 
Th r d inition of th r sp ct'v rol s of th 
thre indep nd nt organ'sat'onal sph r shad resolv d 
a most contentious probl m which had h'nd r d ff tiv 
organisational harmony and co-op rat'on sin th 
party s zed power in March 1963 . How v r, b twe n 
May-August 1965, the provisions gOY rning th's asp ct 
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of party administration did not function as d sign d . 
The r ason for this was that th m'litary partisans took 
advantag of th provis'ons perm'tting th m to enter 
into the spheres of governm nt and party administration 
in ' unlimited numbers', but then th y proce ded to 
manipulate these spher s through their military power 
bas es . This, in fact, nullified the conc pt of th 
' independent complementary spheres ' as institut d in 
the resolutions of th Eighth ational Congress. 
Military interference was in itself a suffici ntly 
grave problem to the B C at this time, but th problem 
became more acute towards the end of July 1965 with th 
presence of an intense military power struggle between 
the Chief-of- taff, Major-General alah Jadid and th 
Command r-in-Chief, Lieut nant-General Amin Hafiz. l 
In addition to th ir military offices, both were senior 
political commissars on th Military Committ e and 
Military Bureau, s~ring th highest civ'lian party and 
governmental ex cutive offices . Betw n th m th y 
monopolis d n th ir own p rsons tripl ex utive 
funct'ons . In this r sp ct 't was imposs'ble for th 
' indep nd nt sph res ' conc pt of th Eighth ational 
Congress to function as d signed . 
The Solution by th Joint Regional and 
in EaElY August 1965 . 
Th mil ' tary pow r struggl b tw n J d'd and Hafiz 
was threat ning to spill ov r 'nto th wid r party 
organisation by early August 1965, th r for out of 
desperation, th joint Commands w r summon d by th th n 
ecretary-G neral, Mun'f Razzaz. 2 Th B C put forw rd a 
1 
2 
Razz 
1966 . 
Part 2, pp. 
t, B C, Communiqu 
--_ ........ ---
o. 1, 11 J nu y 
solution to th mounting organisational risis whi h, 
it was said, lay in th 's paration of military and 
political executiv rol functions' . Th Command 
wanted the offices of Commander-in-Chi f and Presid nt 
of State separat d and 2) that th m mb rs of th BPC 
should not hold any oth r xecutive offic , and J) that 
the office of the Commander-in-Chi f should r v rt to 
I the Minister of D fence . Thus , in th ory, if this w r 
to b r alised the conc pt of the lind p nd nt spheres' 
would be functional . The only liaison betw n the army 
and government, would be the Minister of D f nce entrusted 
with a portfolio as much the concern of the army as 
of th civilian party executive comman ds. But how were 
the joint Commands to get the military to withdraw to 
their own sphere of influence? This in itself was a 
crucial question sinc the military at any rate controll d 
the effective centres of military and civilian power with 
on exception, the B C, which received its mandate from 
the wider party organisation outside Syria . A solution, 
though far from being satisfactory was found in the simple 
expedient of requiring that all military partisans 
participating in either of the other independent spheres 
should relinquish their military commissions or contacts 
during the termination of their political appointments . 
The joint Commands' modus vivendi was a realistic 
solution to the problem of military interference in party 
and governmental affairs which did not directly concern 
them . In theory the Commands were calling for the 
resignations of both Jadid and Hafiz if they wished to 
continu to play an active role in Ba'th politics . While 
both were deeply critical of the interference of the B C 
in this respect, they nevertheless complied with the 
formula designed to lessen mounting military and civilian 
disharmony within Syria . 2 However, no sooner had the 
separation of executiv role functions been agreed upon 
in principle, than both were scheming on how best to 
take advantage of th other by filling their old offices 
1 
Ibid" 
2 
Razzaz, at-Tajribat, p.141 ff . Razzaz said that he 
contemplat d resignation as Secretary-G neral if Jadid 
and Hafiz r fused to resign their military offices . 
with r liable and manipulabl offic rs. Th office 
on which both th ir att nt'on and that of th ir 
supporters fixed , was that of th Min'st r of D f nc 
for who v r should control this offic could influ n 
both military and gov rnm ntal policy alik . 
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Hitherto the Def nc portfolio had not be n v ry 
important as its incumbent was not usually one of th 
senior political commissars on the Military Committee . l 
Major-General Memduh Jab r who had h Id th office from 
May 1964 until August 1965, was quickly shelved off into 
Public Works when De f nce became a key appointment aft r 
August 1965 . As Commander-in-Chief and President of 
State and the Chairman of the SBPC, Amin Hafiz, manipulated 
Jaber as did Jadid and other senior politi c al commissars 
with access to governmental executive commands. 
The importance of controlling the Ministry of 
Def nce became an extremely contentious point at stake 
which threatened to ups et the modus vivendi of the joint 
Commands . A continuing deadlock among the members of the 
Regional Command on this question led to its resignation 
2 
on 6 August . An Extraordinary Syrian Regional Congress 
was quickly convened with the specific purpose of 
examining the resolutions of the joint Commands, electing 
a new Regional Command and conferring upon it a new 
mandate in consonance with or against the resolutions of 
the joint Commands . 
The Extraordinary Syrian Regional Congress, 8 - 14 A~ust 1965 
The resignation of the SRC momentarily gave the B C 
the opportunity to consolidate its e xecutive powers over 
the regional party organisation . The Aflaq-Bitar wings 
of the B C advocated a policy of ' direct challenge' to 
the basis of military authority by suspending the 
statutory Rules and nominating a SRC in which the B C would 
secure a majority of m mbers sympathetic to the 'legitimist' 
party line . J The majority of the B C, how ver, was less 
1 
Int rview, Majdalani, 2J October 1967, Beirut . 
2 
B C, Communiqu ' 0.1, 11 January 1966. 
J 
Razzaz, at-Tajribat, pp . 142-4J. 
v ntur sam Th S c tary-Gen r a l w s f arful of th 
consequen of antagonising th milOtary f tions by 
th assumption of xtra- dmonistrativ pow rs. (S 
Rules 1963, Art . IL (d) 5) . Inst ad th Command adopt d 
th strategy of incr asing th SRC m mb rship from 
eleven lected by th cond Syrian R gional Congr ss 
in March-April 1965, to the statutory maximum of 
sixteen provided by th Rul s (Art o XXXV I) in th hop 
of se curing election of more memb rs sympath tOc to it . l 
The purpose of the Extraordinary Syrian Regional 
Congress was to evaluate the recommendations of th 
joint Command sessions and give a mandate to the newly 
elected SRC . The s y stem permitting personalisation of 
power was the prime concern of the Congre ss. It adopt d 
the r commendation of the joint Commands providing for 
the separation of role functions betwe n military and 
governmental executives . a individual ' , it was stat d, 
' should hold two executIve positions (military and 
governmental) simultaneously ,. 2 This, in effect, amende d 
the provision of the Eighth National Congre ss, which 
permitted senior civilian or military executives to 
monopolise more than one office in their own p e rson. 
(See omination for Ex cutive Office, Eighth ational 
Congress) . 
The function and relationship of the SBPC to the 
SRC and B C came up for scrutiny and red e finition by the 
Congress . A short while before the Congress had ass e mble d, 
Jadid had put forward the proposal to the joint Commands 
that the offices of th Commander-in-Chief and President 
of the SBPC (also President of State) should be separated 
(Hafiz was the incumbent of both offices) and the Milit a ry 
Bureau should assume the executive functions of the SBPC. 3 
This was an unthinkable proposal to the advocates of th 
' legitimist' party line who were anxious to minimise 
military interfer nce in government xecutiv and regiona l 
party commands. Th Regional Congress which had a larg 
1 
Ibid . , p . 145 . 
2 
~, Communique, 0.1, 11 Janua ry 1966. 
3 
Razzaz, at-Tajribat, p . 137· 
conting nt of m mb rs sympath ti to bo h 11 fOz and 
Jadid, adopt d th r omm ndation 0 th joint 
Commands whi h was, in rtain r sp ts, a ompromis 
betw n h xtr m un onstitutional ( Rul s 1963 
and am ndm nts and interpol tions of lat r Congress s) 
stand Hafiz-Jadid and th militarists, nd th 
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legitimist party lin of th B C and its r gional party 
support rs. It onfirm d th righ of th SBPC to xist 
in a cordance with th pro isions of hInt rim 
ConstitutOon of 24 April 1964 (Arts.5l-57) stating, ' Th 
Pr sidential Council is on rn d with planning, 
sup rvision and dir ction of 1 gislation' in gOY rnment 
1 
matt rs. However, it was interpolat d that m mbers of 
th BPC, including the Presid nt w re not to b p rmitt d 
t h d h ° fO 2 o 01 any ot er executlve of lce. M mbership of th 
BPC was retain d at five (See Interim Constitution, 
Art . 48 (b) and was amended on the basis of r solutions 
brought down by the econd yrian Regional Congress . 
(S e Jurisdic tional Powers and Responsibilities) and th 
Eighth ational Congr ss (See omination for Executiv 
Offi c e) to the effect: 
The Presidential Council is consider d as a 
partisan body whose members are to b nominat d 
by the ational and Regional Commands in a joint 
s ssion. 3 
But whil the SBPC was to be nominated by the joint 
Commands ' the interim xe uti e functionary of the party 
and state ' , the Congr ss, perhaps reacting to pressures 
emanating from th 'r gionalists', r solved that the 
SRC ' collectively ' was to b executively responsible for 
th nactm nt of major poli y decisions to be directed 
towards th SBPC for mbodim nt in worling go ernm nt 
pOlicy . 4 A r solution defining powers of jurisdiction 
ov r senior army appointm nts, transfers and dismissals 
stat d that the SRC possess d ' the final authority ' , 
though th actual part 1 ft to the B C in this matter 
was unstated. 5 
1 
~, Communiqu ' , 0.1, 11 January 1966. 
2 
bid. 
3 
bid. 
4 
Ibid . 
5 
Ibid . 
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Th sinist r importanc of bo h th s r solutions 
should not b overlook d by th r drs th y had a 
d"r ct baring on th ev nts which 1 d to th r s s of 
21 D c mb r 1965 nd 23 F bruary 1966 . In both 
r solut"ons ( eel eparation of Authority ' , os.7 and 8), 
th jurisdictional pow rs accord d by th Eighth 
ational Congr ss to the B C wer being whittl d away 
in stages. For xampl , its tipulat d (S 'R port 
Assessing the Exp ri e n of Governm nt in Syria ' ) that 
th SRC and BNC should not only nominate th SBPC, 
but also supervis and direct its op ration as 
' Gov rnm nt is in th hands of the Party' (al-IIizb).l 
The Extraordinary Regional Congress permi t d the B C 
to jo"n wi h the SRC in nominating the SBPC, but 
pr v nt d it from ex r ising any undu influenc over 
policy supervision and dir ction unl ss through th 
2 
administrativ channels of S RC headquarters . Secondly, 
on th question of s nior military appointments such as 
th Commander-in-Chief, the Eighth ational Congress 
had resolved that a joint session of both Commands was 
to nominate candidates for these officees . 0 
provisions, however, had been made for a so- alled 'final' 
power of decision by the RC . The Extraordinary Regiona l 
Congress (See Resolution 0 . 8) was, in effect, stating 
that if the SRC in a joint session with the B ~ was not 
satisfied with the candidates put forward by the B C, 
it had the power to ma k the 'final' d cision itself 
by majority vote. 3 
1 
AP D. , 1965, 0 p . it., p . 184 . 
2 
B C . , Communiqu e , 0.1. 
3 
Ibid . 
The Crisis of 21 Decemb r 1965 : Dis olution of the 
Syrian Regional Command 
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Opinions have differed on the r espective strengths 
of members sympathetic to Hafiz and Jadid elected by 
the Extraordinar y Congr e ss to the SRC . Bitar insi s ted 
t h at of the sixteen membe r s of the Command, fourteen 
were!Jadid!s men!.l Munif Razzaz believ ed that the 
Command was evenly divided into Hafiz and Jadid 
2 
supporters which h e saw as a fe arful omen . The thing 
which troubled t he Secretary-General most of al l was 
the f act that of the sixteen members, nine were military 
officers. 3 Of the nine, six repr e s ented the Military 
Committee while the r emaining three had failed to 
secure election to the Militar y Bureau . 4 In theory 
mi l itary members we r e to r elinquish all official 
contact with the army i f they wanted to hold executive 
office in the Regional Command or government . As the 
S ecre tary-General and ether members of the B C recogni s ed, 
separation of rol e functions was one thing, but it did 
not p r event Ba!thist officers f rom retaining their 
personal following a mong officers controlling army 
headquarters and armoured divisions. Thus, indirectly, 
the officers still had access to the effective 
centres of power in the army through which to influence 
the course of e vents within the party and government. 
Lieutenant-General Amin Hafiz was re-elected 
secretary of the SRC Command, an office which he had 
held since February 1964. 5 However, under his incumbency, 
the office became little more than a f ormal executive 
link between the par ty and state. With all his political 
and mil itary executive offices, Hafiz had v ery little 
time to give to regional party administration. Thus b y 
default, ( See . Rules 1963, Art. XLII), the office of 
deputy secretary took on a new importance and by the SRC 
elections o f the second week in Augus t 196 5, it was the 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Interv iew, 17 ovember 196 7, Beirut . 
Razzaz, at-Taj ibat, p . 148 . 
Ibid . , pp . 146 -47 . 
Ibid ., p.147. 
~, C ommunique 0 .1. 11 Januar y 196 6 . 
most sough after and number one executiv appointment 
in the regional party organisation, if not in the whole 
of Syria . To this office Jadid was lected by the 
Congress, signifying, to the growing influence of his 
power within the regional party organisation . l 
The strategy of the B C in increasing the member s hip 
of the SRC (Resolution o. 62 of 6 August) though well 
calculated, literally 'backfired' . Indirectly some of 
t h e blame for this can be attributed to the Eighth 
National Congress (See Party Organisation in the Army) 
which permitted Ba ' thist army of ficers to enter party 
executiv e commands in ' unlimited numbers ' . This suited 
Jadid ' s strategy a s he owed much of his power to loyal 
army partisans and political commissars of the Military 
Committee and Alawite officers on the secret committee 
which manipul a te d the support of Alawite officers 
2 throughout the army . Jadid, was not content to remain 
with a l oyal mi l itary base. While Hafiz was involved in 
a mu l titude of top line executive appointments, he was 
q uiet l y consolidating his hold over regional party 
c ommand s and civilian partisan bases . J 
Jadid ' s resignation from the office of Chief-of-Staff 
had only followed guarantees that Hafiz would relinquish 
t h e office of Commander-in-Chief . 4 Though the outward 
appearance of executive military power had been taken 
f rom Jadid and Hafiz, Jadid wa s in a much stronger 
position than Hafiz in view of the support he could 
summon within the civilian party commands as well as 
1 
Ibid . 
2 
Interview, Bitar, 17 ovember 1967, Beirut. 
Razzaz, at-Tajribat. pp.146-47 . 
J 
Interv iew Daouk, 9 ovember 1967 . He said 'Jadid 
was v ery much a party man . . . Hafoiz as Head of State 
etc ... had no time to consolidate hi s position among the 
rank and file membe rship' . Daouk, however, doubted Hafiz' s 
a b i l ity to have done thi . He concluded: ' Jadid thus 
consolidated his posit i on in the army and party and 
took over as a r e ult' . Razzaz, at-Tajribat, p.1J8 . 
4 
Razzaz . , at-Tajribat., p.141. 
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within the partisan ba of th l a my. Hafiz wa s 
confined with an impr ssive ar ay of titles and 
t h eoretically the h ighe st exe utive off'ce in Syria, 
the President of State, but in reality it was the 
unobtrusiv e office of d puty ecretary of the SRC, held 
by Jadid which had sub tantive powers over the government 
executive (i . e . SBPC and SBC) and the army through its 
ability to regulate senior military appointments (See 
Separation of Authority, Re so lution 0 . 8 , Extra-ordinary 
Regional Congress), on behalf of the SRC . 2 
Jadid was a master of strategy and intrigue . 
Wh ile he now controlled the most powerful executive 
office in Syria he was conscious of the fact that he 
could only utilise it to the full by havi ng a completely 
s ympathetic, if not manipulable SRC. Before he could 
realise this longstanding ambition to 'rule Syria ' , 
he had f irst l y to weaken and remove t wo major 
obstacle s in his path: Amin Hafiz and the B C . Jadid, 
however, was not a l ready to engage both these obstacles 
in a h ead on clash as he suspected t hat Hafiz and the B C 
still retained a considerable personal following in the 
army and t h e regional party organisatinn . Jadid thus 
resorted to the tactic of seeming to 'play the game fai r ' 
or in accordance with the Rule s . An important office 
which had remained unfilled following the Extraordinary 
l 
Interview, Bitar, l7 ovember 1967, Beirut. He 
believed, that if the civ ilian party fact ions (i.e. 
Razz a z, Aflaq and himself) were to unite behind Hafiz 
Jadid's power could be reduced . Bitar wa s under no 
allusions as to the dange r of Jadid taking over the 
party in Syria . Although he would have welcomed a 
complete return of the military t o its barracks, Bitar 
felt that Hafiz wa s not as great a dange r to the party 
as Jadid who, as far as Bitar wa s concerne d, personified 
sectarianism and regionali m. Bitar wante d to see the 
BNC fo stering support fo r Hafiz again t Jadid in the hope 
of acquiring an effective military power bas e through 
which to implemen i s policy directives in the SRC . 
' But, he said rath r dolefully to the writer, "Razzaz", 
the Secretary-Gen ral, would not come our way, as he 
disliked fostering the upport of one mil itary faction 
against another'. 'Razzaz,' aid Bitar 'adopted the 
childish attitude of trying to t engthen the B C by 
returning to th parti an bases . However, he concluded, 
'this was i mpo ssible in view of the fact t hat the 
military offi (Hafiz and Jad'd faction, probably 
more the latt r) 'had al ady n ured t hat they had 
control over he ba e of the party' . 
2 
B C , Communiq u o.l. II January 1966. 
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Syrian Regional ongre wa hat of th ommand r-in-Ch" f . 
This office had tak n on add d "mportance in view of th 
fact that it was to be merged in the M"n"stry of Defenc . 
Jadid naturally wanted to fill the office w"th a man of 
h is own ch00sing as his hand would be trengthened within 
army h e adquarters and the government . Hafiz and the 
B C similarly saw the key importan e of the off ice . 
Jad id played his cards autiously but alculatedly . He 
we n t t h rough the motions of participating in the joint 
Command s which met a f ter the Congress to c onsid er 
a cc ep table n ominees for the off ice . Meanwhi l e, h is 
att e ntion had focussed on Major-General Hamad Obaid who 
h a d prev iously been the commander of the ational Guard. l 
Obaid had tended to support Hafiz in the military power 
struggle against Jadid. 2 Jadid's move would seem to 
h a v e played into the hands of Hafiz, but this in fact 
was not the case. Hafiz suspected Obaid of having his 
own personal ambitions within the army, government and 
party and at the sessions of the joint Commands on 
11 September 1965, he flatly rejected Obaid's 
candidature in preference to more acceptable candidates. 3 
But the result of Hafiz's rather hasty action, was to 
embitter Obaid and drive him into the waiting, if not 
expectant arms, of Jadid;4 the repercussions of this 
master strategy were to be cumulative . As a senior army 
o f ficer, Obaid had collected a large personal follQwing 
within the army and regional party organisation . Hafiz's 
summary rejection of Obaid's candidature, embittered 
them towards Hafiz (who had indirectly squashed their 
own personal ambitions through Obaid) and like Obaid, they 
1 
Ra z zaz, op . cit., p . 148. 
2 
Ibid., Interview, Man ur Atrash 20 De ember 1967, 
Beirut . In August 1965 Atrash was chairman of the 
enlarged RC and a member of the ational Command . Bitar 
also confirmed that Obaid had previously supported Hafiz 
be f ore being enticed away by the prospect of becoming 
Commander-in-Chief and Mini ter of Defence. 
3 
Razzaz, at-Tajribat, p.150. 
4 
Ibid . Interviews, B" t ar, 17 ovember, Atra h, 20 December 
1967, Beirut . All agr ed that Jadid had out marted Hafiz 
at this junc ure. Major Gene al Hamad Obaid, however, 
insisted to the wri e r that in ac epting the twin offices 
he was not prepared to b manipulated by ither Hafiz or 
Jadid , int rview, 2 De ember 1967, Be" u . 
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went over to Jadid. l Jadid' a tion "n putting forward 
a pro-Haf"z officer for the exalted off "ce of 
Commander-in-Chief, was held by his supporters to have 
been a sign of friendship, designed to le ssen the 
tension wi t h Hafiz in the best interests of the party.2 
The dividend from this strategy soon made itself 
apparent within the Regional Command, as prominent 
officers such as Captain Salim Hatum and Colonel 
Mustafa Tlas and a civilian Jamal Shayya went over to 
Jadid out of sympathy of Obaid. 3 With Obaid' s followers 
or sympathisers securely on his (Jadid's) side, Hafiz's 
support on the SRC dwindled and Jadid easily secured 
appointments acceptable to himself. 4 
Following the sessions of the joint Commands in the 
second week of September 1965, Jadid's control of the 
SRC was virtually complete. 5 Thus with possibly as 
many as fifteen out of sixteen supporters in the SRC 
and certainly two on th.e ational Command (see Table 62), 
he had a majority of reliable supporters wherewith to 
control the appointments on the SBPC, the executive 
council of the expanded NRC along with the rank and 
file membe rship and the SBC, in particular the office 
of the Prime Minister . Amin Hafiz had the 'crown of 
state' (i.e. President of State), but he lacked an 
efficient and direct control over the avenues of power 
wi thin the state. Outwardly, Jadid had made all his 
gains through constitutional channels . He succeede d 
in making appointments suitable to himself through a 
fair majority vote within the joint Commands. In the 
face of this, there wa s very l ittle that the ational 
Command could do but watch helplessly as Jadid, through 
skilful operation of the office of deputy secretary of 
the SRC, imperceptibly weakened and removed from power, 
as was the prerogative of the Regional Command (see 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Razzaz, at-Tajribat, p . 156-57. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid., pp.156-57 . Int rview, Atrash, 20 December 1967. 
Beirut. 
5 
Razzaz, at-Tajribat, pp.156 -57. 
TABLE 62 
Pres i deno y Couno! 18 (SOPe) 
Chai rman 
Deput y 
Natio nal nevolu tion~ 
Council: ( NRCr--
Chaiman 
Deputy 
~I (sac) 
Prime Minister 
Army Headquartore I 
Commander-in-Chiof 
Chie f o f Staff 
Deput y Chiof of Staff 
Ro g ional Command I (SRC) 
Seoretary 
Deputy Seoretar y 
National Command : (DNe) 
Seoretary-General 
Deputy Seoretary-General 
~: 
"lIaf12, Amin 
Ato.si, Nuruddln 0.1 -
Shayyn, Jami1 
II: Jo8sim, Faiz a1-
Huro.lwod, Hassan 
A trash, Mansur 
Anabar!, Hazhar 
Zu' ayyen, Yuaif 
·Obaid, MaJ. -Oon. llwnad 
'PShnaiw.;1, Maj. -Oon. Muhammad 
*Sha I ir, Col. 
-Hal' iz I Amin 
II:J adld, Salah 
Atosi, Nuruddln 9.1-
Zu I ayyon, yustf' 
Shayyo, Jam!1 
*Jwldi I Abd aI-Karim 
Obald, Hamad 
·Rustom, Mustafa 
~ las, Mus tafa 
~aw11, Muhammad Rabah 
"lIa tum, Salim 
Ashawi, Muhammad id 
lIiza, BUsam 
Habbo.sh, Harwan 
-Jass ; m, Falz al-
Zub1, Muhammad 
Razzaz, MuniC 
AisD.mi, Shib1i 
A!'laq, Miohel 
-Bakr, Ahmed Has s an 
Takriti, Saddam 
Shinto!' , Karim 
Khalil , Ali a1-
HaJdalani, Jubran 
GhaJUlam, Ali 
*Hafiz, Amin 
Assad, Hafiz 
Hakhus, Ibrahim 
Atrash, Mansur 
a1 -
Factional Alignmont: 
'in.U'z 
Lul(owarm Hafiz 
Obaid-Jadid 
Jadid 
ltaf'lz 
Hn tional Oommand, l.uke 
J7J 
National Command, lukowarm Hafiz 
Jadid 
Jadid 
Lukewanll Hartz 
No. tional Oonmo.lld I lukowann Ho.fiz 
Hafiz 
Jadid 
Jadid 
Obaid-Jadid 
Jadid 
Jadid 
Jadld 
Jadid 
Jadid 
Obaid-lIafb (after Soptombor 1965. Jadid) 
Jadid 
Jadid 
Jadid 
Jadid 
Jadid 
Natio nal Command 
Na tional Command I lukewann Hafiz 
National Command I lukewarm Hafiz 
National COlmland 
National Command 
National Command 
National Command 
National Command 
National Command I lukewann Hariz 
National Command I Hafiz 
Jadid 
Jadid 
National Command I lukewarm Hafiz 
Based o n ~ oommunique No.1, 11 January 1966 and the Report Tabled on Party Membership at the Eighth National 
Congress . Assossmont of faotional alignments basod on interviews with leading Ba'thists, in partioular Mansur 
Atrash, J ubran MaJdalani Salah ud-din Bitar, 8ashir Daouk and Dr Abdullah Abd'Da'im and others. Also Arab press 
roports were useful in the months of August-September 1965. 
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Rules 1963, Art. XL, (j) & (k)), m mbe rs from lower party 
commands if thei a tions w re not 'in th inter sts of 
t h t ' 1 e par y . 
During the month of October, decrees issuing 
expul sions of membe rs known to by sympath tic to the 
B C and Hafiz, increased . 2 Identified with the policies 
o f the SRC at this stage, was a growing emphasis on 
extreme socialist transformation of Syria . 3 More and mo e 
t h e B C was assoc' a ted with ' bourgeois rea tionary 
e l e ments ' which we re seeking to undermine the Balth ' s 
r e v o l utionary mission in fav our of v ague schemes o f 
Arab unity . Wh ile undermining the B C ideologically, 
a tactic which Jadid had employed in December 1964 with 
Hafiz then as his close ally, the SRC was also 
reasserting its right to be the suprem arbiter of the 
a ffairs of the Syrian regional organisation . 
Constitutionally it was entitled to make this assumption 
( see Rules 1963, Art . XL) but, of course, subject to 
t h e extra-jurisdictional authority as redefined by the 
Eigh t h ational Congress and the Extraordinary Syrian 
Regional Congress . The SRC, by October 1965 , was firmly 
in control of the effective centres of power in Syria. 
Haf iz , it is true, still possessed military allies, but 
h e h ad no direct constitutional access to them in order 
to manipulate the powe r ful executive commands such as he 
had succeeded in doing before August 1965 . 
On 9 October, the SRC mad e the first of a series of 
d irect cha l l enges to the B C and Hafiz who, by then, was 
f irmly, if not off icially, identifie d with t he policies of 
4 t he B C . It amended the provisions of the Eighth 
ational Congress (cf . , omination for Executive 
Office) and the Extraordinary Regional Congress 
( c f. , Separation of Authority , Resolution 0 . 8) 
1 
Interv iew Bitar 17 
Nov e mber 1965, o . 1, 
charge sheets . 
2 
al-Munadil, o . 1. 
3 
ovember, 1967 , Beirut . al-Munadil, 
for Ii ts of dism'ssals and the 
ov mbe 1965 . 
Ibid . Also.§E,Q, 18 October 1965 . See 'Partisan Activity 
Plan , Based on the Programme Adopted by the B C of the 
Party' . 
4 
Interview Atrash, 20 De ember 1967, Beirut . 
with the assertion : 
The Regional Command makes decisions on 
transferring employees (of the state) and 
demands that the President of state authorise 
whatever decree promulgated by the Regional 
Command. 1 
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The SRC was arguing that as the highest executive 
f unctionary within the regional party organisation, and 
as the army and government executives were subject to 
party d irection, all state employees ( i . e . party, 
g overnment and army), were subject to its j urisdiction . 
Constitutionally this action was not illegal insofar as 
it went, but it omitted one very important thing - a plac 
f or t h e B C as the supreme party executive, to have a 
v oice in the regulation of senior executive offices . As 
we h a v e seen, the Eighth ational Congress and the 
Extraordinary Syrian Regional Congress had provided 
f or a system of joint Commands to regulate senior 
p e rsonne l appointments, although in the latter instance 
the Ext raor d inary Congress had interpolated that the 
SRC h a d the righ t of 'final ' decision on senior military 
app ointees . 2 By October, the SRC had found constant 
re f erence to the BNC, tedious and self-restricting to 
i t s po l icies of consolidating its hold over the whole 
basis of p ower in Syria . 
By detaching the SRC f rom any obligation to the 
B C on the control of military appointment, Jadid gained 
a sub stantial advantage over his opponents and 
p articularly, Amin Hafiz . Through his political creation 
Yu sif Zu ' ayyen, he regulated government policies and 
manipulated appointments of provincial governors, 
tra ns f erring or dismissing the more unreliable . J 
Jad i d, h owev er, began to overstep the mark of constitutional 
responsibility to the party when he more openly emploited 
sectarian feelings against the Sunni Muslim majority 
community . 4 Associated with this campaign was an 
intensification of extreme socialism which was calculated 
1 
2 
J 
4 
al-Munadil, o. 1, ovember 1965 . 
~, Communique o . 1, 11 January 1966 . 
Razzaz, at-Tajribat, p . 157· 
Int rv'ew, Atrash, 20 December 1967, Beirut . 
to win the approval of the more impove ished rural-
sectarian Muhafazats of southern, central, and north 
we stern Syria against the middle class mercantile and 
professional classes of the cities and towns. 
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Reaction within the army began to develop as it 
became plain that through Obaid, Jadid was manipulating 
army appointments suitable to his own sectarian and 
politico-ideological interests . l Military officers who 
had been obliged to surrender all contacts with the army 
upon election to the SRC were by ovember fully engaged 
in a scramble to ensure control of vital military 
units for their own 'men,.2 Hafiz, meanwhile, was also 
trying to consolidate hi s hold over key armoured and 
airforce units in and around the capital Damascus . By 
early December, all the formulae gove rning jur isdictional 
powers and authorities including the separation of 
military and civilian role functions were nullified, 
as mi litary officers and their civilian and military 
retainers tore the regional party organisation apart 
in their hunger for power and glory. 
The B C held sessions from 8 - 20 December 1965, in 
wh~ch it reviewed the fast deteriorating situation in the 
army which was threatening to spillover into the 
regional pa rty organisation and government . 3 The 
Command was in some doubt as to the proper strategy to 
adopt in the crisis. A section of the Command led by 
Hafiz, Aisami (Deputy Genera l-Secretary), Al i Ghanam 
and Aflaq, pressed for an immediate dissolution of the 
SRC to be followed by the assumption of extra-jurisdictional 
4 powers by the B C . Another section led by the 
Secretary-General, favoured a policy of mediation between 
the rivalling military and civilian factions . 5 It was 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Razzaz at-Tajribat, pp. 161-67 . 
Ibid . 
Daily Star, 22 December 1965 . 
Razzaz, at-Tajribat, pp . 161-62. 
17 ovember 1967, Beirut . He said 
dis solution of th SRC although he 
the B C . 
Interview, Bitar, 
he supported the 
was not a member of 
5 
Interview, Majdalani, 2 December 1967. Beirut . He 
supported Razzaz in this policy of mediation. Interview, 
Atrash, op.cit., he also told the writer that he favoured 
the l ine adopted by the S cretary Gene ral. 
plain to the Command that one of th major causes of 
unrest in the army resulted f rom the manipulation of 
appointments by Jadid through the Commander-in-Ch"ef 
Hamad Obaid. To allay further tensions, the Command 
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brought down a resolution forbidding the SRC from 
issuing further dismissal or transfer notices on army 
officers. l The SRC however, defied the B C on this 
matte r and the fast growing crisis reached its zenith 
on 19 December when Obaid, under orders from Jadid, 
issued dismissal notices on the commander and deputy 
commander of the Horns garrison (i . e. imur and Hugan) . 
Co lonel Mustafa Tlas carried out the order which called 
for the arrest of immur and Hugan. Then he wired to 
Jad id : 
The operation ended in success . The sector 
Horns garrison) is under the Party, we await 
your or ders . Glory to our mission. 2 
Th is telegram was intercepted by one of Hafiz's diligent 
aides, Thabe t Berro, and immediately delivered to 
Hafiz . J Razzaz was with Hafiz when the telegram arrived 
4 
and his illusions of 'mediation' suddenly faltered. 
He summoned a session of the B C on the 20 December; 
fearful on the consequences of further delay, the 
Command issued a decree dissolving the SRC 'in the 
wider interests of the party and the 8 March Revolution,.5 
An accompanying statement asserted that the Command had 
only taken such a step after careful con ideration of 
the party's experience in government and its relations 
6 
with the people. The Command then went on to propose 
1 
Interview, Majdalani, op.cit. 
2 
Ibid. Razzaz, at-Tajribat, p .167. 
3 
Razzaz, at-Tajribat, p . 1 6 7 . 
quoted the name of the office r 
telegram from Tlas to Jadid . 
4 
Razzaz, at-Tajribat, p. 1 6 7. 
an- ahar 25 December 1965 
who intercepted the 
5 
Interivew, Majdalani, 2 December 1967. Beirut . 
al-Ahrar, 1 January 1966. See' Answers to queries 
Regarding the Recent Reshuffling of the ational Command 
in the Syrian Region by the Secretar y-General 
Munif Razzaz. ' 
6 
Daily Star, 22 Decemb r 1965· 
al-Ba'th 12 January 1966. See 
National Command sessions , 8-21 
al-Ahrar 1 January 1966 . 
'Resolutions of the 
December 1965. 
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that until a new SRC wa s elect e d, exe ut i ve authority in 
Syria would take the form of a single party leadershi p 
comprised of the B C and a Supreme Council of ' all trends' 
The Council was to number fifteen members giving equal 
representat ion the Hafiz t r end (five), Jadid (five) and 
other major trends (five).2 The Council, it seems was 
to be placed directly under the executive jurisdiction of 
the B C until new SRC elections were held . 
1 
Constitutionally the dissolution of the SRC terminated 
the l ife of the SBPC and SBC which owed their mandates to 
it alone. On 21 December 1965, Zu ' ayyen tendered his 
resignation. J As for the SBPC , only two members, Hafiz 
and Ha s s a n Mura iwid, remained in office. 4 Having no 
independent right of existence the NRC al s o dissolved it s elf 
following the dissoluation of the Regional Command . 5 
The swift reaction of the B C to the SRC 's 
manipulation of army appointments momentar i ly caught 
Jadid off guard. He had never suspected tha t the Command 
would resort to such action. With his partisans in the 
army full y extended against Hafiz, hi s hand for the moment 
was checked by a combination of military power and a 
reasse r tion of the extra-juris dibtional powers and 
responsibilities of the B C . Jadid was not to be 
t hwarted in hi s ambition for very long. He contemptuous lY 
rejected any offers of participation in the Supreme 
Council ad interim and for almost two months, went into 
virtual oblivion. 
Before proceeding to discuss the penultimate climax 
of this chapter (i.e., 23 February 1966), let us turn 
our attention briefly to an analysis of the legality of 
the B C in forcing the dissolution of the SRC . Supporters 
of the SRC were later to argue that the B C had no 
jurisdiction to di s miss the SRC for disobeying the 
d irectiv e 'not to t r ansfer or di s miss military officers' 
1 
Ibid. 
2 
Interview, Majdalani, 2 December 19 67, Beirut . 
J 
Daily Star , 2 1 December 19 6 5· 
4 
Ibid . 
5 
MEM, 18/ 9, 19 Febr uary 1966. 
20 Decembe r 1967, Be irut. 
Inter view, At rash . 
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The Eighth ational ongre they a rted, had given 
the SRC through the Military Co mm " tee the power to 
c ontrol senior military and civilian appointments . Th" s, 
of course, was quite t ue, but the Eighth at"onal Congress 
a l s o prov ided for a system of joint Commands to regulate 
s e nior mi l itary appointments . Howev er, the question which 
was n o t sufficiently clarified was, how far this policy 
superv ision was to be taken? Did the B C have the right 
to participate in th nomination of all military offic rs? 
Th e SRC in early October 1965, had categorically reje ted 
t h e righ t of the B C to hav any jurisdiction over military 
appointments . This may b said to have been at the root 
o f t h e problem on 21 December 1965. 
But was the B C legally justified in dismissing the 
SRC on t h e question of not calling a halt to military 
t r ans f ers and dismissals? The action in isolation 
woul d have been an extreme misuse of its extra-jurisdi tional 
powers ; Th e B C only acted rath er belatedly after repeated 
v io la tion o f its executive powers by the SRC . SRC defiance 
was inte rpreted in B C headquarters as symptomatic of a 
mov e ment to destroy the party in f avour of domination by 
a sectarian military lique. l The accompanying statement 
with t he decree dissolving the SRC put a great deal of 
e mp h asis on the way the party, government and people were 
suf fering as a result of continued factional turmoil 
within the army and civ ilian party organisation. 2 Only 
by call ing a halt to this, that is by dismissing all 
off ice h olders and returning power into the hands of a 
Sup r eme Council of all trends, directed by the B C, 
c ou ld t h e Ba'th ever hope to overcome the organisational 
d i l e mma which h ad plagued it for so l ong through the 
proper s h aring of executive authority . In effect, the 
Command was saying something not unlike th Eighth 
Nati onal Congress : ' define the power of juri diction and 
e ach segment of the organi ation will function smoothly' . 
But as we h a v e seen, this was definite l y not t h e case 
eith er be f ore the Eighth ational Congress or after it . 
Mi l itary officers utilising support from airforce and 
armoure d div ision command rs soon reduced meaningf ul 
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executive offices to mere play things . The B C had 
been constantly aware of this and, according to several of 
its members who voted for the dissolution of the SRC , they 
hoped to force by stages, the military back to their 
barracks so that proper ly constituted executive commands 
(i.e . civilians) would have an opportunity to function 
according to party statutes . 
Th e answer to our question would thus seem to be, 
i f t h e B C were not fully justified in forcing the 
dissolution of t h e SRC on a issue around which there was 
some degree of ambiguity it was, nevertheless, acting 
within its legal jurisdiction in forcing the dissolution 
in the interest of preserving the Ba' t hfs revolution, not 
only in Syria but throughout the Arab wor ld . In this 
l atter respect the Rules of 1963 gave the BNC considerable 
p owers over the Regional Commands : 
Art~ : The National Command is the supreme 
command of the Party . .. The Party with all its 
bodies, organisations and Commands is subject to it 
Art . IL, 4(b): To accept or reject the Party's 
participation in governments or representative 
assemblies of any Region 
Art. IL 4(c): To dismiss or suspend any member 
of the Regional Command 
Art. IL, 5: To achieve national unity and an 
effective ideology, organisation, and struggle for 
the party; further to call for a Regional Congress 
to elect a new Regional Command if it finds it 
necessary to dismiss such a command for flouting 
Party principle, policies, or views which have 
received the approval of a ational Congress . 
If there were doubt surrounding the powers accorded 
by the Eighth National Congress to the B C regarding its 
jurisdiction over military appointments, transfers and 
dismissals, it cannot be denied that repeated factional 
unrest in the army and military interference in and 
domination of the executive corrunands of the party and 
gov ernment, were a gross violation of party Rules and the 
j urisdictional formulae implemented for party direction 
at all levels by the Eighth ational Congress. Under 
Article IL 5, the B C was fully justified in dismissing the 
SRC and the executive commands fulfilling policy mandates 
representative of this today. 
Yet if the B C were legally justified in dismissing 
the SRC for 'flouting party principles and policies', it 
too, was bound by the Rules to submit its action to a 
ational Congress fo r offi ial approval or rejection 
(Art . IL, 4(d)) or to immedoately convene a Regional 
Congress to reelect a new Regional ommand. 
J 0 
From 21 December 196 5 to 2J February 1966 : ew So lution 
Old Problems . 
The strategy of the supr eme party executive in the 
weeks following the di s missal of the Regional Command was 
ambiguous and indecisive. The reas on for this l ay in the 
serious d ivisions between its members . l The activists 
of the Comman d advocated a policy of 'direct challenge' 
to Jadid and the Mil itary Committee to take the form of a 
full-scale purge f rom the army, par ty and government. 
On top of this, they wanted the Command to take ove r the 
administration of Syria permanently. Aflaq favoured a 
combination of B C exe cutive au t hority fully supporte d by 
reliable mi l itary re tainers such as Amin Hafiz.
2 
Bitar, 
who was appo i nted to the Supreme COlUlcil, supported 
Aflaq's stand, but h e wa s le ss inclined to agree as to 
the wi Sodom of calling upon the army to defend and support 
BNC executiv e power . J 
Th e more politically cautious, moderate membe rs of 
the Command such as Razzaz, Maj dalani , Atrash and Khali1 4 
were le ss inclined to exacerbate the tense situWion by 
adopting a policy of ' direct c hallenge' as favoure d by 
1 
Inter v iews, 
1967, Beirut. 
Bitar, 17 ovember, Atrash, 20 December 
Razz a z, at-Tajribat, p .185 . 
2 
Interview, Majdalani, 2 December 1967 , Beirut . He said : 
'Aflaq wante d to call in military allies against the 
enemies of the B C (i.e. Jadid), but he apparently h ad not 
learned h is lesson f r om the interference of the a r my in 
1964. He had been f irst to call in the army (i . e . February 
196 4 ) and first to cal l fo r its removal'. 
J 
Interview, Bitar, 17 ovember 1967, Beirut. He said 
that he wanted the army to return to its barracks, but 
in t he extenuating ircumstances he believed that the 
only wa y the B C could reassert its ro le within the 
Syrian region was through a combination of civilian 
executive and mi l itary power . 
4 
Biographical otes. 
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either Aflaq or Bitar . l They believed in the necessity for 
a speedy return to constitutional normality . 2 As the 
f irst step towards this, they had tried to persuade Jadid 
and f our o f his supporters to participate in the fifteen 
me mber Supreme Council of all trends . J Jadid contemptuously 
r ej ected the offer, but this did not stop them from working 
against the adv ocates of 'direct challenge' in preparation 
f or t he Ninth National Congress in April 1966 . 4 
Th e adv ocates of ' direct challenge ' may be said to 
h a v e ranged on the spectrum from Amin Hafiz, who wanted 
to utilise the Command to re-establish his diminishing 
military and political domination of Syria, to Aflaq 
wh o favoured BNC dominance supported by military power, 
to Bitar who had limited used for mili t a ry allied, to 
Razzaz, Atrash, Majdalani and Khalil who wanted to 
remove all military interference from the party unless 
it were fully subject to party discipline and the 
ov erriding jurisdiction of the B C . There was little 
unanimity of purpose within the Command in the weeks 
follo wing its direct assumption of power on the proper 
course of act:iD n to adopt . The advocates of 'direct 
challenge ' were of many and varied political and 
ideo l ogical complexions, but they were agreed on one 
thing, however negative it might be: that with Jadid 
and the regionalists having 'their backs to the wall' 
the time was opportune for intensifying a campaign 
against their bases of power to liquidate them from the 
Syrian r e gIon. 5 
1 
Interview, Atrash, 20 December 19 67, Beirut . He said 
he mistrusted Hafiz at this time (December 196 5), 
believing that he was 'trying to use the B C for his own 
ends' . He said, that he, like Aflaq and Bitar ' believed 
in the necessity for civilian co-operation to offset undue 
army interference in the party, but', he asserted, 'Aflaq 
and Bitar sought to intrigue in the army to find their 
own men '. Atrash clearly did not approve of this as he 
believed that the army would manipUlate their civilian 
retainers at will. 
2 
J 
4 
5 
Ibid . , Interview, Maj da1ani , 2 December 1967, Beirut . 
Ibid . 
Ibid. 
Interview, Bitar, 17 Novembe r 1967, Beirut . 
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Thus by stages, the Command's 'act ivists ' succee ded 
in fo rcing through a number of senior military and 
civilian appointments with the express purpose of employing 
them against Jadid . l Bitar, for example, was appointed 
Prime Minister, his fifth term of office since the party 
came to power in March 1963. 2 Hafiz was confirmed in the 
role of President of state and President of the SBPC, th 
membe rs of which were all personally selecte d fo r their 
loyalty to the BNC . 3 Mansur Atrash was reappointed 
Chairman of the NRC who se members we re increased from 
ninety-five to one hundre d and thirty-four, though 
members of the ex-SRC and the Military Committee were 
explicitly denied membe rship of it.4 Perhaps the most 
controversial appointment of all was that of Major-
General Muhammad Umran as Commander-in-Chief and Minister 
of Defence under Bitar . 5 Umran, in December 1964 had 
1 
Interview, Atrash, 20 December 1967 , Beirut. He said 
that the BNC forced a ll the members of the SRC out of 
the NRC . 
2 
Bitar formed his government on 1 January 1966, though 
he was actually commissioned short l y after the resignation 
of the ZU 'ayyen government on 21 Decembe r 1965. The Arab 
press was naturally speculative about the ten days delay 
in fo r ming the new government. al-Ahram, for example, 
suspected that the delay resul te d from difficul ties in 
finding suitable ministers to serve under him. In a series 
of radio and television interviews, Bitar made it clear that 
he had only agreed to form a government after r eceiving ' 
guarantees from the army that it would detach itself from 
active involvement in politics. See MEM 18/2, 8 January 1966 . 
J 
Daily Star, 28 December 1965. 
4 
Interview, Atrash, 20 December 1967, Beirut . 
5 
Interview, Majdalani, 2 December 1967, Beirut . He said 
that he was personally against the appointment, as it would 
create fre sh troubles in the army as Umran would try 
weaken Jadid's power base in retaliation for his own 
dismissal in December 1964. Of the strategy behind the 
appointment, he believed that Bitar might have been wanting 
to split the Alawite officers loyal to J adid, Umran having 
been a leading Alawite officer and one of the founders of 
the Alawite officer committee. Razzaz, at-Tajribat, p .180, 
also felt that Umran ' s appointment was a mistake, howeve r 
' There was no choice, for there were only two reliable 
(i.e. to B C) senior Ba ' this officers, Umran and Major-
General Fahd Sha ' r . Fahd was inexperienced in handling 
partisan affairs, while Umran, although he had many bad 
points, was the only one who stood with the BNC against 
the Military Committee and was known as a unionist (i.e. 
nationalist). Interview, Bitar, 17 No v ember, 1967 , Beirut . 
He admitted quite frankly that Umran was a difficult man to 
handle and that there was very li tt le real-co-operation 
between them in the gove r nment. He noted that Umran was 
antagonising Hafiz whom he saw as the Command's reliable 
mil itary retainer . Umran was out for himself, asserted 
Bitar, with a good deal of bitterness . 
J8J 
been dismissed from the Military Committee, the SBPC and 
the offi ce of Deputy Chief of Staff by a combination of 
Hafiz-Jadid opposition. 
of power had been turned. 
ow in January 1966, the tables 
For being at least nominally 
a 'nationalist' and ipso facto a supporter of the B C , 
Umran wa s rewarded with the twin offices which Jadid had 
used so ruthlessly against his opponents from September 
to December 1965. His appointment in fact seemed to 
indicate that the advocates of 'direct challenge' had won 
the power struggle within the Command. 
Cons tructive Solutions: 
But while the advo cates of 'direct chal lenge' were 
gradually stripping away the power bases of their enemies, 
the Secretary-General Munif Razzazjwas assessing ways for 
the reorganisation of the party government and army in 
Syria . His prime obj ective lay in strengthening ties 
between the B C and the partisan bases. l Unlike Aflaq 
and Bitar, he did not believe that a small 
unrepresentative executive elite could administer the 
affairs of the party and government indefinitely. It 
was very plain to him that the B C had failed in its 
ro le of centralised co-ordinating functionary because 
of its remoteness and exclusiveness from the partisan 
bases of the regional party organisations. On the other 
hand, the military officers of the Syrian Regional Command 
had maintained firmer contacts with the partisan bases and 
thus were in a much stronger position to regulate the 
voting patterns of Regional Congresses . 
Now that the BNC was in the ascendant over the SRC 
in Syria , Razzaz saw the need and the opportunity for a 
restatement of the rol and place of the army in the party 
and government. It was plain to him that the 'ideological 
army' had misapplied the mandate accorded by the Eighth 
National Congress. For him there had to be a basic 
dist inction between the r oles of the 'ideological army' 
2 
and t he 'political army' . The 'ideological army', for 
example, should be committed to the military defence and 
liberation of the Arab homeland,while the 'political army' 
had to be bound by the Rule governing party administration 
1 
Razzaz, at-Tajribat, p.183 . 
2 
Ibid., p.184. 
whi ch were laid down in partisan ongress in wh'ch 
military and civilian members participated. l 
J 4 
Razzaz also saw the immediate need for a greater 
degree of political co-operation between the Ba'th and 
other progressive Arab movements. 2 The elitist attitude 
of the Ba'th had not earned it the approbation of the 
Arab people and it was widely regarded as an intellectual 
class movement. It was largely as a result of this 
sentiment that the Command amended the statutes of the 
NRC on 14 February 1966, providing for the admittance of 
members from progressive political parties, such as 
the 'nationalist' SUM. Correspondingly, the military 
contingent was re duced f rom a maximum of 20% under the 
provisions of the Eighth ational Congress to three out 
of one hundred and thirty-four, or just a little over 2%.3 
While proposing to restore to party life the 
principle of centralised democracy or collective leadership, 
the Secretary-General believed that the party should 
immediately create a new image for itself within Syria 
as a movement which upheld the principles of its 
Constitution (i.e. 1947) as the exponent of Unity, 
Free dom and Socialism (see, Fundamental Principles). 
He sought to remove all the organs of terror from the 
government and proposed amnestying all political 
prisoners. 4 Intelligence services were to be detached 
from military monopolisation and brought more directly 
under the control of the party through the Ministry of 
the Interior. 5 
Razzaz' s proposed reforms were not in themselves 
innovatory. The Fourth National Congress in September 
1960, had reacted violently against the monopolisation of 
executive office by 'the three doctors' (Aflaq, Bitar 
and Hurani) and later congresses had repeatedly stressed 
the need to implement collective leadership in practice 
as well as in theory. However by January 1966, the Ba'th 
1 
Ibid . 
2 
Ib' d. 
3 
Daily Star, 15 Febru .ry 1966. 
4 
Razzaz, at-Tajribat, pp.183-84. 
5 
Ibid., p.183. 
was still fac d with the old probl m of monopoli ation 
of power by executive civ"lian or mil"tary elites . The 
people had no activ voice in th party and were only 
re f erred to tenderly (~.e . , toiling or ignorant masses) 
when it ~uited the policies of the holders of executive 
office. The party, as Razzaz saw it, had continually 
f al l en a vict i m to rivalling cliques who owed their 
mandates not to the people, but to powerful military or 
civilian retainers . 
Looking immediately into the future, Razzaz saw the 
only hope f or the party to fulfil its Constitutional 
aspirations was by extricating itself from unrepresentative 
military and civilian fact ions and returning to the 
source for which the party was initially formed : the 
people. 
Organisational Disintegration : 23 February 1966 
If, traditionally in the ancient world 'all roads 
led to Rome', so the lack of an efficient system of 
organisational power sharing, inevitably contributed to 
the Ba ' th's bloody end on 23 February 1966. In the 
midst of hope and confidence that a new dawn of party 
government was appearing, the B C was brutally cast aside 
by t he supporters of the ex-SRC and many of its members 
and supporters in the party, government and army were 
summarily imprisoned. How can we explain from the 
organisational point of v iew the events which led to the 
final cataclysm on 23 February 1966? 
Basically, the reason lay in the indecisive strategy 
of the B C . Had it employed the reform measures 
advo cated by the Secretary-General, it may have succeeded 
in winning popular approval for it administration . 
However, like its predecessor which it had dissolved, the 
Command did not set an example of resolving organisational 
and administrative problems in the party, government and 
army according to a cepted party prin iples . The 
advocates of 'direct challenge' acted almost in identical 
fa shion to militarist on the di smi d SRC . Major-General 
Muhammad Umran, for ampl , disregarded the Command's 
injunction pertain"ng to a essation of mil " tary transfers 
and dismi sals 'in the interest of organ~sational unity 
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and harmony', and p 0 ed d to liquidate his rivals on 
the Military Committ e, in key armour d and airfor e 
div isions and in army headquarters . 1 
Umran was by nature a very ambitious officer. ot 
only d i d he antagonis Jadid's off icer partisans, but he 
also created a good deal of d issention with Hafiz and 
his officer retainers . 2 The result was that in the army, 
previously antithetical groups began to work togeth r 
against Umran and by implication the B C . 3 Despite warnings 
of caution fo r the more moderate members of the Command, 
Umran proceeded to liquidate all hi s old rivals, 
conveying the impression that h e was bent upon the 
creation of his own politico-military 'empire' . On 
21 February, he forced through a resolution calling for 
the transfer of thr e powerful and influential officer 
supporters of Jadid - Captain Salim Ha tuum , Colonel 
Izzat Jadid (a relativ e of Salah Jadid) and Major-General 
Ahmed Sweidani, a very close friend of Salah Jadid . In 
addition to these, he brought down transfer notices for two 
officers known to be sympathetic to Amin Hafiz . 4 
The effect of this resolution had disastrous 
consequences fo r the B C. Major-General Hafiz Assad 
(commander of the Mazza Airforce Base, aBC member and 
supporter of the ex-SRC, condemned the resolution stating 
that he stood wholeheartedly with the transferred officers . 5 
Umran disregarded the intense reaction within the army 
and sent the resolution to the Chief of Staff fo r his 
signature in the name of the B C . 
The BNC found itself being d ragge d into the maelstrom 
of another military power struggle . Had its members been 
united behind the SecretarY-General, the bloody climax of 
the 23 February might have been avoided . As it wa s, the 
Command l acked agreement on a constructive programme of 
party, government, army reformation . It repeatedly 
mi sapplied its extra-juri dictional powers by cancelling 
1 
Ibid . , p.180 fi' . 
2 
Ibid . , pp . 191-92. 
3 
Ibid . 
4 
Ibid . , p . 192. 
5 
Ibid . 
the memb e hip of uppo of th ex- R and to many it 
wa s se e n to b a °ng l Oke 0 her despo i ol Oga hi al 
regimes whi h had plagued ia on e °ndepend n e in 1946 . 
Yet th B C did no owe i poli mandat to the Sy ian 
party organi a ion but o a atoonal ong es epres ntin~ 
of h e pa t . In theory, 
ionali t (A ab) in 
all the regional 0 gan a ion 
i f the Ba'th had b en t ul na 
character, thi would not hav matt ed, but th SRC had 
fo s t ed th b l i f in d v 10pOng Sy ian national ism and 
sociali s m (i.e. regional i m) before anything else. Thus 
to Syrian Ba'thists and non-Ba'thi ts alike, it may h a ve 
seemed that their own native national ism was being 
compromi ed b y an e l ite, ( i . " B C) more than h alf 
( sev en out of t h irte n) of whi h wer non-Syrian, and 
who were res pon ible no to he Syrian regional 0 ganisati on 
but to the ational Congre 
vo ice among ma ny anothers . 
in which Sy ia was only one 
vi : .......::C ..;o::...:::;l.:;l;..::e:....:::....::.t.:;i:..;v-=e=--=L;..::e:...:a:::.d::;.;;:e..:r:..;s::.;h:..:.::i:..a;p~_:=---=.R.;..;;.e - s t ate d an d Red e fine d 
Pr lude to the Se ptember 196 6 : 
T h e P r eparatory 
The coup of 23 Feb uary 1966 had the effe t of 
split ting the Ba ' th into ~wo ma ·or war ing camp in 
addition to t he minor entr 
developed over t h ear . 
managed to escap Jadid' 
of hostility which had 
Th rump of the B C whi h 
ivilian and military allies, 
regrouped in B irut and t up new h e adquarters . On 
24 February, a provi ional SRC wa appointed with 
practically t h am member hip a th di so lved SRC . 
Salah Jadid r sum d the off i e of deputy ecretary; 
Major-General Hafiz A ad becam Commander-in-Chief and 
Minister of De f ence in Zu'a n' ond abinet 
(SBC, 0. 23 ); uruddin al-Ata i wa appointed Pre id nt of 
Stat and s r tary of the Regional Command, and 
Major-General Ahm d Sw idani a longtime a ociate of 
Jadid on t he Military ommittee, wa appointed 
Ch ie f of Staff. 1 
1 
MEM, 18/ 19, 26 F b uary 1966. 
J 8 
The un on titutional a tion of the regionalists 
created tremendous fissu es within r gional organisations . 
Damascus claim d to be th effective centr of legitimate 
party administration whil t h is was hotly contested by th 
new party headquar rs in B irut . To justify their action 
in the eyes of the wider party organisation, the 
provisional SRC immediat ly set in motion a campaign to 
return the party to 'constitutional normality' with a 
newly elected BNC whi h would make amends fo r the mistakes 
of the Eighth BNC . It suited Jadid's strategy of 
maintaining t h e fic tion of restoring the party to normality 
as he and h is allies required an effective organisation 
t h r ough which to attain their political and sectarian 
interests . 
In April 1966~the regionalists succeeded in gaining 
sufficient guarantees of suppor t f rom va rious regi onal 
party members to con titute a Preparatory Commi ttee t o 
1 l ay the basis fo r t he inth ational Congress . Betwee n 
April and September, he Preparatory Committee tried to 
persuade Ba'th ist r egiona l organisations to attend the 
Ninth National Congress which was to institute a new 
fo r mu la fo r future organisational harmony and co-operation . 
Defining t h e basis of the new fo r mu la, the Committee 
stated : 
. . . the party is the vanguard which organises the 
masses and learns from their needs and aspirations 
and enacts policies in the fo rm of directives 
which commit t he party to t hem .... The vanguard 
of the organised mas es leads and directs t he 
general policies and affair of t he government . 
Party representatives in legislative and executiv e 
offices are committed to abide by Party dec isions . 2 
Outwa r dly t hi s organisational policy statement 
resembled that of t h e Sixth ational Congress . It wa s, 
howeve r , overlayed with more extremist sociali t thinking . 
The party was not simply to lead t he mass s, indeed it was 
to be 'of the ma ses' . Col le ctive leade ship in party 
government had repeat dly fai l e d 0 function, ass rte d 
the Preparatory Committee, because of an imba lance of 
1 
The a tional Command : Re olution of the inth ational 
Congress h e ld in h s ond half of September 1966 . See 
'The Repor of h e Prepara or Committe ' . 
2 
al-Munadil, 0 . 8 . , September 1966 . Se ' Reply from t he 
Preparatory Commi t of he in h ational Cong e s 0 
the Iraqi Regional Command ' .. . 
" 
social 1 la ss origin . Bourg 0 
J 9 
1 men s, it was 
maintaine d, had monopolised exe utiv power and had trampled 
upon the basi rights of pro l ta ian membe rs of th party 
and th ma ss s und r their ju isd i tion in Syria . 2 Thus 
the solution to the 0 ganisational dil mma which had 
faced the Ba'th f om it e a lie t beginnings, could be 
found in a reid ntification of the whole party with a 
p r oletarian b Oa s and a s i ent"fic s o ialist theory with 
clearly defined objectives . J 
t was with this reco mmenda tion fo r or ganisa tional 
re f orm before it that t he inth ational Congres s 
assembled in Damas us from 25-29 September 1966 . Before 
conside ring the outcome of this Congress towards 
organisat ional re fo r m, le t u first l y consider what was 
transpiring with in the Syrian regional party organisation 
f o l lowing the coup of 2J February 1966. 
Extraordinary Regional Congress, 10 - 27 March 1966 
The Congress confirmed t h e membe rship of the 
Prov isional SRC formed on 24 February 1966 and asserted 
tha t the Ba'th wa s a pa t believing in Arab unity, but 
h ith erto all its efforts towards t h is nd had been 
stultified b y t he 'rightist, ind i v idualistic, depo sti 
mentalitie s whi h had led to the crisi of 23 February 
1966 . ,4 The Ba'th, it held, could only fulfil its 
constitutional objec tiv es through social transfo rmation . 
The true ' revolut ionary elite', it wa s asserted, had 
f ailed to function ffe ctively unde r the old party 
leadership because bour geoi elements within the 
organi s a tion had bought and manipulated the elective 
p r oces s . 5 The true e l ite had to be detached f rom t he 
b ou r geois stru ture to lead and learn f r om the toiling 
6 
masse s u n der its ha rge . Th is, held the Congress, wa s 
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Ibid . 
2 
Ibid . Hafiz wa 
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la rge l y attained by th mov ment of the 23 February ' , but 
the e ne mie o f the people were scheming to undo the 
ben efi t s o f the ' 23 Feb uary revolution '. o l idarity of 
the 'pro l etariat, pea ants and professional, howev er, is 
the r o ck upon which the intrigues of imperialism and 
r evisionism wi ll be crushed, . l 
Und er the sociali t trapping of the Congress, the 
p r ovisional SRC was in fact being identified with the 
t rue i d eo l ogical and revolutionary vanguard of the 
~toil ing masses ' . Having expunged bourgeois elements 
f r om its midst, it could now proceed to fulfil its 
rev o l utionary mission '. The reader at this point will 
no doubt recal l similarities in previous Ba ' thist 
l eadersh ip concepts . For example, from 1947-59 
Mich e l Af l a q thought of himself as an 'ins pired leader' 
s e t apar t to l ead the ' ignorant masses ' to spiritual 
r egeneration in the form of Arab Unity, Freedom and 
Social ism . Th e Third and Fourth ational Congress 
re j ecte d t h is concept of leadership, condemning it for 
misusing executive authority and creating an organisationa l 
crisis within the party . Hereafter, they asserted, 
exe cutiv e authority had to be shared 'collectively' and 
t he senior executive was to be fully answerable to the 
ational Congress and through it to the partisan bases . 
The Eighth ational Congress, meanwhile, lamented that 
executiv e authority had not been administered according 
to party Rul es and collective leadership had thus failed 
to f unction accordingly. The solution it was said, lay 
in a r ede f inition of executive roles and spheres of 
influ e nce within the party, government and army . The new 
rule rs of the party were asserting that al l previous 
attempts at party organi ational r form had failed b cause 
the le a d ership lacked ba ic commitment and identification 
with the Arab ma ses . Therefore, by redefining the role 
of exe cutiv e authority making it id ntifiable with the 
masses , a greater degr e of organi ational harmony and 
co-operation at all level s of the party pyramid would be 
attained . 
Th e sum total of th re olu ion of the Extraordinary 
Syrian Regional Congre wa to confirm the provisional 
SRC in the role of upreme xe utive authority within the 
1 
Ibid . 
Syria.n region whi le at the same time a dding to its 
mandate the air of ' revolutionary devot e dness '. It 
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was what Salah Jadid had wanted as it permitted his 
clique t o consolidate the ir hold over the party under 
the guise of ' socia l transformation' of the organisation. 
The Interim Constitution of April 1964 was suspended and 
with it, the SBPC and the NR C in which were the first 
stirrings of Syrian parliamentary democracy . For the new 
rulers of the r egional par ty organisation, i f the Ba ' th 
we re to become the true v anguard of the toiling masses, 
government and party executive funct ions had to be 
more firmly integrated . The executive and legislative 
1 powers of the SBP C and NRC t hus reverted to t he SRC . 
Instead, the SRC planned to create myriads of popular 
organi sations to be the links between the party and the 
toiling masse s in the fo r mulation of po l icy de cisions . 
How policy consensus was to be achieved between the 
toiling mass e s and the SRC was left rather to slogan 
peddling, fo r example: 'The so l i darity of the organisation 
is a pre-requisite f or reconstruction of society,2 [ or ] 
.. . Mobilisa.tion of the people for revolution against the 
backward and contradictory present, insti ll s zeal for 
construction3 ... [ and ] ... Before attempting any action we 
have to secur e ... a sufficient base and a scientific 
appraisal of our resources then attack,4 . The influence 
here would seem to suggest that the new rulers of the 
Syrian Ba'th we re proposing a period in wh ich the masses 
would be led before they were fully capable of responding 
to the element s of 'democratic socialism ' being 
instituted by the party refo rmers . Once more t he reade r 
should notice simi larities with previous concepts of 
t ransitional elite leadership.5 
1 
al-Munadil, No . 6, July 1966. 
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Regi~nal Command Control over Int lligence and Security 
S e r v lce s: Further Examples of its Strengthened Executive 
Power Base 
In a ddition to confirming the SRC in the role of 
'supreme power in the region on all matters, the 
Extraor d inary Syrian Regional Congress gave it effective 
control over the intelligence and security services . l These 
it was held, ha d been used as weapons of terror by 
indiv i dua l s (i. e . , Hafiz, Umran) against their opponents . 
Th ey were, howe v er, not ideologically motivated and 
existe d onl y to f oster the individual power crav ing of 
t h eir executiv e patrons . But, in future, asserted the 
Congress, t h e security and intelligence services were 
to be ideologised and brought directly int o the service 
of t he party . Thus the amendments introduced called for 
d i v iding them into three independent but complementary 
sph eres ; Political Investigations under the Ministry of 
the Interior ; Military Security and Intelligence under 
army h eadquarters ; and General Security and Intelligence 
unde r t he SRC . 2 The effect of this as calculated, was 
to s t r e ngth en the executive power base of the Regional 
Command vis-a-v is the lower partisan commands and the 
' t o i l ing masses' . As the gov ernment had been more firm l y 
integ rate d with the party (i . e. SRC) and was to be made 
d irectly responsible to it for the implementation of policy, 
t h roug h t h e Ministry of the Interior, the SRC had power to 
manipul ate the Political Investigations bureau . Finally, 
as t h e SRC retained jurisdiction over the regulation of 
military appointments, it was in the adv antageous position 
o f b eing able to control and direct the appointment of 
off icers to the Mi l itary Security and Intelligence Bureau . 
The resolutions promulgated by the Extraordinary 
Syrian Regional Congress in March 1966, had no statutory 
power in theory until they were submitted in the form of 
recommendations to the ational Congress fo r official 
appro v al . The Syrian regionalists resurrected the inth 
National Congress in September 1966 out of deference to 
party orthodoxy, but in real fact to give credence to the 
r e so l utions instituted by the Extraordinary and Third 
1 
Ibid . See 'Party and its Relations with the Security 
Aut h orities' . 
2 
Ibid . 
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Ordinary Syrian Regional Congress s, the latter bing held 
f rom the 20-30 September 196 6 . Let us now turn out 
attention to the inth ational Congress, comparing it 
with previous Congresses, its executive responsibilities 
wi t h in the party organisation and in particular, to the 
regional party organisation in Syria . 
Ominous E v ents on the Eve of the Congress : 
Hatum's Attempted Coup D'Etat, 
The specif ic aims of the provisional SRC in 
assembl ing t h e inth ational Congress in Damascus from 
25-29 September 1966 were to restore the party to 
constitutional normality and, by implication its own 
legitimacy, after the events of 23 February 1966 . Secondly, 
to re-examine and redefine the respective jurisdictional 
powers and responsibilities of the party, army and 
government and their relationships to each other . 
But in the midst of the final preparations for the 
Congress, there occurred an attempted coup d'e tat on 
8 Septemb er, directed by Captain Salim Hatum and a 
group of disgruntled officers and supporters of the 
Eigh t h National Command in Beirut. l The coup itself was 
ruthles sly crushed and some of the main instigators were 
2 imprisoned and later executed . Hatum managed to escape 
across the frontie r into Jordon where he proceeded to 
regroup his supporters. 3 Hatum like Major-Genera l 
Hamad Obaid had supported Jadid in overthrowing the B C 
on 23 February . Later Jadid who wa s suspicious of their 
ambitions, re legated them and their supporters to 
insensitiv e army and civil appointments . Hafiz Assad 
a co-re l igionist of Jadid was appointed to the offices of 
Commander-in-Chief and Minister of Defence, a move which 
deeply embittered Obaid who wanted to retain the offices 
in reward for the support which he had given to Jadid 
1 
al-Munadil, No . 9, September 1966 . 
2 
Reso lutions of the inth ational Con ress, September 1966 
(Information Bureau . See 'Report about Hatwn ' s plot 
submitted to the inth ational Congres ' . (In Arabic) . 
3 
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against Hafiz and the B C . l Jadid, cast Obaid aside as 
he no longer wa s of use to h is strategy . Later Obaid was 
imprisoned and dismissed f rom the party and army on 3 June , 
along with seve ral other senior officers who supported h is 
candidature for t he highest armyappointment . 2 On Obaid's 
dismissal sheet t he re were name s of other army officers 
who had supporte d Jadid in the initial attacks against 
the Presidential P a la ce and ational Command headquarters 
3 in Abu Rummaneh . 
From the continual dismissal and transfer of le a ding 
army officers and the attempted coup of 8 September, it 
is clear that if the s logans of the new rulers had 
changed the shifting 'power hungry' military factiona l 
alliances and alignments had not. The Ninth National 
Congress which assembled twelve days later with incredible 
naivety, or perhaps it was native sagacity , attributed the 
happenings on the 8 September to the work of 'rightist 
deviationists' who we r e trying to sabotage the popular 
revolution of 23 February 1966. 4 The Report on the 
attempted coup submitted to the Congress held, among 
other things that 'it wa s fab ricated by Aflaq, Bitar, 
Razzaz, Hatum, Hakim ' and their clique. 5 If, in theory , 
such an ideological ' smoke-screen ' proffered a so l ution 
to the factional problem, in fact there was suff icient 
evidence to suggest that all s hift ing military and 
civilian facti ons were employing mu ch the same 
r uthle ss pursuit of executiv e power through warlordism, 
as they had done under the pre-23 February 196 6 rul ers 
of the Ba'th and before the Ba 'th era in March 1963. 
1 
Interview, Major-General Hamad Obaid, 2 Decembe r 1967, 
Beirut . Obaid ha s changed factional alliances and is 
now [ December 1967 J working with exi le s from the 
E ighth National Congr ess , such as Maj dal ani and Atrash. 
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As we are ~nterested ~n legal and onst~tut~onal 
quest~ons confront~ng the party at th~s time, let us 
pretend that at least some sincerity of word and de d 
existed to restore the party to organ~sat~onal unity and 
harmony. Let us p r oceed to examine the prov~s~ons of 
the inth ational Congress, comparing these where 
poss~ble with the prov~sions of previous at~onal Congresses, 
the focus be~ng on party organisation. 
The Role of the at~onal Command : 
The inth at~onal Congress confirmed the orthodox 
stand that the at~onal Command wa s the supreme party 
executiv e command (See Rules 1963, Art. IL) in the party . 
But this stated, the mandate actually accorded to the 
Ninth Nat~onal Command was but a shadow of that accorded 
to the E~ghth National Command . According to the 
Congress, which was heavily influenced by the Syrian 
regional party organ~sation, the B C was to assume the 
ro le of 'superv~sor-coordinator-overseer' of regional 
party affairs . l For example, ~t was to establish 
central~sed institut~ons for partisan tra~ning and 
idelolog~cal guidance, as well as for compiling accounts 
2 
of 'the h~storic revolutionary struggles of the party' , 
It was to be responsible for ensuring party d~scipline 
and for ~nstill~ng 'constructive self-crit~c~sm' among 
all members. 3 In add~t~on, ~t was to ensure that all 
reg~onal party organisat~ons conformed to a centrally 
coordinated strategy .4 It had powers to act as the 
party l~a~son between other progressive political 
movements ~n the interests of a common unified strategy . 5 
Perhaps its most important function was to prepare the 
way fo r the return of 'all sound partisan elements' to 
t he party and by ~mpl~cat~on, to d~sm~s s all those who 
did not conform to the new 'social structure' of the party. 
1 See 'The Resolutions of the inth ational Congress. 
Party Report, Regard~ng Party Organisation' 
2 
Ib~d . , sp . Resolut~on, 0 . 5· 
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In this respect, th inth ational Congress's mandate 
was similar to that which the Sixth ational Congress had 
given to The Sixth ational Command . 
Wit h the election of the inth B C the break with 
t he Eighth ational Command, which had exi sted since 
2 3 February, was now made official and complete . Membership 
of the Command was increased from thi rteen to seventeen, 
symboli sing that the supreme party executive was being 
opened to a wider representation of regional party 
. t . 1 organl sa lons . Dr uruddin al-Atasi was elected 
Secretary-General in addition to his office as President 
of State and secretary of the Regi onal Command . The 
other members of the Command repre s e n ted Syria (five), 
Lebanon, (four), Jordon (two), Iraq ( t wo), orth Africa 
( t wo) and the Arab Peninsula (one). 2 But wi th six 
members ( i .e. including Atasi) out of seventeen and B C 
headquarters .in Damascus, the Syrians were in a powerful 
numerical position to dominate the voting patterns of 
the B C. As the B C had been resurrected by the SRC it 
might be argued that it would be little more than useful 
tool in the hands of the new rulers of the Syrian regional 
party organisation. The Ninth National Congress for 
example recognised the right of regional organisations 
to be the highest executive functionaries within their 
respective regions . The B C ' s manda te by compar ison 
wa s based upon party Rules, but it was vague and 
indecisive. It was apparent in it s mandate that it 
d id not possess the same powers of entr y into the army, 
government, and party executive commands such as has been 
given to its predecessor, the discr edited Eighth ational 
Command . The analogy of 'a king without a sword to 
defend his kingdom' r eadily spring s t o mind at this 
juncture as being especially relevant to the inth B "C 
as it was conceived by the Congress . 
1 
Interv iew, Malik al-Amin, Information Officer, National 
Command Headquarters, Damascus, 20 ovember 1967, 
Dama scus . 
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The Three 'Independent Spheres' : Reappraisal 
The inth ational Congress was highly sensitive 
of the need to ensure that in theory the r espective 
roles did not conflict with each other; the role of the 
army was redefined with appropriate ideological socialist 
jargon. For example, the slogan was proferred: 'the 
1 army 1S for war and na t ional conque s t'. This was to be 
a complementary role to the civilian partisans who were 
to pursue the party's revolutionary mission through the 
prose l ytisation of the masses . On the participation of 
the army within civilian party commands, it was held 
that it was to be bound by the same r ules governing 
civilian partisans. 2 Nothing was sa id of the need for 
military officers to resign their commissions upon 
entering governmental or party executive commands. The 
Congress d id stress that military officers had no right 
t o interf ere in the daily affairs of the government. J 
Basically, though with less poignant language, the Ninth 
National Congress was repeating what had been said by 
the Eighth National Congress regar ding military 
participation in the party. However, whe r e the E i ghth 
National Congress had given the BNC some mea sure of 
controlling military interference by convert i ng the 
Military Committee into a Military Bureau and making it at 
least, partially responsible to the National Command, 
the inth ational Congres s weakly gave all powers t o 
the SRC to ensure proper har mony and balance between 
the three spheres in the Syrian region. 
Finally, the Congress consented to the majority of 
SRC recomme.ndations sent up for official approval. The 
suspension of the Interim Constitution of April 1964, 
was confirmed, through the Congress did lay down a 
stipulation that moves were to be made to implement a 
new constitution before 1 July 1967 . 4 The plan for 
1 
Ibid . See 'The Army: Basic Respons ibilities, . . . 
Resolution, 0.5.' 
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Ibid . , Resolutions o s . 1 & 2. 
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Ibid., See 'Recommendat i ons of the ational Congress 
about the Regi onal Bureau, 0.1' . 
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dividing the intelligence and e urity ervices betwe n 
the army, government and party, wa confirmed as a 
1 practical move. As if to counter the critics of the 
Ninth ational Congress, that it was a service tool in th 
hands of the regionali ts, the Congress concluded with an 
indictment upon all who stressed regionalism and 
ipso fac to secessionism in party or ganisation. 2 
Expulsions of Aflaq, Bitar and the members and supporters 
the Eighth ational Command : 
Now that the inth ational Congress had practically 
endorsed all the recommendations of the SRC , only one 
thing remained to be done to give the r egionalists 
complete mastery over the party organi s ation: official 
expulsions of all troublesome 'right wing deviationist' 
(i.e. nationalist) elements. The Congress had in passing 
given the BNC powers to dismiss members who did not 
conform to the new social code of conduct governing party 
administration . Following the Congress, the Command 
proceeded to expel large sections of the Iraqi, 
Lebanese and Jordanian Regional Commands, in addition 
to many smaller centres of party organisation on a wide 
catalogue of crimes, though basically it was their 
refusal to support or attend the inth ational Congress 
in Damascus that was uppermost on the dismissal notices . 
On 7 ovember 1966, dismissal from party membership was 
brought down on nine of the thirteen members of the 
Eighth BNC, many of whom were lanquishing in the Palmyra 
prison. ] At its thirteenth session on 17 December 1966, 
the B C after issueing further expulsions of leading 
Iraqi Ba'thists, such as Major General Ahmed Hassan 
al-Bakr, Lieutenant-General Salah Mahdi Ammash, Saddam 
Takriti etc, concluded with the summation: 
1 
2 
Their mutiny against the ational Command ( inth) 
and withdrawal of recognition from the inth 
National Congress and its resolutions are things 
which confirm the shallowness of their commitment 
to the party .4 
Ibid., See ' Intelligence and Security Bureau' . 
al-Munadil, 0.10, October 1966. S e 'Report on the 
Ninth ational Congress'. 
] 
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Before proceeding to the Eva l uatIon and ummat"on 
it seems fitting to complete briefly the story as it is 
known at the time of writing (January 1969) following 
the inth ational Congress. In Beirut, the hostility 
of the rump of the Eighth ational Command, was as fierce 
towards Damascus as the latter was towards it . Charges 
of illigitimacy, unconstitutionality, deviation from the 
truth, sectarianism, association with communism, Zionism 
and imperialism and so on, were bandied back and forth 
between Ba'thists who, at least in theory, regarded 
themselves as enlightened Arab political reformers : 'men 
d stined to changed the course of Arab history' in the 
interests of the toiling, ignorant and destitute maSses . 
The cumulative result of all this, however, was to weaken 
further and discredit the Ba'th in the eyes of the maSses . 
The political scientist investigating developments 
within the party after 23 February 1966, had to preface 
his inquiry with the particular faction of the Ba'th 
in whi ch he was interested . 
After more than a quarter of a century of 
involvement in the Ba'th, Aflaq was dismissed by the 
'youngsters' whom he and Bitar had coaxed out of the 
colleges and universities to join the party. In great 
despondency Aflaq left the Arab world and, as of writing, 
is known to be living in Brazil. Fo llowing his escape 
from detention in Syria, Bitar fled over the mountains 
into Lebanon where he has taken up residence in Beirut . 
On 10 November 1967, he issued a statement in Beirut in 
which he fo rmally relinquished all further association with 
the Ba'th party. A week later speaking to me he said 
'the Ba'th is dead'. Asked if he had had any recent 
association with Aflaq, he replied that he had not seen 
or heard from him for at least eighteen months. Bitar ' s 
enthusiasm for politics, however, waS far from being 
dead. He told me that he was planning to regroup 
Ba'thists exiles in Beirut with the objective of launching 
a new political movement to 'rectify the mistakes of the 
' pld' Ba ' th party'. At the back of h is mind, Bitar 
wanted a party basing its objectives on Arab unity, but 
possessing a strong centralised party leadership such as 
could effe tively dire t the egional organisations under 
its care. How precisely Bitar plann d to attain this was 
not clear. Per haps more importantly did he have the 
f 
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pol i t i cal acumen to do this? Quit frankl y I doubt this 
v ery much . 
The ma j ority o f the i mprisone d Eighth ationa l 
Command , inc l u d ing Amin Hafiz, were re l ease d from prison 
following the outbreak of the Six-Day-War, most of them 
took u p exile in Beirut . Like Bitar, many be l iev ed that 
t he Ba ' t h 'was d ead '. Majdalani, Atrash and a few others 
jo i ned Bitar in an attempt to f orm a new po l itica l movement l 
while o t he rs c omp l ete l y cut t h emse lves o f f f r om further 
co n tacts with t h e Ba ' t h. A prominent Ba ' t h ist of somewhat 
'mi x ed loya l tie s ' t old me t hat h e estimate d t h at 'of all 
ational Co mmand members who had he ld office between 1947 
and 1967, 60 per cent were no l onger members of the 
Ba ' t h ' .2 
Wha t o f t h e rump of the Eighth National Command in 
Be irut? I t continue d to insist that it was t h e true scion 
of the Ba ' t h ist rev olution3 , but it lacked a d equate 
manpowe r and f inancia l resources . The Damascus 
headquart e rs of the Ba ' th on t h e other hand, had unlimite d 
f i nancia l r esources through grants-in-ai d from the SRC. 
The he a dquarte rs in Damascus had a staff of ov eT one 
h undr ed and fif ty f u ll time workers, while in Beirut 
the Command had bare l y one . 
The Ba'th was badly mauled organisationally as a 
r e sult of t h e c oup of 23 February 196 6 , yet pockets of 
supporters loyal to t h e trad ition of the Eighth atj_onal 
Command, c ontinued to exist in sev eral centres of the 
Ar ab wo r ld. On l7 Jul y 1 968, Major-General Ahmed Hassan 
al-Bakr , Brig a dier Hardan Takriti, Lieutenant - Genera l 
Sal a h Mahdi Ammash and others, succeeded in overthrowing 
t he President Abd ar - Rahman Arif, the brother of Abd as-
Sal a m Arif who ha d ov erthrown the Ba' th on l 8 ovember 
Th e success of this new Ba ' thi t government in Iraq 
l 
Interv iew, Majdalani, op . cit . Interv iew, Atrash op . cit . · 
2 
Interv iew , Daouk, November 9 1967, Beirut . 
3 
a l -Arabi a l -Jadid, 0 . 8, February 1968 . The rump of 
the Eigh t h ational Command f ina l ly reg ouped enough 
s upport t o cev ene it own inth ational Congress in 
February 1968 wher it pro eded 0 bing down all the 
a p propria te anathemas on the Damascus ational Command. 
f 
401 
is far f rom being clear at the time of writing. Perennial 
problems which h ad confronted the Ba'th in 1963 such as 
sectarianism (i.e. the Kurds) are still ve ry l i v e issues 
which could easily lead to the party ' s downfall. 
Previously the Ba'th ' s record in Iraq was not popular with 
the masses, so it is now faced with the task of convincing 
t he people of its sincerity towards socialist and 
revolutionary principles . It may be also predicted that 
future political relationships between Damascus and 
Baghdad will not be ve ry cordial in v iew of the f act that it 
was Damascus oriented BNC whi ch expelled t he current 
leaders of the party in Iraq from membership of the Ba'th . 
One is tempted to compare the almost certain conflict 
in microco s m to the Sini-Soviet rift in the Communist 
party . 
Finally, as fo r the Ba 'th in Syria, the ideological 
formulae of the Ninth National Congress have not 
impr oved its popularity among the masses who are but 
me r e pawns in the perennial intra-party power struggles 
which have continued unabated since 23 February 1966 . 
When I travelled through Syria towards the end of 1967 I 
wa s s hocked by the police state atmosphere which abounded 
everywhere . True, Syria was still very much on a war 
foot ing, but the root of the problem could be seen to go 
beneath war tensions . People in the ~ of Damascus, 
Hama, and Aleppo were apathetic towards the regime . But 
in extreme confidence informed persons told me that 
grave social and political tensions were threatening to 
explode in many parts of Syria . Lamented a senior 
administrator in a large factory complex in Aleppo 
'wha t good would it do the people to revol t as the party 
has seen to it that it controls all effective deterrents, 
the army, police and civ ilian militia. ,1 
vii : Evaluation and General S ummation 
In this Part the evaluation of a system of party 
organisation was observed. Three separate phases emerged 
as a result of the investigation. Chapte r 1 showed how 
the party moved away from the concept of 'inspired 
1 
Interv iew , Anonymous, 23 ovember 1967, Aleppo . 
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lead rS,h ip' o a fo mula embodi d in the Rules of 1959 
'collectiv lead entrali d demo ratic party 
gove r nment' . The colle tive leade ship formula remained 
in theory as the gu'd'ng fo c in party government between 
the Th ird ational Congr ss, ept mber 1959 and the inth 
ational Congress in September 1966 . In t ho se seven 
years, the empha i on ' co l le tive lead rship' v aried 
considerably . Prior to the coup of 23 February 1966, 
'co llective leadersh ip' wa s not consciou l y identified 
with any particular ocial for mula . Perhaps a brief 
exception to this resul te d in the Sixth ational Congress 
in October 1963 , where th re wa a strong emphasis on 
'class struggle' and popular revolution . However, the 
Seventh and Eigh th National Congre ses were not 
consciously mo tivated by this fo mula fo r e ffe ctive party 
organisations . Und er Afl a q and Razzaz, all members 
subscrib ing to Arab unity (i . e. nationalism) were permitted 
to hold offi ce regardle ss of their s ocial cla ss origins . 
Th e coup of 23 February 1966, however, instituted a new 
emphasis in party government, modelled on the formula of 
the Sixth ational Congre s . 'Social transformation' of 
the members wa to be the olution to t he problem of 
equi t able jurisdiction b t ween t he SRC and BNC and the 
independent sph eres (i.e. party, government and army . 
Hence, i f t h e m mbe rs of the party and executive were of 
the s ame socio-economic clas origin (pr oletarian), 
there would be relative harmon in ideal and in practical 
i mplementation of pa rty policy. 
Withou t ex p ion every ational Congress f ro m 1959 
issued reso l utions ep l ete with jurisdictional fo r mu l ae 
for a more efficient sy tem of pa rty organisation. 0 
impartial scholar ould ever ac u e he Ba'th of lacking 
the ab i li ty to riticise itself at all l ev 1 f rom the 
Secr etary-General to the cre a ry of a ce ll. Repeatedly , 
organi s a tional reforme s cal l ed fo r the party to act as a 
unit, coordinated and directe d by the central supr me 
command, t he B C, in he interest of attaining its 
constitutional objective , Unity, Freedom and Social ism . 
In 1959 and 1963, new party Rul we r in titute d fo r 
maintaining mor e fficient organisational oordination 
betwe n t he cen and the part (i.e. r egion) and 
betwe n t h e region and the par i ,san bas s . Yet with a ll 
the impr ssiv e juri d i tional formul a fo r ffe ctiv 
f· 
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party goverrunent with heck and balances against he 
misuse of executive power by party, goverrunent and military 
executive c omman d s, it has been observed that the party 
literally tore it elf apart on 23 February 1966 . Thus we 
are faced with the que tion which cannot be avoided: why 
did the various sections of t he Ba 'th suddenly 
disintegrate in a welt r of aT}.ger and blood on that 
fateful day in February 1 9 66? Was it primarily the 
party's failur e to d evise an equitable and acce p table 
system of power s haring between the centre and the regional 
organisations, or was it something deeper over which the 
organisational reformers were helpless to counter? 
The accumulated evidence tends to show that a wider 
acceptanc e of an equitable system of power sharing between 
the party's respective parts would have contributed towards 
greater organisational har mo ny and cohesiveness at all 
level s . But h ow was t h e party to arrive at such a 
formula ? Deep down e.t the back of our minds mus t surely 
be the que stion : was the Ba'th mentally capable of 
devi sing a system of party goverrunent acceptable to all 
party organs throughout the Ara b world? Or perhaps the 
ques tion s hould be rephrased : were the various regional 
party executives truly convinced of the party's 
objectives as to be willing to relingui h part of their 
sovereignty to the B C to attain Arab national unity? 
The evidence s hows a theoretical observance of the 
Fundamental Principles by the various regional party 
executive s ; but when it came to the actual point of 
surrendering executive authority to the B C in order to 
enable it to perform its centralising ro l e function, 
r eactions in mo st regional organisations ranged from 
veiled re l uctance on the one hand to brutal suppression 
of the BNC ' s int rference (i.e. 23 February 1966), on 
the other. 
Parallels with International Organisations: 
Ba sically we have been ob e r ving an attempt by the 
B C to p r f orm th role of an 'international organi ation ' 
in re l ation to Arab tat 
international organi ation , 
no effe tive pow ba of it 
di ective po we Indeed, it 
Like the majo ity of 
the B C had no tate and 
own to facilitate i 
wa ompletely dependent 
upon the goodwill of the r egional 0 ganisation to 
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implement its directives. If the regional organisations 
defied the BNC there was very little which the Command could 
do apart from cancellation of membership and in extreme 
cases assuming extra-jurisdictional powers over the 
regional organisation itself . But these were clumbsy 
procedures which were likely to have deleterious effects 
upon party unity and harmony within the regional organisation. 
In fact the experiences encountered by the B C 
in relation to the regional parts, resemble in microcosm 
the experiences encountered by the United at ions since 
its inception. On the one hand ,the example of the UN has 
shown that a nation however small can hinder and in cases 
even paralyse U policy procedures, Israel being one 
case in point. On the other hand, the U could not exist 
for one minute without the financial contributions of 
the large nations such as the USA, USSR, Britain and 
France, nor could it ever hope to implement international 
policy without great or superpower backing. Supposing, 
for example the UN were to demand a voice in appointing 
the President of France a.nd the army chiefs of staff in 
the interests of international harmony and co-operation 
of the nations of the world. In France as elsewhere the 
reaction would amount to something like this: the 
statutes of the UN Charter do not provide for 
interference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign 
member nation even in the interests of international 
harmony. ational mentalities govern the policies and 
conduct of the UN and will continue to do so into the 
foreseeable future. Like the Ba'th's B C in microcosm, 
the UN possesses no independent means of punitive action 
upon which to command a wayward or deviant member nation 
to conform to its resolutions . It faces the problem 
confronting all international organisations in the 
twentieth century in which nations participate without 
surrendering national sovereignty 
Arab regionalism (i.e. statism) was the force which 
hindered effective BNC party government and in the end 
(23 February), undermined the whole organisational structure 
weakening its centralising role as effectively as national 
mentalities have weakened the role of the in such 
things as peace keeping, employment of collective sanctions, 
aid and so on. The Ba'th was a trans-regional party 
basing its ultimate objective on Arab unity (i.e. the 
f 
creation of an Arab nation stretching from the Taurus 
Mountains to the Maghrib) through the coordination of 
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the regional party organisations, but was existing in an 
environment in which traditional socio-religious values 
were clashing with Westernising secular values. Concepts 
of 'nationalism' and 'democracy' were in theory observed 
by the majority of Arab intellectuals and the more 
politically articulate Arabs but, in practice, there was 
little agreement on the method and form of their 
implementation . The majority of the Arab people were 
still largely conditioned by parochial ties and kinship 
loyalties . To many, the village or the ethnic or 
religious community was the" prime focus of their lives. 
When the Ba'th was proselytising on behalf of Arab unity, 
it was in the midst of this semi-traditional environment. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that members who joined 
the Ba'th and rose up its pyramidal structure to s nior 
executive office should have been pulled between loyalty 
to the longterm ideal of Arab unity on the one hand, and 
the daily reality of confessional, ethnic and district 
loyalties, on the other. This was demonstrated in 
Part 3 on the sociology of the Ba'th . 
Thus to return to the question posed several 
paragraphs above: was the Ba'th basically capable of 
overcoming its organisational problems by jurisdictional 
formulae? Our answer based on the evidence of the 
previous parts suggests that in seeking a solution to 
the problem of apportioning powers of jurisdiction between 
the parts, the party was unconsciously papering over a 
much deeper sociological problem of the traditional 
mentality. The Ba'th inherited this within its 
organisational framework from the beginning of its 
existence as a political movement. In theory party Rules 
of 1959 and 1963 provided for Ba'thist executives to be 
answerable for their actions and policies to the ational 
Congress and through it indirectly to the partisan bases. 
The same applied to Regional Commands in re lation to the 
Regional Congresses and so on down the party pyramid 
to the cells. But what in fact actually happened? 
When a man reached the highest executive office he could 
not avoid the temptation of appealing to his co-religionists, 
or the members of his socio-economic class, or if a 
military officer to loyal army supporters, to ensure his 
f 
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tenure in office. In return for ma"n aining him "n offic 
hi s coreligionists or members of h"s faction, requ"red 
suitable rewards in the form of political and military 
appointments, or simple conomic renwn at"on for 
serv ices rend ered. Thus there followed a period in which 
all elements within the organisation not of the faction 
of the senior executive or power, were emoved from 
office or relegated to inferior postings . This, created 
invers e di ssatisfaction among t he factions edged out of 
office and of future p r o spect s fo r attaining political 
and mil itary powe r . The resul tant outcome was the 
proverbial ~icious circle', in which executive office 
created inverse di satisfaction among those denied entry 
into the senior executive commands because of differing 
factional alignments. 
Therefore in view of t he accwnulated e v idence above, 
it seems that if the organisational reformers of the 
Ba'th had succeeded in perfecting a theoretically 
accep tab le system of power sharing between the parts of 
the organisation, it is likely that sooner or later it 
would have founde red like other jurisdictional formulae 
because of t he mentality gap' between the ideal of Arab 
unity and the reali ty of the confessional and kinship 
loyalties existing in the minds of the majority of the 
Arab people and as we have demonstrated within the 
membe rsh ip of the Ba'th party . 
f 
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APPE DIX 1 . CO STITUTIO OF THE ARAB BA ' TH 
SOCIALIST PARTY* 
Fundamental Principl s 
Al 
First Principle : Unity and Freedom of th ation 
The Arabs form one nation . This nation has the 
natural right to live in a single stat and to be fr e 
to direct its own d estiny . 
The Party of the Arab Ba 'th therefore believes that : 
1) Th e Arab f atherland constitutes an indivisible 
p oli ti c al and e conomic unit y . 0 Arab country c an liv 
apart f rom the others . 
2) The Arab nation constitutes a cultural unity . 
Any differences existing among its sons are accidental 
and unimportant . They will all disappear with the 
a wakening o f the Arab consciousness . 
J ) The Arab fatherland belongs to the Arabs . They 
alone have the right to administer its affairs , to dispose 
of its wealth , and to direct its destinies . 
Se c ond P r.::i:.:.n::.:c=-=i.J::p~l=-e=-..::: __ =-P....::e:..:r::....=.s..::o:.:.n::.:a=l:..:i=-t::..y,,--....::o:..:f=--....:t:..:h=e~A:.:.r::..::::a ..:b::._:..:..::a=-t:..l=· ..::o~n 
The Arab nation is characterised by virtues which 
are the result of its successive rebirths . These virtues 
are characterised by vitality and creativeness and by 
an ability for transformation and renewal. Its renewal 
is always linked to growth in personal freedom, and harmony 
between its evolution and the national interest . 
The Party of the Arab Ba ' th therefore believes that: 
1 ) Freedom _of speech, freedom of assembly, fr eedom 
of belief , as well as artistic freedom, are sacred . 0 
authority can diminish them . 
2 ) The value of the citizens is measured - once 
a ll opportunities have been given them - by the action 
they take to fur ther t h e progress and prosperi ty o f the 
Arab nation, without regard to any other c riter ion. 
Third Principl e : The Mission of the Arab ation 
The Arab nation has an eternal mission . This mission 
reve als itself in ever new and related forms through the 
different stages o f history . It aims at the renewal of 
human values , at the quickening of human progres s, at 
increasing harmony and mutual help among the nations. 
Th Party of the Arab Ba ' th therefore believes that : 
1) Colonialism and all that goes with it is a 
criminal enterprise . The Arabs must fight it with all 
possible means, just as they must take it on themselves 
to hlp, according to their physical and moral abilities , 
all peoples fighting for their freedom . 
* Translated by Sylvia 
Antho!£gy (Berkel y : 
1 962 ), pp .2JJ-4l. 
Haim, Arab ationalism : An 
University of California Press, 
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2) Humanity constitutes a whol , the int rests of 
which are solidarity and the values and civilisation of 
which are common to all . Th Arabs ar nrich d by 
wo rld civilisation and enrich it in th ir turn . Th y 
stretch a f raternal hand to other nations and 
collaborate with them for the establishm nt of just 
institutions which will ensure for all th peoples 
prosperity and peac , as well as moral and spiritual 
advance . 
General Principles 
A2 
Articl e 1 . The Party of the Arab Ba ' th is a universal 
Arab party . It has branches in all th Arab countries . 
It does not concern itself with r e gional politics except 
in relation to the high r interests of the Arab cause. 
Articl e 2 . The headquarters of the party is for 
the time being located in Damascus. It can be transfe rred 
to any other Arab city if the national interest should 
require it . 
Articl e J . The Party of the Arab Ba ' th is a national 
party . It believes that nationalism is a living and 
eternal reality . It beli e ves that the feeling of national 
awakening which intimately unites the individual to his 
nation is a sacred feeling . This feeling has within 
itself a potential of creative power : it binds itself 
to sacrifice, it seeks the exercise of responsibilities, 
and it directs the individual personality in a concrete 
and active manner. 
The national idea to which the party appeals is 
the will of the Arab people to free themselves and to 
unit e . It demands that the opportunity be given to it 
to realise in history its Arab personality, and to 
collaborate with all the nations in all the fields which 
will ensure the march of humanity towa rd welfare and 
progress . 
Article 4 . The Party of the Arab Ba ' th is a 
So cialist party . It believes that socialism is a necessity 
which emanates from the depth of Arab nationalism itself . 
Socialism constitutes, in fact, the ideal social order 
which will allow the Arab people to realise its 
possibilities and to enable its genius to flourish, and 
which will ensure for the nation constant progress in 
its material and moral output . It makes possible a 
trustful brotherhood among its members . 
Article 5 . The Party of the Arab Ba 'th is a popular 
party . It b lieves that sovereignty is the property of 
the people, who alone is the source of all authority . 
It b lieves that the value of the state is the outcome 
of the will of the mass s from which it issues and that 
this value is sacred only to the extent that the masses 
have ex rcised their choice freely. That is why, in the 
accomplishment of its mission, the party relies on the 
people with whom it seeks to establish intricate contact, 
the spiritual, moral, mat rial, and physical level of 
whom it is trying to raise, in order that the people 
may b com conscious of its personality and that it may 
become able to exercise its right in private and public 
life . 
f · 
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Articl 6 . The Party of the Arab Ba ' th is 
revolutionary . It b li v s that its main obj ctives 
for th r alisation of th renaissanc of Arab 
nationalism or for th establishment of socialism cannot 
be a chi ved except by mans of revolution and struggl 
To r lyon slow evolution and to be satisfi d with a 
partial and superficial reform is to thr aten these 
aims and to conduce to th ir failure and th ir loss . 
This is why the party d cides in favour of : 
1) The struggle against foreign colonialism, in 
order to liberate the Arab f atherland compl tely and 
finally . 
2) The struggl e to gather all th Arabs in a 
singl e independent state . 
J) The overthrow of the present faulty structure _ 
an overthrow which will include all the sectors of 
intellectual, economic , social, and political life . 
Article 7 . The Arab fatherland is that part of 
the globe inhabited by the Arab nation which stretches 
from the Tauru s Mountain , the Pocht - i-Kouh Mountains, 
the Gulf of Basra , the Arab Ocean, the Ethiopian Mountains , 
the Sahara , the Atlantic Ocean , and the Mediterranean . 
Article 8 . The official language of the state, as 
well as that of all the citizens, is Arabic . It alone 
is re c ognised in correspondence and in teaching . 
Article 9 . The emblem of the Arab state is that 
of the Arab revolution begun in 1916 to liberate and 
unify the Arab nation . 
Article 10. An Arab is he whose language is Arabic, 
who has lived on Arab soil, or who, after having been 
assimilated to Arab life, has faith in his belonging to 
the Arab nation . 
Article 11 . To be ex c luded from the Arab fatherland: 
whoever has fought for or has belonged to a factious 
anti -Arab asso ciation , whoever has lent hims elf inside 
the Arab f atherland to colonial ends . 
Article 12 . The Arab woman enjoys all the rights of 
citizenship . The party struggles to raise up woman's 
level in order to make her fit to exerc ise these rights . 
Article IJ . The party strives to give all the 
citiz ens the same opp ortunities in the field of schooling 
and liv lihood in order that, in the various aspects of 
h u man activity , everyone should be equally able to show 
his real abilities and to develop them to the maximum . 
Th Way : Int rnal Policy of the Party 
Articl 14 . The regime of the Arab state will be a 
constitutional parliamentary regime . Executive power 
is responsible before the legislative , which is directly 
elect d by the people . 
r 
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Articl 15 . The national tie is the only tie that 
may xist in the Arab stat It nsur s harmony among 
all the citizens by m Iting them in th ru ibl of a 
single nation and counteracts all r liglous , communal, 
tribal , racial, or regional factions. 
Article 16 . The administrative syst m of th Arab 
state is a system of d centralisation. 
Article 17 · The party strives to mak popular 
fe ling universal and to make the power of the people a 
liv ing r ality in the life of the individual . It 
undertak s to give the state a constitution guarant ing 
to all Arab citiz ens absolute equality before the law, 
the right to express their opinions in absolute freedom, 
a nd a true choice of their representatives, thus ensuring 
for them a free life within the framework of the law . 
Article 18 . A single code of laws is to be established 
freely for the whole of the Arab nation . This code will 
be in conformity with the spirit of the times and wil l 
take into account the past experiences of the Arab nation. 
Article 19 . The judicial power will be independent . 
It will be free from inference by other powers and enjoy 
total immunity . 
Article 20 . The rights of citizenship are granted 
in their totality to every citizen living on Arab soil 
who is devoted to the Arab fatherland and who has no 
connection with any factious association . 
Article 21 . 
Arab fatherland . 
Military service is compulsory in the 
Foreign Policy of the Party 
Article 22 . The foreign policy of the Arab state 
will be guided by the interests of Arab nationalism and 
of the eternal mission of the Arabs which seeks to 
establish in co-operation with other nations a free, 
harmonious, and secure world, continuously a dvancing in 
progress . 
Articl e 23 . The Arabs will struggle with all their 
power to destroy the foundations of colonialism and of 
foreign occupation and to suppress all foreign political 
or economic influence in their country . 
Article 24. Since the Arab people is the sole 
source of power, all treaties, pacts, and documents 
c oncluded by governments which d etract from the total 
sovereign ty of the Arabs will be abrogated . 
Articl e 25 . Arab foreign policy seeks to give a 
true picture of the will of the Arabs to live in freedom, 
and of their sincere d sire to see all other nations 
enjoy the sam liberty . 
Economic Policy of the Party 
Articl 26 . 
Socialist party . 
of the fatherland 
The Party of the Arab Ha I th is a 
It b Ii ves that the economic wealth 
belongs to the nation. 
f · 
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Article 27. The present distribution of wealth in 
the Arab fatherland is unjust. Therefore a review and 
a just r edistribution will becom n e cessary . 
Article 28. The equality of all the citizens is 
founded on human values. This is why the party forbids 
the exploitation of the work of others . 
Article 29 . Public utilities, extensive natural 
resources, big industry, and the means of transport 
are the property of the nation . The state will manage 
them directly and wi ll abolish private companies and 
foreign concessions. 
Arti c le 30. Ownership of agricultural land will 
be so limited as to be in proportion to the means of the 
proprietor to exploit all his lands without exploitation 
of the efforts of others . This will be under the control 
of the state and in conformity with its over-all economic 
plan . 
Article 31 . Small industrial ownership will be so 
limited as to be related to the standard of living of 
the citi z ens of the state as a whole . 
Ar ticle 32 . Workers will participate in the 
management of their factory . In addition to their wages -
fixed by the state - they will receive a proportion of 
the profits, also fixed by the state. 
Article-1] . Ownership of immovabl e property is 
allowed to all the citizens so long as the state ensures 
for all citizens a minimum of immovable property . 
Article 34. Property and inheritance are two natural 
rights. They are protected within the limits of the 
national interest . 
Article 35 . Usurious loans are prohibited between 
citize ns. One state bank is to be founded to issue 
currency, which the national output will back . This 
bank will finance the vital argicultural and industrial 
plans of the nation . 
Article 36 . The state will control directly internal 
and external trade in order to abolish the exploitation 
of the consumer by the producer . The state wi ll protect 
them both, as it will protect the national output against 
the competition of foreign foods and will ensure 
equilibrium between exports and i mports . 
Article 37 . General planning, inspired by the most 
modern economic ideas, will be organised so that the 
Arab fatherland wi ll be industrialised, national production 
developed, new outlets opened for it, and the industrial 
economy of each region directed a cco rding to its potential 
and to the raw material it contains . 
Social Policy of the Party 
Article 38 . Family, Procreation, Marriage . 
1) The family is the basic cell of the nation . It 
is for the state to protect, to develop, and to help it. 
first 
Both must 
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2) Procreation is a trust given in th 
place to the family, and th n to th stat 
ensure its increase , and look to the health 
of the descendants . and ducation 
J) Marriag is a national duty . Th stat must 
encourage it , facilitat it, and control it . 
Article J9 . Public Health . The state will build , 
at its expense, institutions of preventive medicine, 
dispensaries , and hospitals which will meet the needs 
of all citizens , for whom the state ensures free m dical 
treatment . 
Article 40 . Labor . 
1) Labor is an obligation for all those who are 
capable of it . It is for the state to ensure that work 
is available to every citizen, whether intellectual or 
manual . 
2 ) The employer must ensure at the least a decent 
stand ard of liv ing for his employee . 
J) The state sees to the maintenance of all persons 
i n c apable of work . 
4) Just laws will be promulgated to limit the 
wo r kman ' s daily hours of work , to give him the right to 
pai d weekly and annual holidays, to protect his rights, 
to ens ure so c ial security for him in old age, and to 
indemnify him for any cessation of work, whether partial 
or total . 
5) Free workmen ' s and peasants ' unions will be 
established and encouraged, so that they may constitute 
an instrument efficient in the defence of their rights, 
in raising their standard of living, in developing their 
abilities, in increasing the opportunities offered to 
them, in creating among them a spirit of solidarity , and 
in representing them in joint works councils . 
6) Joint works councils will be created in which 
the state and the unions of workmen and peasants will 
be represented . These councils will have power to decide 
the issues ariSing among the unions, the works managers , 
and the representatives of the state . 
Article 41 . Culture and Society . 
1) The party seeks to develop a general national 
culture Tor the whole Arab fatherland which shall be 
Arab , liberal , progressive, extensive, profound, and 
humanist ; it attempts to disseminate it in all sections 
o f the population . 
2) The state is responsible for the protection of 
the liberty of spee ch, of publication, of ass mbly, of 
protest , and of the press, within the limits of the 
higher Arab national interest . It is for the state to 
f acilitate all the means and the modalities which tend 
to realise this liberty . 
J) Intellectual work is one of the most sacred kinds . 
It is the state ' s concern to protect and encourage 
int lle c tuals and scientists . 
4) Within the limits of the Arab national idea , 
ev ry fr edom will be giv n for the foundation of clubs, 
associations , parties , youth groupings , and tourist 
f 
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organisations , as well as for obtaining profit from th 
c in rna, radio , television , and all th other fa ilities 
of mod rn civilisation in order to spr ad g n rally th 
national culture, and to contribut to th nt rtainm nt 
of th people . 
Article 42. Separation of the classes and 
differentiation among them are abolished . Th 
separation of the class s is the cons equenc of a faulty 
social order . Therefore, the party carries on its 
struggle among the laboring and oppr ss d classes of 
society so that such separation and diff rentiation will 
come to an end and the citizens wi ll recover th whole 
of their human dignity and wil l be enabled to live in 
the shad ow of a just social order in whi c h nothing will 
distinguish one citizen f rom another exc ept intellectual 
c apacity and manual skill . 
Articl e 43 . Nomad ism . omadism is a primitive 
social state . It d ecreas es the national output and 
makes an important part o f the nation a paralysed 
member and an obstacl e to its development and progress . 
The party struggles for the sedentarisation of nomads 
by the grant of lands to them , for the abolition of 
tribal customs, and for the application to the nomads 
o f the laws of the stat e . 
Policy of the Party in Educ ation and Teaching 
The e duc ational policy of the party aims at the 
creation of a new Arab generation which believes in the 
unity of the nation , and in the eternity of its mission . 
This policy , based on scientific reasoning , will be 
freed from the shackles of superstitions and reactionary 
traditions ; it will be imbue d with the spirit of optimism , 
of struggle, and of solidarity among all citizens in the 
carrying out of a total Arab revolution , and in the 
cause of human progress . 
Therefore the party decides as follows : 
Articl e 44 . A national Arab stamp will mark all the 
aspects of intellectual, economic , political , architectural , 
and artistic life . The party establishes once again the 
links of the Arab nation with its glorious history and 
urges it toward a fu t u re even more glorious and more 
exemplary . 
Articl e 45 . Teaching is one of the e xclusive functions 
of the state . Therefore, all for eign and priv ate 
educational institutions are abolished . 
Articl e 46. 
for all ci ti z ens. 
be compulsory . 
Education at all stages shal l be fre e 
Primary and secondary ~ duc at i on shall 
Articl e 47 . Professiona l schools with the most modern 
equipment shall be established, where e ducation shall be 
fr ee . 
Article 48 . Teaching careers and all that relates 
to e duc ation are set asid for Arab citizens . An 
e xc eption to this rule is made in the instance of higher 
educ ation . 
Amendment of the Constitution 
Single Article. The fundamental and general 
principles of the Constitution cannot be amended . 
Other articles may, however, be amended, provided that 
two-thirds of the General Council of the party agree 
thereto, on a motion put by the Executive Council, 
or by a quarter of the members of the General Council, 
or by ten members of the Party Organisation. 
f 
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APPENDIX 2 . CREDAL DIFFERE CES 
(i) The Sunni Muslims regard themselves as xpon nts 
of the original and unadulterated slamic orthodoxy , 
as set forth not only in th Holy Book of Islam, 
b ut also in the Traditions of the Proph t and th 
system of theology and jurisprudence built up by 
the great Islamic thinkers . They constitute the 
v a st majority of beli vers not only in the Syria 
and Lebanon but in the Islamic world as a whole. 
The other sects diverged from the main body of 
Islam at different times on ac count of political 
or theological dissensi on . 
(ii) The Shi 'is (known in Lebanon as the Metawila) 
split off in the seventh century A.D., with the 
struggle for the Caliphate betwe en Muawiya and 
Ali, the Prophet's son-in-law . Eve n after the 
death of Ali they c lung to his cause; their breach with 
the Sunnis was widened and made permanent by the Battle 
of Kerbela (681), in which Ali's son Husain was killed 
after the defeat of his army by that of the Umayyads . 
The Shi 'is regard the succession to the Prophet 
as having passed, not to the orthodox line of 
Caliphs whom the Sunnis recognise, but to a hereditary 
line of Imams who were both the spiritual and the 
temporal heads of Islam , and of whom the first was 
Ali . The majority of Shi 'i s recognise twelve such 
Imams, the last of whom disappeared during the ninth 
century but will, it is believed, some day reappear . 
(iii) The Isma ' ilis split off from the majority of Shi ' is 
during the eighth century, over the question of 
the succession to the Imamate. They recognise the 
first six only of the Shi 'i Imams, and regard as 
the seventh and last of the Imams the brother of 
the seventh Imam of the Shi'i line. They introduced 
into Islam a number of esoteric doctrines, such as 
the ideas of successive emanations or incarnations 
of God, and of the transmigration of souls . These 
e soteri c d octrines they regard as placed above 
human discussi on and dispensed by the Imam to a 
chosen bo d y of initiates . They look upon the Imam 
as infallible, and his followers as therefore owing 
abs olute obedience to him . For a time during the 
Middle Ages part of Syria was rulled by the ' orthodox ' 
Isma 'ili Caliphs of Egypt, the Fatimids but on their 
decline a heterodox branch was formed as a political 
secret society, which under the name of the 'Assassins ' 
terrorised a large part of the Islamic world . Today 
th y owe religious allegiance to the Aga Khan . 
(iv) The Druze sect originated in the eleventh century, 
when some of the followers of the Fatimid Caliph 
Hakim , ruler of Egypt, put forward the claim that 
h was the last incarnation of the De ity . Forced 
to fIe to Syria, th y made converts among the 
adherents of Isma ' ilism there, and in course of time 
those converts came to form a community distinct 
from the Isma'ilis. They preserved and in some ways 
develop d the esoteric doctrines of Isma'ilism and 
th distinction between the initiates and the 
' ignorant' . They are characterised by the cohesion 
of their social organisation, the strength of their 
communal spirit and th rig our of their moral code. 
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(v) Finally, the Alawites, who are also known as the 
usairis , took over from Shi ' ism and developed 
the cult of Ali , whom they regarded as an 
incarnation of God . From Isma ' ilism they 
borrowed the idea of an esoteric teaching hidden 
from the masses; and their liturgy, the possession 
of which distinguishes them from other Islamic 
communities , seems to be largely Christian in 
origin. Their faith also contains elements 
derived from the pre-Christian worshi p of nature. 
Source : Hourani , A.H., Syria and Le banon: A Political 
Essay (RIIA , OXfo~fJ Univers ity Press , London, 
Third Edition 195~, pp . 122-2J, 
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18 ovember 1963; f. moderate wing of the Ba ' th . 
Ali, Baba 
I r aqi rural notable, representing Iurdish political 
interests; b . 1912, northern Iraq; r . Sunni Muslim . 
Helpe d to overthrow Hashemite monarchy, 14 July 1958; 
later supported Ba ' th in overthrow of President Abd al-
Karim Qasim on 8 February 1963 . Minister of Agriculture, 
IBC . Nos . 6 and 7; resigned portfolio because of 
opposition to Ba ' th 's Kurdish policy . 
Ali, Col . Ibrahim 
Syrian army officer and Ba ' thist; b . 1933, Lattakia; 
r .Alawite; ed . Homs Military Academy . 
COlmand of the ational Guard from December 1964; 
f . e xtremist wing of the Ba ' th . 
Ali, Khalid 
Leban se lawyer and Ba ' thist; b . 1927, Akkar, 
Lebanon; r . Sunni Muslim; ed . Syrian University . 
Memb r of B C, os . 6 and 7 . 
Al i , Sul eiman 
orth 
Syrian ngineer a nd Ba ' thist ; b . 1931, Horns ; 
r . Alawit e ; d. Central Engineering College , Damascus . 
Minist r of Labour and Social Affairs and Rural and 
Municipal Affairs, SBC . o. 19 ; appointed to the 
S u pr m Council of all trends , De c emb r 1965-February 
1966 ; f.identified with th moderate wing of the Ba ' th . 
Imprison d following coup of 23 F bruary 1966 . 
'f 
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Allush, Fathalla 
Syrian lawyer and Ba ' thist; b . 1924 , Hama; r . Sunni 
Muslim; ed . Syrian Univ rsity. Minist r of Justic , 
SBC . o . 24; f . pro - Hurani (regionalist), later Jadid and 
the extremists . 
Alwani , Darwish 
Syrian lawyer and judg ; member of the SUM ; b . 19l6, 
Hama; r . Sunni Muslim; ed . Syrian University . 
Director of Educ ation in Aleppo, 1958-61; serv d 
in Ministry of Education during Secessionist governm nts , 
1961 - 6 3; Minister of Wagfs, SBC , o . 15; removed from 
off ice during anti- asir purge by Ba ' th in mid-1964. 
Amin , Malik al-
Lebanese lawyer and Information Officer at B C 
headquarters, Damascus; b . 193l, South Lebanon; r . Shi ' i 
Muslim; ed . Lebanese University; f . identified with 
mod erates prior to coup of 23 February 1966 , but lat r 
went over to the Ninth BNC to become a prominent official . 
His action was looked upon unfavourably by moderate 
Lebanese Ba ' thists . 
Amir , Col . Ahmed 
Syrian army officer and Ba ' thist; b . 1922 , Lattakia; 
r . Alawite; ed . Horns Military Academy . 
A foundation member of the secret Alawite officer 
committee during latter stages of the UAR, 1958 - 61; 
p robably a member of the Military Committee following 
the c oup of 23 February 1966; Commander of the Syro -
Israel front during the Six Day War, June 1967 ; f. 
identifi ed with extremist wing of the Ba ' th. 
Amma sh, Lt . Gen . Salih 
Iraqi army offic er and Ba ' thist; b . 1920, Baghdad; 
r . Sunni Muslim; e d.A rmy Academy, Baghdad. 
Assisted in overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy on 
14 JUly 1958 ; later cashiered from the army because of 
ant i-Qasimit e sympathies; elevated by the IBC to Minister 
o f Defence, Nos . 6 and 7 and wi th Foreign Affairs in 0 . 8; 
removed from office following the coup of 18 ovember 1963 . 
In the month prior to 18 ovember, was Commander-in-Chief 
of the Syro - Iraq unified army . Elected to the B C by the 
S ixth ational Congress in October 1963; f . identified 
wit h the anti - Sa ' di moderate wing of the Ba ' th . Made a 
return to power in Iraq following the coup of 17 July 1968 . 
Anbari, Mazhar 
Syrian lawyer and Ba ' thist ; b.1920 , Damascus; 
r . Sunni Muslim; ed . Syrian University. Member of the 
Damascus Bar Association; Minister of Justice and Waqfs, 
SBC. 0 . 17; SBC . os . 18 and 19 Justice and Health; 
appointed Deputy Chairman of the enlarged NRC in August 
1965 and was re-appoint d to the position in February 
1966 shortly before the coup; f . identified with the 
moderate wing of the Ba ' th, being overthrown by th 
extr mists on 23 February . 
'f 
Arif, Lt . Gen. Abd ar-Rahman Muhammad (brother of 
late President Abd as-Salam Muhammad Arif) 
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raqi army offocer and Pr sOdent of t t ; b.19l6, 
Baghdad; r.Sunni Muslim; ed . Army Acad my, Baghdad . 
Took part in th 14 July revolution; Command r, 
Armoured Corps, 1958-61; Commander, ifth Division, 
Febru ary- ovember 1963; ass isted in the overthrow of 
President Qasim; later assisted brother in the ov rthrow 
of the Ba ' th on 18 ovember 1963; memb r of the Reg ncy 
Council, 1965; Deputy Chief of Staff, 1964; Chief of 
Staff 1964; Presid ent of State following d ath of broth r 
on 16 April 1966 and Prime Minister, May 1967 . Overthrown 
by a Ba ' th sponsored coup on 17 July 1968 . Went into 
exile on Turkey . 
Arif, Field Marshal Abd as-Salam Muhammad 
Iraqi army officer and President of State (deceased); 
b .192l, Baghdad; r.Sunni Muslim; ed. Army Academy , 
Baghdad . 
Took prominent part in overhrowing Hashemite monarchy, 
14 July 1958; later appointed Deputy Prime Minister, 
Minister of the Interior and Commander-in-Chief of the 
Armed Forces under President Qasim; relieved of offices 
in September 1958 and appointed as Iraqi ambassador to 
West Germany; later recalled and arrested on a charge 
of complicity to overthrow President Qasim; was sentenced 
to death but later reprieved by Qasim and released from 
prison in 1962. He lived quietly out of the army and 
politics for several months until in ited by the Ba ' th 
to become the figurehead of its ' revolution ' of 8 February 
1963. He was elevated to President of State and Field 
Marshal; but on 18 November 1963 following differences 
between himself and the Ba ' th, he overthrew the party 
and formed his own government. He continued as President 
of State until killed in a helicopter crash on 16 April 
1966 . Till his death he remained a devout Muslim and a 
strong opponent of the Ba'th. 
Aris, Thabat 
Syrian school teacher and diplomat; independent 
unionist; b.1907, Aleppo; r.Sunni Muslim; e d. Sorbonne 
University. 
Secondary school teacher, 1939-34; ntered diplomatic 
corps and held many senior posts in the Middle East and 
Europe; was the UAR ambassador to Yugoslavia and Greece 
prior to being recalled to become Minister of Culture 
and Guidance in the Syrian Regional Council in March 
1960; in September 1960 appointe d to Central Cabinet of 
the UAR with the same portfolio; in August 1961, was 
appointed Minister of Social Affairs and remained in 
that offi e until th coup of 28 September 1961. Later 
return d to the diplomatic corps becoming Syrian ambassador 
to Cyprus . In May 1964 was recalled by the Ba ' th to 
become Minister of State, SBC. 0.19;went back to the 
diplomati life and is currently Syrian ambassador to 
Czechoslo akia with accreditation to Hungary. 
Ashawi, Muhammad Id 
Syrian lawyer and Ba ' thist; b.1930, Deir ez-Zor; 
r.Sunni Muslim; ed. Syrian University . Go ernor of 
Dera ' a and Hama between 8 March 1963 and September 1965· 
El cted to SRC, 0.4 and 6, and aft r; Minister of 
the nterior, SBC. os.2l, 23 , 24 and after; Deputy 
Military Governor, March 1966 succe ding Ashuri; f. 
identified with the extremist wing of the Ba r th. 
'f 
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Ashuri, Muhan~ad Fahmi 
Syrian lawyer and Ba ' thistj b .1928, Idlibj r . unni 
Muslimj ed . Syrian University . F o ll ow"ng 8 March 1963, 
appointed Governor of uw ida and la cr Lattakia but 
resigned following riots and unrest in April 1964 . 
Ele cted to SRC . No . 2j Minister of th Int rior, BC . 
os . 19 and 22j Deputy Military Gov ernor , January _ 
23 February 1966j f.identified with mod rat wing of 
the Ba ' th. 
Assad, Ma~-Gen. Hafiz 
Syrian army and air force officer and Ba ' thistj 
b . 1932 , Tartus (then in the Muhafazat of Lattakia)j 
r . Al a wit e j e d. Horns Military Acad emy and in the US R . 
Came from very poor peasant family name Wahish or 
' Beast ' . Later he changed his nam e to Assad, a name 
more befitting his elevated status within the air force 
and party . One of the foundation memb ers of the secret 
Alawite officer committee and a close associate of 
Maj.-Gen . Salah Jadidj appointed Maj . -Gen . in Decemb r 
1964 by Jadid then Chief of Staffj Commander of the 
Mazz a air force base prior to coup of 23 February 1966. 
El e cted to SRC . No s.1-4, 6 and afterjBNC , 0 . 8 j 
Minister of Defence and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed 
Forces, SBC . Nos . 23, 24 and afterj f . identified with 
the younger extremists of the Ba ' thj being very good 
e xampl e of the way in which the army was elevating men 
from lowly social origins to positions of military 
and political prominence in Syria . 
Assuad, Suleiman Abd ar-Razzag 
Iraqi senior civil servant and Ba ' thistj b .1918, 
Baghdadj r . Sunni Muslimj ed . American Un iversity of 
Beirut . 
Director-General of Customs, February- ovember 1963j 
Minister of Finance, IBC , No . 8; went out of office wi th 
coup of 18 November 1963 . 
Atasi Jamal-al 
Syrian school teacher, journalist, writer, newspaper 
editorj Ba ' thistj b . 1910, Homs j r . Sunni Muslim j ed . 
Sorbonne University . 
Took part in Rashid Ali couE April-May 1941 in 
Iraq j a foundation member of the Ba ' thj editor of al-iahda 
( Unity ) and al-Jamahir (The People) during the UAR , the 
latter being suspended by the security authorities j 
Minister of Information, SBC . 0 . 15 j a member of the 
Constitutional Drafting Committee on the Tripartite Union 
of 17 April 1963j resigned from the Ba ' th following th 
anti-Nasirite purges of mid-1963j f.ident"fi d with pro-
Nasir moderate wing of the Ba ' th. 
At asi , Li ut.-Gen. Luai al-
Syrian senior army officer and politician with 
independent unionist sympathiesj b . 1926, IIoms j r . Sunni 
Muslimj d . Horns Military Academy and Staff College . 
Took part in Palestine war of 1948j sp nt five years in 
Egypt as an assistant military attache , then following 
the union of 1958 he served with a military unit in 
Al exandria jopposed Syrian secession in ptember 1961. 
Had a brlef tour of duty with the Syrian mbassy in 
Moscow aft r the s cessionj later appointed Commander 
'f 
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Atasi, Lieut . - Gen . Luai al- (cntd . ) 
of the Aleppo Garrison; took part in th abortiv 
unionis t officer c oup on 28 March 1962; soon after 
appointed milit ary attache to Washington , a s mi-e il 
posting; later was recalled to fac charges of 
complicity in the unionist officer mov m nt and 
imprisoned; following 8 March coup was appointed 
Commander -in-Chief and Chairman of the RC ; he 
resigne d on 19 July 1963 following the abortiv pro- asir 
coup of 18 July . 
Atasi , Dr Nu r uddin al -
Syrian physician and Ba ' thist ; b . 1929, Horns ; 
r . S unni Muslim; ed . Syrian University . Ent red Ba ' th 
from student days; Secr tary of the SRC , July 1963 ; 
ordinary member of SRC, September 1963-February 1964; 
February 1964-April 1965, but later r signed to become 
a member of the newly constitut ed SBPC from May 1964-
De c emb er 1965 . Minister of the Interior , SBC . os . 17 
and 18 and Deputy Prime Minister, 0 . 20 . Following 
23 February 1966 , appointed President of State , Secretary 
of the SRC , and Secretary-General B C . 0 . 9 in September 
1966; f . he vacillated between the moderates and 
e x tremists , but by 1965 he we nt over to the extremists . 
Became Prime Minist er , 29 October 1968 following 
replac e ment of Dr Yusif Zu a ' yyen . 
Atra sh, Mansur 
Syr i an school teacher, j o urnalist and writer; 
Ba ' thists; b . 1925, Goraya , Jabal Druz e; r . Druze; 
e d . American University o f Beirut (fine arts ) and Sorbonne 
(law) . So n of Grand Chief Sult an Pasha al -Atrash , he 
wa s one of the very few Ba ' thists with an aristocratic 
heritage . Collaborated with Jamal al-Atasi in pub lishing 
al -Ja mahir , until its suspension in 1959 ; ele cted to 
the ational Union of the UAR in 1959 ; appo int ed Minister 
of Labour and Social Affa irs under Dr Bashir al -Azma in 
April 1962, though a ccepted office for only four d ays; 
appointed t o s ame port foli o under the SBC . os .15, 16 
17 and 18. In SBC . 0 . 16 held in addition the portfolio 
of Industry . Appointed to the SBPC in May 1964, bu t 
resigned in October of the same year; Chairma n of the 
enlarg d NRC , August 1965-February 1966; f . ident ifi e d 
with moderate unionist wing of the Ba ' th . ow living 
in Beirut and ' politicking ' with exiles from the over-
thrown BNC . 0 . 8 . Had membership of the Ba ' th c a ncelled 
by BNC . 0.9 . 
Attiya , Samih 
Syrian lawyer wi th Communist sympathies ; b . 1929 , 
Horns ; r . Greek Orthod ox Christian; ed . Syrian University . 
Minist er of Communications , SBC . os . 23, 24 and 
aft r; f.id e ntified completely with the extremist wing 
of the Ba ' th . 
Azzuz, Adnan 
Syrian engin er and Ba ' thist; b . 1932 , Deir ez -Zor; 
r . Sunni Muslim. Succ e ssfully negotiat e d for increas d 
transit oil royalties with IPC ; Minister of Industry , 
SBC . os . 23, 24 and after ; f . id entified wi th the 
extremist wing of the Ba ' th . 
~f . 
Badruddin, Dr Ahm d 
Syrian physician and Ba ' thist; b . 1924, Damas us; 
r . Sunni Muslim; d . Syrian Univ rsity . Foundation 
m mb r of th Ba ' th; Minist r of Communications, BC . 
0 .2 2; f.id ntified with moderate unionist wing of th 
Ba ' th . 
Bakr , Maj .-Gen . Ahmed Hassan al-
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Iraqi senior army officer, politician and Ba ' thist; 
b . 1916 , Iraq; r. Sunni Muslim ; ed . Army Academy, Baghdad. 
Helped to overthrow the Hashemit monarchy on 14 
July 1958; forced to r tire from army by President 
Qasim in 1959 following an anti-Arif purg ; play d a 
prominent part in Qasim ' s ov rthrow on 8 February 1963. 
Formed the first IBC on 8 February and subsequently 
led it os . 6, 7 and 8 until overthrown by President Ari r 
on 18 ovember 1963; was demoted to Deputy Prime Minist r 
by Arir . then quickly relegated into insignificance in 
1964 whe n he was gaoled , charged with plotting against 
Arif . Later he was released and went into exile . He 
was elect e d to the B C . 0 . 6 in October 1963, and retain d 
m mbership until the extremist coup of 23 February 19 66 . 
His membership of th Ba ' th was cancelled by the B C. 
0 . 9 , but this did not trouble him very much . He p lanned 
a com back to power in Iraq from Beirut, then used many 
of his old Ba ' thist military allies , to topple the brother 
of the man who had originally overthrown him, on 17 July 
1968 . He became President of' State of Iraq and until 
the time of wri ting (February 1969) has ruled it very 
ruthlessly , creating world wide disapprobation with 
the public hangings of Jewish spies . 
Bitar, Ibrahim 
Syrian banker and Ba ' thist; b . 1925, Deir Attiye, 
Damascus ; r . Greek Orthodox Christian; ed . Syrian 
University (law) . 
Director of the Central Bank of Syria from 1965-66 
(February) * ; Minister of Economy . SBC . os . 20 and 21; 
f.identified with the extremist wing of the Ba ' th . 
Bitar, Dr Mad hat 
Syrian physician and Ba ' thist; b . 1907 -12 , * Damascus; 
r . Sunni Muslim; ed . yrian University . * 
Cousin of Salah ud-Din Bitar and a foundation member 
of the Ba ' th; asso ciated with the Arab ( at ionalist) 
Club, Damas cus for many years and possibly the Secretary 
in 1944; during the 1950s dropped out of the Ba ' th 
aft r merger wi th Eurani ' s Arab Socialis t Party; lis ted 
in April 1966 as Ambassador to Saudi Arabia. 
Bitar , Salah ud-Din 
Syrian school teacher, politican and co-founde r of 
the Ba ' th; b . 1912, Damascus; r . Sunni Muslim ; ed . Sorbonn 
Univ rsity (physics, B . Sc . ) . 
Secondary school teacher , Tajhiz, Damascus , 1934-42; 
ent red poJiticsj co-founder of Ba ' th 1942 with Mich 1 
Aflaq ; founder-editor of al-Ba ' th newspaper 1946; served 
several gaol sentenc s b fore Syrian independence in 
April 1946; 1 ft Syria following Shishakli ' s coup in 1952; 
took part in merging th Ba ' th with Akram Hurani ' s Arab 
socialist party in 1954 ; el cted to Syrian parliament for 
first tim in 1954, following Shishakli ' s ove rthrow; 
'f 
Bitar , Salah ud-Din al- (cntd . ) 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, July 1956-F bruary 195B; 
h ead of Syrian UN delegation in 1957 during th Syro-
Turkish c risis ;Mini ster of Culture and Guidan~e in 
AlB 
the UAR, Central Cabinet, 195B-5 9 , but resigned with 
other Ba ' th ministers in December 1959 in prot st against 
asir ' s ' dictatorial policies' . Signed the Secessionist 
manifesto in October 1961, but later recanted . Prim 
Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, SBC . os . 15, 
16, 1 7, dropping Foreign Affairs in 0.19 a nd resuming 
it in 0 . 22 . Appointed to the SBPC , May - October 1964, 
being Vice - Chairman; a member of the e xt end d RC 1965, 
August-February 1966; appointed BNC . os . 1 and 2; the 
Supreme Council, De cember 1965-February 1966; f . identifi d 
wi th the mo d erate unionist wing of which he was one of 
the main spokesmen; was imprisoned following the c oup 
of 2J February 1966, though later he escaped and went 
into exile in Beirut . B C . 0 . 9 , c ancelled his party 
membership; on 10 ovember 1967 he issued statement 
formally relinquishing all further contacts with the 
Ba ' th which he cl aimed was ' now dead '. A keen writer in 
al-Ba'th and al -Ahrar , Bitar also published several 
longer works among them being al-Siyasah al-Arabiyya 
Bayn al-Mabda Wa at - Tatbig (Arab Politics Between Principle 
and Practice) in 1960 . 
Bizri, Lieut .-Gen . Afif 
Syrian army officer with pro -C ommunist sympathies; 
b . 19l4, Lebanon ; ed . Homs Military Academy and the 
French Army Geographical School . 
Fought in Palestine war; served on the Mixed Armistice 
Commission, 194B -49; promoted under Shishakli being 
sent to France for post -graduate military education; 
later became Commander of a map surveying unit . Following 
the assassination of Deputy Chief of Staff, Adnan al-Malki , 
April 1955, was appointed President of the Military 
Tribunal which tried and convicted members of the PPS 
on the charge; rose quickly afterwards to become Commander-
in-Chief , August 1957 . Took a prominent part in the unity 
discussion with President asir prior to the formation of 
the UAR in February 195B . He was something of an 
enigmatic figure in view of his Communist sympathies 
and i nterest in Arab unity . He was not liked by the Ba 'th 
and in the early months of the UAR agitation from some 
of its leading members including Akram Hurani led to his 
dismissal . Later he went into exile in Iraq under Qasim. 
According to Col . Abd al-Hamid Sarraj, Bizri was appointed 
army c hief as a front-man for more ambitious fficers . 
Bus hi , Abd al-Fattah 
Syrian civil servant and Ba ' thist; b . 192 J, Harna ; 
r . Sunni Muslim; ed . Syrian University (law). 
Director - General of the Agricultural Co-operative 
Bank , 1961; member of the Board of ' L'Orient Arab Bank; 
Minister of Finance, SBC . os . 20 and 21; appointed to 
SBPC December-February 1966; f . accepted office under 
extremist Prime Ministers but seems to have gone over 
to the moderates prior to the 2J February coup. 
'f 
Dahi , Jihad 
yrian lawy r , politician and Arab ation list; 
b . 192 8, Homs; r . S unni Muslim; d . yrian Univ rsity 
and the American Univ r si ty of Beirut . 
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M mber of the ational Assembly of th UAR; Council 
for unionist officers implicat e d in th attempt d coup 
of 28 March 1962; imprisoned several tim s for unionist 
a ctiviti es ; Minister of Communi cations, SBC . 0 . 15 , 
but r e signe d in early April 1 ss than a month aft r 
taking office . Favoured unconditional r turn to union 
with President a sir; f . ide ntified mainly with the 
pro - asirite elements o f the Ba ' th though , himself , a 
member of the Ara b ationalist Mov eme nt . 
Oa ' im , Dr Abdull a h Abd ' 
Syrian university lecturer , politician , writer and 
Ba ' thist; b . 1924 , Damascus ; r . Sunni Muslim; ed . Syrian 
University (philosophy) Fuad University, Cairo 
(lit erature ) and Sorbonne , (D . Litt in e ducation and 
psychology ) . Teache r Lyce e , Secondary , Homs , 1947; 
le cturer in psychology , Syrian University 1948; Director--
General of Public Instruction , Qatar, 1958-58; Director 
of Cultural Affairs , Ministry of Culture and Guidanc e , 
1959 - 60 ; l e cturer in faculti es of arts and educ ation , 
Syrian Univers i ty 1960 - 62 ; appointed Minister of 
Information u nde r Dr Bashir al - Azma , April - June 1962; 
Minister of Information , SBC . 0 . 19 and Education i n 
the ill-fate d 0 . 2 2; f. a foundation member, identified 
mainly with the Aflaq wing of the moderates . Has been 
living in Bierut since coup of 2 J February 1966 , where 
he is curre ntly head o f the UNESCO college for the 
Training of Cadre Superior in the Arab World . The 
author of many books on Arab nationalism, al -1-latan 
al - Arab i wa ath - Thawrah , 196J is typi c al of his inte rest 
and is worth reading for an a ppre ciation of an 0 rthodox 
Ba ' thist exposi tion . 
Dairi , a zzal 
Syrian engineer an d Ba ' thi s t; b . 19JO , Dera ' a; 
r . S unni Mus 1 im . 
Minister of State for Jazirah a nd the Euphrates 
(Irrigation Projects), SBC . 0.2 2; f . longstanding member 
identifi ed mainly with the moderates o f the Ba ' th . 
Dalli , Lieut.-Col . Salah 
Syrian army off icer and Ba ' thist; b . 1924 , Dera ' a; 
r . S unni Muslim; ed . Homs Military Acad emy . 
Chairman of the Military Tribu nal; Commander of 
the Qatifa brigad ; f. supported Hafiz but later we nt 
over to Jadid to assist I n the coup of 2J February 1966 ; 
dismissed from the army and party in mid - 1966 . 
Daoul, Dr Bashir 
L e banes e universi ty lecturer , p ublisher and Ba ' thist; 
b . 19Jl, Beiru t ; r . Sunni Muslim ; e d . America n Univers it y 
of Be iru t ( e c onomics) and London . Come s from a very weal thy 
f amily ; nephew of an ex - Lebanese Prime Minister and 
nationalist leader , Ahmed Daouk; part owner of the Ba ' thist 
publishing house, Dar at - Tali ' ah ; prominent for many years 
in th Leban s e Regional Command ; Economic Advi ser to 
the Iraqi Ba ' th Gov ernment February - ov embe r 196J ; part 
of a thr man inve stigation c ommitte appo int e d in 1964 
to report on Syrian nationalisation; f . seems to have 
'f 
Daouk, Dr Bashir (cntd . ) 
vacillated between the moderate unionist and socialist 
extremist wings of the Ba ' th . Is curr ntly engaged 
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in editing Ba ' th documents which he is publishing under 
th heading of idal al - Ba ' th. Sev n volumes so far 
have been publish d and are of vital us in appraising 
the ideological and political developments within the 
Ba ' th from its earliest beginnings, to the period when 
it formed governments in Iraq and Syria . 
Darkawi, Dr As ' ad 
Syrian intellectual politician and Ba ' thist ; 
b . 1 927 ,* Aleppo ; r . Sunni Muslim; ed . Sorbonne (Ph . D . ) . 
Minister of Culture and Guidance, SBC . 0 . 22; 
f . mod rate wing of the Ba ' th . 
Domad , Talib 
Syrian lawyer, civil servant, politician and Ba ' thist ; 
b . 1923, Dera ' a ; r . Sunni Muslim; ed . Syrian University . 
Governor of Aleppo, circa May- September 1963, and 
thereafter of Rilld<a ; f . probably moderate unionist . 
Drubi, Samih 
Syrian diplomat, 
Horns ; r . Sunni Muslim ; 
and psycholo gy) . 
politician and Ba ' thist ; b.1918, 
ed . Cairo University (philosophy 
Dip lomat ; Cultural Councillor to Brazil for UAR, 
1958- 61; lecturer Syrian University 1961 - 63 ; Minister 
of Education, SBC . No . 15; attempted to form own cabinet 
May 1963 but failed . Thereafter served in several 
diplomatic posts including the UAR , Morocco, 
Czechoslovw<ia, and the Arab League May 1966 ; f . identified 
mainly with the moderate unionist wing of the Ba ' th with 
pro - asir sympathies ; name associated with Abd al - Karim 
Zuhur and Jamal al - Atasi . 
Eid , Col . Khalid 
Syrian army officer, unionist officer; b.1935, Hama; 
r . Sunni Muslim ; ed . Horns Military Academy. 
Purged from the army in S eptember 1965 , in a move 
against pro - Hurani e l ements . 
Fadhal , Dr Muhammad 
Syrian university lecturer, politician and 
independent unionist ; b . 1919, Lattakia ; r . Alawite . 
Minister of Justice, SBC . No . 22; f . moderate 
unionist wing of the Ba ' th . 
F akhuri, S amih 
Syrian engineer, politician and Ba ' thist; b . 1 930 , 
Horns ; r . Sunni Muslim; ed . Central College of Engineering, 
Da mascus . 
Minis ter of Communications , SBC . os . 20 and 21 and 
Public Works, 0 . 22; member of the enlarged RC, August 
1965 . Director - General of the Executive Committee of 
the Syria- Hedjaz Railway , August 1 966 ; seems to have 
vacillated between extremists and moderates of the Ba ' th . 
Farhan , Dr Shakir 
Syrian univer ity lecturer, politici n, diplomat; 
ind pendent unionist; b . 1921, Hama; r . Sunni Muslim; 
ed . Cairo Univer ity (D . Litt . ) . 
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L ctur r, Syrian Uni er ity; Minister of Education , 
SBC . 0 . 17; Syrian amba sador to Algeria 1966 . 
Ghanem, Dr Wahib al-
Syrian physician, politician and Ba ' thist ; b . 191S,* 
L attru ia; r . Alawite; ed . Syrian University . * 
A foundation member of Ba ' th ; fought in Palestine 
war 1945; m mber of First B C ; amalgamat d his peasants 
s o c i alist party of Lattakia with Ba'th in 1947 . Later 
l eft th Ba ' th; warrant for arrest in October 1965 for 
ass ociation with Akram Hurani ' s ' reactionary gang '. 
Ghannan , Ali 
Saudi Arabian tudent leader , ' politicker' and 
Ba ' thist; b . 1934 , Saudi Arabia; r . Sunni Muslim; ed . 
Syrian and Cairo Universitie (no qualifications to 
show) . 
Member of the Seventh and Eighth B C; pressed for 
the dissolution of the SRC, December 1965; f . identified 
with the Aflaq moderate wing of the Ba ' th . 
Ghaz z i , Souheil 
Syrian lawyer, politician; b . 192S , Damascus;* 
r . Sunni Mu lim; ed . Syrian University . Warrant for 
arrest October 1965; Minister Culture and Guidance , SBC . 
September 1967; f . identified with Huranist wing of the 
Ba ' th . 
Haddad , Maj . -Gen . Ghassan 
Syrian army officer, politician and Ba ' thist; b . 1921, 
Lattakia; r . Alawite ; ed . Horns Military Academy . 
Promoted to command r of a division in March 1963; 
appointed a member of the NRC; participated in the 
Tripartite Unity Talk in Cairo , March-April 1963; 
Mini ter of Planning, SBC . Nos.16, 17, lS, 19 and 20; 
f . identified with the moderate wing of the Ba ' th . 
Had dad , Dr Habid 
Syrian phy ician, politician and Ba ' thist; b . 1931 , 
Damascus; r . Greek Orthodox Christian; ed . Syrian University . 
SRC . 0 . 3 , 4 and after; Minister of Information , 
SBC . September 1967; f.identified with extremist wing of 
the Ba ' th . 
Haddad , Jamil 
Syrian chool teach r, politician and Ba ' thist; 
b . 1931,* Lattakia; r . Alawite; Teacher Training College, 
Damascu . * 
Mini ter of Agrarian Reform , SBC . 0 . 22' f . identified 
with moderate wing of the Ba ' th; impri oned following coup 
of 23 February 1966 . 
Haddad, ])r Mu tafa 
Syrian uni er it lecturer , politician and Ba ' thist; 
b. 1925 , Lattru ia; r.Sunni Mu lim; ed . Sorbonne ( D. Sc .). 
Minist r 0 Education, SBC . os . ~S, 19, 20 , 21 and 
23 ; m mber of e pand d C, Augn t 1965 · 
Hafiz , Lieut . -Gen . Amin 
Syrian army offic r, e -Presid nt of S ate, ru~d 
Ba ' thist; b . 1922 , Al ppo; r . Sunni Muslim; d . Horns 
Military Academy and in th USSR. 
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Came from a very poor family; fought in Pal stin war 
1 948 , as a n wly graduat d lieutenant; 1954 Command of 
the South rn Area; oppo ed Pre ident Shishakli; Battalion 
Commander 1957-58; took part in unity discussions with 
Presid nt asir in January 1958; appoint d Deputy Command r 
of orthern Syria , then Commander of th orth Eastern 
Area b ordering Iraq until secession in S ptember 1961; 
b ecame Chief of Army training at the Horns Military 
Acad my; later partially exiled as Syrian Military 
Attache to Mo cow ( prob a b ly fr om April 1962 ), and d emoted 
further in Oct ober 1962 to Military Attache to Buenos 
Aires . Minister of the Interior, SBC . os . 15 , 16, 
Deputy Prime Minister, 0 . 16, Prime Minister, os . 18 and 
2 0 ; Chairman of the RC, July 1963; Chairman of the SBPC. 
May 1964-23 February 1966; President of State , July 1963 -
( officially May 1964)- 23 February 1966; Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Force, July 1963-August 1965; prominent 
member of the Military Committee and Military Bureau ; 
S e c retary of the SRC . os . 2-5; member of the B C . , os . 6 , 
7 , and 8 ; f . vacillated between extremists and moderates 
t hough after mid-1965 supported the moderates . Overthrown 
on 23 F ebruary 1966 and imprisoned having his memb ership 
o f Ba ' th cancelled by B C . 0 . 9 . He was a good example 
of th way in which the army was permitting officers of 
l owly socio-economic origins to climb to power . 
Haidar , Abd a -Salam 
Syrian lawyer, politician and Ba1thist; b . 1918 , 
L attakia; r . Alawite; ed . Syrian University . 
Minister of Justice, SBC . 0 . 23; f . identified with 
extremist wing of Ba'th . 
Hakim, Khalid al -
Syrian trade union leader and Ba'thi t; b . 1928 , 
Damascus;* r . Sunni Mu lim; ed . no tertiary education . 
Trade Union leader; member of ational Union of 
the UAR , 1959; f . identified with moderate wing of Ba ' th; 
r eported to have taken part in the abortive coup of 
September 1966 . 
Hakki , Dr Khairuddin 
Syrian phy ician , politician; independent unionist; 
b . 1 918 , Damascu ; r . Sunni Muslim; ed . Syrian Uni ersity . * 
Minister of Industry , SBC . 0 . 18 . 
Hammadeh , Dr Sa'adun 
Iraqi economist, politician and Ba ' thi t; b . 1928 , * 
Iraq; r . Sunni Mu lim; ed . American Univer ity of Beirut 
and the USA (probably Wisconsin) (D . Econ . ) . Secondary 
school tach r, 1950-52' postgraduate tudie , USA , 1952 -
57; editor al - Jumhuriyya, July 1958; forced into exile in 
the anti-Arif purge of Pre ident Qa im, 1959; worked in 
L ibya for a while, later returned to Iraq and imprisoned 
b y Qa im until rel a ed by the Ba'th in February 1963 ; 
Mini ter of Agrarian Reform, IBC. Nos . 6 , 7 and 8 . In 
1964 appointed to a thr e man committ e to inve tigate 
the nationali s ation of yrian indu try and commerce . Has 
book and article among them bing ahnu Wa 
al-Hadirah LWe and the Communi ts in -;-;.;;=---..:...:::....:...,,:~~~:....:::-~~:---rJ---,(~D:-a-r--a-;t--T al i ' ah, Be iru t , n . d . ) . 
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Hassan, Dr Abd al-Hamid 
Syrian civil er ant , politician; pro-Communist; b . 
1 928 ,* Al ppo; r . Sunni Mu lim. 
Civ ' l ervant in Ministry of Planning; Minister of 
Planning, SBC. 0.23; f.id ntified with e tremist wing 
Ba ' th . 
Hatum, Sal'm 
Syrian army officer (commando) and Ba'thist; b . 1928, 
Suweida; r.Druze; ed . Horns Military Academy . 
A member of the Military Tribunal with Dalli and 
Rabbah Tawil; SRC . 0 . 4 being ma d e head of the ational 
Guard Bureau; allied with Hafiz on Military Committee 
until September 1965, then w nt over to Jadid; led 
assault against the Presid ntial Palace (Hafiz ' s) 23 
February 1966, with Izzat Rashid; later appointed 
Commander of the Harasta Division by the ' Regionalists ', 
though by S ptember 1966, relations with Jadid had 
deteriorated; reported to have held Jadid and members 
of the SRC . No.6 hostage in Suweida, while demanding 
bett er terms for him elf and officer allies; was the 
leader of the abortive 8 September 1966 coup; later fled 
into exile in Jordan where he regrouped Syrian Ba ' thist 
exiles (i. e . Atrash, Swairy,Khalid Hakim etc . ) for a 
return to power . FinalJ.y during the Six Day War he 
returned to Syria with aide , Badr Juma'a, to take 
a dvantage of the government 9 s predicament; (coincidentally 
Hurani returned at the same time!) he was , however, 
apprehended by Jadid and executed . 
Hindi, Hani 
Syrian politician and Arab ationalist; b . 1927, 
Damascus; r.Sunni Muslim; ed . American University of 
Beirut (pol itics) . 
Leader of the Arab Nationalist Movement; member of 
the ational A sembly , UAR, 1958-61; following secession , 
September 1961 took up residents in Cairo where he opposed 
the Seces ionist governments; editor of ar-Ra'i for a 
while; Mini ter of Planning, SBC. 0 . 15 ; member of the 
Political Bureau of the Arab Social Union in Syria (pro-
Nasir ) July 1964; f . identified with the pro-Nasir unionist 
wing of Ba ' th . Author of many articles and book on 
Palestine . 
Homad, Dr Abd al-Wahab 
Syrian uni ersity profes or of law, politician; 
pro- asir unionist; b . 1925, Aleppo; r.Sunni Muslim; ed . 
Sorbonne (D . Law) . 
Practi ed at the Bar from 1946; Chair of Criminology , 
Syrian Uni er ity, 1952; Chairman of the Syrian Constitution 
Committ e , 1949-50 . Deputy for Aleppo, 1947, 1949 ; Minister 
of Public In truction 1951; Mini ter of Economy and Finance 
1955-56 under Said al-Ghazzi; Mini ter of Public Instruction 
under Sabri Asali, December 1956-February 1958 ; Minister of 
Justice , SRC/ UAR, October 1958; Mini ter of State for 
Planning, Augu t ~961; Minister of Finance, SBC . 0 . 15; 
f . id ntified with th moderate unioni t wing of the Ba ' th. 
Author of man book on law and ociology in French and 
Arabic among them being Principle of Penal Law . 
'f , 
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Hurani , AkraJ11 
Syrian lawyer, politic'an and Ba i this ; b . 1914, Hama; 
r . Sunni Muslim; ed . Uni r ities of St . Jos ph , B irut 
and Syria. 
Oppon nt of landed int re ts; participat d in youth 
movements modelled on fasci t proto-types in 1930s; 
founded Arab ocialist party 1945; fought in the Palestine 
war 1948; merged with Baith 1954 to form the Arab Ba ' th 
Socialist party; expelled from Ba ' th 1962, formed own 
political party with a very anti- asir unionist bias. 
Syrian deputy for Hama, 1943; Minist r of Defenc 
and Agriculture 1949-50; political refuge from 
Shishill~li in Lebanon, 1952-53; deputy 1954 , Speaker of 
the House ovember 1957 - F bruary 1958; Vice - President 
of the UAR , 1958-59; d eputy 1961-63 . Following Ba ' th 
~oup of March 1963 p rsecuted and forced into political 
exile . Later implicated by the Ba'th in several 
attempts to overthrow the government . Someone has said 
that Hurani was in some way connected with most Syrian 
coups from the 1940 . His political alignments varied 
considerably over the y ars, indicating a sense of 
opportunism on his part . Hi was overwhelmingly oriented 
t owards unity in the 1950s, while in the 1960s he was 
the Ba ' th i s trongest opponent of unity . He returned to 
Syria following the Six-Day-War, and although he is still 
watched carefully by the Syrian government his political 
interests are clo er to their own than the moderate wing 
of the Ba'th overthrown on 23 February 1966 . 
Husni , Dr Kamal 
Syrian economist, civil servant, and Ba ' thist; b . 
1928,* Damascu ; r . Sunni Mu lim; ed . Sorbonne* (D . Econs . ) . 
A foundation member of the Ba ' th; Minister of 
Economy, SBC . os . 19 and 22; f . identified with the 
moderate wing of Baith. Working a a busines consultant 
1 967 , Beirut . 
Jaber, Dr Ali 
Lebanese phy ician and Baithist; b . 1921,* abatieh; 
r . Shiii; ed . Syrian University . 
A foundation member of the Baith; B C . os . 2, 3 , 4 
and 5;f . identified with moderate wing of the Ba ' th . 
Jaber , Maj.-Gen . Memduh 
Syrian army officer, politician' independent unionist; 
b . 1927, Hama; r . Alawite; ed. Horns Military Academy . 
RC . , March 1963-Augu t 1965, and in enlarged RC . 
August 1965-Februar 1966; Mini ter of Defence, SBC . os . 
19, 20; Public Work, 0 .21, 23, 24 and September 1967; 
Presidential Affair, No . 22; f . vacillated between moderate 
and e tremist wing of Ba'th. 
Jadid , Maj . -Gen. Salah 
Syrian army offic r, politician and Ba'thist; b . 
1926, Lattill~ia' r . Alawitej ed . Hom Military Academy . 
One of the founder~ of the Alawite officer committee 
during th UAR; a prominent member of the Military Committee 
and Military Bur au 1963-; RC. March 1963-Augu t 1965 
and in nlarged RC . Augu t-February 1966; Chief of Staff, 
ovember 1963-Augu t 1965; SRC . 0 . 2-4 and 6 and afterj 
D puty Se r tary SRC . 0 . 4, 6 and after; SBPC, October 
1964-De mber 1965; D puty Chairman December 1964-December 
1965j B c . 0.6 and 7. 
R pon ibl for the coup of 23 February 1966, which 
overthrew Pre ident Hafiz and the ational Command; currently 
reported to be the mo t pow rful man in S ria . 
'f 
Jarrah, Maj.-G n. Muhammad 
Syri n arm offic r' unioni t pro- asirj b . 1918 , * 
Hama; r . Sunni Mu lim; ed . nom Military Academy . 
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Police Chief, Dama cu , 1958-61; implicat d in pro -
a ir attempt d coup, Sy· ia, 18 July 196J, and nt nced 
to tw nty year in pri on; r 1 a d Jun 1964 with oth rs 
implicat d in th coup during pro- a ir pha of Ba r th 
policy in Syria; f.id ntif· d with the moderate pro- asir 
wing of the Ba r th . 
Jassim, M~Faiz 
Syrian army officer , politician and Ba r thist; b . 19JJ, 
Deir ez -Z orj r . Sunni Mu lim; d . Horns Military Academy . 
Gov rnmor of Jazirah; SBPC , S pt mb r-December 1965; 
SRC , Augu t-December 1965 and March- September 1966 , and 
aft r; Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform , SBC . 
0 . 10, and Agriculture, S pt mber 1967; f . identified with 
the extremist wing of the Ba 'th. 
Jawad , Hazim 
Iraqi school teacher, politician and Ba'thist; 
b . 19J6 , Iraq; r . Sunni Muslim; ed . Teachers College 
Baghdad . 
Minister of State , IBC . 0 . 6 , Interior, os . 7 and 8 ; 
forced into e ile 15 ovember 196J by the B C resulting 
from interna l troubles within the IRC . At 27 years he was 
probably one of the youngest men ev r to hold a senior 
ministerial appointment; f . identified with moderate wing 
of Ba ' th . 
J ayush, Mahmud 
Syrian lawyer, politician, and Ba'thist; b . 19JJ, 
Mariba, m. Dera ' a; r . Sunni Mu lim; ed . Syrian Uni ersity . 
Minister of Supply, SBC . os . 17 and 18; detained 
following coup 2J February 1966; f . identified with moderate 
wing of Ba ' th . 
Ji shshi, Majid 
Qatar engineer and Ba ' thist; b . 1927, Pale tine; 
r . Sunni Mu lim . BNC . o . J . 
Jundi, Lieut . -Col . Abd al-Karim 
Syrian army officer, politician and Ba ' thist; b . 19J2, 
Salamiyya, Hama; r . I ma ' ili' ed . Horns Military Academy . 
Station d on UAR frontier s , 1958-61; retired from 
army following sece sion , 1961-6J' Commander Qatana 
garri on 196J-64, and Qatifa garri on from December 1964. 
Minist r of Agrarian Reform, SBC . os . 20, 21 and 2J , 
including Agriculture in o . 2J; SRC . 0 2, 4 and 6 ; 
identified with e tremist wing of Ba 1th, being a close 
associate of Jadid . 
Jundi , Dr Samih 
S rian denti t, politician, diplomat and member of 
SUM; b . 1925 , Salami ya, nama; r . I ma'ili; ed . Syrian 
Uni er ity (denti try). 
S ce 
SBC . 
18 . 
th 
ational Union, UAR, 1959-61 , impri oned by 
~ ioni t r gime; Mini ter or Culture and Guidance, 
os . 15, 16 and 17 and In ormation , o . 16 , 17 and 
Originally a memb r of th Ba 1 th but 1 ft following 
c s ion to join th UM; favour d reconciliation 
Jundi , Dr Samih (cntd.) 
with Ba'th following 8 March 196J . Lat r appointed 
Syrian amba s ador to Franc July 1964-and currently; 
f . id ntifi d with mod rate pro- asir wing of Ba'th . 
An int llectual , report d to be able to p ~c five 
languages in addition to Arabic . 
Kabbani, Hammud 
Syrian lawyer, politician and Ba 'thist; b . 19Jl, 
Damascus; r . Sunni Mu lim; d . Syrian Uni ersity . 
Minist r of Planning, SBC . , Sept mber 1967- . 
Kaddur, Abd al-Halim 
Syrian Lawyer , politician and Ba'thist; b . 192J, 
Kara, Dama scus ; r . Sunni Muslim; ed. Syrian University . 
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Minister of the Interior, April-May 1962, 
Information and Labour and Social Aff a irs, September 
1962-January 196J; f . identified with the Hurani wing of 
the Ba ' th which wa expelled following the secession in 
September 1961 . 
Kallas , Khalil 
Syrian lawyer, politici a n and Baithist; b . 1921 , 
Hama; r . Sunni Mu lim; en . Syrian University . 
Deputy Hama, 1954, Minister of Economy, June 1956-
February 1958; Mini ter Economy SRCj UAR, October 1958-
January 1960; Deputy Hama, December 1961; Minister 
of Economy, September 1962-February 196J; Acting Minister 
of Labour and Social Affair and Public Works , January-
February 196J; f . clo ely identified with the Hurani 
wing of the Ba'th, expelled following the ece sion in 
September 1961 . 
Karim, Col . Ahmed Abd al-
Syrian army officer, politician and Ba'thi t; b . 1926, 
Ezra'a, m.Dera'a; r.Sunni Mu lim; ed . Hom Military Academy . 
Pale tine war, 1947-48; stationed on Syro-Jordanian 
front, 1955- 57; participated in unity tal} with asir 
January 1958; Mini ter of Rural and Municipal Affair in 
SRCjUAR, March- October 1958 and in CC j UAR, October 1958-
May 1960; Deputy Ezra'a December 1961; Mini ter of Labour 
and Social Affairs , April-June 1962, Agrarian Reform , 
June-September 1962 and Interior, September 1962-March 
196J; f . iden ified with the Hurani wing of the Ba'th 
e pell d following eces ion, September 1961 . 
Kawakebi, Dr Abd ar - Rahman 
Syrian lawyer, enior civil ervant and independent 
unioni t politician; b.192J, Aleppo; r . Sunni Muslim; 
ed . Sorbonne (D . Law) . 
In pector of Cu tom 1964; Mini ter of Waqfs, SBC . 
os . 15,16 and 17 ; f.identifi d with th moderate pro-
Nasir wing of the Baith . 
Khabbaz , Yus if 
S rian lawyer, politician and Ba'thi t; b . 1918,* 
Damascu ; r . Gr ek Orthodo Chri tian ; ed. Syrian 
Univ r ity . 
H ad of Syrian Reconciliation Committee to the UAR, 
May 1965; Mini ter of Touri m SBC . 0 . 22' f . identified 
with mod rat unioni t wing of the Ba'th. 
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Khalil , Dr Yu if Ali 
Lebane e newspaper ditor and Ba ' thist; b . 19JJ, 
Tyre ( Sur ) ; r . Shi ' · Mu lim; d . Am rican Univ rsity 
of B irut , (politic, BA,1955, MA, 1958) and Washington , 
USA ( Ph . D. p olitic, 1962) . 
Memb r, B C . os . 7 and 8; promin nt member of the 
L ebanese R gional Command for many years; editor al-Ahrar , 
1964-1967; identifi d with mod rat unionist wing of th 
Ba ' th . 
Khalkhal, Hami d 
Ir qi school teach r, politician and Ba'thist ; 
b. 19J2 , * Iraq; r . Sunni Muslim; ed . Baghdad University 
( arts ) . 
Dismissed from. teaching 1962 for holding anti-
Qasimit view; Minister of Labour and Social Affairs , 
IBC . os . 6 and 7 and Housing, 0. 8 . 
Khani , Zuheir 
Syrian lawyer, politician; be . 1926,* Damascus ; r . 
S u nni Muslim; ed . Syrian University . 
Minister of Ministerial Affairs, SBC . 0 . 24 and 
September 1967; Minister of Economy and Foreign Trade; 
f . identified with Hurani and pro - Communist groups . 
Khatib , Ahmed 
Syrian trade unionist, school teacher, politician 
and Ba ' thist; b . 1926, Damascus; r.Sunni Muslim ; ed . 
Teachers Training Coll ge, Damascus . * 
President of Teachers ' Union 1965; SBPC, December 
1965 - February 1966; RC, Augu t 1965-February 1966; 
f . identified with moderate pro- asir wing of the Ba ' th . 
Khatib, Kamal al-
Iraqi lawyer, judge ffiLd politician; b . 191J, Baghdad; 
~ . Sunni Muslim; ed . Baghdad University . 
Occupied many enior post in Iraqi courts , in 
particular the Supreme Court of Appeal; Minister of 
Justice, under President Qasim . 
Khattab, Maj . -Gen. Mahmud Shit 
Iraqi army officer, politician and Ba'thist ; * 
r . Sunni Muslim. 
Participated in 14 July 1958 revolution ' later 
ca ' hiered from army by President Qasim; Mini ter of 
Municipalitie , IBC . 0 .6, 7, 8 and 20 ovember 196J 
under President Arif' Mini ter of Communications , 17 July 
1968- following ucces ful Ba'thi t coup d'etat . 
Khayatah , Dr Abd al-14ahab 
Syr'an civil ervant and politician; independent 
unioni t; b . 192J, Dama cus;* r . Sunni Muslim; ed . 
( Ph . D. commerce) . 
Mini ter of PlwuLing , SBC . 0.22; f . identified with 
moderate wing of the Ba ' th. 
KhayatruL , Dr Zakariya 
Syrian phy~ ician, politician; pro-Cownuni t; b . 1928 , 
Damascu ; * r . unni Mu lim; Mini t r of Ileal th , September 
1967- ; f . identifi d with e tremi t wing of the Ba ' th . 
Khoder, Ahmed Mahdi 
Syrian lawy r and politician; b.1928,*Damascus; 
r . Sunn" Mu lim; Minist r of Waqfs, SBC . o . 
Khush, Suleiman 
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Syrian school teacher, politician and Ba ' thist; 
b . 1929, Salita, m.Homs; r . Alawit; d . Syrian Uni rsity 
(arts and education) . 
Produc er of the Re u , Le Maitre Arab for the 
Mini try of Education; school teacher Lattakia for a 
while; Minist r of Cultur and Guidance, SBC . os . 20 , 21; 
Acting Information, 0.21; Education, 0 . 24 and Sept mb r 
1967; f . identified with th extremist wing of the Ba'th . 
Author of many works and articles. 
Mahamid, Salih 
Syrian school t acher, civil servant, politician and 
Ba ' thist; b.1 928 , Ezra'a; r . Sunni Muslim; ed . Syrian 
Univ rsity ( education and philosophy). 
Secondary school teacher and Director of Education 
and T aching at Dera ' a until August 1963; Minister of 
Rural and Municipal Affairs, SBC . os . 17, 18, 20, 21, 23 
and 24; re igned his portfolio, March 1967 in protest 
against attacks made on close associate Muhammad Zubi, 
by the Minister of Defence and Commander-in-Chief 
Maj . -Gen . Hafiz A ad . 
Majdalani, Jubran 
Lebane e lawyer and Ba'thist; b.1925, Haifa, 
Palestine; r . Greek Orthodox Christian; ed . Lebanese 
University. 
Comes from a very wealthy family, father being a 
Beirut rentier; related to a zzim Majdalami, a prominent 
Lebanes e politician and baruzer; married to an American; 
active for many years in Lebanese Ba ' thist affairs, 
being a senior member of the LRC; a frequent exponent of 
Ba ' thist view at the AUB, being regarded as the 'Mufti' 
by younger members of th party; on the B C . os . 5, 6, 7 
and 8; impri oned following the February coup until 
June 1967, his party membership being cancelled by the 
Ninth B C; following relea e from prison (P almyra ) is 
now actively associating with Bitar, Atra h, Swairy and 
others with the intention of forming a new political 
movement inspired by the ideals of the Ba'th. Has written 
many articles on a pects of Ba ' thism , e .g. 'The Arab Socialist 
Movement ' in Walter Laqueur ' s The Middl e East in Transition. 
Majid, Hamdi Abd al-
Iraqi school teacher, politician and Ba'thist; b . 193l, 
Iraq; r.Sunni Mu lim; e d. L ' Ecole ormale Superieure, 
Baghdad . 
Arre ted by Presid nt Qa im for plotting against 
th state; Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, IBC . 
0 . 8; iled to Madrid, 13 ovember 1963 by Iraqi army; 
B C. os.5 and 6; IRC for sometime being Regional Secretary, 
October 1963· f .identified with the Sa'di e tremist wing 
of the Ba' th in Iraq and closely allied with Hamud Shufi 
in Syria . 
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Makhus, Dr Ibrahim 
Syrian phy ician, politician and Ba'th'st; b . 1930, 
Lattwia; r . Alawite; ed . Syria Uni rsity . 
Fath r the heikh of Makhu , a form r feudal lord; 
Minister of H alth, SBC . os . 15, 17 , 18; Foreign Affairs 
and Depty Prime Mini t r, os . 21 , 23, 24 and S ptember 
1967-0ctober 1968; RC, August 1965-F bruary 1966; 
Supr me Council, D cember 1965-February 1966; B C . 0 . 8; 
SRC . March-September 1966 and currently; f . identified 
with the xtremi t wing of Ba'th . 
Malki , Li eut . Col . Adnan al-
Syrian army offic r; b . 1928 , Damascus ; r . Sunni 
Muslim; ed . Horns Military Academy . 
Dismissed from the army by President Shishakli, 
Decemb r 1952 for leading an abortive army coup against 
his regime; restored after Shishkli's downfall in 
early 1954, allied with the Ba'th; brother, Riyad , was 
a promient Ba'thist civilian politician; opposed Syrian 
entry into the Baghdad Pact; paved way for a defence 
agreement with Egypt in March 1955; appointed Deputy 
Chief of Staff under General Shawkat Shuqayr, 1954-55; 
assassinated in April 1955 py a member of the PPS, while 
at a footfall match . 
Ma'ri, Col . Raif 
Syrian army officer; b . 1925, Idlib; r . Sunni Muslim; 
ed . Horns Military Academy . 
Involved in the pro- asir uprising in Syria, 18 July 
1 963, sentenced to death, but later reprieved and exiled, 
December 1964 . 
Milhem, Col . Hu ayn 
Syrian army officer; bo . 1928,* Aleppo; r . Sunni Muslim; 
ed . Horns Military Academy . 
Sent to London May 1965 for 'medicare'; Commander of 
the Milit ary Police garri on, Aleppo, on 23 February 1966; 
led resi tance in orthern Syria again t the coup of 
23 February; f . moderate, pro-Hafiz wing of the Ba'th . 
Muhanna, Husayn 
Syrian judge, politician and Baithist; b . 1925, 
Jableh , m.Lattakia; r .Al awite; ed . Syrian University . 
Vic -Governor of Aleppo, March 1963; Minister of 
Justic e, SBC. os . 20 and 21; f . identified with extremist 
wing of Ba' th o 
Muharib, Maj. Fawwaz 
Syrian army officer' member NRC, March-May 1963; 
participated in the Tripartite Unity Talks, March-April 
1963; retired from army 1 May 1963 . 
Murad, Dr Ahmed 
Syrian conomi t, politician; pro-Communi t· b . 1928 , * 
Dama cu ; r . Sunni Mu lim . Senior official in the Ministry 
of Financ before March 1966; Mini ter of Economy and 
Foreign Trade, SBC. 0 .23 and 24; f . identified with th 
e tr mi t wing of Baith. 
Muraiwed , Ha an 
Syrian chool teach r, politician and Ba'thist; 
b . 1927 , Dama cus; r . Sunni Muslim; ed . Am rican 
University of Beirut (politics) . 
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Following March 1963, Syria's r pr ntative in 
Algeri a ; Minister of For ign Affairs, SBC . os . 18, 19 
and 20; SBPC . Decemb r 1964-February 1966; f . id ntifi d 
mainly with the mod rate wing of the Ba'th . 
Mustaf a , Adham 
Syrian school t acher , politician , and Baithist; 
b . 1925-28,* Aleppo; r . Alawit . * 
Mini st r of State, SBC . 0.24; f . reported to be pro-
asirite . 
Must afa , Dr Shakir 
Syrian 
b . 1923, Hom 
(Arabic ) . 
civil servant, politician and Ba'thist; 
r . Sunni Muslim; ed . Syrian University 
Minist er of Information, SBC. 
with the moderate wing of Ba'th. 
akshabandi, Dr Abd al-Khalik 
0.22; f .identified 
Syrian gynaecologj.st, poli tician and Ba' this t; 
b.1928 , Deir ez-Zor; r .Sunni Muslim; ed . Syrian 
University (medicine) . 
Minister of State for RC . , SBC . 0 . 15, 16 . 17 and 
18; f . identified with moderate wing of Ba'th. 
Nasir, Col . Gamal Abd' an-
Egyptian army officer and President of State; 
b . 1918, Upp e r Egypt; r . Sunni Muslim; ed . Military 
Academy , Cairo. 
Commi ioned 1938, served in Palestine war and 
wounded; a prominent leader of the Free Officers' 
movement which overthrew King Farouk on 23 July 1952; 
Deputy Prime Mini ter and Minister of the Interior, 
1953-54; Prime Minister and Military Governor of Egypt, 
1954-56; Pre ident of Egypt, 1956 - 58; President of the 
UAR, 1958-61 (Syri a and Egypt) and after Syrian 
secession in September 1961, Pre ident of UAR, 1961-69; 
Prime Minister 1967; Chairman of the Arab Socialist 
Union, 1962- ; 'Hero of the Soviet Union' . Resigned 
following Si -Day-War, June 1967, but compelled by 
popular demand to remain in office . Has had a long and 
varied career; entered into unity with the Ba'th in 
February 1958 to form the UAR; discus ed fre h unity 
ventur s in March-April 1963 with the Syrian and Iraqi 
Ba ' ths but the outcome was abortive . After July 1963 
developed an inten e hatred of the Ba'th party which 
in many respect wa mutual. 
Naufal, A 'ad 
Syrian ci il er ant, politician; pro-Communist; 
b.1918 , * Al e ppo; r.Sunni Mu lim; ed . Syrian University 
(law* ) . 
Minister of CuI tur and Guidance , SBC . TO .19 . 
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Jordanian lawyer, editor, politician and Ba l th'st; 
b , 1916 , Jordan (i .. Greater Syria); r . Sunni Muslim; 
ed . Syrian University (law) . 
A foundation memb r of Ba'th (1948); published 
al-Yagzah (Awill<ening) with e eral others; imprisoned 
as a susp ct in murd r of King Abdullah of Jordan in 
1951 , but later rel a ed and uccessful in the lections 
of August 1951; vocal critic of the Anglo-Jordanian 
treaty and e pecially of the Commander of th Jordanian 
L egion, Sir John Glubb; a clo associate of Abdullah 
ar-Rimawi and th Arab nationalist tr nd in Jordan ; 
BNC . 0 . 2, later broke away to join wing led by Rimawi . 
egu i b, Gen l Muhammad 
Egyptian army offic r, politician and a leader of 
the Free Officer movem nt; b.1901, Khartoum, Sudan; 
r . Sunni Muslim; ed . Gordon College, Kha rtoum , Royal 
Military Academy and Cairo University . 
Commissioned in the infantry 1917, served in 
General Staff, Adjutant-General and Quarter Master 
General's departments during Second World War ; Sub-
Governor of Sinai and Governor of Red Sea Provinces 
i n F rontier Corps; Colonel Commanding Second Machine 
Gun Brigade; second in command of Egyptian troops in 
P alestine , commanding successively , 1st, 2nd , 3rd, 4th 
and 1 0th Infantry Brigades during Palestine war 1949-50; 
General Frontier Corps, 1950, Director General of 
Infantry , 1951, Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Army 
July 1952 ( following 23 July)' Prime Minister, Minister 
for War and Marine, Commander-in-Chief of the Army and 
Military Go ernment of Egypt , September 1952-1953; 
President of the Republic of Egypt, Jun 1953-December 1954 . 
Obaid , Maj . -Gen . Hamad 
Syrian armv officer, politician and Ba'thist ; 
b . 1928 , Suweida, Druz ; ed . Horns Military Academy . 
Stationed in Sinai during UAR with the rank of Major ; 
promoted to Maj . -General after March 1963; Commander of 
the National Guard, July 1963-December 1964; Commander 
of the 8th Brigage 1965; Mini ter of Defence, SBC . 0,21 
and Commander-in-Chief of the rmed Forces, Augu t-
Decemb er 1965; SRC . 0 . 4; f . identified with Hafiz wing 
of the RaIth in the army until August 1965, when he gave 
his support to Jadid and the extremists . Following 
23 February coup was dismissed from army and Ba ' th by 
Jadid . 
Pharon , Dr Sadik 
Syrian uni er ity lecturer in m dicine, politician; 
independent unioni t; b.1925 , Damascu . 
Minist r of Health, SBC 0 . 21; f . political 
alignment uncertain though identified with extremist 
cab inet . 
Qasim, G n . Abd al-Karim 
Iraqi army officer and Pre ident of State; b . 1913, 
Iraq; r . Sunni Mu lim; ed . Military Academy Baghdad and 
London . 
Rashid Al,i couE, 1941; Pale tin war , 1947-48 ; leader 
of 14 July 1958 co~ which ov rthrew the Hashemite 
governm nt ; 1958-63, Pr ident of State , Commander- i n -
Chief and M' ni t r of D fence; promoted to General 
January 1959; life threatened by a a sination by Ba l thists , 
Octob r 1959' cuted by the Ba'th following it tak ov r 
power on 8 February 1963 · 
Qasim, ihad al-
Syrian lawyer, magistrat , polit' ian and A Mj 
b . 1908, Damascusj r.Sunni Muslimj d . Sorbonn . 
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Began career in th Court of Appeal, Damascusj Magistrat 
in the Court of Invalidationj Minister of Public 
Ins truct'on, 1954, then Dir ctor of the Bur au of 
Insp ctionj Minister of Justice, SRC / AR, October 1958-
August 1961j Justic CC / UAR, August-Septemb r 1961j 
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Justic , SBC. 
Io . 15 . Following anti- asir purge by Ba'th in yria 
be c ame very anti-Ba'thj joined ASU in mid-1964, being 
appointe d to its Political Bureauj f . ident'fied with 
the moderate pro - asir wing of the Ba'th . 
Qutayni, Maj .-Gen . Rashid. 
Syrian army officerj b . 1923, Khan Sheikhoun , 
I d libj r . Sunni Muslimj ed. Homs Military Academy . 
Commander of General Military Inte lligence , Syrian 
region of the UAR, 1958-6lj sent as Syrian Military 
Attache to Amman following secession 1961-63j promoted 
fr om Colonel to Maj . -General March 1963, becoming Chief 
of Military Intelligence and Deputy Commander - in-Chiefj 
played prominent part in the coup of 8 March 1963, 
which brought the Ba'th into powerj relieved of his 
posts in May 1963, for pro- asir sympathiesj arrested 
after the abortive asirite coup of 18 July 1963 and 
sentenced to 20 years imprisonmentj later released in 
June 1964 . The village of his birth on the main road 
north to Alepp o from Damascus is known to be a 
'socialist village'. 
Ra ' di , Muhsin Sheikh 
Iraqi Ba'thistj b . 1929, Najjafj r.Shi ' i, secondary 
education only in Iraq . 
Professional 'politicker', rabble rouser et c., 
close associate of Ali Salih Sa'di on the IRCj B C . 
No . 6, but expelled from the Ba'th in February 1965 ' later 
joine d with Sa' di in the formation of the Revolutionary 
Labour Party in Iraq . 
Rawi , Dr Muhammad Ammar ar-
Iraqi agronomist , politician and Ba'thistj r . Sunni 
Muslim' ed. USA (D ,Ag . S c.). 
Minister of Agriculture, IBC. 0 . 8 . 
Rawi, Dr Musari ar -
Iraqi educ ationist, politi cian and Ba 'thistj b . 1933, * 
Baghdadj r . Sunni Muslimj ed . American University of 
Beirut and p . g. USA (D.Ed . ) . 
Minister of Culture and Guidance, IBC . 0 . 6 and 
Minist r of State for Federal Union , os . 7 and 8 . 
~azz~Dr 1unif 
Jordanian physician, writer and Ba 'this tj b . 19l9, 
Syria, 1 ft when seven years with family to take up 
resid nc in Ammanj r . Sunni Muslimj ed. Arab College 
Jerusalem, American University of B irut, 1939-41 (physi~s 
and ch m'stry), Cairo Univ rsity circa, 1943-47 (medicine ). 
S condary school t acher, Amman, 1941-43j married a 
Palestinian formerly Miss Laman Bsiso,a teacher at the 
American Junior ColI g in Beirut j played prominent role 
in th R d Crescent (Muslim equi al nt of Red Cross) 
Ip f ' 
Razzaz, Dr Mun'f (cn d . ) 
'n 1948 du ing Pal t'n war; jo'n d Balth 1950, but 
xiI d from Jordan for Arab nationalist a tivit' s 
1952-53; active in th JRC, but impr' on d following 
th reaction again t Arab nationali ts , 1957-59 · B C . 
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os·3-8 ; S cretary-Gen ral of 0 . 8 , but 0 rthrown by 
th coup of 23 February 1966; identifi d with th 
moderate unioni t wing of the Ba ' th , later had his 
memb rship canc lIed by he B C. 0 . 9 . A prolific 
writer on topic related to Arab nationalism; in 1963 
award d a prize for th b st book on Arab nationalism 
Ma ' a lim al-Ha a l aI-Arabi a al-Jadida (Essential of 
the e w Arab Life having gone to five ditions by 1966 . 
Other important work includ al-Hurriya (Freedom) 
a favourit topic (1965), and at-Ta jr'ba al -Mura 
(Bitt r Exp rience) 1967, relating to the events leading 
up to th coup of 23 February 1966, 
Rifa ' i , Dr Abdul Majid ar -
Lebane e physician and Balthi t; b . 1928, Tripoli; 
r . Sunni Muslim; ed . Switzerland. 
Has stood as Ba l th candidate for election to th 
L ebanese parliament in Tripoli; in 1960 polled 17000 
votes to lo se by only 300 vote ; an active member of 
the LRC for many year: B c . 0 . 7; f , id ntified mainly 
with the moderate pro-Aflaq wing of the Ba l th . 
Rifa l" Dr ur 4iddin ar-
Syrian engineer, politician and ANM; b.1924 , Horns . 
r . Sunni Muslim; ed. Univers ities of orth Carolina and 
California . 
Hydraulic engineer, has occupied po t of Director 
of the Institute of Electricity and Tran port in Aleppo; 
Minister of Industry, SBC. 0 . 17, Public Work s , os . 18 
and 19; elected to the RC, February 1966; f .identifi ed 
with moderate pro- asir wing of the Ba l th . Speru<s French, 
English and German in addition to Arabic; D an of Faculty 
of Engine ring on 1968 Staff List of Syrian Univer ity. 
Rikabi , Fuad 
Iraqi engineer , politician and Balthi t; b . 1926 , Iraq ; 
r.Sunni Muslim; ed . Baghdad University ( eng . ) . 
. A foundation m mber of Balth in Iraq and Secretary 
of the ~RC until 1959; B C . os . 2 and 3; Minister of 
Public Instruction July-September 1959 and Minister of 
State, S ptember 1958-February 1959; later took refuge 
in Egypt; wa expelled from the Ba l th following the 
sece sion , September 1961; ovember 1964-July 1965 , 
Mini ter of Municipalitie under Pre id nt Abd a -Salam 
Arif; married Jun 1963, in Cairo, a r attending th 
wedding , the rec ption h ld in the hou of the 'bete 
noir I of the Ba I th during th UAR, Abd aI-Hamid Sarra.i; 
f.identifi d with Rimawi and other who believed that 
th Ba l th hould lo ~ it identit in the AR. Author 
of Ala Tari y ath-Thawrah (On the Road to R volution) (Cairo 1962 , and other worl on Arab nationali m. 
Sadat, Col . Anwar a~-
Egyptian arm o.ffi er , politician and prominent in 
th Free Offi er movement; b . 19l8, Egypt; r . Sunni Mu ~ lim; 
d. Military Colleg . 
Conuni :3~. ioned 19 .33: form r S cr tary-General of th 
I slamic World Congre c.,s; former di tor of al-Jwnhuriya and 
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Sadat, Col. Anwar a - (cntd.) 
at - Tahrir; Pr sid nt of th Egyptian ational Union , 
19 57 - 61; Pre ~ 'd nt 01 Arro-A ian Conf r nce , Cairo , 195 , 
Sp ak r , UAR , _ a tional A mbly , 1961 - ; President Council 
m mber , 1962-64 ; Vic -Pr e~id nt of the UAR , 1964-66; 
memb roth UAR- Iraq Unified Command 1964 . 
S addawi , Abd al-Ghani 
Syrian engineer , enior civil s r ant and Ba ' thist ; 
b.1932 , Hom; r.Sunni Mu lim. 
Governor of Al eppo since S ptember 1965; related 
to the Prime Minister Yusif Zu ' ayy n through his wif who 
is a ist r of Zu' ayyen ' wife . 
S a ' di, Abd al -Halim 
Syrian politician and Ba ' thist; b . 1925 , Horns; 
r . Sunni Muslim; ed . American University of Beirut 
(medicine , but doe not s em to have graduated). 
Mini ster of Supply and Industry , SBC . 0 . 19; 
f . identified with moderate wing of the Ba ' th . 
Sa ' di, Ali Salih 
Iraqi politician and Ba ' thi t; b.192 8 , * Iraq; 
r . Sunni Mu lim; ed . University of Baghdad, circ a , 
1950-54 (commerce and economics) . 
An acti e ' politicker' .from student days; implicated 
in the attempted a a ination of Pre ident Qasim in 
Oc tob er 1959 and forced into exile in the UAR; later 
returned to lead the Ba ' th in the overthrow of Qasim ' s 
regime on 8 February 1963; Minister of the Interior , IBC . 
0.6, Deputy Prime Minister , 0 .6 , 7 and 8 and Culture 
and Guidance, o s . 7 and 8 ; Secretary of the I RC for 
many years circa 1961-63 ( 0 ember ), until e i l e fr om 
Iraq; on B C . 0 . 4 , 5 and 6 ; dismissed by the party by 
BNC. 0.7, being charged with causing the Ba ' ttis overthrow 
in Iraq on 18 ovember 1963; l ater in 1964, formed a 
left-wing ociali t party in oppo ition to the Ba'th; 
f .identified with the extreme left-wing ociali ts of 
the Si th ati onal Congre ,October 1963 and , in 
particular , Hammud Shufi. E pelled from Lebanon in 
January 1966 wi th Muh. in Sheikh Ra ' di and Hamdi Abd al -
Ma jid, for lefti . t tend nces . 
Salih, Ahmed Abu 
Syrian lawyer , politician and SUM; b . 193l , Aleppo; 
r . Sunni Mu lim; ed . Syrian Uni er ity. 
R pre ented Aleppo in ational Union of the UAR; 
Mini st r of Public Work , SBC . 0 .15, 16, 17 and 
Communication. , o. 16 , 1 8 and 19· 
Sarraj, Col. Abd al - Hamid 
Syrian army officer, politician and unioni t 
ind p nd nt; b . 1925, Hama; r . Sunni Mus lim . ed . Hom 
Military Ac ad my, graduat d 1947 and postgraduate studi es 
France 1952-54 . 
Childhood friend of Akram Hurani; commi ioned 1947 , 
fought in Pale tine war with Hurani a irregular ; 
assi t d Col. Hu -ni az -Z a ' im in overthrowing President 
Quwatly in March 1949 , becoming his aide de camp; later 
turne d ag in t az-Za!im, supporting Pre ident Shi hal<.li; 
appoin ed to Head 01 Mili tary Per onnel under Shi hal<.li 
1954 , but later remo ed following th Jatt r ' s overthrow; 
Sarraj , Col. Abd al -Hamid (cntd.) 
s nt to Pari a Syrian Military Attach' , but lat r 
recall d in 1955 by th Chief of Staff , G n ral 
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Shuqayr, to become H ad of the Deuxi m Bureau in March 
1955, on month befor th assassination of the Deputy 
Chi f o f Staff Adnan al -Ma l1d; largely establi shed fam by 
his purging of the PPS for its part in th assassinati on 
of Ma l ki ; 1955-56 ros to power in association with th 
Ba ' th and other 1 ft-w ' ng unionist 1 m nts ; took a 
prominent part in the unity discussions with President 
Nasir in January 1958; upon the formation of the UAR in 
F bruary 1958, became Minister of th Interior in the 
SRCjUAR and a member of the Supreme Council of the UAR; 
in S eptemb er 1960 became Cha irman of th SRC jUAR and a 
few we ks b e fore th coup of 28 Septemb r 1 96 1 Vic e -
President of the UAR; after secessi on imprisoned by the 
Syrian government , but in earl y 1962 friends helped 
to escape from Mazz a prison , whereupon h fled to Cairo . 
During 1964-65, was reported to b e one of asir ' s Middl 
Eastern roving emissarie , a thing which exceedingly 
annoyed the Syrian Ba'th . 
Sayya d , Jalal as-
Syrian lawyer a nd Ba'thist; b . 19l3, Deir e z - Zo r ; 
r . Sunni Muslim; ed . Syrian University . 
A foundation member of the Ba'th; on B C . 0 . 1, but 
r es i gn e d from the party in 1955; in June 1953, listed as 
one of the lea der of the Lawyers ' Syndicate in a 
memorandum to President Shishakli, condemning his regime ; 
took office a a deputy in the Syrian parliament, December 
1 96 1 . 
Shabib , Talib Hu ayn 
I raqi engineer , politician and Ba'thist ; b . 1 93l , 
a jj af ; r . Shi'i Muslim; ed . American University of Beirut 
(poli tic and economics) and London University ( engineering , 
but according to one close source no degree a a result 
of student ' politicking' ). 
Strong opponent of Pre ident Qasim ' s regime , full -
time party worker for several year while the party was 
underground; prominent in the IRC until ovember 1963 
when forced into exi l e in Beirut; on B C . os . 3 and 4; 
Minister of Foreign Affair s IBC. No .6 , 7 and 8 . Closely 
ass oc iated with Ha zim Jawad in the IRC and a trong 
opponent of Ali Salih Sa ' di. One prominent Lebanese 
Ba ' thist call ed him a megal omaniac and opportunist -
qualities which 'l ed to hi own perdition'. In 1967 
reported to be the Iraqi repre entative to the Ara b 
L eagu e . 
Shadid , Dr Abdullah Wathig 
Syrian profe s or of atomic phys ic, politician a nd 
Ba ' thi t; b . 1923,* Sama ' an m.Aleppo; r . Sunni Mu lim . 
Minister of Higher Education , SBC . 0 . 23 and 24; 
f . identifi ed with e tremist wing of the Ba'th. 
Sha ' ir, Col. Fahd 
Syr 'an army offic r, Ba'thi t; b . 1928 , Suweid a; 
r . Druz e; d . Hom Milit ary Academy . 
On the NRC . March 1963-May 1964; p art icipated in the 
Tripartite Unity Tall though not then a member of the 
Ba ' th; Command r of the S ro-Iraqi Yarmuk garri on , 
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Sha ' ir, Col . Fahd (cntd . ) 
October- ovember 196J, decorat d for brav ry January 
1964; D puty Chief of Staff, August 1965-February 1966; 
Command r of the Syro - Israeli front, March-August 1966; 
f . identified with the mod rate wing of th Ba ' th but 
lat r went over to the extremists following 2J February 
1966 coup; later implicat d in the IIatum att mpt d 
coup, dismissed from the army and imprisone d with a 
pending death sentence . 
Shakaki , Dr Abd ar -Rahman 
Syrian physician , politician and Ba ' thist; b . 192 5, 
Hama ; r . Sunni Muslim; ed . Syrian University (medicin , 
specialising in internal diseases) . 
Practised medicine in Hama and Damascus; clos e 
friend of General Ziad Hariri; Minist er of Health, SBC . 
0 . 16; f . identified with moderat e unionist elements of 
the Ba ' th. 
Shamma, Mustafa 
Syrian lawyer, politician and indep ndent unionist; 
b . 1906, Damascus; r . Sunni Muslim;* ed . Syrian University 
and University of Montpellier, France . 
Minister of Finance, SBC . os . 16, 17, 18 and 19; 
f . ldentified with moderate unionist wing of the Ba ' th . 
Sharara, Ghassan 
Lebanese 'student politicker ' , Ba ' thist; b . 192 9, 
South Lebanon' r . Shi 'i Muslim; ed . Spent six to seven 
years in Egypt, but no degree to show for it as a result 
of student ' pol iticking '. 
Involved in the Arab Student Council; on B C . os . J 
and 4; active in the Lebanese Ba ' th . 
Shayya, Jamil 
Syrian school teacher, politician and Ba ' thist; 
b . 19JO, Suweida; r . Druze. ~ 
On SRC . os . 2 , J, 4 and 6 ; SBPC . August-December 1965; 
Minister of Supply , SBC . 0 . 20 and Culture and Guidance, 
0 . 2J; f.identified with the extremist wing of Ba ' th, 
close friend of Captain Salim Hatum . Lat e r implicated 
in attempted coup of 8 September 1966, led by Hatum and 
factions previously overthrown on 2J February 1966 . 
Shehadeh, Kamal 
Syrian chemist, politician; 
Muslim . 
D puty Minister of Finance, 
Shintof , Karim 
b . 1927,- Aleppo; r . Sunni 
SBC . 0 . 22 . 
Iraqi lawyer, Ba 'thist; b . 1927, Kirkuk; r . Sunni 
Muslim; e d . Baghdad University . 
One of the original Iraqi Ba'thists of the early 
1950s; prominent in the IRC for many years; on B C . 0 . 8 ; 
f . identified with the moderate wing of Ba ' th . Confidential 
files show him as 'loose' regarding wom n. 
Shufi, I-Iammud 
Syrian school teacher, and Ba ' thist; b . 1927, Jabal 
Druz d . T achers College Damascus . * 
SRC . S cretary, 0 . 1 ' ousted from pow r by an Aflaq-
Bitar military purge , February 1964; f . identified with 
extreme 1 ft-wing socialists sympathetic to the Sa ' diyya 
wing of Ba 'th in Iraq . 
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Shukair, Amin 
Jordanian pharmaci t and Ba'thist; b . 1917 , Jordan 
( Greater Syria) ; r.Sunni Mu lim; d . Syrian Univ rsity . * 
A f oundation memb r of the Ba'th; on B C O os . 3 
and 5 . R p ort d to have 1 ft the Ba ' th , beOng now a 
weal thy pharmaci t in Jordan . 
Sh umaitilly , Abd al-Wahab 
L ban e s chool teacher, full-time party worker , 
Ba ' thist; b . 1932, Beirut; father Sh ilh _of Beirut; r . 
Sunni Muslim; ed. Lebane s University (psychology 1959 ) · 
Full-time party work r for many y ars in L e b anon on 
sal a r y o f US $300 per month ( approximately 100 US ); on 
BNC . 0 .3 ; l eft the Ba ' th in 1962 f o llowing sp l it in 
the IRC with the B C . 
Sh uman , Dr Adnan 
Syrian economist , politician and Ba tthist ; b. 1929, 
Damas c us;* r . Sunni Muslim; ed . Syrian University (law 
1 9 4 9 ) and Ohio (D . Econs . 1957 ) · 
Director of Social Affairs and Works, 1958-61; 
Di r e c t or o f Agricultural Economi c s in Ministry of 
Agriculture , 1962-63; E c onomic Adviser to Iraq J u ly 
1 963-April 1964; Economic Councillor to the Presidency 
Council April 1964-February 1966; participated with Daowc 
a nd Hammadeh in drawing up the Syrian ationalisation 
Re por t in 1964; SRC . 0 . 3; Minister of Labour and Social 
Affai r s (D eputy ) 0 . 21 and 22; f . identified with moderate 
wing of the Baith . 
~n, Samih 
Syrian lawyer , politician and SUM; b . Yabroud , 
Damascus; r . Sunni Muslum; ed . Syrian University . 
M mber of ational Assembly , UAR for Yabroud; 
i mpris oned by the Sece sionist regime for oppo ing the 
coup of 28 September 1961; Mini ter of Supply , SBC . 
0. 15; f . identified with pro- asir wing of Ba i th; resigned 
ministerial office April 1963, and forced into exile 
f ollowing the anti - a ir purge of mid-1963· 
Sufi , L ieut.-Gen . Muhammad 
Syrian army officer, politician, independent 
u ni onist; b . 1925 , Lattakia; r . Sunni Muslim;* ed . Horns 
Mili tary Academy . 
Prominent in the military coup which brought the 
Ba ' th t o power, March 1963; Minister of Defence , SBC . 
0.15; implicated in the pro- a ir attempted coup July 
1 963 , impri oned and in September sentenced to life 
in prison , but later r lea ed in June 1964 in a pro-
asir wave of ympathy . Related to Suleiman Khush throu gh 
marriag . 
Su weidan , Dr Abdul Halim 
Syrian profe sor of zoology , politician and 
ind epend nt unioni t; b . 1913, Talbi e , m. Hom ; r . Sunni 
Mu s l im . 
Vice-R ctor of the Syrian Uni er ity, 1958-61 , 
resign d following s ece . ion, September 1951; holds Chair 
o f Zo ology in Syrian Uni er ity , curr ntly; Minister of 
Agricu ltur SBC . 0 . 15 · 
Swairy , abil 
Syrian army officer, civil servant and Ba'thist; 
b . 1 930 , Damascus; r . Gr ek Orthodo r Christian; d . 
Horns Military Acad my . 
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A foundation memb r of the Ba ' th; a li utenant In 
the army during th union, 1958 -61; lat r 1 ft army 
and worked in the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 
under his brother-in-law, Mansur Atrash who held the 
portfolio in the SBC. o s .15 , 16, 17 and 18; implicat d 
in the att mpted coup of 8 September 1966; f . identified 
with th moderate wing of the Ba 'th. Currently 
' politicking ' in Beirut with Arash , Bitar , Majdalani and 
others for a comeback in Syria. 
Sweidani , Maj . - Gen . Ahmed 
Syrian army offic r, Ba ' thist; b . 1927 - 28,* Dera ' a ; 
r . Sunni Muslim; ed . Horns Military Ac ademy. 
Military Intelligence Chief, 1963-65 (July); 
prominent member of the Military Committ ee and close 
associate of Salah Jadid; demoted to Officers 
Administration by Amin Hafiz, July-F ebruary 1966; r ai sed 
to Chief of Staff following 23 February coup; SRC . 
No . 6 ; f . identified with the extremist wing of the Ba ' th . 
Tabb a , Abd ar-Rahman 
Syrian civil servant, politician and independent 
unionist ; b . 19l3 , * Damascus; r . Sunni Muslim; e d . Syrian 
University (law ) . 
Minister of Wa qfs, SBC . 0 . 16 . 
Takla, Dr Assad 
Syria n diplomat, politician and Ba'thist; b . 1926 , 
Lattrucia ; * r . Alawite; ed . postgraduate in chemical 
engineering, probably European university . 
Minister of Indu try, SBC . os . 23 and 24; f . 
i d entified with the extremists , ha ing pro-Communist 
synpathies . 
Takrjti , Gen . Hardan 
Iraqi army officer, politician and Ba 'thist; b . 1926 , * 
Takrit , near the Syrian border on the Euphrates; r . Sunni 
Muslim; ed . Baghdad Military Academy . 
Con~and of the Air force , February 1963 - March 1964; 
Minister of Defence, ov mber 1963-March 1964 and following 
the Ba ' this t coup of 17 July 1969 - ; between 196L~ -69 
I raqi amba sador to Sweden; f . seems to have been 
identified with the moderate wing of the Iraqi Ba'th altough 
he does not appear to have been a very devoted member . 
Trucri ti , Saddam 
Iraqi farmer a nd Ba'thist; b.1930,* Takrit; r . Sunni 
Muslim; ed . no tertiary education . 
A member of the IRC for many years, participated in 
the attempted as assination of President Qasim in October 
1959; on B C. 0 . 8; regarded as a dangerous enemy by 
Presid nt Arif a fter the 0 rthrow of the Ba ' th in Iraq, 
ovemb r 1963, h aving a price of ID . 2000 plac e d upon hi 
had; r . ld ntified with the moderate wing of the HaIth . 
Is a r lative of Hardan Takriti . 
Talib , Walid Abd ar-Rahman 
Syrian school tach r, politician and Ba 'thist; 
b . 1930, Harem , Idlib; r . Sunni Muslim; ed . Syrian 
Univ rSity, 'arts). 
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Deputy for Ifurem, Dec mber 1961; Minist r of Rural 
and Municipal Affai rs , SBC . os . 15, 16, Minister of 
State for Presidential Affairs, os. 18, 20 and 21 ; 
on SRC . os. 3 and 4; on the enlarged RC . August 1965-
February 1966 ; implicated in the abortiv IIatum coup 
of 8 September 1966, and forced into exile in Beirut ; 
f . id ntified with moderate and later xtremist wings 
of the Ba'th . 
Taljabini, Ali 
Syrian trade union leader, politician and Ba ' thist; 
b . 192 9 , Aleppo; r. Sunni Muslim; * ed . secondary only . 
Trade unionist since 1948, President of the 
Textile Workers Union, Aleppo 1953-59; Gen ral Secretary 
of the Federation of Trade Unions , 1954-60; Member 
of the Bureau of Arab Workers, 1956-60; M mber of th 
Municipal Council of Al ppo, 1958-59; President of the 
Road Workers Union since 1964; Minister of Labour and 
So cial Affairs, SBC . 0 . 20; Member of the NRC, August 
196 5-February 1966; was the only minister not to have 
a tertiary education in the period 1963-66; f . identified 
wi th the extremist wing of the Ba'th though to what 
extent is not clear . 
Tarbain , Dr Abd al-
Syrian agronomist, politician and Ba ' thist; * 
b . 1926, Damascus; r.Sunni Muslim; ed. University of 
Jembloux, Belgium (D . Ag . Sc . ). 
Occupied many senior posts in the Ministry of 
Agriculture; has undertaken extensive research into the 
harmful effects of parasites upon an agricultural economy; 
Minister of Supply, SBC . 0 . 16 and Agriculture , os . 16, 
17, 18, 19 and 20; has held cabinet rank longer than 
any other minister in the period, 1963-66; f.identified 
mainly with the moderate wing of the Ba'th and in 1963 
with the Chief of Staff , Ziad al-Harriri . 
Tawil, Li ut.-Col. Muhammad Rabah 
Syrian army officer, politician and Ba'thist; 
b . 192 7 , * Lattakia; r . Alawite; ed . Homs Military Acad emy . 
Member of the Ba ' th Military Tribunal; Commander 
of the Missile Corps; Commander of the Popular Resistance 
Forces after 23 February coup 1966; SRC . 0 . 6 ; finister 
of Labour and Social Affairs, SBC . os . 23 and 24 ; f . 
cl ose associate of Jadid, identified with the extremist 
wing of the Ba'th . 
Thabet, Jamil 
Syrian lawyer, politician and Ba'thist ; b . 192 6, * 
Suweida; r.Druze; ed . Syrian University . 
Minister of Labour and Social Affairs , SBC . os . 
21 and 22; f. 'dentified with the extremist (Hatum Wing) 
o f the Ba'th . 
'P f ' 
Tlas, Maj . -Gen . Mustafa 
Syrian army officer, Ba'thist; b . 1930, * D ra t a; 
r . Sunni Muslim; ed . Homs Military Acad my . 
A40 
Commander of th I-Ioms Military Garrison 1965 , 
lat r transferred to the Chief of Staff II adquarters, 
Da mascus; supported the ~~ of 23 F bruary 1966 ; in 1968 
report d to be Chief of taff of th Arm d Forces; 
on SRC . 0 . 4; f . identified with Jadid and the extremist 
wing of Ba'th in 1965 prior to th coup of 23 February 
1966 . 
Tomeh, Dr George 
Syrian diplomat , univ rsity lectur r, politician 
and Ba ' thist ; b . 1921, Damascus; r . Greek Orthodox 
Christian; ed. AUB (BA, 1941 and MA, 1944, philosophy) 
and Georgetown (Ph.D. 1951). 
Attache, London and Alternate De l e gate to U ESCO, 
1945-46; Syrian Embassy, Washington, 1 947-52 ; Alternate 
Governor of the IMF 1950; Director of the U Treaties 
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Damascus, 
1953-54; Assistant lecturer in philosophy and Assistant 
to the Dean of Arts and Sciences, AUB, 1954-56; 
Director of the Research Department, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Damascus, 19 .56-57; Consul-General in ew York, 
1957 - 58 later representing the UAR (formed F ebruary 1958 ) 
in this appointment; Minister Plenipotentiary of the 
UAR March 1961 ; Consul-General and Deputy Permanent 
Representative of Syria to U , 1961-63; Minister of 
Economy, SBC . Nos . 16, 17 and 18; lecturer in Philosophy, 
Syrian University, 1964-65 ; Syrian Permanent Representative 
to the U 1965- ; has written many books on philosophy; 
f.s eems to have identified himself with the moderate 
wing of the Ba ' th . 
Umran , Maj . -Gen. Muhammad 
Syrian army officer, politician and Ba'thist; b . 192 3, 
Lattakia; r .Alawite; ed. Homs Military Academy . 
A foundation member of the Alawite (secret) officer 
c ommittee in Cairo, 1959, with Jadid, Assad and Amir; 
Commander of 5th Armoured Brigade, orthern Sector , 
March-July 1963, and 70th Brigade, al-Kiswa (near Damascus) 
July- ovember 1963; Commander-in- Chief , Armed Forces , 
January-February 1966 ; on NRC, March 1964 - May 1964 , 
SBPC , May - December 1964, Military Committee March 1963 -
December 1964, SRC . 0 . 2; B C . 0 . 7; Deputy Prime 
Minister, SBC . 0 . 18 and Defence, 0 . 22; f.identified 
with Jadid, until overthrown by the latter in December 
1 964 in a power struggle; after a period of exile for 
almost a year he returned to support the B C in its 
struggle against the SRC, for which he was rewarded with 
the high st military office . 
Wazzan, Dr Salah 
Syrian economist, civil servant, politician and 
Ba ' thist; b.1928, * Lattakia; r . Sunni Muslim * (or Alawite). 
Minister of Agrarian Reform, SBC . 0.19 and 
Agriculture 0 . 22; f.id ntified with moderate pro-Bitar 
wing of th Ba ' th. 
A4l 
Yaghi, Ghaleh 
Leoanes lawy r and full-tim Ba ' th work r; b . 1933, 
Baalb ck; r . Shi'i Muslim; d. L ban se Un'versity . 
Com s form rich rural family, brother bing a 
L banese deputy; activ in L ban s Ba ' th until th 
split with the B C in 1962; on B C . os . 4 and 5; 
f . identified with Shumaitilly and the r gional socialist 
wing of the Lebanese Ba ' th. 
Yahya, Gen . Tahir 
Iraq army officer, politician and Ba ' thist; b . 19l5 , 
Takrit; r . Sunni Muslim; ed . Baghdad Teachers ' Training 
College and Baghdad Military Academy . 
Former teacher Mamounia School Baghdad; member of 
Nationalist Movement, 1941; Commander Armoured Cars ' 
Battalion, Palestin war 1948; member Military Court 
Habaniya 1948; member Free Officers' Group, 1958 ,later 
Director-General of Police; Chief-of-Staff , Iraqi Army, 
February- ovember 1963; Prime Minister of Iraq , ovember 
196 3 - September 1965; Deputy Prime Minister 1967, Prime 
Minister June 1967-July 1968 and acting Minister of the 
Interior , 1967-68;overthrown by the Ba ' th, which h had 
earlier deserted, 17 July 1968 . 
Yashruti, Khalid 
Lebanese engineer and Ba'thist; b . 1933, Acre; r . 
Sunni Muslim (Shazli sect); ed . AUB . 
An active member of the Lebanese Ba'th for many 
years and on the LRC; on BNC . 0.3; f.identified with 
moderate pro-Aflaq wing of the Ba ' th. 
Zaitun, Mashhur 
Syrian civil servant, politician and Ba ' thist; b . 
1932 , Sammah or Sanamein, Dera ' a; r . Greek Orthodox 
Christian; * ed . Syrian University (law, 1958) . 
Civil servant in Departments of Customs and 
Municipal and Rural Affairs until 1964; Minister of 
Information, SBC . No . 20 and Supply, 0 . 23 . 
Ziyad eh, Brig . Abdullah 
Syrian army officer, politician, independent 
unionist ; 0 . 192 5, Lattakia; r . Sunni Muslim * (or Alwaite); 
ed . Horns Military Academy and Cairo . 
Minister of Defence, SBC . os . 17 and 18; f . probably 
moderate unionist wing of the Ba'th . 
Zu ' ayyen, Dr Yusif 
Syrian osteopath, politician and Ba ' thist; b . 193l, 
Abu Kamal, Deir ez-Zor; r.Sunni Muslim; ed. Syrian 
Univ rsity (medicino ) a ndLondon (osteopathy) . 
Called back from London by Hafiz to become Minister 
of Agrarian Reform, SBC . 0 . 18, Prime Minister, os.2l, 
23, 24 - until October 1968; on SBPC, October 1964-
September 1965; SRC . Nos . 4, 6, -; member of enlarged 
I RC . August-December 1965; Ambassador designate to 
London , August 1964. At 34 years, Syria ' s youngest 
Prim Minister; f.identified with the socialist extremists 
of the Ba'th . 
f ' 
Zubi, Muhammad 
Syrian school tach r, politician and Ba ' thist; 
b . 1 9JO , * lIar m, m. Idlib; r . Sunni Muslim; d . AUB . (s c ience ). 
Minister of Information , SBC, SBC . No . 2J and 
Cu ltu re and Guidance , 0 . 24; f . id ntifi d with th 
extremist wing of the Ba ' th . 
Zuhur , Abd al -Karim 
A42 
Syrian librarian , writer , journalist, politician 
and Ba ' thist; b . 1918 , Harna ; r . Sunni Muslim ; d . Cairo 
University (philosophy and psychology ) to postgraduate 
lev 1 . 
A p rominent member of the Ba ' th for many years; 
c lose associate of Jarnil Atasi, and Sami Drubi with a 
socialis1-unionist bent; assisted Bitar in 1962 in 
al - Ba ' th newspaper writing many critical articl s 
the Ba ' th's lack of scientific socialist theory ; for 
a time Director of the Zahiriyya ational Library, 
Damasc u s ; Minister of Economy , SBC . 0 . 15; participat d 
in the Tripartite Unity Talks , Cairo , March-April 196J , 
d istinguishing himself as one of the most outspoken 
a d vo c at s of unity; later in mid-196J, left the Ba ' th 
f ollowing a purge on unionist and pro- asir elements of 
the pa r ty and country; in July 1964 named as a member 
o f t h e Pol i tical Bureau of the Arab Socialist Union 
i n Syria (cland estine) , a pro - asir organisation, but 
late r in 1964 r eported to hav e left the ASU; f .identified 
wi t h pro - as ir u nionist elements of the Ba'th . 
* Information uncertain . 
Definition : Moderate - subscribed to Arab unionist 
policies of the~-Prior to 2J February 1966 . 
Extremist - subscribed to the socialist legislation of the 
Six th BNC and subsequent SRCs . Supported SRC in the 
overthrow of the Eighth B C on 2J February 1966 . 
Sou rces : Archives Biographigue Permanentes Du Monde Arabe, 
vols . 1 and 2 . 
The Middle East 
vols . 1948 - 67 . 
(Europa, Publications , London) , 
See 'Who ' s Who in the Middle 
East ' . 
Press Reports . 
Interviews . 
Document on Party Membership Tabled at the 
Eighth ational Congress, April - May 1965 . 
Anonymous and Highly Confidential Sources . 
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